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Unbecoming Cinema explores the notion of cinema as a living, active agent, capable of 
unsettling and reconfiguring a person’s thoughts, senses and ethics. Film, according to 
David H. Fleming, is a dynamic force, arming audiences with the ability to see and make 
a difference in the world. Drawing heavily on Deleuze’s philosophical insights, as well as 
those of Guattari and Badiou, the book critically examines unsettling and taboo footage 
from suicide documentaries to art therapy films, from portrayals of mental health and autism 
to torture porn. In investigating the effect of film on the mind and body, Fleming’s shrewd 
analysis unites transgressive cinema with metaphysical concepts of the body and mind. 
David H. Fleming is assistant professor of film and media studies at the University of 
Nottingham, Ningbo, China.
Suicide. Autism. LSD. Vomit gore. You’d be forgiven for walking away from such a heady cocktail of potentially 
unbecoming topics, but you’d also be losing out. David H. Fleming may write – lucidly and intelligently – about films and 
film-makers whom many might find hard to stomach, but Unbecoming Cinema is nonetheless an essential enquiry into 
why such films get made, why some people do watch such films and – more importantly – what it is that such films do. 
For while many of the films that Fleming considers might be unbecoming of cinema in the eyes of various viewers, these 
films and film-makers are nonetheless pushing the boundaries of what it is that cinema can show and, by extension, 
what it is that cinema can make viewers think and feel – perhaps even changing how they think and feel. In this sense, 
unbecoming becomes a positive force, helping cinema to get over itself and become something exciting and new. 
At the forefront of film-philosophy and fizzing with ideas, Fleming guides us through this unbecoming cinema so that we 
might experience some (un)becomings of our own.
William Brown, University of Roehampton
In this exciting, intellectually intense and pleasantly mind-warping new book on cinematic ethics, David Fleming 
approaches films not as texts to be drily analysed, but as events to be encountered. What is at stake here is the 
shock which films are able to bring to our thought processes, their ability to shatter all that we may think we know is 
normal, so that we can look at the world afresh. This is an insightful work, philosophically informed but accessible and 
engaging, which rises up to meet key challenges of present times.
David Martin-Jones, University of Glasgow  
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How does one become conscious of oneself, of God, and of things? 
(Deleuze 1988: 28)
For both the philosopher-cum-artist Friedrich Nietzsche and the artist-cum-philosopher Antonin Artaud, thinking through, or with, stimulating works of art offered one of the few ameliorations from the smothering drudgery of so-called ‘normal’ (or normalized) 
life. The other came from the emancipatory embrace of madness, delirium and disorder. 
Imprimis, Unbecoming Cinema sets out to synthesize both, for today we arguably need 
disruptive encounters evermore, to help defamiliarize, disorganize and destabilize the systems 
that everywhere deform and distort life. Although admittedly exploring a range of mad and 
maddening films and ‘non-cinema’ (see Brown 2016; Nagib 2016) from diverse sectors, times 
and places – aimed at a broad spectrum of demographics including film festival audiences, 
art gallery visitors, YouTube viewers, ‘head audiences’ and niche ‘gore whore’ fangirls – the 
works explored throughout Unbecoming Cinema appear arranged together courtesy of a 
shared desire to construct new conceptual dimensions for thought, and think or impart 
difference. 
More specifically, the book sets out to explore, survey, map and reconnoitre a diverse 
range of ethico-political films that work to communicate1 what it is ‘we are up against’, and 
raise ethical questions about ‘how best to proceed’. Or to put it more plainly, the book dives 
into expressive screen projects that desire or aspire to make a real difference in the world, by 
plugging themselves into, and operating upon, the nerves, brains, bodies and milieus they 
encounter. Unbecoming Cinema is primarily about moving encounters, then, and is itself a 
product of these moving encounters with thinking films: of being touched by artistic bodies 
that communicate difference, or agitated to feel-think alterity. As such, we maintain that 
the ‘delirious’ (Seem 2004) ethical philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, both with and without his 
erstwhile collaborator Félix Guattari, appears best suited for approaching such forms of film; 
not only for its capacity to conceptualize becomings, events and the thinking of difference, 
but also because against any narrow conception of ivory tower intellectualism, Deleuze and 
Guattari insist that philosophy be inseparable from a lived way of life, and address itself to 
the real-world problems that confront us (otherwise it would be of absolutely no use). 
What remains true of philosophy also extends to our understanding of ethical art 
throughout this project, for this too is comprehended in terms of addressing itself to real-
world problems, or operating as a productive agent or force for change. This is to say, the 
unorthodox films of this project are not principally explored as stable texts to be laid out and 
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hermeneutically deciphered or interpreted. Rather, and contra to such negative approaches 
to media, we view these ‘unsettling’ and ‘unbecoming’ films as active agents, dynamic forces, 
machinic bodies or immanent modalities that display a positive ability to modify viewer’s 
senses and thoughts, and generate actual movements of world. The ethical or evental 
encounter stemming thereof becomes a primary focus of this book, particularly with regard 
to how such encounters potentially increase an individual or collective body’s range of 
‘affections’, their ‘power of action’, or else aid them in coming into ‘full possession of that 
power’ (see Deleuze 1992: 269).
Our opening epigraph, which appears in Deleuze’s writing on Benedict Spinoza’s Ethics, 
relates comparable notions to the formation of adequate ideas. That is, empowering forms 
of knowing that increase one’s ability to live, act and be affected. Of particular relevance 
to this project is how this three-fold question can also broadly account for the forms of 
‘philosophical’ enquiry raised by the various audio-visual projects explored throughout this 
book; or the forms of questions the films prompt their viewers to think about, or become 
conscious of, during and after the screening event. For good or bad, however, and as the 
title of the book suggests, the types of encounter explored throughout Unbecoming Cinema: 
Unsettling Encounters with Ethical Event Films are rarely customary or run-of-the-mill, and 
can be understood using their form and content to provoke and agitate their viewers. As 
such, we must here temper an early warning to our prospective readers. Note, the films 
explored hereafter undeniably encroach upon contentious, troubling, shocking, provocative, 
disgusting, transgressive and taboo topics and themes that are likely to offend or upset certain 
sensibilities. In addressing our subtitle first, readers would do well to recall that in everyday 
parlance, to feel ‘unsettled’ or suffer from ‘unsettling’ means to be disturbed by something: 
to be made to feel uneasy, anxious or worried. Being unsettled simultaneously implies a 
sense of being inconstant, though, of being altered or disrupted: like the unsettling of the 
riverbed or the ocean floor by dynamic movements of water. Many chapters in this book 
accordingly explore filmic encounters that are unsettling in both these senses of the term: 
being at once moving emotional encounters, which concomitantly disturb sedimentalized 
modes of perceiving, feeling or thinking. For across all four chapters we necessarily dive into 
the unsettling: disturbing documentaries that record and display actual suicides; disrobing 
art installations, art therapy films, and art brut videos that positively portray autism, ‘brain 
disorders’ and ‘machinic animism’; distorting drug cinemas that promote spiritual and 
physical revolt; and revolting pervert(ing) torture-porn designed to turn our stomachs and 
instil feelings of disgust. Albeit in an ethical way. 
By foregrounding the ethical potentials bound up in such encounters, Unbecoming 
Cinema necessarily finds itself allied with a tranche of recent works that appear to reject 
dipping once more into the cinematic ‘canon of joy’ (Culp 2016: 1), and instead confront 
works that patently do not leave their viewers happy, cathartically soothed, or even 
necessarily entertained. Indeed, in titles such as Mikita Brottman’s Offensive Films (2005), 
and more recently Nocolaj Lübecker’s The Feel-Bad Film (2015), we can locate scholars 
gauging the political importance of films that appear deliberately antagonistic, assaultive, 
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boring, confusing, despairing, frustrating, humiliating, irritating, irksome, misfortunate, 
sickening, traumatic or worrying. Lübecker critically foregrounds the importance of films 
by directors – such as Lars von Trier and Harmony Korine – who deliberately deploy 
negative affects to unground viewers, as a means of stimulating valuable ethico-political 
thought patterns (2015: 171). Film here surfaces a privileged medium for making us aware 
of the role non-positive feelings play in modern life, particularly by operating in a cruel 
fashion upon our bodies and minds. Accordingly, as Lübecker puts it, these feel-bad films 
help highlight ‘the Artaudian dimension of going via the body of the spectator to her 
metaphysics’, in an unpleasant operation that we know ‘the patient will survive’ (Lübecker 
2015: 169). 
Such ethical impulses and gestures might also be recognized as part of a wider reappraisal 
and critique of what, after Slavoj Žižek, we might call the political factor of enjoyment 
(2008). And in this sense Unbecoming Cinema, like these aforementioned titles, might also 
be thought in relation to a broader spread of works that include Lauren Berlant’s Cruel 
Optimism (2011), Sarah Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness (2010), Mark Fisher’s Capitalist 
Realism (2009) and the blazing political manifestoes by The Institute for Precarious 
Consciousness (2014) and The Invisible Committee (2005), which confront dead-on the 
circulation of so many negative affects, sad passions and bad feelings that increasingly 
impact life within so-many modern societies.
Because the majority of the films explored in this book are also peripheral personal-
political projects emerging from the shadowy margins of the commercial industry or the 
military-entertainment complex,2 we also often encounter emancipating experimentation 
with film form, format, content and expression, which further disturb or unsettle 
what it is we might traditionally think of as cinema, either as a mode or practice. Such 
fluid approaches are again best accommodated by Deleuze and Guattari’s immanent 
schizoanalytic paradigms, wherein any nominal notion of ‘cinema’ is recast to account 
for its contingent borderings, while recognizing it as a dynamic living assemblage caught 
cross-pollinating with other fecund bodies, forces and ‘desiring machines’, which ignite 
ongoing processes of de- and reterritorialization, qua becoming different. In the same vein, 
recent standout ‘intermedia’, ‘transmedia’ and media-archaeology projects such as Sean 
Cubitt’s The Cinema Effect (2004), Thomas Elsaesser’s ‘The  New Film  History as  Media 
Archaeology’ (2004), Pavle Levi’s Cinema By Other Means (2012), Jefferey Geiger and 
Karin Littau’s edited collection on Cinematicity (2013) as well as Steven Shaviro’s work 
on ‘Post-cinematic affect’ (2010) display fruitful parallels with the unsettled forms of film 
we engage with throughout this project. For in all these what we often encounter is the 
familiar image of mainstream cinema in its absence, or difference. That is, in unfamiliar 
or hybrid forms that appear to ‘do’ film differently, and as such contingently interfere with 
any stable notions we might have of a particular genre, its viewing practices, or even what 
we should experience with cinema. Accordingly, many of the films explored henceforth 
can be understood as making palpable Elsaesser’s conceptualization of the cinema as a 
‘philosophical perpetuum mobile’ (Elsaesser 2008: 239); a notion that forces us to restlessly 
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interrogate the hyper-plastic medium cinema always-already is, and pay heed to how it 
becomes modified, deformed and detoured in its distorting and perverting encounters 
with its ‘outside’ (changing industries, technologies, politics, economics, social practices, 
and the nature of the real). 
We can locate a geopolitical iteration of this self-same deterritorializing impulse in 
Victor Fan’s Cinema Approaching Reality (2015). Characteristically, Fan there invites 
readers to reinterrogate and re-perceive ‘traditional’ occidental film theory’s thinking of 
the aporia between art and the real; first by considering it from the perspective of its 
oriental ‘outside’, and then by passing these ontological and epistemological considerations 
through a defamiliarizing eastern prism. With this reorienting gesture, the cinematic 
writing of philosophers of film such as André Bazin and Deleuze are literally and 
metaphorically shanghaied,3 becoming estranged and made alien as they are re-read and 
re-imagined through the lenses of Chinese critical theory and Buddhist thought. At the 
very end of his mind-bending book-length enquiry, Fan finally unbuttons Bazin’s famous 
ontological question of ‘What is cinema?’ by inviting readers to ponder instead the more 
enigmatic Zen-like problem of: ‘What is not cinema?’ (Fan 2015: 222). The making 
strange of the cinema bound up in this gesture ethically and politically resonates with our 
investigation into what we are conceptually calling ‘unbecoming’ cinema here, and which 
at this stage I must confess to not being the sole offender in fashioning. Indeed, an earlier 
iteration of ‘unbecoming cinema’ was forwarded by William Brown and I in our reading 
of Gaspar Noé’s Enter the Void (2009), which was published in 2015 in Film-Philosophy 
as ‘Voiding cinema: Subjectivity beside itself, or unbecoming cinema in Enter the Void’. 
There, we highlighted the extent to which digital imaging technologies ostensibly allowed 
the cinema as we knew it to stand outside and beside itself – in a manner metonymically 
mirrored by the dying and reborn character Oscar (Nathaniel Brown) within the narrative – 
so that the film and viewer could better ponder or prehend the non-fixity of being 
alongside notions of death and re-birth relevant to cinema’s digital becomings (Brown 
and Fleming 2015).
Brown’s subsequent writing on Supercinema and ‘non-cinema’ has since served to 
bifurcate or vacillate these earlier discussions, branching them off in two distinct yet 
complimentary directions. In Supercinema (2015), for example, Brown explores Hollywood 
blockbuster manifestations of digital cinematic expression, while foregrounding the novel 
becomings and new ontologies opened up by the wider digital event. Echoing Jonathan 
Beller (2006), Brown remains aware that these particular manifestations of cinema are 
ideologically co-extensive and synonymous with capitalism. Thus, if in this project Brown 
shows that there can be philosophical profundity in even ‘vapid’ Hollywood blockbusters, 
in his later work he encourages us to see that there is likewise philosophical value ‘in even 
the “worst” films in the world’ (Brown forthcoming). Indeed, in ‘Non-cinema: Digital, 
ethics, multitude’, which he expands in his forthcoming monograph of the same title, Brown 
takes us down an altogether different ethical path, away from the centres of commercial 
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film-making, towards the digitally enabled democratic peripheries and margins – and the 
weedy peripheries within those margins – of the lo-fi non-commercial underbelly of global 
digital screen culture. In his search for alternative (Dusselean) ‘barbarian’ philosophies and 
non-cinema expressions, which become reminiscent of François Laruelle’s ‘non-philosophy’ 
and ‘non-photography’ models (2011, 2012),4 Brown investigates the work of amateur/
alternative USA directors such as Giuseppe Andrews, that find clear parallels with the sick 
and perverse independent films we explore in chapter four here. Certainly, the ‘Vomit Gore’ 
work of Lucifer Valentine, like the marginal bad taste work of Andrews and certain so-
called ‘mumblecore’ directors, is celebrated for its clear sense of ‘thinking outside the box 
office’ and for its truly thought-provoking and unbecoming nature (more on which later). 
Of course, these off course and outlandish forays into the offensive and trashy margins also 
recall an already long line of critical and philosophical engagements with alternative screen 
cultures, tastes, practices and politico-aesthetics, which include, but are not limited to, 
realizations and/or conceptualizations of a ‘counter-cinema’ (Wollen), ‘imperfect-cinema’ 
(Garcia Espinosa), ‘third cinema’ (Solanis and Getino), ‘amateur cinema’ (Zimmerman) or 
‘bad cinema’ (Sconce) (see Brown 2016: 116). 
Perhaps demonstrating the timely nature of such enquiries, in the very same edition 
of Film-Philosophy that Brown’s introduction is published in, we can also discover Lúcia 
Nagib’s own slightly different take on what ‘non-cinema’ means today. Nagib’s notion of 
non-cinema is more precisely informed by her critical engagement with Jean-François 
Lyotard’s concept of ‘acinema’, André Bazin’s description of the ‘impure cinema’, and Alain 
Badiou’s theorization of the parasitic art’s bastard ‘inaesthetics’. 
As this latter critical coordinate also becomes significant for our larger investigation, 
we  might minimally unpack it a little before proceeding. Worth recalling here is that 
throughout his writing Badiou maintains that philosophy and cinema are both impure arts 
and practices, which reveal a dissimilar and asymmetrical relationship with regard to how 
they ‘think’ (or provoke thinking). On the one hand, an art form like cinema offers itself up 
as one of the fundamental ‘conditions’ for philosophy, which is itself a ‘truthless’ medium 
that needs the cinema to vampirically feed upon and ‘re-think’ (cinema as an object for 
philosophy). On the other hand, the cinema is an art form that functions perfectly well 
without philosophy. It is this realization that ultimately leads Badiou to coin his neologistic 
term ‘inaesthetics’, which is designed to draw a distinction between the way in which art 
thinks and the manner in which philosophy re-thinks art (qua aesthetics). Or, as Badiou 
renders it in the preface to his Handbook of Inaesthetics (2005): 
By ‘inaesthetics’ I understand a relation of philosophy to art that, maintaining that art 
is itself a producer of truths, makes no claim to turn art into an object for philosophy. 
Against aesthetic speculation, inaesthetics describes the strictly intraphilosophical effects 
produced by the independent existence of some works of art.
(Badiou 2005: i)
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Badiou also understands the cinema to be an impure art at its core, outlining it as a 
parasitical art form that synthesizes and democratizes all the other arts, without for all that 
actually presenting them. Picking up on such ideas witnesses scholars such as Brown and 
Nagib expanding on the important role that ‘non-cinematic’ forces (from artistic, political 
and technological fields) have upon the changing nature of film (and by extension the real). 
Together, such forays into the realms of the non-philosophical and the non-cinematic 
become indicative of a larger swell of titles that increasingly demand that those who 
study film and/or philosophy ‘zoom out’, as such, and pay heed to the broader landscape, 
or historical events, while recognizing the complex entanglements and intermingling of 
other technologies, practices, institutions, movements, artworks, thoughts and non-human 
forces, actors and factors that directly or indirectly interfere with and impact how and what 
philosophy and film can think today. In the wake of such ideas, Unbecoming Cinema remains 
politically alert to the in-forming historical, artistic and non-cinematic formations that 
impact the unsettling of cinema as a heteroclite and dynamic (inter)medium or apparatus, 
with several chapters touching upon how film – as an audio-visual mode and social practice – 
becomes and unbecomes, or reterritorializes and deterritorializes, as it forges transforming 
articulations with its outside. 
Here, the unsettling and emancipatory drives reified by the form and expression of many of 
the films necessarily dovetail into our notion of ‘unbecoming cinema’, which is reshaped here 
to be more than just another polysemous portmanteau tactically deployed to defamiliarize 
or disturb our habitual thinking of the cinema as a technosocial medium and practice. To 
spell it out, beyond highlighting how film becomes and unbecomes as it makes assemblages 
with other bodies and forces (as the second half of the book makes abundantly clear), the 
specific notion of an unbecoming cinema mobilized here also performs a spiralling return 
to reconnect us to notions of disturbing and unsettling films – particularly with regard to 
our encounters with taboo transgressing drug films and Vomit Gore BDSM5 horror porn 
that often stand accused of being ‘unbecoming’ in the more vernacular sense of the term: 
being deemed too disturbing, disgusting, unseemly, immoral, pretentious, unflattering or 
unpalatable for conservative tastes. As we will soon discover, though, these choices are often 
adopted as part of a broader tactic to help promote the ethical perception of alternative 
conceptual dimensions, and provoke the thinking of difference. 
Thinking Ethically with Films (and Deleuze)
Of late, many have commented that the study of film, and in particular ‘film-philosophy’ – 
which constitutes a host of practices that David Martin-Jones broadly defines as being 
concerned with ‘how films philosophise’ or ‘do philosophy’ (2016a: 6) – has undergone 
something of an ‘ethical turn’ (see e.g. Nagib 2011: 10, Choi and Frey 2014: 1, Sinnerbrink 
2016: 5). Certainly, if one were to construct an extensive catalogue of recent titles that contain 
a conjugated nominal clustering of ‘film/cinema’ and/as ‘ethics’, it would easily plug several 
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pages, even if printed in size ten font. A by no means exhaustive smattering of book-length 
specimens in this grain would have to contain stand-out monographs such as Lisa Downing 
and Libby Saxton’s Film and Ethics (2010), Lúcia Nagib’s World Cinema and the Ethics of 
Realism (2011), Joseph Kupfer’s Feminist Ethics in Film (2012), David Leiwei Li’s Economy 
Emotion and Ethics in Chinese Cinema (2016), Robert Sinnerbrink’s Cinematic Ethics (2016) 
and the far-reaching edited collections such as Ward E. Jones and Samantha Vice’s Ethics 
at The Cinema (2011), Jacqui Miller’s Film and Ethics (2013) and Jinhee Choi and Mattias 
Frey’s Cine-Ethics (2014). Collectively, if not individually, this expanding cluster of titles 
draw on a diverse range of movies plucked from the ‘polycentric’ ‘world of cinemas’ (see 
Nagib 2011: 1; Martin-Jones 2016b: 69), while putting them into productive dialogue with 
a legion of eminent thinkers and philosophers such as Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Lévinas, 
Laura Mulvey, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jacques Ranciére, Stanley Cavell, André 
Bazin, Enrique Dussel and Alain Badiou, to name just a few. 
To speak generally, we might note that this growing field characteristically betrays 
a collective movement away from any quest for grand unifying theories, and instead, to 
hijack Choi and Frey’s observations, discloses a preference for ‘singularity over universality, 
affectivity over rationality, and ethics of the particular over ethics of moral imperatives’ 
(2014: 2). Nonetheless, if we were to try to pick a guiding line through this ever-expanding 
labyrinth, we might note how much of this scholarship places emphasis on the way in which 
films specifically affect their viewers, while allowing them to emote and evaluate, relate to 
and empathize with others, or else gain new perspectives and understandings upon pressing 
real-world issues. Also common to many of these enquiries is their taking cognizance of 
a complex entanglement and immingling of politics, aesthetics and ethics bound up in in 
our reception and understanding of film: as text, praxis, politico-economic product or as 
a social practice. To channel Sinnerbrink’s recent summation of the turf, in order to fully 
appreciate cinema as a ‘medium of ethical experience’ (2016: x), these studies variously pay 
heed to three separate, yet interconnected, levels or dimensions that we can adumbrate here 
as the ethics within cinematic representations, the ethics of cinematic representation and the 
ethics and politics of cinema as a symptomatic expression of broader cultural-historical or 
ideological perspectives. Towards the end of his book, Sinnerbrink also points forward to 
an important fourth dimension that he sees as being specifically linked to ‘how’ it is films do 
what they do when they express or evoke ethical experiences in their viewers. 
In recognizing the importance of all these dimensions, Unbecoming Cinema takes time 
in each and every chapter to explore the intersections of context, politics, aesthetics and 
form with regard to audio-visual expression and evocations of film-thinking, and how 
these different dimensions help create or configure ‘a particular philosophical view’ (Kupfer 
2012: 1), or else allow a film and its viewer to ‘do’ ethics (Downing and Saxton 2010: 3; 
Sinnerbrink 2016: xi). Unbecoming Cinema also shares with many of these existing enquiries 
an understanding of film as an important and prioritized site/sight of ‘ethico-political’ 
thinking or thought. In working to unpack this concept somewhat, though, we might first 
take pause to reflect on the meanings of each of these terms, as well as the role of the hyphen 
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in inter-connecting ethics and politics under the canopy of film aesthetics (or ‘inaesthetics’). 
As a starting point, we might return to Downing and Saxton’s assertion that while ethics 
and politics always remain ‘irreducible to one another’, consideration of cinema makes us 
intensely aware of how the two terms are ‘mutually implicated and enabling’ (2010: 11). 
Accordingly, for Downing and Saxton, cinema makes tangible the Levinasian notion that 
‘ethics is an optics through which we habitually view and conceptualize [the world]’ (2010: 
2). Echoes of D.N. Rodowick’s assertion here too, that all aesthetic questions of medium 
specificity eventually ‘turn into ethical questions’ (Rodowick 2007: 73). Of course, in the 
broader context of the academy’s so-called ‘affective turn’, many scholars conscious of the 
film-optics as ethics position take pains to account for the embodied nature of film viewing. 
Vivian Sobchack’s Carnal Thoughts (2004), to take but one example, remains a landmark 
in this field, augustly foregrounding the extent to which film aesthetics materially impact 
the viewer’s sensorium, by eliciting feeling and emotional responses as the human body 
and ‘the film’s body’ become experientially enfolded during the act of screening. In her 
explication of such experiences and emotional reactions, Sobchack demonstrates how, 
aesthetics as ethics ultimately emerges ‘first and corporeally as sense-ability and response-
ability’ (2004: 310). 
The aforementioned explosion of works on ethics and film no doubt also overlap with 
another fanning spread of titles fashioned under the ‘Deleuzian’ Film Studies banner. At 
the time of writing, the website Deleuzecinema.com reliably informs its users that there 
are between twenty to thirty monographs penned in this particular film-philosophy style, 
not to mention the ever-growing catalogue of edited collections, special journal issues, 
articles, book chapters and talks that collectively institute this sprawling rhizomatic 
field. Of course, it could be argued that the turn to Deleuze is in and of itself simply 
symptomatic of film-philosophy’s wider ethical (and affective) turn: if not the reverse. For 
sure, the conflation of Deleuze’s thought models (both with and without Guattari) with 
ethics boasts a well-furnished history. We might recall that in the preface to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s first co-authored collaboration, Michel Foucault notes: ‘I would say that Anti-
Oedipus (may the authors forgive me) is a book of ethics’ (2004a: xv). Ronald Bogue goes 
further still, suggesting that in a sense, ‘all of Deleuze’s work is concerned with ethics, 
in that ethical principles inform his basic conception of thought and what it means to 
think’ (Bogue 2012: 7). Or as D.N. Rodowick renders it, with regard to Deleuze’s thought 
models more broadly, ‘the fundamental ethical choice is to believe in this world and 
its powers of transformation’ (Rodowick 2009: 99). It is precisely for such reasons that 
many, such as J.H. Müller and William Brown, discuss Deleuzian thought in terms of 
being a ‘difference machine’ (see Brown 2015: 4), or else (in my own preferred variant) a 
‘difference engine’.
It is no secret here that Deleuze (and Guattari) took inspiration from Nietzsche, picking 
up his arrows and furthering his conviction that truly ethical ‘thought is creation, not will 
to truth’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 54). At its heart, then, a Deleuzian ethics is associated 
with an immanent political search for a ‘new health’, which often only arrives alongside a new 
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‘art’ or ‘style’ of thinking/living. Deleuze famously earmarked the cinema as a particularly 
privileged site/sight for achieving this, not only because cinema’s psychomechanics ‘makes 
thought immanent to the image’ (168), but as Bogue elucidates, because ‘learning to think 
otherwise is a manner of learning to see in a new way’ (Bogue 2012: 4). Accordingly, for 
many Deleuzian scholars, the two Cinema books are best understood – like Deleuze’s 
other forays into painting, literature, architecture and music – as ethical exercises that are 
principally concerned with the alternative ‘ways of being that art provokes in us’ (Rodowick 
2009: 99; see also Bogue 2009, 2012). In a chapter in Cinema 2 entitled ‘Thought and cinema’ 
Deleuze posits that because cinema literally puts movement into the image, it should be 
understood as a transversal spiritual automaton that is capable of engineering a shock to 
thought by ‘communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system 
directly’ (Deleuze 2005b: 151). 
Let us recall here that Deleuze’s original models of cinematic thinking were based 
upon his Spinozian (immanent) and Bergsonian (temporal) take on the medium, which 
demanded we first believe in this world, and then make ourselves open to becoming with 
it (Rodowick 2009: 100). Deleuze’s models of cinematic thinking were also mapped over 
two distinct historical moments (predominantly effecting Europe and the United States) 
that nurtured a shift from a classical pre-war modality (Cinema 1’s movement-image) to a 
modernist post-war one (Cinema 2’s time-image). In Rodowick’s reading of Deleuze’s two 
Cinema books, these distinct regimes are described offering viewers different ethical paths 
across the plane of immanence (2009: 109). In the first instance, the movement-image, as 
it was expressed through the work of directors such as Sergei Eisenstein and D.W. Griffith, 
made a belief in the possible transformation of the world tangible. In difference to these, 
the post-war time-image shaped by modernist directors such as Orson Welles and Jean-Luc 
Godard appeared to disclose an alternative
intuition of an interior, deeper world, ‘before man,’ as it were, produced from a shock to 
thought or by thought’s confrontation with what is unthinkable. This is a confrontation 
with a time that is not that of Being, identity, or teleology, but rather, an anticipatory time – 
of contingency, the purely conditional, the nondetermined or not yet.
(Rodowick 2009: 109)
To make a parenthetical comment on such issues here, it is interesting to note that several 
chapters in Annie van den Oever’s recent edited collection on Viktor Shklovsky’s notion of 
ostranenie (variously translated as ‘making strange’, ‘deautomatizing’ or ‘defamiliarizing’) 
make overt links to Deleuze’s film-thinking models. In a section revisiting cognitive and 
evolutionary-cognitive perspectives, for example, Làzló Tarnay notes significant overlaps 
between Deleuze’s concept of ‘deterritorialization’ and Shklovsky’s notion of ‘defamiliarization’. 
There, Deleuze’s Bergsonian view that ‘the radically new, a radically new experience, can 
only come through the senses and not through some rearrangement of the already known’ 
finds significant resonances with Shklovsky’s formalist view of art’s defamiliarizing cognitive 
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potentialities (2010: 155). Crucial to both models, Tarnay maintains, ‘is that deautomatizing 
perception is tantamount to constituting a challenge to the intellect which “normally” can 
only classify’ (2010: 147). In another chapter Miklós Kiss harnesses Godard’s Pierrot le 
Fou (1965) to help further Shklovsky’s idea that the main ‘purpose of art is to impart the 
sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known’ (2010: 165). Kiss thus 
queries how Godard’s film disrupts our habitual cognitive modes of perceiving and knowing 
in both a ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ manner. By so doing, his exploration forges significant 
parallels with Deleuze’s earlier discussions of Godard’s cinema as ‘a pedagogy of the image’ 
(2005a: 14) and his outline more generally of a deterritorializing ‘Godardian pedagogy’ 
(2005b: 258). 
Deleuze essentially understands Godard’s films inviting audiences to confront the 
‘intolerable or the unbearable’, the unknown or the unthought, in an artistic manner that 
forces us to ‘forget our own logic and retinal habits’ (2004b: 18). Bogue accordingly employs 
Deleuze’s pedagogical views to highlight the ethical dimensions and nature of the filmic 
encounter, wherein avant-garde ethico-politics are deployed to teach viewers ‘to stop seeing 
and hearing the clichés that clutter the world and to see and hear the new that is already 
there’ (2012: 4). Bogue elsewhere clarifies that such disjunctive artistic encounters spawn 
‘genuine thought’ courtesy of ‘the disruption of ordinary habits and notions’ (2004: 333). 
Consequently, an encounter with Godard’s pedagogical cinema forces us to ‘undergo the 
disorienting jolt of something new, different, truly other, and then to explicate those signs, 
to unfold the differences they enfold’ (Bogue 2004: 341). 
From this vantage we are now able to recast Deleuze’s models of creativity in an ethico-
aesthetic light, and in turn re-perceive how many existing titles that explore, expand, 
adapt or detour Deleuze’s take on cinematic-thinking are also in principle exercises in 
film and/as ethics. Especially those that highlight the different attitudes bound up with 
the psychomechanical thinking of different image forms. In Deleuze, Cinema and National 
Identity (2006) and Deleuze and World Cinemas (2011), for example, David Martin-
Jones investigates the causes and effect of different ethical and pedagogical forms of film 
thinking in cinemas emanating from times and places above and beyond those of Deleuze’s 
Cinema books. In the former work, he foregrounds how discontinuous or disjunctive 
historical moments – such as the build up to the 1997 handover of Hong Kong or the post-
economic boom period in Japan – frequently bear witness to increased experimentation 
and hybridization of movement- and time-image forms of cinematic thought. Apropos of 
significant historical disturbances and sociopolitical unsettlings, different film-makers and 
national cinemas are observed to creatively toy with alternative ethico-political modes of 
film thinking as previously stable notions of national identity (and history) come into crisis. 
In Patricia Pisters’s The Neuro-Image (2012), to take another noteworthy masterwork from 
the field, readers and viewers are confronted with newly emerging image forms that expose 
an entirely different ethical path across the plane of immanence. Following Deleuze and 
Bergson, if the movement-image is primarily concerned with action that takes place in the 
present, and the time-image exposes a second synthesis of time wherein the past surges 
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forth into the present, in modern films such as The Butterfly Effect (Eric Bress and J. Mackye 
Gruber, 2004) Pisters observes a new image modality emerging. These ‘neuro-images’, as 
she calls them, emerge entangled with our modern screen cultures and modulating digital 
artworks (and networks), and appear to think and express an alternative ‘third synthesis’ of 
time (2012: 23). What is most unusual about these novel time-image forms, Pisters argues, is 
that they appear to reach backwards to touch us from the untimely time of the future (2012: 
138ff). Thus, and to momentarily channel Bogue as our guide again, we might state that in 
these creative readings of newly emerging time-image forms (and in an ethical act of mise 
en abyme with the very screen-images she describes), Pisters ludically confronts her readers 
with the shock of having to think something new, by first exposing them to that which ‘is 
not orthodox but paradoxical, and hence its sense seems nonsense, not good sense’ (Bogue 
2004: 333). 
More recently, Nadine Boljkovac’s Untimely Affects (2015) continues to provoke readers 
to ethically confront the unthought that precedes thought via Deleuze’s philosophical 
writing. While Boljkovac’s ideas and concepts clearly resonate with Pisters (2012: 147–148) 
and Brown’s (2015: 115–118) earlier writing on Resnais, this mind-bending body-conscious 
project serves to further swell the ever-expanding ‘bastard line’ (see Massumi in Deleuze 
2005a: ix) of Deleuze-inspired ethico-political film-philosophy, with a flair and style 
reminiscent of previously striking ‘personal’ projects such as Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic 
Body (1993), Laura Marks’ The Skin of the Film (2000), Anna Powell’s Deleuze, Altered States 
and Film (2007) and Patricia MacCormack’s Cinesexcuality (2008), to name check but a few 
that we will return to throughout Unbecoming Cinema (on account of their shared Deleuzian 
sense and sensibility that there is always a ‘fundamental affinity between the work of art and 
the act of resistance’: Boljkovac 2015: 15).
Arriving here, and before moving on, it becomes helpful to briefly disentangle our 
working notion of cinematic creativity from the ethico-politics of the works we will be 
exploring hereafter. Indeed, it is important to recall that creativity (and deterritorialization) 
in and of itself does not a Deleuzian cine-ethics make. And although we will strive to 
make this point clearer within the space of each chapter, it is beneficial to return here 
to Joseph Barker’s take on Deleuze’s film ethics, where contrary to ‘the standard view’, 
he teases out the prioritization of ‘ethics over creativity’ in Deleuze’s cinematic writing. 
Barker demonstrates that to be truly ethical in a Deleuzian sense demands film-makers 
create images that make felt the complex inter-relationship between thought, the body 
and the ‘intolerable’ (2014: 122). Integrating statements from Deleuze’s Dialogues (2006) 
with Claire Parnet, Barker further clarifies that we should not here mistake a Deleuzian 
ethics as simply ‘speaking for the unhappy, speaking in the name of victim, of the tortured 
and oppressed’, but rather ‘of giving voice to unlivable spaces, of which the brain is most 
intimate with thought’ (2014: 131). This is to say that, for Deleuze, ‘the creation of new 
images is necessary only in order to force thought into a vision of the intolerability of the 
world, an intolerability that is continually arising anew and thus continually demands new 
vision’ (Barker 2014: 122). 
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Throughout Unbecoming Cinema as we explore cinemas about suicide, madness, spiritual 
revolt and revolting perversions we will engage with artworks and art forms that expressly 
foreground or make palpable a deep malaise, or that which is truly intolerable, and by so 
doing unleash or untether ethico-political images that ‘force thought to think its constant 
imposition of deadly boundaries upon bodies, rather than being produced merely for the 
sake of creation’ (see Barker 2014: 123). In such manner, this book also differs from many 
of the existing (Deleuzian and non-Deleuzian) works on cinema and/as ethics, by uniquely 
exploring works that put into question the current state of thought, while setting into motion 
new thoughts, which make thinking itself grope towards that which has not yet been thought, 
or else introduce untimely truths about what is intolerable in the world. In so doing, we 
necessarily explore voices and artworks from the margins and peripheries which reach out to 
their viewers’ nervous systems in order that they might touch them, impress them, come into 
consciousness with them, in the hope of making them feel and think differently, or otherwise, 
and increasing their powers to act and interact. Or again, and to momentarily purloin the 
powerful words of the Argentine-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel, Unbecoming Cinema 
embraces and harnesses the electricity and power of minor ethico-political voices from the 
wilderness that appear to express or be ‘grounded in an avowed affirmation of life in the face 
of the collective murder and suicide that humanity is headed toward if it does not change the 
direction of its irrational behaviour’ (Dussel 2013: xv).
Thinking Ethically with Deleuze (and Film)
As is now hopefully becoming clear, for Deleuze, the mind’s capacity for thought is directly 
related to the body’s ability to act and interact with (or affect and be affected by) its 
surrounding environment. Following Spinoza, he outlines three primitive affects that entail 
profound consequences for all human thought and action: desire, joy and sadness. At its 
simplest, this trident ‘practical philosophy’ amounts to a love of freedom, the joyous 
denouncement of death worship, sad passions and ‘all that separates us from life, all these 
transcendent values that are turned against life, these values that are tied to the conditions 
and illusions of consciousness’ (Deleuze 1988: 26). Reflecting Spinoza, Deleuze maintains 
that what most often divides us from living life to the fullest are the passions and actions that 
arrive courtesy of a negative encounter with ‘the outside’, qua the ‘lines’ that serve to 
territorialize and border us. In outlining these, Deleuze and Guattari necessarily take up a 
non-normative notion of identity and politics that is not easily mapped onto ‘the most 
enduring fictions of Western political thought’ or discourse (Patton 2000: 2). Instead, they 
adopt non-subjectivist terms to describe processes of transformation within a transcendent 
field of force relations, which amounts to discussing societies in terms of an abstract yet 
literal assemblage of different ‘desiring-machines’: such as language-machines, social-
machines, economic-machines, judicial-machines, education-machines, entertainment-
machines, etc., etc., etc. 
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Within these complex and dynamic confederate systems, individuals appear cut up and 
divided into three broad bundles of ‘lines, meridians, geodesics, tropics and zones’, with 
each of these being multiple and modular in nature, and moving ‘to different beats’ and 
rhythmic vibrations (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 223). The first line formulates the ‘molar 
line’, or the hard segmental line that vertically frames individuals into distinct social and 
political groups, cutting them up and categorizing them under various stratifications and 
appellations (such as French, white, male, cisgender, philosopher and smoker). This line is 
associated with the (re)production or maintenance of stratified molar identities and moral 
systems. The second line becomes the ‘molecular line’, wherein small or miniscule changes 
take place that do not necessarily challenge the overall structure, or an individual’s stratified 
subjectivity. The final line does challenge the overall structure, however, being recognized 
as the ‘nomad line’, or line of flight, which amounts to a radical (and at times dangerous) 
horizontal pathway that takes off from the molecular line, fully breaking with the molar 
structure, and drawing bodies into new and unknown territories.
Familiarity with these models can help us to understand how many of the films and videos 
explored throughout this project work to engineer an encounter with difference, or open up 
perception or thinking to alterity. For here, human and artistic bodies, qualities, powers, 
and forces encounter one another as desiring-machines that move into transformative 
composition with each other, mingling and modifying each other, so that film, as a machinic 
force, becomes capable of scrambling the thoughts and beliefs of those it encounters: as it 
introduces or inculcates new or alternative modes of thinking and acting. Arriving here, 
it appears seemly to also enjoinder yet another warning to our potential readers regarding 
an associated playful perversion and distortion of language (and meanings) they will 
necessarily encounter in the following pages on account of such forces. Indeed, in the 
attempt to engage with dynamic audio-visual artworks that deploy their form and content 
to express alterity, or communicate unfamiliar feelings directly to the viewers’ body, nerves 
and guts, we place a heavy burden on the resources of critical language. In the first place, 
some might already have anticipated that the expressive function of representational and 
symbolic language (as critical language-machine) is destined to be pushed and stretched 
to its limits by articulating itself with experimental artworks, especially those designed to 
ignite or impart the thinking of difference. For them, it will come as little surprise that 
several chapters occasionally find language taking (philosophical) sustenance and flight 
from its encounter with these unbecoming and unsettling films, so that words too begin to 
stutter, stammer, stim and operate artistically, or differently. Such consequences will likely be 
familiar to readers of contemporary film-philosophy, which regularly harnesses and detours 
philosophical concepts and discourses to better express how it is that moving filmic images 
provoke intensive and untimely sensations, the unthought or the becomings of thought, 
while opening up new dimensions and spaces of possibility, or else challenging viewers 
to feel or act non-habitually. As already intimated, Deleuze’s materialist work on cinema 
becomes particularly instructive here, especially with regard to his detailed investigation 
into the ways cinema puts movement into the image and the mind. 
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Of particular importance to us here is the extent to which Deleuze opts to treat film-
makers as he would philosophical authors, and how he describes cinema as a scientific/
artistic medium that resonates with philosophical ideas and notions (see Rodowick 1997: 
xiv). What is more, on account of cinema’s dynamic movements, and the movements of 
thought that this stimulates or begets, Deleuze also maintains that one naturally moves 
from cinema to philosophy, and back again from philosophy to cinema (Deleuze 2000: 366). 
Subscribing to similar beliefs, Unbecoming Cinema openly explores a broad selection of film 
and video that manifestly needles us to move backwards and forwards between philosophy 
and film, film and philosophy, and to think differently or ‘eventally’ about important life and 
death matters. 
In What is Philosophy? (2011) Deleuze and Guattari draw out yet more pertinent parallels 
that link together the philosopher and the artist (cinematic or otherwise). In the first instance, 
both are identified as experimental creatives, whose inventive and intensive works promote 
new possibilities, or inculcate fresh modes of thinking and acting. The philosopher’s task is 
to fashion new concepts, they demonstrate, while the artist’s is to generate novel bundles 
of sensation (affects and percepts). Of particular value to this project is the extent to which 
both art and philosophy are recognized as being primarily concerned with movements, 
or looking past what things are to how they become. Accordingly, Deleuze and Guattari 
describe philosophical and artistic thinking as particular forms of experimentation; with 
thought as experiment being linked to the (ap)prehension of something that is the process 
of becoming, which entails recognizing how whatever ‘is in the process of coming about 
is no more what ends than what begins’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 111). The artist and 
philosopher’s job is ultimately to wrestle thought into the middle of things, of life, and make 
it known about, or felt. Thinking is here literally doing something, then, whether it be in the 
form of coaxing, creating, tinkering, arranging, modifying or shaping. Or stated differently, 
thinking becomes the attempt to actualize ‘that which is in the process of coming about – 
the new, remarkable, and interesting that replace the appearance of truth and are more 
demanding than it is’ (111). For the experimental artist, therefore, to think and know one’s 
world is to intervene in it and change it, to sense and partake in events. To at once unconceal 
or make tangible the invisible forces that deform and deny life, and at the same moment 
create new paths, new possibilities and new worlds. 
Although philosophers and artists are destined to work within adjacent creative 
territories and upon different ‘planes of consistency’, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate 
how their works can intersect and interfere with each other, either by speaking directly to 
one other, by expressing comparable notions or by harmonizing into a joint refrain. As we 
will shortly discover, this is especially true when art and philosophy become entangled in 
the dynamic movements of the same pure event. Indeed, from chapter to chapter we will 
foreground the affects and effects of controversial, provocative and outlandish projects that 
strive to communicate or stimulate new patterns of thought, feeling and/or perception in 
those they encounter and apprehend. That is, we explore machinic films that operate or 
perform as immanent ‘difference engines’, attempting to increase the powers of the bodies 
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they articulate with both during and after the event of screening. From such a vantage, the 
only way to evaluate an encounter comes to be in terms of whether one’s capacity to act or 
be affected is increased or decreased: the former being recognized as a good encounter that 
increases the ‘will to power’ of those involved, and the latter as a bad or disadvantageous 
encounter, which negatively impacts or decreases one’s ability to live and act.6 
Here, we necessarily follow Deleuze’s ethical method of explanation by immanent modes of 
existence, which amongst other things, and against negative models of social contracts, Laws 
and transcendent Judgments, frames life in terms of ongoing experimentation and creation 
(Deleuze 1992: 269). But not, as Deleuze and Guattari forewarn us, in a manner that would 
risk blowing ‘apart the strata without taking precautions’, or bring about a catastrophic 
collapse by throwing them ‘into demented suicidal collapse’, or opening up dangerous forms 
of ‘black hole’ becoming (or terminal unbecoming) (2004b: 178). Instead, Deleuze and 
Guattari advocate a careful art of life, wherein one should lodge themselves within the strata 
whilst keeping open ‘a small plot of new land’ to move into (178). Throughout Unbecoming 
Cinema we will return time and again to emancipatory examples of film-makers that deploy 
blocks of sensation and fashion bundles of affect to elevate their artistic expressions into an 
intensive force and material body that allows viewers to think, feel and perceive differently, 
while signposting new paths and zones of action and becoming. 
By opting to structure his own Cinema project (Cinema 1: the movement-image [1983] 
and Cinema 2: the time-image [1985]) around the catastrophic event of the Second World 
War, Deleuze specifically explored how films thought – and invited viewers to think – a 
different image of time and temporality before and after the war. There, film images are 
outlined as a pre-subjective materiality that serve to distribute thought and feeling across 
and beyond the confines of the traditional bounded human brain and body, so that thought 
and perception come into being courtesy of a more-than-human encounter with the 
outside, and an aggregated trans-kingdom articulation of film and viewer. In Cinema 1, for 
example, Deleuze describes cinematic ‘movement-images’ in terms of material aspects of 
the viewer’s subjectivity, which although found operating in the world, directly trace circuits 
inside their biological brains. The transductive mental movements ignited by the encounter 
with dynamic film images reach their zenith in Cinema 2, where Deleuze explores the art 
cinemas of exhaustion, delirium and madness (as well as modern political films) that begin 
to expose an alternative way of thinking about time and temporality that emerged after the 
war, and at times demanded the creation of new circuits, or patterns of thought (Deleuze 
2000: 366).
Instead of setting out in search of alternative cinematic models of time, we attempt to 
extract here certain patterns, or ethical affinities, that can be detected resonating within and 
across many very different forms of film (drawn from different periods and sectors), and 
which appear to diagnose the immobility or stagnation of life and thought, while calling 
forth ‘a new earth’ or a new people (see Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 109). Such films are 
often simultaneously destructive and creative in nature, then, at once found desiring to 
‘do violence’ to the viewer by intervening and engineering a cut, or a crack, in what they 
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thought they already knew – often by first dislodging or ungrounding certain clichés and 
molar truths – whilst promoting and promulgating new affective patterns and associations 
that open up fresh potentials. As such, the broad range of projects explored throughout are 
not selected because they open up vistas onto some shared or essential notion of Truth, 
but rather because they appear to make the thinking and circulation of different ‘truths’ 
possible, or palpable (even if not palatable) to the senses. Furthermore, we contend that by 
introducing viewers to new sets of possibilities, or alternative truths, the films explored in 
Unbecoming Cinema can be understood in terms of increasing the viewers’ powers to act or 
be affected, whilst igniting ethical ‘events of thought’ (see for example MacKenzie and Porter 
2011: 66). 
On Event Cinemas and Evental Encounters
For many, Deleuze goes up against Alain Badiou as the main philosopher of the event today: 
with these two philosophical heavyweights conceptualizing the nature of events somewhat 
differently, by focusing upon dissimilar immanent and transcendent aspects therein (see for 
example Janning 2013; Badiou and de Baecque 2013; Ling 2011). Broadly speaking, against 
Badiou’s Neo-Platonic models of (essential) truths, Deleuze (the anti-Platonic) foregrounds 
the immanent aspects of events, while speaking of universal becomings. Amongst other 
things, and as Finn Janning renders it, this invariably involves erecting a line of flight away 
from the Ancient Greek dictum of ‘know thyself ’, to demand we instead know our location, 
or locatedness (see Janning 2013: 31). By also taking heed of the intraphilosophical 
intersections that connect contemporary physics and film-philosophy à la Deleuze or Brown, 
we might add here too an awareness of our ‘speed’ or ‘momentum’ (see Brown 2015: 57–59). 
Although both these models remain relevant to our thinking of events in the following 
chapters, Unbecoming Cinema ultimately employs Alfred North Whitehead, Deleuze and 
Guattari, and Alain Badiou as its four cardinal points (and conceptual personae) that 
help orient our thinking of events. In striving to minimally adumbrate the parameters 
and perimeters of these hybrid models here, we can begin with the process philosophy of 
Whitehead, wherein events are determined as something that is lived through, and emerge 
from progressive encounters within a world in process, or passage, and where causal relations 
between events begin to emerge and accrue as life dynamically unfolds. Moving beyond 
human-centred models, Whitehead fundamentally views events as ‘units of realization’, or as 
the ‘emergence into actuality of something’ as a consequence of agents (human or inhuman) 
and an activity, which in combination, result in a new unity. Here, the vital and universal 
processes of becoming are ostensibly redrawn as a series of prehensions (to prehend is to 
grasp or experience something) of ongoing and unfolding events. Accordingly, if one event 
prehends another that precedes it, each constituent event is transformed by their mutually 
prehensive relationship. As such, Whitehead outlines events in terms of that which extends 
around us, and as being both ‘the medium within which our physical experience develops’ 
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and ‘the development of that experience’ (Whitehead 1955: 63). Or put more plainly, events 
are understood by Whitehead in terms of ‘the grasping into unity of a pattern of aspects’ 
(Whitehead in Lowe 2013: 174–175).
Taking inspiration from Whitehead in The Fold (2006b), Deleuze similarly argues that 
events should be understood as a form of extension, wherein our unity with an event is 
tantamount to our becoming with it. Accordingly, before they become ‘actualized in us’, 
events ‘signals and awaits us’, appearing to ‘want for us and invite us in’ (Deleuze 2004a: 
63, 170). Although events are here both immanent and processual, and occur in the ever-
changing plane of consistency, Deleuze maintains that they are also the result of the frisson 
generated between the actual and the virtual (see for example Parr 2010: 78–79). Thus, 
elsewhere, Deleuze describes an event as not so much being ‘what occurs (an accident)’, 
but rather that which is to be found ‘inside what occurs, the purely expressed’ (2004a: 170). 
What Deleuze calls the pure event must in turn be understood in terms of unique instants of 
production, then, or as the appearance and expression of difference within a continual flow 
of becoming. It naturally follows that the only thing ‘shared’ by all actors and objects swept 
up in an event for Deleuze relates to their having become different together, or perpetuated 
difference in an ongoing process of becoming (our becoming with the event). In this manner, 
a viewer may move into composition with an evental film that pre-exists their encounter 
with it. The film here being a distributed force field or intensive artistic-machine that awaits 
and signals them from the vantage of the future (the film lying in wait for the viewer to 
discover or encounter it), while at the same time, the film itself must also be understood in 
terms of prehending or becoming in-formed by the wider movements of an event external 
to and prior to it, and to which it already expresses a unity. Here, both the viewer and the 
film attest to the unified and unifying existence of a broader movement that expresses itself 
through them, or else stretches out over them, grasping them and enrobing them within the 
movements of its wider event horizons. 
If the Deleuzian event is primarily understood in relation to ‘sense’, for Badiou events 
are more precisely related to ‘truth’ (see for example Badiou’s ‘The Event in Deleuze’ 
[2006]). Albeit courtesy of his refashioning of Platonic essences and a malleable toying 
with the chronological flow of time, Badiou claims that new truths, or truth procedures, 
can essentially be discovered or created. Badiou’s model of the event thus confronts the 
creation of new ‘truths’, and the emergence of a trace of that which formerly inexisted. 
As such, the event itself is best understood as a kind of ‘vanishing mediator’, which 
although becomes responsible for the emergence of a new present or world, is ultimately 
dissolved in its wake. From this aspect, events unavoidably decompose what came before 
and create new truths and worlds that replace them from within what Badiou refers 
to as an ‘evental site’ (2005: 202). Events can here be conceived of flowing backwards 
to contingently modify and transform the past they formed a break with. In contrast to 
Deleuze’s immanent model of universal becomings then, Badiou more precisely proposes 
that the event should be understood in terms of a pure break with the becoming of an 
object or the world. 
07756_Introduction_1-22.indd   19 4/27/17   9:51 AM
Unbecoming Cinema
20
Key here is that for both Deleuze and Badiou, the significance of an event is ultimately 
distanced from our own subjective experience of it, either by continuity (becomings) on the 
one hand, or the cut or break on the other (unbecoming). Events consequently have little 
intrinsic significance in and of themselves.7 For in both Badiou and Deleuze, the missing 
‘thing’ or piece of the evental puzzle is the immanent experience by the subject, or the 
personal encounter of the subjective form becoming swept up or grasped by the movements 
of the event. In the following pages we can attempt to plug this gap by paying attention to 
how different ethical and machinic artworks engineer what Ian Mackenzie and Robert Porter 
refer to as ‘an event of thought’ (2011: 65ff) in the viewer. That is, we will foreground how 
a dramatic production of difference can become ignited in the subject by their encounter 
with an intensive thinking artwork that moves into material composition with their senses. 
In combination with Whitehead’s notion of unifying prehension, MacKenzie and Porter’s 
dramatic tweaking of such encounters help us to re-ground the evental happening in the 
concrete experience of screening, and pinpoint the film as having ‘some kind of autonomy 
to cut open being and bring something new into existence as an experiential dramatic event’ 
(2011: 129–131). 
Over the following four chapters we will explore several different manifestations of such 
evental encounters with ethico-political films, and examine how different forms of audio-visual 
art or art-brut unleash deterritorializing movements that make wider becomings palpable to 
the senses, or else allow viewers to think new truths, and begin resonating with the movements 
of a wider distributed event. These dramatic experiential transformations can also here be tied 
to what Deleuze elsewhere refers to as a ‘fundamental encounter’ (Deleuze 2004c: 176), which, 
Simon O’Sullivan reminds us, are typically ‘future-oriented’, and ‘diagrammatic’ in nature (2006: 
1), in that they connect the concrete artworks and viewer to an ‘outside’ (here the virtual, a new 
truth, or the movements of a pure event). In such light, we can understand films emerging as 
rhythmic material assemblages that during and after the event of screening affectively prompt 
viewers to grapple with what Deleuze terms the unthought that precedes thought.
The Territories
Although each of the following chapters explore radically different forms of film and 
evental encounter, and can be conceived of as self-contained territories that can be entered 
and crossed in any order whatsoever, the book is concomitantly divided into two 
complementary halves: the first engaging with ‘missing peoples’ that are typically filtered 
out of everyday political discourses and consciousness, and the second with ‘lost peoples’ 
who appear to be left utterly unsure of how to act or live. Part one opens by diving straight 
into life and death issues surrounding sad passions, mental illness, ‘mad pride’ and sensory 
and brain ‘disorders’, by confronting ethical and animist art projects that provoke viewers 
to come face to face with the veiled worlds of suicide and autism. If the book’s first half 
is about unveiling and disclosing, then the second half is more precisely about works 
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that appear to distort and pervert the ‘real’ in an attempt to defamiliarize the familiar, or 
grant audiences novel opportunities to see, feel and think otherwise.
In working to establish what an ethical cinema is, or does, chapter one first works to 
engineer an encounter between Deleuze’s suicidal defenestration and his own practical 
philosophy, which, for many, emerges as an univocal force capable of ‘rescuing’ or rethinking 
his own self-killing. We thereafter articulate these philosophical discussions with an ethical 
investigation of Eric Steel’s haunting 2006 documentary debut The Bridge: a film that records 
and replays twenty-three out of twenty-four images of real suicide recorded in San Francisco 
during 2004. En route, we road test whether Steel’s thinking and thought-provoking film can 
overcome some of the opprobrious criticisms levelled at it, while investigating whether its 
tactical deployment of shocking percepts and animist affects can artistically redeem what 
many see as an immoral exercise in tragedy tourism and suicidal snuff. As we unpack a whole 
raft of ethical and moral issues bound up with the recording and screening of actual death, 
we concomitantly flesh out what is meant by a machinic model of film, whilst exploring how 
a particular iteration encourages its viewers to feel differently about certain taboo issues, 
think philosophically about life, ignite into political actions and become swept up in the 
movements of a wider political event. 
Chapter two thereafter moves beyond considerations of ‘mental illness’ to focus upon 
‘brain disorders’. As such, this chapter is marked by a series of defamiliarizing movements. In 
the first instance we make a marked ‘philosophical’ movement away from Deleuze towards 
Guattari (or rather from Deleuze and Guattari towards [Fernand] Deligny and Guattari), 
as we uncover a range of clinical and critical autistic films that appear to nudge perception 
beyond the ‘neuronormal’ or ‘neurotypical’ world of the intellect, the ego, the figure and the 
Other towards the prehension of an alternative alien universe of autistic intuition, the eco, 
fields and animism. In this chapter we concentrate on the transformative impact of film 
moving into an assemblage with autistic and animist modes of thought, perception, action 
and expression, and explore how three ‘autie type’ machinic artworks prompt or provoke 
viewers to apprehend alternative ethical modes of being in and with the world. 
As intimated, the next chapters undertake a further ethico-political movement as they drift 
away from considerations of missing peoples to focus instead upon what we might call ‘lost’ 
peoples. Specifically we will be considering films targeted at 1970s counterculture and post 
9/11 generations living under the shadow of unpopular foreign wars and fears of domestic 
violence, albeit as they appear rendered in the twisted ‘minor’ films of the outlandish and 
ostentatious outsiders Alejandro Jodorowsky and Lucifer Valentine, the anarchic inventers 
of Midnight Movie ‘pill films’ and ‘Vomit Gore’ torture-porn(ology) respectively. As cruel, 
corrupting and contagious projects, these doubly articulated unbecoming ‘cinemas of the 
body’ are discovered trying to make palpable the invisible political forces and powers that 
actively distort and deform life around them. By exploring these sick and distorted cult 
films as unique sociotechnical products of their time, chapters three and four necessarily 
dive head first into agitating corporeal ethico-political cinemas of the body which address 
themselves as much to the viewers’ nerves and viscera as they do their minds or intellect. 
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One final warning might be mindful at this stage before proceeding, regarding the mixed 
ecologies of methods readers will encounter as they cross the following chapters, and no 
doubt appear as a consequence of allowing the different films to dictate the terms upon 
which we approach and understand them on a case-by-case basis. For indeed, within each 
and every chapter, readers will find themselves on occasion taking an unforeseen turn or 
path, or entering into an unusual interdisciplinary terrain that they might not have predicted. 
Being unable to satisfactorily lay the foundations for any of these features here, we hope the 
reader will consent to our doing much of the conceptual groundwork and construction on 
site, so that like nomadic peoples, we might turn new and uncharted plots of land into useful 
temporary dwelling places that allow us to pause long enough to take sustenance and what we 
need, before prompting us to take flight once more into those other open territories. 
Notes
 1 Here, we agree that at ‘the most prosaic level […] communication could be said to involve the 
perception of an altered state’ (Fuente, Budarick and Walsh 2012: 41, emphasis in original).
 2 See, for example, Elsaesser (2011).
 3 In Lost In Translation (2010), Homay King reminds us that the verb ‘to shanghai’ colloquially 
means ‘to drug or otherwise render insensible’, as well as ‘to transfer or forcibly abduct’ (51). 
 4 For Brown, non-cinema is to the cinema what non-philosophy is to philosophy in the 
work of Laruelle. In his mind-bending work Principles of Non-Philosophy (2012), Laruelle 
outlines non-philosophy as being born on the plane of ‘radical immanence’, as succeeding 
philosophy, and being concerned with all that is Real and philosophy is not. Or, as John 
Mullarkey explicates it, in his work Laruelle ‘abstains from philosophy as such while 
simultaneously taking it as its own raw material’ (2006: 133). Which is to say, philosophy 
‘becomes the material of non-philosophy rather than its object’ (Mullarkey and Smith 2012: 
2). In a similar spirit, Brown’s notion of non-cinema is essentially a non-negative one, in that 
it offers a positive democratic way of viewing what might otherwise be negatively judged as 
failures or small and insignificant trifles by mainstream or academy standards.
 5 BDSM is a commonly used overlapping acronym deployed to describe a range of six erotic 
practices or preferences associated with Bondage and Discipline (BD), Dominance and 
Submission (DS) and Sado-Masochisim (SM). 
 6 Bogue characteristically clarifies such ideas when he notes that by following Spinoza, 
Deleuze understands this will to power not in terms of ‘an increase in power over a world, 
but an increase in powers of affecting and being affected’, which ultimately amounts to ‘a 
responsiveness to a selected world and an openness to interaction’ (Bogue 2012: 12).
 7 Ian MacKenzie and Robert Porter (2011) have recently highlighted how by trying to escape 
the traps of empiricism and dogmatism, both Deleuze and Badiou were similarly forced to 
look outside the event itself for the real drama constituting it.
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Exposing and Revealing
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Chapter One
Death 24X A Haecceity: Or Deleuze, Life and the Ethico-Aesthetics of 
Documenting Suicide in (and off) The Bridge
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As harps for the winds of heaven,
My web-like cables are spun;
I offer my span for the traffic of man,
At the gate of the setting sun.
Joseph Strauss (Chief Engineer for the Golden Gate Bridge)
The Golden Gate Bridge is to suicides what Niagara Falls is to honeymooners.
Tad Friend (2003) 
I’m going to walk to the bridge. If one person smiles at me on the way, I will not jump.
Anon (Suicide note from Golden Gate Bridge Jumper)
We open Unbecoming Cinema by taking in earnest Albert Camus’s assertion that there ‘is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide’ (1955: 11). For alarmingly, today we inhabit a world where around 800,000 
people are known to take their own lives every year, which the WHO informs us amounts to 
around one self-killing every forty seconds (2014). Although Emile Durkheim cast 
considerable doubt over the value and validity of suicidal statistics on account of the 
phenomenon’s many and varied morphological ‘species’, by propositioning that we consider 
suicide collectively as sui generis a ‘social fact’, he concomitantly highlighted dangers in 
overlooking the ‘mutual connection’ between suicidal event-acts and the ‘social constitution’ 
(Durkheim [1951] 1997: 37, 636). In the wake of such thinking, we must also take seriously 
Durkheim’s notion that collective suicidal tendencies emerge within any given culture, 
especially those where certain social ‘breakdowns’ or ‘maladjustments’ permit ‘suicidogenetic’ 
currents to flow towards and infect individuals. For indeed, it is under the shadow of today’s 
so-called suicide ‘epidemic’ that we here set out to explore a raft of moral and ethical issues 
bound up with the public documentation and projection of suicide, particularly with regard 
to Eric Steel’s haunting ninety-four-minute debut The Bridge (2006); an unsettling, upsetting 
and yet edifying personal-political project that literally brings viewers face to face with 
twenty-three (out of twenty-four) suicides that occurred around San Francisco’s Golden 
Gate Bridge during 2004.1 
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The Bridge
The opening black frame bleaches out so that a surging pearly greyness engulfs the screen. 
All the while a resonating sound-wave amplifies towards a higher frequency. The intensifying 
pitch peaks as a dark object pierces through the soupy fog. This allows viewers to retroactively 
discern what it is they have been seeing; a time-lapse image of a gigantic body of sea harr 
rolling through the architectural struts of San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge: the imperious 
structure that will hereafter serve as the film’s gravitational centre. 
Gear changing to a more accustomed ‘human’ speed of perception, the ensuing montage 
strings together a series of scale-shifting close-ups depicting seagulls gliding beyond the 
bridge’s steel cables, a ferry sounding its horn as it navigates beneath the bridge’s span, 
pleasure craft skimming over the water, kite-surfers skipping waves and hanging in the 
wind, seabirds paddling against the tide. A conspicuous zoom thereafter introduces us 
to the bridge’s human traffic, as Alex Heffes’ elegiac string and piano score The Shadow 
of the Bridge is sneaked in. The lilting melancholically tune immediately mediating how 
viewers perceive and ‘think’ the subsequent ‘all too human’ montage containing images 
of a lean male figure dressed in black striding along the bridge (a character we will later 
come to know as Gene Sprague), some joggers taking in morning exercise, a businessman 
peering over the red railing, a family of three enjoying an uninterrupted view of the Bay, 
a motionless hooded woman contemplating the water’s surface below, a tourist making 
snaps and a rout of schoolboys marching headlong into the gusting wind. Presently, an 
older gentleman dressed in a green T-shirt and red baseball cap is isolated by the camera’s 
trembling telephoto lens. He abruptly straddles the bridge’s four-foot barrier, crossing over 
it with an assured movement. He pauses, for a pulse, and then in a heart-in-mouth moment, 
throws himself away from the bridge. 
The unexpected, and yet inevitable, hits us as the figure crosses from the horizontal 
platform to swiftly drop down a vertical plane. The shaken camera is jolted by his precipitous 
celerity. Limbs extend outwards, pathetically kicking against thin air. His body hastens 
down, escaping the camera’s haphazard framing as it approaches terminal velocity. Frame 
and body blur into pure motion. Two hundred and fifty feet down, seventy-five miles per 
hour, 9.83 meters per second per second: four fleeting seconds.
A splash sound (effect?). The camera’s catch-up gaze misses the impact. Its operator 
scours the scene for traces. There is no visible scar. A kite surfer moves into shot, towards 
where this stranger’s life must have passed. The Coast Guard arrives moments later. Heffes’ 
sorrowful piano tinkles on, as the film’s title fades up: The Bridge. 
Thinking Suicide with Film
Deleuze, whose own suicide and writing upon death and life becomes fundamental to our later 
analysis of Steel’s film – offers us a valuable and practical philosophy that appears well suited for 
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approaching this particularly unsettling documentary artwork. For one thing, Deleuze’s 
practical philosophy is immediately ethico-political, and utterly inseparable from a lived way of 
life, in that its primary duty is to confront and formulate a response to the real problems 
challenging us in our actual lived experiences: otherwise it would be of absolutely no use. What 
remains true of ethical philosophy also stretches out to account for our ethical evaluation of 
Steel’s thinking film, which we likewise argue appears capable of bringing adequate thoughts 
and perceptions into being, which increase the powers of those who encounter it to act and live. 
In What is Philosophy? (2011) Deleuze and Guattari argue philosophy and art are 
comparable creative disciplines, with the philosopher and artist each unleashing productive 
forces into the world that become capable of transforming the individuals, populations 
and societies they encounter. For the purposes of this chapter we maintain that Steel’s film 
bridges these two worlds or disciplines, emerging as an ‘evental’ artwork that inculcates a 
philosophical encounter with those who encounter it. As discussed in the introduction, 
in his Cinema (2005a [1986], 2005b [1989]) project Deleuze demonstrates how films 
provide material conditions for thinking and emotionally evaluating, by offering viewers 
affective and perceptive methods of making sense of their world. By extension, a film’s 
psychomechanical capacity to generate movements in the viewers’ brain, body and mind 
also harbour potentials for generating movements of world, creating change or igniting 
becomings. From this vantage, both philosophical thoughts (concepts) and film thoughts 
(affects and percepts) are understood as immanent assemblages, or difference engines, that 
intervene in and operate upon the very problem-worlds from which they emerge.
Of particular interest here is how, whilst working to disturb and agitate existing 
thoughts and feelings, and stimulate new patterns and associations, The Bridge emerges as 
an immanent and ethical ‘machinic’ force. Undoubtedly, Steel hoped that his film would 
contribute to specific pragmatic outcomes and real-world consequences. For one, he 
anticipated the film would draw public attention to an otherwise secreted problem, and 
by so doing, elevate suicide into a political rather than merely private discourse. Steel also 
hoped his film would inspire real-world action, and be a factor contributing to the building 
of a barrier to prevent further suicide bids from this notorious landmark. Concomitant with 
these pragmatic goals, The Bridge also emerges as an affective body or force that works to 
inculcate ‘philosophical’ modes of thought. For as a material exercise in film-thinking that 
circuitously approaches life via a confrontation with death, The Bridge builds associations 
with a long and illustrious line of philosophical thinkers. Indeed, in a statement which itself 
echoes a belief that ‘has been the living formulation of philosophy since Plato’, Deleuze 
describes the philosopher as he who ‘has returned from the dead and goes back there’, and 
as ‘someone who believes he has returned from the dead in full consciousness’ (2005b: 201). 
Going back further still, Enrique Dussel traces Plato’s idea to the Egyptian sages, whom the 
Greek philosopher conceded were the ‘originators of the wisdom of the Greeks themselves’, 
and thus responsible for erecting the first ancient pillar of all ethical thinking. Before that, 
the Bantu African world too used the knowledge of death for thinking through ‘what is 
right, what is correct, law, order, justice, and truth’ (Dussel 2013: 6–7). 
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The strong ties between ethics, philosophy and death also becomes the subject of Simon 
Critchley’s benchmark Book of Dead Philosophers (2009), which opens by reminding us that 
Socrates claimed ‘all philosophers had to make dying their profession’, that Cicero argued that 
‘to learn to philosophise is to learn how to die’ and (of particular interest to our investigations 
below) that Montaigne felt that only those who learned how to die could unlearn how to 
be a slave (Critchley 2009: xv–xvii). There, as in his own philosophy, Critchley argues that 
in order to gain any true sense of freedom today, we should pragmatically structure our life 
(or our entire living existence) in relation to the stark reality of death. Somewhat tragically, 
however, ‘the most pernicious feature of contemporary society is the unwillingness to accept 
this reality and to flee the fact of death’ (Critchley 1997, 2009: xviii). 
To recapitulate before moving on, then, we might say that The Bridge emerges as an 
immanent response to two different real-world problems encountered in the particular 
milieu it records and screens within: the sociopolitical problem of suicide itself, and the 
acculturated difficulty bound up with ignoring the stark reality of death (that interferes 
with living a proper life). By extension, by overtly making death one of its primary 
themes, The Bridge offers its viewers a rare chance to confront and think about life in a 
‘philosophical’ manner. What is more, courtesy of the repeated convergence of death and 
suicide throughout the documentary, Steel’s film appears to cajole viewers into an evaluative 
attitude, experientially inviting them to assess whether or not life is worth living (both in 
the concrete and in the abstract), and by such token can be understood encouraging viewers 
to grapple with what Camus refers to as ‘the fundamental question of philosophy’ (Camus 
1955: 11). In the following sections we will also claim that The Bridge emerges as a powerful 
ethico-political force that demonstrates a real potential for imparting a renewed belief in 
the world. 
Film Ethics and an Ethics of Film
Unquestionably certain film-makers and films address their viewers as emotional and moral 
beings, and inculcate viewing experiences that are tantamount to exercises in moral thought 
or psychology (see for example Downing and Saxton 2010; Nagib 2011; Kupfer 2012; Miller 
2013; Choi and Frey 2014; Brown 2015; Sinnerbrink 2016). As a starting point we might 
pick up on two commonly touted ways in which film can be thought of as an ethical force 
during the screening encounter. The first relates to how, during its running time, a film 
builds up a distinctive evaluative attitude towards a given subject using formal devices and 
framing techniques. Thereafter we might concern ourselves with how such a film encourages 
an individual (or collective) to adopt its attitude or perspective upon that subject, object or 
event; particularly if this differs from their current attitudes, or those prevalent within the 
wider milieu. With these overlapping perspectives in mind, we might then try to decide 
whether the new attitude was better than the old one, by judging its moral value against 
some higher force or law. This immediately proves problematic however, for here we run 
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into problems of moral relativism: the belief that the truth of all moral judgements is 
individually or culturally relative. 
If we were to ask whether or not a film is an ethical one from a Deleuzian perspective, 
however, our questions and assumptions about film need to be framed slightly differently, 
and force us to pay attention to the manner in which a film increases or decreases the powers, 
or ability to live and act, of those it comes into contact with. As already discussed in the 
introduction, Deleuze’s larger philosophical project can be understood in terms of an ethical 
desire to be done with negative judgements (whether these be through a God figure, some 
associated system of laws or morality or even the opinion of some authority). For throughout 
his work Deleuze upholds that there can be no objective standard or transcendental moral 
ground from which to evaluate a life, an artwork, or indeed the state of the present, because 
any given judgement can be little more than an expression or opinion of the ‘I’ or body that 
evaluates, and this cannot take us very far. 
A brief return to Deleuze’s writing on Nietzsche helps us chart a path around the apparent 
‘moral relativist’ roadblock, for there, Deleuze concedes that there can be a legitimate and 
ethical evaluation of life, but if and only if it is based upon an immanent will to power. In 
explaining why, Deleuze first warns us away from many of the age-old moth-eaten platitudes 
surrounding this greatly misunderstood Nietzschean concept. In the first instance, we must 
not mistake the will to power for a sinister Machiavellian desire to enslave or exercise control 
over others. Far from it, the will to power must instead be recognized as a positive desire 
for an enriched life. Thus, in following Nietzsche and Spinoza, Deleuze recognizes the will 
to power as being concerned with a given body’s ability to affect and be affected by other 
bodies and forces, which amounts to saying that power does not reside inside any individual 
body, but rather is locatable in the empowering or disempowering relationships that any 
given body forges with other external bodies and forces. From such a perspective, we can 
only ever evaluate in terms of empowering or disempowering encounters. Disempowering 
encounters are those that affect individuals with sadness, or negatively impact or negate 
their power to live and act. Against these bad physical and psychical articulations, a positive 
encounter would be one that affects them with joy, and increases that body’s will to power. 
For the remainder of this chapter we should enquire into these ethical aspects of Steel’s 
film, which on the surface appears to institute a somewhat standard reflexive documentary 
format, aiming to uncover a veiled truth by constellating an array of interviews and recordings 
that are edited together with various dynamic shots wrestled from over 10,000 hours of 
footage amassed throughout the 366 days of shooting in 2004. As already indicated, these 
images are intercut with ‘surreptitious’ footage of the bridge’s human visitors, and contain 
twenty-three images of real suicidal actors and acts captured around the bridge. It is these 
images in particular that serve to differentiate The Bridge from most other documentary 
fare, and are responsible for profoundly unsettling and moving encounters with the film. The 
bold directorial choice of recording and screening these self-killings contribute to the film’s 
affective intensity, and lead to several strange effects, including the shocking experience of 
time itself slipping out of joint. 
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Without doubt, foreknowledge of The Bridge’s disturbing content allows muted pre-
emptive feelings to operate upon viewers before the screening even begins. For me this 
foreboding became manifest as a mild feeling of nausea or anxiousness the moment I 
emotionally committed to watching it. During viewing, untimely sensations are also 
kindled by the film’s obsessive return to close-ups of human bodies lingering near the edge 
of the bridge. For whether these are actual jumpers or not, watching these precarious bodies 
immediately serves to dilate and fracture the experience of film time, at once evacuating the 
present from the image (as thoughts speed up and make it known in our viscera that whatever 
is about to occur has already passed), while at the same time trying to offset the shock by 
concomitantly splitting the image into actual and virtual components, wherein the virtual 
or compossible (they may jump) coexists with the actual and the possible (they do or do not 
jump). Further disquieting feelings are actualized and amplified by seeing atypical images 
of real people jumping to their death, which makes tangible the film’s strange articulation or 
folding together of ethics and aesthetics, perception and affect, sight and moral insight (see 
Sobchack 2004: 231). Such unusual qualities ensure that The Bridge is a film that touches us 
before we see its first image, gets under our skin during the screening event, and stays with 
us and works upon us long after the final credits have rolled.2 
With specific regard to the themes of self-killing, there can be little doubt that most film 
viewers will be predisposed to hold certain personal and deep seated (acculturated) beliefs 
about the phenomena and actions under scrutiny, and inclined to apportion causation or 
blame to certain already known factors, such as nature, nurture, biology, biography, pathology, 
etc. In its attempt to give shape to a hidden story and secreted situation without evaluating 
or judging, though, Steel abandons any mediating ‘Voice of God’ or first-person voice-over 
convention, allowing instead a dispersed multiplicity of talking heads, embodied voices, 
photographs, sounds, images and memories to map out a tangled and fractured rhizomatic 
picture.3 Throughout, the farrago film also begins to betray a ‘will to art’, made noticeable by 
the unleashing of subtle ethico-aesthetic vibrations that gather into a philosophical counter-
rhythm. This only gradually becomes palpable to the viewer’s senses, however, as they are 
prompted to grope beyond the realm of the visible and, as we will discover below, to grapple 
with the as-yet unthought of a ‘pure event’.
Documenting Death
Much has been written of late about the ethics of depicting death in documentary films. 
Beyond my own work on the unethical framing of murder and suicide in twenty-first 
century ‘Terrorist infotainment’ (Fleming 2016), Joshua Oppenheimer’s unforgettable 2012 
docudrama The Act of Killing has now occasioned the spilling of much academic ink. The 
special dossier of Film Quarterly inspired by this ‘lightening rod for debate’ (Rich 2013: 8) 
offers some outstanding examples, which stand alongside Slavoj Žižek’s typically insightful 
essay exploring the inversion of public and private space in The New Statesman (2013), and 
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Robert Sinnerbrink’s more recent investigation into the ties between these historical murders 
and the Hollywood gangster movie genre (2016: 165ff). To me, The Bridge offers itself as a 
comparably provocative example of documentary film, albeit one that appears to have 
slipped under the critical radar, as such, despite the fact that it, unlike Oppenheimer’s work, 
captures images of actual, as opposed to simulated, death/killing. Consideration of this film 
allows us to expand these cine-ethical discussions somewhat, while opening up another 
perspective on such issues and debates. 
On account of its recording of twenty-three acts of self-killing, Vivian Sobchack’s 
archaeological exploration into the recording and projection of ‘nonsimulated’ images of 
death in documentary film makes for a useful starting point for our ethical enquiry into 
The Bridge. For there, Sobchack takes time to unearth how it came to pass that human 
death became ‘an antisocial and private experience’ within advanced western cultures, and 
a fact of life that increasingly became voided from public representation (Sobchack 2004: 
227). Engaging with Amos Vogel, amongst others, Sobchack illuminates how the ‘ferocious 
reality’ of death increasingly came to threaten the western ‘social order and its value systems’, 
by calling into question, undermining and upsetting all the dominant cultural codes and 
semiological systems (Sobchack 2004: 232). During the twentieth century in particular, real 
images of death – as opposed to fictional representations thereof – increasingly began to 
circulate as the unrepresentable ‘sign that replaces all signs’ (Sobchack 2004: 233). Echoing 
Critchley’s observations above, Sobchack notes how the progressive disavowal of death 
from public thought and conversation inexorably led to the members of advanced western 
cultures being shielded, and therefore desiring to shield themselves, from the stark realities 
of death. 
Tying in to a comparable view, Jeffrey J. Cohen and Todd R. Ramlow opine that we now 
live in a society that is so ‘death-phobic’ in the extreme that it is now virtually impossible 
for us to think about death in a way that is not always-already pre-digested, pre-judged and 
pre-thought in advance. That is to say, in consumer-oriented western cultures today we 
face the death of any real thought about death, so that images of real death are, cerebrally 
speaking, typically encountered ‘dead on arrival’ (as cliché). Cohen and Ramlow thus 
ponder if it is at all possible that death might still be ‘rendered an affirmative event’, or made 
capable of ‘igniting a becoming’? (2005/2006: 19). Or posed differently for the purposes of 
this chapter: could death ever be creatively or artistically deployed in the ethical services of 
life? Although Deleuze stated that there could be no ‘art of death’ (Deleuze with Parnet in 
Boutang 2011 [1996], see also Stivale 2010: n.p.), as we will soon discover, his own ethical 
philosophy offers itself up as a positive and life-affirming force (or difference engine) capable 
of transmutating how we predominantly think or understand death today. Recall, as Philip 
Goodchild puts it, the conditions of living a vital and full life from a Deleuzian perspective 
entails living in ‘the world as though already dead’ (1996: 206). That is, through amor fati 
(affirmation) or becoming entirely free or untethered from the negativities imposed by 
morality, judgement and opinion. As an immanent machinic force in its own right, Deleuze’s 
ethical philosophy becomes capable of unbridling death (suicide and mental illness) from 
07756_Ch01_23-60.indd   33 4/27/17   9:56 AM
Unbecoming Cinema
34
deforming molar moulds (clichés), and allows us to re-perceive and re-think it in relation to 
life, and a wider more distributed rhizomatic web of external forces and social affects. Or as 
Finn Janning depicts it, by erecting a line of flight away from the Ancient Greek dictum of 
‘Know Yourself ’, Deleuze more precisely prompts us to ‘Know your location’ (Janning 2013: 
31), and to interrogate how our thoughts and actions are constrained or enabled by our 
immanent encounters with the outside. 
It becomes useful to recall here that in his writings, both with and without his erstwhile 
collaborator Félix Guattari, Deleuze distinguishes between two broad forms of living and 
becoming that we can crudely adumbrate in terms of the ‘mechanical’ and the ‘machinic’. 
The former are largely undesirable, essentially being fixed, repetitive and entropic in nature. 
These constitute exhaustive closed-loop processes that eventually become responsible for 
wearing down bodies and brains through ongoing closed cycles of habitual mechanized 
movements and action, gradually decomposing and breaking down their constituent 
relations. The latter are different in nature, being experimental, liberating and open, and 
understood to be benefitting or enriching all the bodies involved by positively increasing 
their ‘will to power’, qua their ability to create and act (more on which later). Turning to 
Deleuze’s own life and death can help us to flesh out what these different forms of living and 
acting entail, whilst divulging how his own practical philosophy – which allowed his own 
death (and our thinking of it) to return differently or otherwise – can help steer our ethical 
evaluation of Steel’s handling of suicidal themes in his documentary. 
Deleuze’s Death
How people have thought, or been invited to conceptually re-think Deleuze’s suicide 
becomes of pedagogical relevance to our investigations into Steel’s film, particularly with 
regard to the complex intersectional interferences between philosophy and art on the one 
hand, and real-world problems and actions on the other: that is, between an empirical plane 
of consistency (where actors physically commit suicide) and an abstract plane of immanence 
(where the philosophical or conceptual meaning of such actions become evaluated or 
assessed) (see Buchanan 2015: 390–391). The circumstances surrounding Deleuze’s own 
decline in health that led to his defenestration at the age of seventy can be used here as a 
fruitful case in point. Indeed, during his life Deleuze had suffered from ongoing respiratory 
problems, and was a heavy smoker who eventually lost a lung to a pneumonectomy. By late 
1995, the now voiceless and tracheotomized philosopher found himself ‘chained like a dog’ 
to a mechanistic breathing machine, and suffering from advanced pulmonary problems, 
that led to the loss of his ability to communicate through speech or writing. Deleuze thus 
found himself in an increasingly insufferable and alienated situation. What is known is that 
on the fourth of November of that year, he bounded out of a window to his death. 
The question we must ask here, then, and which divides many commentators is this: 
does our knowledge of Deleuze’s conditions before his suicide warrant our thinking of 
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his self-killing as meaningful? Unquestionably, for some, Deleuze’s suicide was utterly 
meaningless, being little more than a mechanical or auto-affective act. That is, what Deleuze 
might refer to as ‘a mechanism of the body capable of astonishing us’ (Deleuze 1988: 86). 
In this particular case, however, it can be framed as an astonishing mechanical act that 
reified his own Spinozist dictum that we do not yet know ‘what a body can do’. Certainly, 
Stephen Perrella deems that there was no conscious decision at all behind Deleuze’s bound 
towards his ‘becoming-pavement event’, for in it we can only see the desperate habitual 
reflex of an emphysema sufferer reduced to a mere ‘animal’ (this being made all the more 
tragic because he was ‘not quite becoming-animal’ in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense; see 
Perrella 1995).4 Michel Serres, Simon Critchley and Jean-Pierre Faye concur, upholding 
that Deleuze cast himself out the window because he couldn’t catch his breath. From such 
a vantage, Deleuze was simply feeling smothered or drowned by his remaining lung, and 
succumbed to the overwhelming physical compulsion to force rushing oxygen into his chest 
‘by diving towards death, from the height of a window’ (Faye in Colombat 1996: 244; see also 
Serres 1995; Critchley 2009: 237).5 Deleuze’s actions here become little more than a reflexive 
or instinctual bodily (re)action, which occurred without any cerebral or philosophical 
mediation whatsoever, and might even have been a surprise to his own consciousness. 
However, if Deleuze’s embodied actions were a surprise to himself, they would not have 
been to those who design, manage and maintain pulmonology or emphysema wards, for 
experience and legislation dictate that these be located on ground floors, or behind barred 
windows (see Critchley 2009: 237; Goodchild 2014). 
Deleuze was not in a ward, though, but rather ‘chained’ at home, behind his unbarred 
third-floor Parisian window. For Alphonso Lingis, on account of this locatedness, even if we 
were to concede that there may have been some form of conscious intent behind Deleuze’s 
suicidal act, the fact that his jump passed through the window of his own private abode (as 
opposed to some public place such as building or bridge) signals a decidedly private nature 
to his actions. Meaning that, for Lingis at least, ‘Deleuze was not making a statement to 
others by the way he chose to die’ (Lingis 2006: 1).6 
If viewing Deleuze’s death as either a habitual psycho-somatic response or a sincerely 
private action amounts to saying that there is little or no philosophical or intellectual 
meaning behind the philosopher’s final actions, others think the events differently, often 
(re)turning to Deleuze’s own immanent philosophical persona(e) to help guide them. Rosi 
Braidotti is one such philosopher, who reminds us that Deleuze himself had commented 
upon the suicides of Primo Levi and Virginia Woolf, reading both ‘positively’ through his 
Spinozian lens. By the same coin, and in a gesture more in keeping with the larger ‘pure 
event’ of Deleuze’s life, Braidotti uses Deleuze’s practical and ethical philosophy so that his 
own death might escape its historical fixity, and return differently, to speak out to all time.7 
A return to Spinoza’s Ethics allows us to see that Deleuze understood the individual in terms 
of a self-preserving conatus, or as a body that cannot freely will its own self-destruction 
(Spinoza [1987] 2001: 176–177). Following Spinoza, when a conatus encounters noxious 
bodies or negative forces, it is affected by sadness, and is cut off or blocked from the vital 
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flow of life. In extreme cases, such as coming into contact with a disease or poison, the 
result is to rapidly diminish or entirely decompose that particular body’s optimal relations, 
radically decreasing its powers to live and act (Spinoza [1987] 2001: 176–177; Deleuze 
1992: 241–243). Consequentially, the death of an individual, even to suicide, is always 
recognized as the result of a negative encounter with sad passions or actions that originate 
in ‘the outside’. Thus, Deleuze upholds that, ‘in reality, what is involved is always a group of 
parts that are determined to enter into other relations and consequently behave like foreign 
bodies inside us’ (Deleuze 1988: 42). And with respect to these, Deleuze maintains that in 
situations where preponderant forces were at play that actively deformed and decreased 
one’s ability to act or live an affirmative life, life can be affirmed by suppressing one’s own 
life (see Braidotti 2010: 152). 
By returning to Deleuze’s practical philosophy, André Pierre Colombat and Paul Veyne 
likewise appear empowered to think positively about life, courtesy of Deleuze’s suicide. 
Veyne, for instance, interprets Deleuze’s ‘voluntary and “reasonable” death’ as an act fully in 
keeping with his Stoic roots; and as an event-act that helped actualize and complete ‘a truly 
philosophical destiny’ (Colombat 1996: 240). Other commentators have similarly been able 
to perceive Deleuze’s leap as an ethical action, and as an evental happening that prompts 
thought to weigh life against the degree zero of death. Amongst others, Greg Seigworth 
ethically evaluates Deleuze’s ‘final relay’ as an ‘instantaneous switch of theory into practice’ 
(Seigworth in Cohen and Ramlow 2006). Similarly for Eric Alliez, Deleuze’s final bound 
can be viewed as ‘the last act of an exemplary philosophical life’ (see Colombat 1996: 240). 
By a similar token, Janning describes Deleuze’s ‘altruistic suicide’ as a happy death fully 
in keeping with the philosopher’s larger life project (Janning 2013: 32). With comparable 
philosophical licence, Cohen and Ramlow proclaim that Deleuze ultimately:
ended his life with a fall, an arc that somehow sought an escape from a teleology of the 
flesh – from its medicalization, its Christianization, its reduction into morality. Deleuze 
leapt from the window in order to write with his own body that memorandum about 
Lucretius, to show that maleficent thinkers do not end in the ‘terror and anguish’ of 
deathbed conversions.
(2005/2006: n.p.) 
Hari Osaki too is primed by the event-act to read Deleuze’s final leap in terms of traversing 
the ‘largest fracture’, or as folding together the force of the outside while expressing the 
power of life (Osaki 2008). Accordingly, any contemplation of this ‘infinite movement’ 
becomes the definitive ‘gift of Deleuze’s death’, allowing the event-act to (re)emerge as a ‘call 
for beings to come which can live with the power expressed in suicide without committing 
it, in hope that we do not die as he did, but live otherwise, differently’ (Osaki 2008: 98). And 
there is the rub, for it is these forms of machinic transformation that we must seek to detect 
operating within Steel’s documentary film if we are, in the last analysis, to recognize it as an 
ethical artwork capable of thinking, or inculcating the thinking of difference. 
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To better understand the forms of machinic question we must consequently pose at The 
Bridge, we might here return to those that Cohen and Ramlow ask of Deleuze’s suicide as 
an ethical event. For there, rather than negatively asking what Deleuze’s suicide means or 
represents, they more pointedly, and positively, enquire into what it ‘can it do?’
What are its affects, its vectors, its possibilities, and how do they form an assemblage 
with other bodies, other forces that might, in their own way, change the world? How 
might his death be read, or become, otherwise than the limits of humanist discourse, 
which could only see in his suicide a final, tragic, individual signification? And is to seek 
alternative significance/signification in Deleuze’s death merely to fetishize suicide (or 
might it, to return momentarily to Spinoza-Hegel-Levinas-Butler, transform the negative 
into something else)? Was Deleuze’s death necessarily a human, all too human surrender 
to despair, or can his death serve as a potentially creative, constructive event act – a last 
and affirmative rejection of the normative – that renders such a query beside the point? 
Of course, in this instance we must specifically ask if Steel’s ninety-four-minute documentary 
appears capable of transforming twenty-four suicidal event-acts into a creative political and 
philosophical force that increases the ‘will to power’ of the bodies it comes into contact with. 
Before considering these ethical dimensions, however, it becomes prudent to work through 
what many see as the insurmountable moral barrier preventing Steel’s film from being an 
ethical force for good: the moral transgression of ‘objectively’ documenting death. 
Beyond Objectivity and Morality
Above all else, it is because The Bridge records real images of death that it serves to upset and 
unsettle people, and raise a whole raft of moral barriers. Of particular interest here is a 
belief, or legacy, that suggests that the ‘objective’ nature of the documentary mode, as 
opposed to art or fiction (endowed with powers of the false), presents film-makers with 
terminal problems regarding a film’s fundamental ability to ‘think’ suicide. For explaining 
why, we can here return to the ontological writing of the analytical philosopher Roger 
Scruton, who maintains that cinema’s causal relationship to objective reality presents film-
makers with an undefeatable problem when it comes to capturing and meaningfully 
representing images of death. Scruton’s notion of an ‘ideal’ photographic document becomes 
of relevance here, particularly if read alongside a Bazinian notion of cinema’s photographic 
ontology, wherein traditional cinema is understood as a photographic apparatus capable of 
embalming change twenty-four frames a second (hence the title of Laura Mulvey’s Death 
24X A Second). Although Steel works with digital cameras that do not share in the same 
indexical processes as the analogue cinema, Scruton’s discussion of a photographed 
document of martyrdom (and by extension self-killing) retains some damning parallels to 
the forms of image Steel records throughout his film. 
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Bracketing the religious and moralistic undertones of Scruton’s argument for the time 
being, the analytic philosopher notes that unlike a painterly representation of martyrdom, 
the photographic re-presentation of the same event can only ever be perceived as horrific. 
This being a necessary determination impressed upon the photographic image thanks 
to the indexical nature of its production, or the mechanical process of reproducing an 
‘objective’ image of something actually laid out in front of the camera’s technological 
inscribing surface. From this perspective, the image of a martyr reproduced by a camera 
becomes entirely transparent or continuous with reality, so that metaphysically speaking, 
they are no different to someone simply holding up an empty frame or mirror to direct 
a viewer’s attention to a real event occurring somewhere ‘over there’. It thus follows, for 
Scruton at least, that photographs and film are entirely unable to tell viewers how to see 
or think about the subject or object depicted (Scruton 1995: 101): That is, or That was, 
is all the documentary image can ever say. Accordingly, while it is perfectly conceivable 
that a painting of a suicide or martyrdom can be serene, aesthetic and thought provoking, 
Scruton contends that the documentary image simply cannot be, because ‘one’s attitude 
is determined by the sure knowledge that this is how things are, or were, in reality’ 
(Scruton 1995: 103).
On account of its causally produced nature, Scruton contends that any interest in the 
object (or subject) depicted in a photographic document (unlike in a painting or play dealing 
with the same subject) can only offer a surrogate interest in the actual thing the image 
represents. Or again, the photographic (or cinematic) document(ary) essentially cannot be 
Art for Scruton, and is limited to merely re-presenting viewers with a reflection of the actual 
object/subject. If the application of artistic discourses to photographic documents is simply 
erroneous for Scruton, we can locate comparable sentiments expressed in the writing of 
the documentary historian and critic Bill Nichols, who similarly sees the application or 
expression of abstract concepts with regard to documentary images as profoundly flawed. 
Indeed, Nichols sees theory as an essentially generalizing practice that forever moves inwards 
towards ‘abstraction’, and is therefore useless for understanding documentary images, which 
fundamentally point ‘outwards’ towards an actual subject or object in reality. Nichols thus 
argues that the application of theory compromises the ‘material effects of individual texts’, 
and blind us to how the camera points out towards the ‘full dimensionality’ of the material 
world (Nichols 1992: xiii, 230). 
For many, such extreme claims necessarily trouble taking up an artistic or ethical 
approach to Steel’s documentary film in the first place, and undermine any claims that 
The Bridge invites viewers to think-feel suicide in an alternative ethico-aesthetic manner. 
For if there can be no art of the index or death (no matter how many times per second), 
Steel’s documentary images would always-already be utterly incapable of provoking thought 
or mediating thinking. In countering such beliefs, however, we can first turn to some of 
the illuminating discussions gravitating around The Falling Man (Richard Drew, 2001) 
photograph – believed to capture an image of Jonathan Briley dropping to his death from 
the World Trade Centre on 9/11. 
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First and foremost, the frozen image encountered in The Falling Man is extremely potent 
because we know that it captures the final moments of a real human life. These feelings are 
amplified or compounded by certain other external, ontic and ‘aesthetic’ features of the 
chosen image, which impact our decoding of the image as a text. That is to say, the image as 
cultural artefact is always already more than just a horrific testament to how actual things 
looked, and recognition of this forces us to pay attention to what it is the image is able to ‘do’ 
(as well as ‘mean’) in the immanent encounter with its viewers.8 As such, The Falling Man 
offers us a useful opportunity to destabilize Scruton and Nichols’ thought-image impasse at 
the same time as we begin to forge aesthetic-political links to similar forms of documentary 
imagery that originally kindled Steel’s desire to make his own film in the first place. 
For Damian Sutton, encountering The Falling Man was an intensely powerful and moving 
event. Even more so, he claims, than seeing moving video images of the same or similar 
material. Engaging with the writing of Rob Kroes on the subject, Sutton explores how the 
photograph engenders a qualitatively intense encounter that becomes manifest ‘at the time 
of the look’ (2009: 59). It is important for Sutton and Kroes that it is this particular image 
that was selected by Drew from within his larger movie-like sequence, which arrested the 
spinning and tumbling fall of the body during its descent towards the ground (2009: 59). 
This image was chosen on account of its ‘unexpected yet true’ pose, it is suggested, with 
the exceptional posture appearing suggestive of flying, rather than falling. This image, 
rather than another like it, they argue, manages to free itself of the chronological flow of a 
teleological action-image sequence by seeding a cerebral time-image crystal. Or put more 
plainly, during an encounter with the actual photograph, the image appears capable of 
shattering or annihilating the chronological movements downwards towards death, while 
creating other possibilities to the Imagination, and bringing thought itself into contact 
with ‘the non-organic Life which grips the world’ (Deleuze in Sutton 2009: 60). That is, the 
encounter with this photographic document ostensibly allows the falling body to escape the 
invisible forces around it, and to momentarily defy death, and gravity, even if we know that 
this is not really true (Sutton 2009: 59–60). 
If Scruton and Nichols see such an image as a thoughtless or meaningless indexical 
photographic artefact, Sutton and Kroes similarly admit that Drew’s image does operate 
at this horrific realist level. At the same time, however, the latter also identify something 
additional in their encounter with The Falling Man picture, another force that serves to 
ignite a creative movement of mind, and that opens up imaginative lines of flight and escape 
from the real. Here, the actual image gives birth to virtual images, which surround and 
affect its reception, irrespective of the fact that the catalyst for these creative movements 
of mind is an indexical image. The Falling Man here becomes a pertinent tutor image that 
allows us to recognize how a static recorded document can also contain or gain new life and 
aesthetic value – as well as contingent political/spiritual meanings – when in circulation, 
and can betray a quasi ‘will to art’ that many would find incommensurable with the image’s 
mechanical or technological origins. Going further still, we can also begin to apprehend how 
a documentary film-maker, more than the stills photographer, may have an even greater 
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arsenal of tools and techniques at their disposal with which they can unmake and remake 
meanings with their audio-visual modes of expression. 
In working to counter associated beliefs that the indexical nature of documentary film 
likewise forces us to look out towards a real objective world (even more so than stills 
photography in the case of The Falling Man for Sutton), rather than inwards towards 
feelings or thought with regard to documentary film-making, it helps to briefly turn 
to Tom Lundborg’s survey of 9/11 documentary films that capture the same (or similar) 
horrific events indexed by Drew’s photograph (Lundborg 2012). Amongst other things, 
these discussions can help us draw out a useful distinction between the mere recording 
and replaying of static and objective ‘historical events’ and the productive unleashing 
of dynamic movements associated with what Deleuze refers to as a ‘pure event’. Indeed, 
Lundborg’s interest in 9/11 documentaries resides in how some film-makers and films re-
contextualize existing images in a manner designed to escape familiar and sedimentalized 
ways of experiencing the same old political narrative (as in a mechanistic recognition of 
the same static historical event). In particular, it becomes the disruptive affect of raw and 
untethered cinematic aesthetics that interests Lundborg the most, specifically for their 
ability to qualitatively re-create and re-interrogate the pure event that 9/11 both was, and 
is. Alejandro González Iñárritu’s contribution to the 2002 assemblage film 9’11”01 (entitled 
Mexico) makes for a pertinent case in point here, for its calculated violence of sensation 
demands viewers to experience the disruptive and unsettling feelings in a way that disallows 
for any comfortable distance or ‘common sense’ positions from which to re-master a fixed 
knowledge of 9/11 as a stable ‘historical event’ (or political narrative).
Throughout Mexico Iñárritu harnesses the affective power of blank screens, silence, 
disorienting and disjunctive noises, and raw images of bodies falling from the World Trade 
Centre. His embrace of a fragmented and discordant form allows the raw dynamism of pure 
affective movements and unsettling sounds to repeatedly assault viewers, presenting only 
broken and disconnected fragments of the events so that we are confronted by confusion, 
disorientation and bewilderment in a manner that recalls the first encounter. That is to say, 
viewers are confronted by intensive movements of a pure event that escapes thinking. As 
such, the film’s form and content force us to (re)experience the unsettling nature of the pure 
unfolding event, and (re)encounter and (re)think its ‘problem-questions’ afresh. Although 
Mexico contains looped documentary images of bodies falling or jumping from the World 
Trade Centre, the immanent encounter with the film forces viewers to confront the sheer 
‘inexistence of a whole which could be thought’, and trades in that which Deleuze terms the 
‘inpower [impourvoir] of thought’, or ‘the figure of nothingness’ (see Lundborg 2012: 92). 
Or stated otherwise, by disruptively forcing viewers to (re)experience and (re)encounter the 
pure event via an artistic encounter, Mexico offers viewers the opportunity to see and think 
the known in an altered or defamiliarized ethical fashion. 
Although it displays a more subtle ‘will to art’ than Mexico, The Bridge can nonetheless 
be understood as a comparable evental ‘documentary’, which attempts to encourage viewers 
to confront the dynamic movement of a quite different event. For if Iñárritu’s film aims to 
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revitalize perception by challenging its viewers to see the spectacle of an all too familiar 
historical event afresh, Steel more precisely tasks himself with exposing that which is 
invisible, or of elevating the unseen or overlooked to an object of political and philosophical 
thought. In this way, The Bridge can be recognized as a film that challenges its audiences 
to come face to face with public issues that although ‘known about’ are nonetheless rarely 
given sustained political attention, and are typically eschewed by the mainstream media. As 
a result of such factors, the film was ultimately destined to encounter fear and opprobrium, 
qua moral disgust, on its release, with some San Francisco City officials damning the film 
(before even seeing it) and branding it a morbid and immoral ‘snuff film’ that cashes in on 
tragedy tourism (see for example Glionna 2006). Such moralistic views (even if by non-
viewers) cannot be flippantly dismissed, of course, and we must take pause to consider them 
in more detail. To help evaluate the texture of this complex documentary, then, we must now 
delve into some troubling ethical and moral issues and questions surrounding the actions 
and desires of the film-maker, his crew, their film, and the various subjects and actors with 
which it forms immanent articulations.
Not Falling but Jumping: From Spectacle to Seclusion
In interview Steel claims that the original idea for making his documentary was a synthesis 
of two personal encounters or events. One was coming across Tad Friend’s striking 2003 
New Yorker article entitled ‘Jumpers’, which reported on the strange ongoing phenomenon 
of the Golden Gate Bridge suicides. There, Friend describes that there remained (at that 
time) between fifty to eighty people who were prevented from committing suicide by bridge 
authorities every year, whilst around thirty ‘successful’ jumpers managed to slip through the 
security net (today these numbers have increased). Friend’s article engages with the strange 
vital power and eerie spiritual draw the bridge has for those wishing to end their life there, 
and the cult-like status the monument now has for potential suicidal actors. To help explain 
why, Friend integrates the words of Mayor Al Boro, who claims that the ‘bridge is more than 
a bridge: it’s alive, it speaks to people. Some people come here, find themselves, and leave; 
some come here, find themselves, and jump’ (Friend 2003). The other significant ‘inspiration’ 
for making his film, Steel says, stemmed from watching the powerful events of 9/11 unfolding 
live on television, and the particularly visceral experience of seeing people leap to their 
deaths in order to escape the furnace of the burning towers. In a press release statement for 
the documentary, Steel elaborates on this creative disjunctive synthesis: ‘I imagined that the 
people who jump from the Golden Gate Bridge must be trying to escape their own private 
inferno’ (Rosenfeld 2006). 
Inspired, Steel set about preparing to make his documentary. This involved tasking his 
crew of twelve with turning up every day throughout 2004 to train their cameras on the 
bridge from a network of different angles. However, it is in desiring to create this multi-
perspectival web through which to record the bridge jumpers that many initially begin to 
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feel that the ethical waters surrounding Steel’s film-making practices and desires begin to 
become somewhat muddied. For in this urge to record suicidal event-acts his critics detect 
a taste for misery tourism, or else a vulture-like desire to opportunistically profit from the 
despair of others. But perhaps we get ahead of ourselves, for concomitant with the desire to 
film these event-acts arose another moral infraction or violation; this being linked to Steel’s 
false bureaucratic application to obtain a filming permit, wherein the director openly lied 
to the State authorities in order to secure his licence to shoot the bridge for the full 366 days 
of 2004 (a leap year). Indeed, Steel had to submit a film-making application to the Golden 
Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA) on whose land almost all of the 10,000 hours of 
footage would be recorded. In his application Steel clearly outlines a different project to the 
one he intended to actualize, with the permit records indicating that he was slated to shoot 
a film that captured ‘the powerful, spectacular intersection of monument and nature that 
takes place every day at the Golden Gate Bridge’ (Rosenfeld 2006). 
Although it is probably true that the GGNRA officials ‘wouldn’t have granted [Steel] a 
permit to film suicides’ (Kottke 2006), as the director maintains in various interviews, the 
main reason he lied on the application form was linked to discouraging people who might 
seek out his cameras in order to capture their own self-killing for posterity (more on which 
shortly). A similar reasoning is also offered by Steel to excuse an altogether different, and 
arguably even more troubling deceit, this time involving the raw interviews he recorded 
with the surviving friends and families of the suicidal actors. Indeed, the majority of Steel’s 
mosaic film is composed of interviews and testimonies of those who knew the jumpers 
captured in his film. However, none of the interviewees were informed by the director that 
he had actual footage of their friends and loved ones committing suicide when they agreed 
to be interviewed. Steel again links this to an ethical consideration or evaluation. Which 
he says was an attempt to avoid word getting out about his recording, and of generating 
undue publicity for fear of appealing to any potential jumpers that might desire to become 
‘immortalized’ in his film.9 In both cases, Steel’s ethical reasoning relates to his fear of 
spreading what is colloquially known as ‘suicide contagion’ or ‘copycat suicides’: linked to 
apparent statistical spikes in suicidal activity after prominent media coverage of such events. 
In the years since Durkheim’s sustained 1897 investigation into the phenomenon of 
suicidal ‘imitation’ (1997: 123–142), the notion of ‘suicide contagion’ has arguably become 
most famous today courtesy of Malcolm Gladwell’s global best-seller The Tipping Point 
(Gladwell 2000: 216–252), which includes a case study of teenage suicides in the South Pacific 
Islands.10 There, Gladwell discusses how a kind of informal permission is apparently offered 
to potential suicidal actors by the circulation of stories covering suicide events in the media, 
which seemingly cause an exponential rise in suicidal event-acts by establishing a quasi-
feedback loop (2000: 216ff). Both Friend and Jeff Stryker touch upon similar phenomena 
with specific reference to the Golden Gate Bridge suicides, with Stryker exposing the role of 
the local media in ‘advertising’ or ‘promoting’ further suicidal activity. In 1973, for example, 
both the San Francisco Chronicle and the Examiner were witnessed initiating ‘countdowns 
to the five-hundredth recorded jumper’, which resulted in officials turning back ‘fourteen 
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aspirants to the title, including one man who had “500” chalked on a cardboard sign pinned 
to his T-shirt’. In 1995 (the year of Deleuze’s suicide), as the title for the one-thousandth 
official Golden Gate jumper loomed, there was a veritable media ‘frenzy’, with a local disk 
jockey going so far as to promise a case of Snapple to the family of the ‘lucky’ victim (see 
Friend 2003). Thereafter, Stryker notes how new media ethics guidelines were put in place 
to prevent the media from reporting/advertising suicides, unless it was a celebrity jumper or 
bridge traffic was being held up (which in and of itself may inadvertently reveal something 
about the desires and values of that culture’s abstract desiring machines). 
Whatever the case or validity of such beliefs, the new ethical guidelines generated 
unforeseen consequences, and by voiding the coverage of suicidal events from public 
discourses, began contributing to the phenomena’s non-politicization and increasingly 
taboo status. At this stage we should briefly return to Steel’s desire to film these suicides 
in the first place, for in the wake of such discussions his actions gain a renewed moral-
political texture. Indeed, Sobchack reminds us that when death, and by extension suicide, ‘is 
represented in a nonfiction context, its representation seems to demand ethical justification 
(often generalised as the “public’s right to know”)’ (Sobchack 2004: 242). To wit, was there 
a story here the public needed to know? And if so, was Steel right to film the public self-
killings as part of this right? For if, prima facie, Steel’s actions can arguably be linked to a 
professional politico-journalistic desire to expose and politicize a hidden or secreted story 
otherwise ignored by the official media, it is not immediately apparent that such a story, if 
it needed to be exposed, requires actual images of the suicide actors themselves in order to 
tell it. On account of this latter issue in particular, Steel’s decision is often claimed to reveal 
his ethical irresponsibility or moral turpitude, particularly by those unwilling to watch his 
film, precisely because it goes against the more common and comfortable media and moral 
guidelines crystallizing around such event-acts within that particular habitus. 
An article about the film for Kottke makes clear that for many, the director’s greatest 
moral transgression centred around the desire to film death in the first place, for the ‘film 
crew’s basic job description was to wait for people to die […] they needed people to die for 
their film. If there’s no good footage of people jumping, there’s no film’ (Kottke 2006). Of 
course things are rarely this black and white, and many reports and interviews concede that 
the film crew were in fact trained in suicide prevention, and that they did actually intervene 
in several attempts throughout the year (although these do not become part of the film’s 
story or thinking of the events). In defence of comparable accusations in various interviews, 
Steel works to tease out a nuanced distinction between his cameras ‘being out there waiting 
for people to die’, which he sees as being morally wrong, and his desire to bear witness ‘to 
something we knew was happening’, which is ethically sound (Steel 2006b). Whatever the 
case, Steel maintains that during filming he and the crew remained ‘human beings first and 
film-makers second’, with all film-makers having the phone numbers of bridge authorities 
on speed dial for the moment they spotted anyone crossing the bridge’s four foot safety 
barrier (Steel 2006b). All in all, when pushed, Steel maintains that the crew averted around 
six attempts at suicide throughout 2004. 
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If at this stage Steel’s stated desire to ‘bear witness’ to a hidden truth might pass muster 
with some, it remains useful to interrogate further the evaluative and ethical nature of the 
gaze that The Bridge generates or inculcates, and how this in turn factors into the thinking 
of the events that viewers are made party to during the screening encounter. For if we can go 
along with the director’s desire to record such images for later public display, the complicated 
ethical texture of the images themselves become further drawn into focus when we consider 
the actual forms of images Steel desired to capture for his film. Indeed, it apparently became 
clear to Steel after a few weeks of filming that simply recording the jumps was not good 
enough for his future documentary, for the images he had failed to pack a punch capable 
of making viewers sit up and take notice. Thus, in a BBC interview Steel describes growing 
increasingly dissatisfied with the rushes produced by the standard lenses he deployed at 
the beginning of the year, which only captured the splashes, or distant evental traces of the 
jumpers upon the sea’s surface. With these images, he says, he would often only retroactively 
realize that the camera had captured a jump, maybe after noticing the Coast Guard arriving 
on the scene he had been recording. As director he thus made an ethico-aesthetic choice to 
try to get up closer to the jumpers and the action, and switched to larger telephoto-lenses 
in February. These, he believed, would allow him to get more intimate and ‘close-up’ images 
of the jumpers during their last moments, which he hoped would help make palpable ‘the 
darkest corner of the human mind’ by capturing all the bodily gestures, expressions and 
actions during the build up to the final event-acts. 
A brief consideration of Sobchack’s typology of ethical gazes can be used to guide us here, 
especially as these help to identify how Steel’s telephoto sequences reify a ‘helpless gaze’: a 
form of looking that seemingly actualizes a technical, physical or legal distance from the 
observed events. Typically, these helpless forms of gazing expose the ‘embodied situation of the 
filmmaker and thus his or her capacity to affect the events before the camera lens’ (Sobchack 
2004: 249). However, we must concede in these instances that any embodied relationships to 
the subjects and objects recorded are distanced or absented by the huge spatial gaps imparted 
and indexed by the unstable telephoto camera lenses. In Steel’s case the helplessness of this 
distancing gaze is often counter-balanced by extra-textual or paratextual information, such 
as our knowledge gleaned from the BBC press of Steel arming his crew with mobile phones 
with direct links to the emergency services, and priming them to intervene as soon as they 
witness a body cross the barrier. Such extra-textual knowledge clearly infuses and recasts the 
film’s helpless modes of looking with a more discernible ‘humane’ quality, which implicitly 
converges to express that although ‘there is no tolerable point of view from which to gaze at 
such a death’, by recording them we simultaneously assert that this ‘horror must be witnessed 
and attested to’ (Sobchack 2004: 253). On account of the extra-diegetic location of such 
information regarding the crew’s duties to intervene, we might thus say that the ethical gaze 
of Steel’s film is ostensibly helpless, albeit framed by a horizon of humaneness. 
Due to its high production values The Bridge arguably also invokes a variation of 
what Sobchack refers to as the most ethically ambiguous documentary gaze of all: the 
‘professional gaze’, which is understood to oscillate between the services of journalism 
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and humanitarianism (Sobchack 2004: 255). Debatably, Steel locates a molecular balance 
between these two, especially if we consider the film as a sober political documentary and 
ethico-aesthetic artwork, which aims to impact the spiritual life of the viewer. The complex 
intersection of these different forms of gaze becomes dramatically played out within a key 
scene featuring a tourist photographer named Richard Waters who crossed paths with, 
and pointed his own camera at, a potential jumper on the bridge one day. The inclusion of 
these images, along with a subsequent recorded interview with Waters, appears strategically 
inserted into The Bridge in order to help the film self-consciously reflect upon the role of 
documenting or observing suicide through a camera lens. 
The dramatic retelling and re-presentation of this event witnesses the film crosscutting in-
between Steel’s helpless telephoto documentary footage of Waters and the probable female 
jumper upon the bridge platform, a talking-heads interview with Waters recorded at a later 
date, and the close-up photographs Waters himself took upon the bridge on that fateful day. 
Interestingly, Waters’ images provide the only images within The Bridge actually taken from 
the structure itself, and as such provide a contrasting ‘reverse-angle’ perspective from the 
majority of the film’s other perception images, which are invariably recorded from the Bay 
Area looking out to the bridge. Not only do these images geographically and philosophically 
look-back at Steel’s own absent cameras, but their crisp and clear aesthetic also introduces 
an unusual stilled and intimate gaze that contrasts much of the documentary’s own grainy 
long-shot footage. 
From Steel to Waters
The reflexive sequence in question first introduces viewers to a hooded woman walking 
upon the bridge platform. Initially, just another of many human bodies isolated from within 
the red steel and cable landscape. Glimpses of Waters taking photos on and around the 
bridge are suddenly intercut, in a parallel montage fashion, immediately linking the two 
characters together. An alternative upbeat score is also sneaked in to parcel together these 
two particular bodies, drawing attention to an emerging quasi-narrative passage of an event-
within-the-larger-film-event. Waters is here arrested intermittently leaning on, over, or 
across the bridge’s barrier, all the while snapping photographs with his camera and gazing 
photographically as he carves up the scenery around him. As we watch him frame and click, 
one of his still photographs is edited into the film assemblage, depicting the cross-shaped 
shadow of the bridge upon sea from his point-of-view (POV). Several more ‘quoted photos’11 
are inserted into the sequence, functioning to suture together a unique quasi shot-reverse-
shot effect, at the same time as an alien ‘stilling’ trope and alternative way of perceiving (the 
familiar subject matter) is introduced into the film’s thinking. 
Returning to Steel’s telephoto shots from the shore, the film presently cuts to images 
of the hooded woman coming to a complete standstill by some suspension cables, as she 
begins staring over the barrier contemplating the sea below. Moments later Steel captures 
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Waters and the woman in the same frame: Waters here walking behind the now statuesque 
female figure. One more stilled image enters from Waters’s POV, as the photographer begins 
speaking to Steel’s viewers in voice-over: 
I was taking pictures of Alcatraz at the time, and whilst taking a picture I saw, like out of 
the corner of my eye, a girl walking by, and she climbed over the rail. And, she did it so 
smoothly, it was almost like she was going to her own little club house. Like, I don’t know, 
like she was going to sit on the ledge and eat lunch. 
As he says this, Steel’s camera captures the woman’s decisive clamber over the barrier in a 
single take, which is then intercut with Waters’s still images of the same event from the 
reverse angle. Waters’s voice continues:
So, I got a couple of pictures of her climbing over, and then I started taking pictures of her 
standing on a ledge, and I realised that this girl is about to jump. But when I was behind 
the camera, it was almost like it wasn’t real, because I was looking through the lens. I was 
actually, like I guess, waiting for her to jump, because I thought there was nothing I could 
do, it was too late.
The sudden arbitration of Waters’s photographs alongside his mediating voice-over account 
(during an interview with Steel) begin to fortuitously introduce a surrogate or double for 
Steel and his cameras into and within the body of the thinking film. Here, Waters also 
poetically describes or justifies why he initially continued to observe and take photographs 
of the unfolding event rather than (re)act and try to alter the situation: 
As crazy as it sounds, I think of myself like [how I imagine] a National Geographic 
photographer must feel. When he’s behind the camera filming, and there is a big tiger 
running at him, and his footage is so great that he forgets that […] you know, in a couple 
of seconds that tiger’s going to be right on top of him. And it’s like, you’re in that camera, 
and just behind, and you don’t really think about what is going on. And that’s where I had 
to separate, or get out of that mode of thinking, and act on it and actually do something 
to help her.
After taking two or three dramatic snaps of the woman poised afore the abyss – which the 
film shares with viewers – Waters says he suddenly broke out of his passive observer role and 
began actively intervening in the scene. Immediately, we return to Steel’s recording of the 
events from the shoreline, capturing Waters reaching across barrier, and pulling the 
anonymous and voiceless woman back over onto the bridge. As she disappears over the rail 
onto the ‘safe’ side, beyond the film’s gaze, viewers perceive fragments of bodies and 
movement which Waters’s voice-over describes as the woman putting up a fight: until ‘I sat 
on her chest’ and dialled 911. 
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The inclusion of Waters’s photographs and testimony intercut with, and run alongside 
Steel’s film, serves to put Steel and Waters, film camera and stills camera, film-maker and 
photographer into direct relation, and draw into relief the core ethical issues surrounding 
the differences and similarities between observing and acting qua materially and practically 
intervening.12 Waters’s later description of how the woman he ‘saved’ then unexpectedly 
turned her gaze upon him as he left also serves to cast a troubling shadow over the idea 
that anyone necessarily has the right to intervene in such an event-act in the first place (one 
thinks here of David Hume and the individual’s right to commit suicide). Steel here cuts to 
Waters’s photograph of the woman being handcuffed by bridge authorities, staring back at 
him making the picture. Her return of his gaze caused him to feel guilt, Waters says, and to 
question his rights to intervene or block her suicidal desires (using physical strength and 
brute force). Waters’s final image makes this all the more troubling, for in her face we can 
detect, or project, a continuation of her pain and suffering (and anger at his blocking of her 
‘free will’). These feelings are compounded shortly after when viewers are presented with 
one of Steel’s images of the same woman returning to the bridge at a later date (we assume), 
and (again) peering over the edge into the void. Here, bridge security arrives rapidly in 
time to block her attempt. It is never made clear whether or not it was the film-makers who 
dialled 911 this time (but if so it serves to erect another link between Steel and Waters). 
Directly following on from these abnegated attempts, the film returns viewers to an 
image of a now familiar lean figure dressed in black, Gene Sprague, as he restlessly paces up 
and down the bridge’s platform. With hindsight he was the first human figure viewers were 
introduced to during the opening sequence, and is one of the few characters obsessively 
returned to throughout the film’s running time. Courtesy of his unique look and his friends’ 
testimonies, he also emerges as the only actor viewers become sure is actually going to kill 
himself before they actually see him doing so. Arriving at this point brings us to yet another 
troubling dimension of the film that raises moral questions with regard to our ethical 
reception of it, and forces us to engage with what it is Steel’s arrangement of these images 
make viewers think and do during and after screening. 
Documentary Ludology and Thinking Philosophically
The first suicidal jump viewers witness in The Bridge is shocking. The body falls through 
space, and pierces through time. The effect is to immediately institute a disturbing ludic 
viewing experience that changes what audiences actually see in and around the film’s images. 
And for the majority of the film’s duration thereafter, an unsettling and apprehensive mode 
of looking is ignited. The discomfort felt immediately instils a desire to try to (protectively) 
know in advance who is a jumper, and who is not: as if this foreknowledge might somehow 
offset the raw shock instigated by seeing the finality of a suicide action-event: which it never 
does. No, every lone body singled out upon the bridge’s platform by Steel’s camera ostensibly 
becomes, in the viewer’s mind at least, a potential, or virtual jumper. As such, actual 
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documented suicidal actors come to coexist and comingle alongside a ghostly population of 
imagined compossible jumpers, whose numbers expand to include anyone framed alone 
upon the bridge.13 
From the irruptive shock of the first jump, actual and virtual, the possible and the 
compossible, the visible and invisible become disturbingly folded together, concomitant 
with an unsettling erosion of any sense of having mastery or control over the emotions or 
feelings the film will subject us to. In lieu of certainty or foreknowledge, viewers are left 
to scrutinize the minutiae of body language, gait, mannerisms, facial expressions, micro 
gestures for clues. Viewers here sense, judge and analyse everyone framed by Steel’s cameras, 
predicting who might, and might not be a jumper. The experience is to be left suspended 
and exposed, between a documented past event and a future shock or surprise (during the 
event of screening), between the actual and the virtual, and the illogicality of the soon to 
be and already been. But when the jumpers leap, we are always surprised. As are we when 
others do not. 
Surprise thus becomes a powerful and intensive affect and sensation unleashed by 
the film. One image shows us a jovial man intercepted mid-life speaking on his mobile 
telephone, communicating with expressive pantomime gestures to some friend on the other 
end of the line. We can detect a smile as he hangs up. As he then removes his sunglasses, he 
inexorably moves towards, and then over the bridge’s barrier, in one unforced movement. 
Four seconds later, he has departed this plane. We are caught off guard, punctured, deflated: 
his exceptional departure jarringly irreconcilable with the banality of his preceding (now 
final) everyday habits. Another image pricks us for a different reason, as we watch a man 
leaning out over the bridge’s barrier, alternately staring into space and hopelessly sobbing 
into his arms. He suddenly hangs out, far over the safety of the railing, seemingly at the end 
of his tether. In the context of the film, many viewers might anticipate that this mortal must 
be contemplating his end, and visualizing his final leap into the void. As if confirming these 
premonitions, his body suddenly settles into a profound and pregnant stillness. But he does 
not jump. Instead, he wipes clean his face, takes one final look over the edge and walks 
away towards a life. Another likely suspect downs a beer alone near the barrier. Tossing 
the bottle over the edge, he stoops to watch the empty vessel tumbling towards the water’s 
surface. After an expectant pause, he too seems to reject the jumping option, and strolls off. 
Were these actually averted jumps? Last-minute changes of heart? A decision to live 
otherwise? Or were the only ‘real’ thoughts of their suicide in the minds of the film and 
viewer? In our surprise at their departure on foot, we are left to ponder the meaning of these 
anticipatory braces and emotional affects that impact us from a virtual plane or the realms 
of compossibility, and that on this occasion (or in this dimension) did not materialize or 
actualize. But were we not affected by these unsettling feelings or untimely experiences all 
the same? And was not our experiential brace met with real feelings of relief when nothing 
suicidal actually came to pass? Does it matter that these emotions that were so real in us had 
their origins in the virtual that split off from the actual? That is, the nonorganic Life that 
gripped our world, and displayed a very real power to act upon and affect us. 
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All the actual encounters with the suicidal leaps are marked by surprise. Even if viewers 
have rightly earmarked a jumper, or correctly anticipated that they are watching a human 
living out their last mortal moments on Earth. These palpable affects recall and recast the 
work of Jason E. Smith, who contends that the suicidal act by its very nature is always a 
surprise. Including for the actors: even if they have planned their self-killing down to the very 
last detail. For the suicide-act merely appears as the final action in a long chain of planned 
events, decisions and executions, wherein the ‘last glimmer of consciousness must be one of 
amazement, of desperate surprise’ (Smith 2010: 83). The fact that so many of the jumps jar 
us with surprise during our encounter with the film seems to bear out Smith’s view, as if the 
affect were somehow passed directly between jumper and viewer via the medium of film. 
As indicated, there is but one actor that the film signals us in advance is a jumper. And 
although the action of his jump is arguably the most surprising, to my mind, the decision 
to draw attention to this figure presents us with one of the most unethical choices Steel 
makes as a film-maker on this outing. To understand why, we must recognize that formally 
speaking, Steel opted to mix up the calendric order of the suicides he captures as they appear 
on-screen. On the one hand this disregard for the chronological order of frozen ‘historical’ 
events can be understood as part of an artistic strategy to foreground the movements of a 
‘pure event’, but on the other hand one cannot help but feel that this logic also betrays an 
aesthetic desire to intensify the dramatic resonance of the film as an experiential encounter. 
For Steel appears to save the ‘best’, or rather the most visually dramatic and memorable 
jumper and jump, for last. As if the film reaches some form of crescendo or peak with the 
suicide-act of Gene Sprague, whose leap from the bridge constitutes a spectacular and 
theatrical backwards open-armed tumble into the air. Over and above his leap, Sprague 
himself makes for an interesting and dramatic character, cutting a lean figure, bedecked 
from head to toe in black, wearing wraparound sunglasses and leather clothes, and sporting 
long black wavy hair that dynamically blows in the wind.
In interview Steel speaks of how Sprague spent about an hour and a half pacing up and 
down from the north to south end of the bridge before finally committing to his jump: a 
period of time with uncanny parallels to the film’s own running time. As is perhaps becoming 
evident, the real-time parallels are formally made evident by the film thinking, which 
employs Sprague as the first and last human image we see in and on The Bridge. Beyond 
bookending the film with this dramatic character, Steel also opts to intersperse images of 
him throughout as he restlessly prepares for his jump. It is the film’s obsessive return to this 
memorable figure, in combination with interviews and commentaries from his friends, that 
allows Sprague to surface as the sole actor singled out as an actual – as opposed to a virtual 
or potential – jumper before the fact. By so doing, Steel’s editing and formal arrangements 
ostensibly make Sprague a quasi ‘star’ of the film. This notion can be borne out somewhat 
by a brief consideration of the film’s Wikipedia page, wherein Sprague appears as the only 
jumper dedicated with an entire section. 
Sprague’s distinct look and long preparation no doubt contributes to his ‘star’ status, as 
does his colourful biography and backstory, and the practical philosophical musings of his 
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larger than life godmother in her interview sections. Sprague also stands out for being the 
only jumper to climb theatrically up on the four-foot rail, turn his back to the abyss, face the 
bridge’s public, and fall majestically backwards to his death whilst holding his arms aloft in 
a cross shape. My gut feeling is that as a by-product of this Hollywood-like dramatic action, 
with its proximity to the film’s end credits and closing emotional score, Steel transforms 
Sprague into something like a romantic figure. Which in light of the director’s self-professed 
knowledge of so-called suicide contagion appears to be an ethically inconsistent dramatic 
decision. 
Others appear to hold a comparable view, albeit extending their indignation to Steel’s 
more general use of suicidal images. Mark Chaffee, the President of the Suicide Prevention 
Advocacy Network-California, for example, argues that Steel’s film is dangerous:‘it’s 
irresponsible, exploitative, voyeuristic, ghastly and immoral, […] The phenomena of 
copycat suicides come from people just reading about this. Now we’re showing it in full 
colour on the big screen? That’s just beautiful!’ (in Glionna 2006). Celia Kupersmith, the 
CEO and general manager of the Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation District 
shares comparable beliefs, contending that there actually were observable increases in the 
number of suicide attempts off the bridge after Steel’s film began to get publicity in festivals. 
Adding statistics to these (spurious or selective) claims, Rosenfeld quotes the bridge’s official 
spokesperson May Currie, who maintains that in the two months following The Bridge’s 
Tribeca Film Festival premiere, there was a marked ‘increase in people contemplating 
suicide from the bridge and a spike in overall activity by fourfold’: with incident reports 
and bridge statistics indicating ‘that after Steel’s movie premiered in April, the number 
of people who attempted suicide by jumping off the bridge spiked from three in April to 
[eleven] in May’ (Rosenfeld 2006). 
No conclusive links between the documentary and the suicides are ever firmly established, 
however, and no other explanations or other contributing factors are ever introduced into 
the equation (such as economic crashes, foreign wars and falling employment rates). All 
the same, if one is to believe these claims, Steel’s actions appear to reify a cine-ethics with 
bloody hands. Bearing this in mind, it now remains for us to turn to the other machinic 
impacts of the film as an immanent force that strives to make a real (political, practical and 
philosophical) difference in the world. 
A Practical Art and Political Machine
In interview Steel stated that he hoped The Bridge would achieve various goals. One desire 
was an utterly pragmatic one: to force the inert bridge authorities into erecting a safety rail 
that would make the act of jumping off the bridge, if not impossible, extremely difficult. 
Another associated goal was to force viewers to emotionally engage with the real issues of 
mental illness and suicide, and by so doing, catalyse a robust public, and therefore political 
dialogue. The director here, as elsewhere, describes a desire to create a film that articulates 
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itself with real-world problems, and aims to ignite an immanent movement of world by 
mobilizing bodies into action, and making a real difference within and upon the milieu it 
screens in. 
If The Bridge can be understood desiring to make machinic connections to other 
immanent bodies, the first way in which it does this is by disturbing everyday modes of 
thinking about these taboo issues. That is, by provoking viewers to make new associations 
and to perceive or think new patterns. To this end, we might say that if The Bridge was 
about one isolated suicide and actor it would likely be received as an all too familiar human 
tragedy; likewise if it was ‘just’ about two or three self-killings at that particular spot. But 
Steel forces viewers to face one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, 
twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-
one, twenty-two, twenty-three images of actual suicide, and evokes the twenty-fourth that 
eluded his cameras during the fifty-two weeks of filming. These, in turn, were linked to the 
unlikely survival story of the jumper Kevin Hines, and other images of Waters and bridge 
authorities intervening to prevent even more public suicides from becoming actualized. The 
film also interlinks the set of 2004’s twenty-four successful leaps to those of all the previous 
years at this particular suicide hotspot, so that this annual set joins up to the Golden Gate’s 
set of all sets, which began when the bridge opened in 1937.14 The film, in turn, connects 
these to a glut of national and international suicide forums and ‘help’ groups, which offer 
advice on how to succeed at suicide the first time. And it is in this sense that the film begins 
to think suicide in quantities that trouble and disturb common everyday attitudes, and 
encourages thought to zigzag from the particular to the general, or from the case of the 
Golden Gate to a wider national and international phenomenon, so that the issue of self-
killing begins to take on an altogether different (political and philosophical) pallor. With 
regard to this, Steel describes wanting to make a ‘movie that stays with you, and makes you 
think’, a film that ‘can change views about mental illness and suicide’, by forcing people to 
engage with ‘the bigger picture’ rather than just focusing in on the smaller personal issues 
(Steel 2006b). 
Indeed, throughout The Bridge the notion that the sum of all these suicides and cases 
of mental illness is greater than the individual pathologized parts gradually becomes 
discernible, so that viewers begin to think, feel or see these actors in terms of a sign or 
symptom of something different, something else (and not directly represented). As such, the 
images and stories of these spiritually crushed and mentally ill actors gradually gain different 
meanings, at the same moment as the people that the film focuses upon begin to emerge as 
a marginalized or missing people not too unlike those discussed by Deleuze as the focus of 
the modern political cinema. Related to this, many of the biographical stories recounted by 
the friends, families and acquaintances of the jumpers begin to link up and talk back to each 
other, with all too familiar details resonating in-between the gaps and fissures of the broken 
mosaic picture. Themes here travel freely in-between different back-stories, and resonate 
across the discussions of one actor and the next: Unemployment, depression, alienation, low 
self-worth, despair, unrealizable (implanted) desires. 
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If we return to Deleuze’s work on Spinoza here, we can recognize these qualified feelings 
and emotions as sad passions, which modify beings from the ‘outside’, in a manner that 
serves to undermine notions of all of these individual self-killings being free ‘choices’ made 
by autonomous and free individuals. In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, for example, Deleuze 
outlines comparable sad encounters in terms of decreasing the individual’s power to be 
affected with joy, or of diminishing their power to act, and as impacting them in such a way 
as the modified part ‘behaves like a poison that disintegrates the other parts and turns against 
them’, and in extreme cases results in suicide (Deleuze 1988: 34). Echoes here again of the 
Durkheimian notion of suicide as a social fact linked to broken or dysfunctional societies, 
or of individual suicides being ‘provoked by society’ to employ Antonin Artaud’s (to whom 
we will return in future chapters) more blazingly polemical framing of comparable ideas 
(see Artaud 1948). Making such affects palpable allows Steel’s film to promote thinking 
these missing people in terms of the ‘the new wounded’ (Malabou 2012), or as victims of 
the global ‘mental health plague’ (Fisher 2009: 19). Steel shows us those who are made sick 
through their disempowering encounters and gives shape to a hidden and informe non-
population that are seemingly made ill by their interactions within a noxious inhuman 
assemblage. 
On account of the absolute ‘commonness’ of mental illness in developed countries such 
as the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom today, crusaders increasingly 
demand that mental illness be recognized as a political category. This involves permitting 
the possibility that it is both the abstract logic and concrete sociotechnical practices of these 
neoliberal societies that are in part responsible for affecting so many with sad passions, 
which lead to endemic mental illness, and the current ‘suicide epidemic’. Or, to conflate 
Spinoza with Durkheim here, we must become politically aware of the ‘suicidogenetic’ 
pathogens in circulation outside and beyond individual victims, which effectively render 
suicide ‘one of the forms through which the collective affection from which we suffer 
is transmitted’ (Durkheim 1997: 37). One thinks specifically here of the Institute for 
Precarious Consciousness’s recent manifesto entitled ‘Six Theses on Anxiety and Why it 
is Effectively Preventing Militancy, and One Possible Strategy for Overcoming it’ (2014), 
which forwards the idea that each phase of capitalism trades in different negative affects, 
which become known to all that suffer them as a shared ‘public secret’ (2014: n.p.). There, 
three distinct phases, or historical phase transitions, of capitalism become linked by their 
tendency to blame ‘the system’s victims for the suffering that the system causes’ (2014: n.p.). 
If nineteenth-century capitalism affected its working-class victims with misery, and the 
Fordism of the twentieth century produced confrontations with boredom, today most are 
subjected to feelings of anxiety: which is most often personalized, or pathologized, so that 
‘the problem is only visible at an individual, psychological level; [and] the social causes of 
the problem are concealed’ (2014: n.p.). Similar claims were made by Mark Fisher, who 
earlier noted that the system at the root of the cause ultimately compounds matters by 
insisting upon a pernicious ‘privatization’ of stress and mental illness, which forecloses any 
political interventions and prevents us from asking how it has ‘become acceptable that so 
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many people, and especially so many young people, are ill?’ (2009: 19, 2012). The major 
road-blocks to recognizing and tackling these political problems and acting to address 
them are, in turn, linked to neoliberal government bodies and Big Pharma corporations 
that desire profit and control. Fisher again: ‘By privatising these problems – as if they were 
caused only by chemical imbalances in the individual’s neurology and/or by their family 
background – any question of social systemic causation is ruled out’ (2009: 21). Therefore, 
all political possibilities or solutions are always-already foreclosed in advance, by a system 
that wilfully ignores the entanglement of the individual body and its wider assemblages, 
and desires its populations flee the stark fact of death in order to continue consuming neo-
liberal technologies of the self (including repeatable and profitable pharmaceutical solutions 
to personal anxiety, stress and mental illness). 
It is by recalibrating our perceptions of these issues, or offering new vistas onto them 
that The Bridge primarily emerges as an ethical film, with its politico-aesthetic treatments 
of these issues forming into a counter-rhythm that works to make a real difference. Here we 
also might note that by so doing, The Bridge helps generate real movements of the world, 
and increases a wide range of actors’ will to power, allowing them to think, act and desire 
in new ways. To take a few illustrative cases here, we might note how Steel’s film clearly 
empowered the friends and family of multiple actors who ended their life at the bridge, 
inspiring them to self-organize into The Bridge Rail Foundation (2008–2012, and hereafter 
TBRF), a localized pressure group that campaigns assiduously for the erection of a safety 
barrier upon the bridge. On their official website, TBRF informs visitors that in 2005, before 
Steel’s film had actually debuted, the documentary was already demonstrating a backwards 
affect upon the material world from the vantage of the future. Indeed, the awareness of a 
forthcoming documentary that provided ‘visual evidence of ongoing death at the Golden 
Gate’ led to an emergency meeting of the ‘outraged and embarrassed’ Bridge District (TBRF 
2008–2012). Thereafter, the website tells us that the San Francisco Chronicle reported:
The board, seated around a vast, oblong table, listened all morning to individual stories of 
suicide. So many people showed up with photos of their loved ones that some had to wait 
in the hallway. One by one, they stood or sat at the end of the table and spoke, a funeral 
procession of mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, boyfriends and girlfriends, 
teachers and classmates. Knowing the statistics – 18–20 suicides a year from the bridge, 
around 1,300 since it opened – still doesn’t prepare you for the weight of the grief in 
a room packed with people who have endured such pain and loss. You wonder how a 
person hearing these stories could ever view the bridge the same way again.
(Ryan 2005 in TBRF)
While covering these reactive events, journalists form the Associated Press cascaded reports 
to The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, European newspapers and Japanese television. 
These helped in turn to trigger other bodies into action, including a group of ‘U.C. Berkeley 
Engineering students [who] produced a set of scale model suicide barriers’, which in turn 
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‘received extensive press coverage and [were] published in the influential Journal of 
Architectural Engineering’. The San Francisco Chronicle also decided to reverse its long-
standing policy of not reporting on suicidal events, and tackled ‘the bridge suicide problem 
in a five-day, front-page feature series’. Marin County Coroner Ken Holmes was likewise 
moved to start ‘publishing a yearly death toll at the bridge – and included data from other 
counties as well as those missing and presumed dead’ (TBRF 2008–2012).
On the film’s release other articulations made with individual bodies continued to provide 
evidence of empowering and enriching assemblages that increased the will to power of all the 
parties involved. One powerful example can be located in the difference the film made to Kevin 
Hines, an unlikely character featured in the film who survived a jump from the bridge, found 
God on the way down, and later began touring the country with Steel’s movie to proselytize 
and lend his voice to the political cause.15 In an interview Hines describes The Bridge as a rare 
positive force in his life, that he believes is not only ‘going to save lives’ but will also force viewers 
to confront the fact that ‘these are beautiful people with terrible issues that a lot of people want 
to just shove under the rug’ (Hines in Rosenfeld 2006). After touring with the film, Hines 
subsequently became a celebrated public speaker and political activist in his own right, delivering 
lectures and seminars on mental health issues and suicide awareness. He also still advertises The 
Bridge on his public webpage and associates his success with Steel’s film (Hines 2015). 
Other reports suggest that the increase in publicity surrounding the film’s release prompted 
bridge officials to fund a $2-million study into building a pedestrian suicide barrier – a move 
they had long resisted. Although this has long been postponed due to economic reasons, at 
the time of writing a seventy-six million dollar ‘steel suicide net’ is under tender and due to be 
erected (see BBC 2015).16 When all is said and done, then, even if we cannot establish concrete 
empirical ties between the film and the erection of a barrier, we might concede that both 
prehend each other as aspects of the same event. The practical result the film set out to achieve 
offers up a mixed bag. Around the film, mental illness and suicides are increasingly becoming 
recognized as a political category in the US political landscape, as the 2014 WHO Global 
Imperative on Preventing Suicide and the 2015 Republican and Democratic presidential 
candidate debates amply indicate. As arguably further aspects of the same event, the WHO 
report, the erection of a steel safety net and Steel’s film grasp each other and move into evental 
relationships across time. But if these practical and political issues are still under way, while 
we wait on the pure evental movement to stretch out and embrace more bodies, we can finally 
turn our attention to how The Bridge operates as an artistic force or affection that increases 
viewers’ will to power by inviting them (or providing the material conditions with which) to 
think ‘philosophically’ about life.
A Life Line
Philosophically speaking, The Bridge allows viewers to see and evaluate the shape of a life in 
a somewhat transfigured and trans-personal way. That is, the film allows viewers to perceive 
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life as an extended ecology of beings and inhuman becomings. These ideas are felt or signalled 
via recorded memories, documentary images, montaged collages and aesthetic sensations, 
which become artistically compounded or amplified by the film’s playful unravelling of 
different indices of time, and exposing of a heterogeneous arrangement of entangled 
temporalities via the wider assemblage of shots. Thus, whether it be a year, a day, an entire 
lifetime recalled in oral reflection, a rainbow, a flash of lightning, a weather system moving 
over an afternoon, a photographically arrested sliver of a second, a gestural pause before a 
jump or the (seemingly slow-motion) four seconds of free-fall captured by the tracking 
camera, many different sensations of time become woven into the larger screening event. In 
and around all of these, the bridge’s immense architectural stillness persists and insists, 
anchoring the events to a vital living structure. Such aesthetic touches gradually build into a 
minor counter-rhythm, as if the metteur-en-scene somehow conspired to intellectually and 
affectively convey an animistic-aesthetic presence, or endow the dramatic living-landscape 
with a mystical prehension of the all too human dramas unfolding at this monumental 
intersection of man and nature. Concomitant with this, and on an intersecting symbolic 
plane, the bridge also signals or speaks of the passage between the all too human world and 
the more-than-human world that lies (around and yet) beyond it. 
Returning to the life, rather than death of Sprague here can help make this point clear. 
Indeed, Sprague, like all the jumpers in the film, is constantly isolated by the camera’s 
framing and gaze alone upon the platform, before his body is tracked falling (in his case 
backwards) to his death. In extreme, his case makes clear that through Steel’s telephoto lens, 
viewers always see the jumpers apart from, rather than as a part of their vital environment; 
or their extended body of friends, lovers, parents, colleagues, pets or psychiatrists, which 
together constitute the extended body of swarming becomings that delimit the real shape 
of a life. The talking heads sections and photographic montages help partially reconstruct 
and reinsert this distributed teeming body. In Sprague’s segments, viewers see photographs, 
hear memories, anecdotes and stories regarding his past adventures, loves, hopes, desires, 
disappointments and depressions. In the faces, bodies and gestures of his friends we can 
locate the lingering traces of his life and its ongoing affects: via the involuntary curve of a 
smile upon the lips of a friend who recalls a happy encounter, or through the impressionistic 
mimetic hand gestures of another who re-animates an old debate. It is in these involuntary 
and impulsive movements that we catch a glimpse of what an immanent life after death 
might look like: distributed affective resonances. 
Recalling the words of Rosi Braidotti, the concept of life that the film builds up and unfolds 
is neither a transcendental essence or quasi-religious concept, but rather a series of real and 
radically material acts, composed of memories and interminglings with other bodies (see 
Braidotti 2010: 152). Through these material traces and embodied memories, viewers are 
also invited to reflect upon their own living relationships with their fellow mortals. Other 
thoughts and ideas are unbridled and there for the taking too. For amongst other things, 
in and between the cathartic and emotional interviews, the film embeds realizations of the 
various different forms of love Alphonso Lingis discusses the living feeling for and towards 
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the dead and dearly departed. In one recorded interview, for instance, the interviewee 
expresses hopeless wishes for their missing friend to somehow return, for ‘he had not 
yet lived enough’. In another, the sadness of the friend who had ‘not loved the departed 
enough’ is made emotionally tangible. In the interview with Sprague’s godmother (a true 
stoic character), the film also unfolds that stranger expression of love that manifests itself in 
a person’s relief, or their seeming gladness for the loved one’s death, stemming from their 
knowledge that the one who was loved and suffered has now died, and therefore suffers no 
more. Evoking an Epicurean argument, time and again the film also makes perceptible that, 
indeed, it is the death of others, rather than ourselves, that is the hardest to face up to (see 
for example Critchley 2009: xxx). 
With its repeated fascination with tracking the arc of suicidal jumpers down into the void, 
however, and lingering upon their eerie disappearance, or transfiguration into the inhuman 
landscape, The Bridge not only begins to image death as the ‘degree zero’ of life, but also as 
a strangely impersonal event. Indeed, if earlier we said that the jumpers appear surprised 
by their own action, Smith also maintains that the suicidal actor is simultaneously infused 
with the sense that one ‘never dies by oneself, no matter how alone one may be’ (2010: 83, 
emphasis in original). This latter notion is also made discernable by The Bridge, courtesy 
of a strange form of affective feedback loop that the film fixes up between the jumpers and 
viewers, which bridges the chronological gaps between the event of recording and the act 
of looking. For if the feelings of surprise pass from actor to viewer during the screening 
encounter, these emerge alongside an impossible and untimely feeling of being present with 
the jumper during their last moments, as if a reverse affective flow somehow sutures the 
yawning gaps in time between the past event-act and our perception thereof in the viewing 
encounter. Although, in the last analysis, this may be attributable to the encounter-flow 
between the camera operator, suicidal actor, thinking film, and viewer. 
Despite our disjunctive viewing present/presence, the sense of the jumpers not being 
alone is also made felt by several other factors. At the most prosaic level, this is made 
palpable by the absented presence of the telephoto camera operator, whose hand shake and 
trembling make the human labour of recording present in and around the image. Coupled 
to this is a feeling of human presence that arrives courtesy of the very public nature of 
the event-acts themselves, which are always-already surrounded by streams of human and 
vehicular traffic contingently co-present with the jumpers during that particular moment 
in time. Even in the shots devoid of human witnesses this feeling remains, as a nonorganic 
vitalism or life emanating from the bridge, landscape and elements emerges and engulfs 
them. The presence of this vital force is in part a residual product of Steel’s intercutting 
of dynamic and dramatic moments of ‘nature’ wrestled from his 10,000 hours of footage 
around the Bay Area, which grant the monument and landscape an animistic lifeforce. This 
is to say, the film allows us to think or feel a panpsychic or nonorganic life of things that is 
always-already co-present with the jumpers in the film. 
The jumps themselves, in turn, mark a passage that forces viewers to recognize a strange 
doubling of life and by extension death. Here, it becomes useful to return to Deleuzian 
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models of life and death as it is outlined in The Logic of Sense, where any death is necessarily 
seen as double, being ‘the cancellation of the great difference that it represents in extension, 
by the swarming and the liberation of small differences that it implies in intensities’ 
(Deleuze 2004a: 333). Bruce Baugh explains how it is ‘at this very instant, impersonal dying 
makes death lose itself in itself, as the decomposition of one living body is simultaneously 
the composition of a new singular life, the subsumption of the dead body’s parts under 
a new relation’ (Baugh 2010: 64). From such a perspective, it becomes the ego alone that 
is confronted with death, which here formulates the end of subjectivity for the ‘I’, or the 
personal and recognizable anthropomorphic form of modern life. This can be understood 
as the personal death, or the actual death that ‘I’ mistakenly think ‘I’ experience when ‘I kill 
myself ’. In a distant echo of Epicurus’ dictum, ‘where I am, death cannot be’, this death is 
ultimately impossible to realize. For where subjective death is, the ‘I’ that thinks and speaks 
likewise cannot be. Steel hints at this idea operating within the film when he discusses the 
peculiar moments of film that bear witness to the erasure of the jumpers as subjects within 
the restless elemental landscape. Here, in the passage from monument to nature, life to 
death (or the nonorganic life of things) within the film frame, Steel describes how the scene 
wipes clean the memory of the human action that suddenly pierced or penetrated it: ‘The 
bridge has this magical ability to practically erase what happens there. Someone jumps, 
there’s a splash, the boats come by and then it’s as if nothing has happened’ (Steel 2006b). 
Another interview embedded within the film offers a discussion of a friend’s choice of the 
bridge as a fitting location to kill himself. This too exposes a strange doubly disjunctive 
nature to his death:
I think the bridge has a false romantic promise to it. Because he’s dead. And he doesn’t get 
to benefit from the romanticism of it. He doesn’t have any benefit from it. […]. [I mean] 
he doesn’t get any benefit from it. So what if his story has that at the end. He’s gone. […] 
So maybe when he walked out there he had a romantic moment or two, or an hour. But 
hitting the water can’t be fun. […]. [The bridge] just drew him with this [false] idea of, 
being famous […]. 
For Deleuze, the paradox of ‘my death’ is to uphold a false subject and object distinction 
that death itself ultimately wipes away. Baugh again: ‘To this death, as founded in the 
personal self and the body, Deleuze contrasts the “event” of dying, which is impersonal 
and incorporeal, expressed in the infinitive verb “to die” and in the predicate mortal’ 
(Baugh 2010: 64). The death of the subjective ‘I’ marks an event horizon, then, which The 
Bridge demands viewers broach time and again as it forces them to encounter the event 
of death and of dying. The double death that passes into and overlaps with two forms of 
life too, as the erased subject crosses a threshold to enter into what Deleuze in his final 
essay calls ‘a life’, or the impersonal ‘singular life immanent to man who no longer has a 
name’ (Deleuze 2001: 29). Steel’s film thinks this, or makes it perceptible to the viewers’ 
senses. 
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The film ultimately communicates these as pure haecceitic qualities, made sensible by 
the excellence of a light that seemingly sculpts space in a singular moment, the restless 
texture and myriad hues of scattered colour rubbed across the water’s surface by gusting 
winds, the shape and span of the bridge’s magisterial shadow projected onto a green ocean 
screen, or the elemental movements of huge weather systems through the Bay. In short, the 
intense inhuman forces, expressive elements and vitality of matter that the film aesthetically 
envelopes, and endows with a secondary ‘spiritual’ nature. Through these touches The 
Bridge ultimately manages to create and impart an aesthetic counter-rhythm that offers 
a glimpse of a more-than-human presence, or vital haecceitic nonorganic life of things 
that resonates with and around all the jumpers. And it is on account of this that the film 
wilfully imparts a sense of uplift into the otherwise troubling situation, which surfaces as a 
‘counter-effectuation of a line of death’ (Colombat 1996: 242). Or put differently, The Bridge 
offers a lifeline, a line of life, by creating a space for examination and emotive evaluation 
wherein viewers can ponder the shocking material and immanent reality of their own death, 
recognize an expanded concept of what life is, and have their will to power increased. For 
such reasons, and by such means, the film to me ‘does’ ethics, or constitutes a truly ethical 
encounter, and enables a rare opportunity to conduct a care of the self. As a machinic force, 
Steel’s film not only serves to raise the plight of missing people to a political level, then, but 
also allows us to ethically perceive and ward off the invisible threats that loom everywhere 
outside, and to rediscover the power of life, while being better armed to think, live, love or 
act otherwise in the future. 
Notes
 1 Andrew Schaeffer (January 10), Philip Manikow (January 16), Frank Cuneo (February 6), 
Donal Congress (February 20), Anaya Hausner (March 7), James Singer (March 9), Elizabeth 
Smith (April 11), David Paige (April 28), Greogory Faulkner (May 6), Deborah Chedel 
(May 10), Gene Sprague (May 11), Joseph Robinson (June 14), Klaus Grasner (July 16), 
Dan Rubinstein (August 2), Luke Calsius (August 6), Rachel Lichtle (August 20), Bernard 
Blackburn (September 16), Lisa Camilli (September 28), Phil Holstein (October 26), Michael 
Barnard (November 11), Ann Noon (December 16), Davin Salo (December 29).
 2 Scholars of film perhaps cannot help detecting echoes of Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) 
in such untimely gestures. This after all is a film that famously depicts a suicide attempt 
framed under the looming shadow of the Golden Gate Bridge, and leads to an unhinging 
of time, alongside a tense mobilization of cinematic suspense. Indeed, within Hitchcock’s 
narrative, Scottie’s (James Stewart) witnessing of Madeline’s (Kim Novak) suicidal gesture 
by the bridge leads to time itself slipping out of joint, and a spiralling return of jumping/
falling bodies. Parenthetically speaking, Deleuze also wrote of Hitchcock’s work as marking 
the proverbial bridge between the movement-image and  the time-image modalities of 
cinema.
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 3 For a broader discussion of similar multi-perspectival approaches to truth in documentary, 
see Mitcheson (2013).
 4 Stephen Perrella’s short but potent commentary states:
   The various speculations on Deleuze’s suicide in relation to his philosophy, have for 
the most part, assumed some degree of Deleuze’s conscious decision to leap toward a 
becoming-pavement event. The theoretical expressions here that most expressed the utter 
materiality in this act, were the most poetic responses to this radical empiricists death, 
but still assumed his having consciously chosen suicide. It might have been, that this 
act was not at all once borne of any conscious choosing. But the (desperate) reflex of a 
human reduced to an animal; not quite becoming-animal. Isn’t there something outside 
of conscious choosing, a subjectivity not specific to Deleuze’s formulations, that better 
characterizes his death?
 5 Serres writes: ‘I don’t think he committed suicide. It was impossible to breathe – he opened 
the window and […]’. For more, see Serres (1995).
 6 Others problematize this view by pointing to how Deleuze’s body fell onto a public street, 
and would have created a very public scene. Thus, the public would encounter it, and public 
officials would have to clean up his blood, as well as record and remove the body, etc. 
 7 For a detailed exegesis upon the differences between the notion of a static ‘historical event’ 
and a gaseous ‘pure event’, see Lundborg (2012). 
 8 Viewers bring to the encounter with the picture an embodied knowledge of cultural 
symbolism, aesthetics and an understanding of the image’s transformed meanings within 
different spaces or sites of emission (whether it appears in a western newspaper, an Art 
Gallery, or a Terrorist webpage). Together, these extra-photographic features modify and 
mediate the reception of the image, and what it connotes or communicates.
 9 Steel maintains that none of the family members or interviewees complained about his 
footage or indeed the film itself upon its release, claiming that many in fact understood 
his reasoning and were happy that his film was made and brought these issues out into the 
(cinematic) light.
10 A range of fiction films such as Suicide Club (Sion Sono, 2001) and more recently Brigend 
(Jeppe Rønde, 2015) also directly reference this ‘copycat suicide’ phenomenon. 
11 See Stewart (1999: 9).
12 We can draw parallels here between Waters body and the film body, which is itself acting 
within the world. But as an observer-cum-actor Waters is both a metaphoric double 
and an ideal. For although Steel and his crew averted or thwarted some suicide attempts 
(in interview Steel claims the crew averted around six), they did not manage to intervene 
and avert all that they encountered.
13 Reflecting this idea in her review of the film, blogger S.F. Violet describes this how after 
seeing the first jump, she suddenly realized that: ‘It could be anyone, any of the people I’m 
watching [could be] about to jump – and I was going to see it. Every new person I saw 
became suspicious, and I found myself trying to second guess the motives of each person 
looking at the view, or talking on their cell phone’ (Violet 2006).
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14 Numbers of successful and attempted suicides appear to have risen dramatically since the 
release of Steel’s film. At the time of writing there is an average of one attempt every two to 
three days. One report states:
   In 2014, 37 people jumped off the Golden Gate Bridge and 162 others were stopped 
by Bridge Patrol and California Highway Patrol officers. In 2013, 46 people jumped – 
the highest one-year total ever. In addition, 118 people were stopped from jumping. 
In 2012, 33 people jumped and 86 were stopped. In 2011, 37 jumped and 100 were 
stopped.
Today, the total number sits around 1700 jumpers. See ‘The Final Leap’ http://www.
thefinalleap.com/the-death-toll.html. 
15 Within the film Hines describes his ongoing troubles with depression, the dramatic build-
up to his decision to jump, and of how he found God on the way down as time dilated on 
his rush towards the water. Thanks to quick thinking, speedy actions, and the intervention 
of a Bay Area seal, Hines managed to survive his attempt that day long enough for the Coast 
Guard to rescue him.
16 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-34533779.
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Chapter Two
Cinema and/as Autism: Disorder-ing Movements from the Intellect to 
Intuition, Ego to the Eco, and ‘Pre-chunked’ Perception to In-forming 
Haecceitic ‘Shapes’ (via Deligny and Guattari)
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Too much of a trait causes severe disability, but a little can provide an advantage. 
Temple Grandin (2013: viii)
‘Trying to understand autism from within’ is the first axis of our approach to under- 
standing autism. In the first instance you need to try to share the mind of someone who 
is different.
Theo Peeters (2003: 17)
The world can be conceived as a medium for the transmission of influences.
A.N. Whitehead (1978: 286)
This chapter maps a series of movements. Philosophically and theoretically speaking, it is marked by a deliberate drift from Deleuze towards Guattari (for reasons that will soon become clearer). Thematically, it moves from the forms of psychological 
sickness and mental illness explored in chapter one to explore fundamentally different 
modes of being in the world linked to brain (or sensory) ‘disorders’. As such, we also 
necessarily chart a course through and away from narrative forms of cinema that favour 
‘normopathic’ re-presentations of reality to investigate multi-stream gallery installations 
and agential ‘autie-type’1 art brut films that disclose a dynamic vital world within, beyond, 
beneath and parallel to our everyday ‘neurotypical’ reality. Finally, in our exploration into 
these stimulating films, we are forced to trace a series of movements beyond the screen 
into the sensory realms of the viewers’ brains and bodies. 
Autism Now
A whole tangle of interweaving political, medical, legal and moral truth games gravitate 
around the pathologized state known as autism. For example, whether or not an autistic 
person lacking in a ‘theory of mind’ – or suffering from so-called ‘mind blindness’ – can 
be considered an equal member of the community is pertinent to moral philosophy (see 
e.g. Barnbaum 2008: 71–105); and by extension, whether or not such a being can be held 
accountable for their actions or their consequences becomes of importance to those 
practicing the law or safeguarding justice. With regard to discourses of human and civil 
rights, organizations such as MindFreedom International and Mad Pride contest and 
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dispute prevailing views upon the autistic condition, forwarding counter narratives to 
those deployed by ‘neuro-normal’ authorities (with their power/ knowledge) in the fields 
of medicine, psychiatry and pharmacology. The Autistic Rights Movement (ARM), for 
example, contest orthodox practices of categorizing autism as a ‘disease’, ‘disability’, 
‘disorder’ or even a ‘problem’. Associated political groups such as The Aspies for Freedom 
likewise rail against what they perceive to be unethical forms of treatment and therapy, 
particularly those that physically restrict or chemically inhibit natural embodied autie-
type modes of thought, feeling, expression or movement. What is more, recent 
neurodiversity debates work to confront the politics of funding research into ‘cures’ and 
prenatal screening tests, defiantly recasting these practices as modern (neurotypical or 
neuro-normal) forms of eugenics, linked to a dubious bio-political desire to actualize an 
autistic ‘genocide’.2 
Whatever ones thoughts on these divisive issues, many writers, scholars and historians 
have made strong cases over the years against framing autism exclusively in terms of 
problems, handicaps and disabilities. One effective strand mounts a counterclaim wherein 
many of humanity’s greatest creative geniuses (whether they be inventors, philosophers, 
scientists, mathematicians, artists, engineers, musicians and so on) are shown to be 
touched by, or located somewhere upon, the autistic continuum (see inter alia Fitzgerald 
2004; Brown 2010; Bogdashina 2010; Grandin 2006). In this chapter we look to art and art 
brut for answers, paying attention to what happens to the form and content of films that 
forge articulations with these alternative ways of perceiving, thinking, acting, expressing 
and being; and by so doing directly invite viewers to re-think or re-perceive autism, or to 
feel differently about these affective conditions. We thus probe into what an ethical autistic 
cinema might look or feel like, and explore ‘what it can do’ as an immanent machinic force. 
Setting up a three-tined structure to approach these multivalent issues, we initially 
work to adumbrate some key differences between an ‘all too human’ mode of neurotypical 
perception and an (abstracted) ‘alien’ autistic form. Thereafter we move on to interrogate 
mainstream cinema’s treatment of characters on the autistic continuum, noting how these 
offer a tantalizing glimpse into what an alternative autistic worldview may be like. The final 
section picks up and then moves beyond Art cinemas in order to explore affective forms of 
audio-visual expression that unsettle both classical models of film language and indeed the 
cinematic apparatus, whilst affectively pushing perception beyond the typical world of the 
ego, into what we can here call the in-forming heteromorphic eco. Which is an expanded 
vibrational ecology of things that disorders and disorganizes the Other (qua social) as its 
primary structuring coordinate, and which invites participatory viewers to become touched 
by, or in-habit, a dynamic enclave of non-symbolic and pre-linguistic experiential energy-
matter. We thus end the chapter by exploring very different forms of unbecoming autie-type 
cinemas that find expression in the art therapy film Le Moindre Geste (The Least Gesture, 
Jean-Pieerre Daniel and Fernand Deligny, 1971), Angela Melitopoulos and Maurizio 
Lazzarato’s three-channel video installation Assemblages: Félix Guattari and Machinic 
Animism (2010) and the non-cinema art brut YouTube microfilm In My Language (2007) by 
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autistic film-maker Amanda Baggs, which Erin Manning recently discusses as expressing 
an alternative autistic ‘leaky sense of self ’ (2013). By allowing viewers to sense or perceive 
the dynamism of the inhuman confederation of preconceptual and prepersonal affects as 
it experientially enfolds and unfolds as a range of unique in-forming haecceitic ‘shapes’, all 
three of these disorder-ing and defamiliarizing art works display different a-signifying and 
non-representational strategies to make perceptive alterity palpable to the viewer’s senses. 
To help expose the practical, political and ethical value of decentring subjectivity in 
these ways, we explore how these films can be understood transversally marshalling 
affective aesthetics and intensive sensations to unsettle, revitalize, recalibrate or reorient 
sedimentalized or habitual neurotypical perceptive-cognitive models (see for example 
Mullarkey 2009; Jullier 2010; Tarnay 2010; Brown 2015: 133–146), whilst concomitantly 
unveiling an alternative human perspective onto the world. Or put differently, by forming an 
assemblage with autistic themes and modes of thought and perception, these unbecoming 
cinemas of autism and animism unleash contagious forms of experiential alterity that 
add new supplementary dimensions to our ‘private’ (neurotypical) understanding of the 
immanent relations between body, brain and material plane. 
From Classical to Conceptual Autism
As indicated, advocates of neurodiversity increasingly maintain that autism is best conceived 
of as a ‘spectrum’ of different conditions embedded upon a continuum. However, because a 
spectrum is such a linear schema, it might better be thought of here in terms of a nodal 
constellation or network of different conditions. Indeed, amongst many other diagnostic 
categories and syndromes that this would permeate out to include, we would discover 
neurotypicals touched with (what are called) ‘shadow traits’, individuals diagnosed with 
pervasive development disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, Rhett’s syndrome, 
Kanner’s syndrome, Asperger’s syndrome, savant syndrome, high- to low-functioning 
autism and schizophrenia (Manning 2013; Skott-Myhre and Taylor 2011; Bogdashina 2010; 
Tammet 2009; Barnbaum 2008; Prince-Hughes 2005; Grandin 2006, Grandin and Panek 
2013; Ernspberger 2006). From a neurodiversity perspective, autism, or rather a range of 
autisms, effectively constitute alternative forms of being, which as we will shortly discover, 
many see insisting or persisting beneath the ‘normal’ or neurotypical perceptual world (of 
the ‘Other’ and the social), and can best be grasped as constituting ‘a certain kind of border 
dwelling between modes of consciousness and affect’ (Skott-Myhre and Taylor 2011: 45). 
For the purposes of this chapter, and in a manner inspired by the way in which 
Deleuze and Guattari divorce their productive model of schizophrenia from the desolate 
schizophrenic deposited at the asylum door, so too will we abstract a productive notion of 
autistic perception from any pathologized individual. Albeit at times, incorporate autie-
type writings or experiences to help delimit a plane of conceptual consistency. But why? 
In the first place – and as Steven Shaviro recently notes – the neurodiversity movement 
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increasingly helps us to recognize that ‘autistic modes of thought should not be stigmatized 
as deficient just because they are evidently different from neurotypical ones’ (Shaviro 2014: 
132). Indeed, self-identifying autistic ‘spectrum’ people such as Dawn Prince-Hughes argue 
that autism offers ‘a beautiful way of seeing the world’ (2005: 2), and a radically different 
way of living or being that (she and many others claim) no one should ever desire to ‘cure’, 
medicate or otherwise ‘normalize’ out of existence. Similarly, Jim Sinclair maintains that: 
‘My personhood is intact. My selfhood is undamaged. I find great value and meaning in my 
life, and I have no wish to be cured of being myself ’ (Jim Sinclair in Barnbaum 2008: 15). For 
Olga Bogdashina, because the sensory processing functions in autism differ considerably 
from those of the ‘normal’ population, knowledge of autistic forms of perceiving and thinking 
provide us with a valuable alternative human outlook onto the same world (Bogdashina 
2010: 15). Michael Blastland goes further still, claiming that ‘people with autism may 
understand life better than those of us who seek to impose narratives on its rather random 
events, because they have a better sense of how random things can be’ (Blastland 2007: 
2). Certainly, as many autistics appear to be entirely blind or generally indifferent to ‘the 
entire field of representation’, Hans A. Skott-Myhre and Christina Taylor recognize autistic 
perception offering rich, untapped potentials for new revolutionary forms of practice and 
becoming (2011: 35–42). 
Building on similar – what we might here call – autie-type ethics or insights in her 
philosophical project Always More Than One: Individuation’s Dance (2013), Manning strives 
to transform typically negative encounters with autistic thought into an enriching and 
productive one, whilst arguing that we should all strive to become as autistically perceptive 
as possible. There, Manning sees the multiple, complex and continually diverging forms of 
autistic perception as being productively united in their liberating movements beyond rigid 
pre-fabricated ego-centric and/or anthropo-centric moral systems and desires. In point 
of fact, autistic perception promotes recognition of an expanded ecology of practices and 
things that collectively foreground a co-constituting ‘hyperrelationality’, or dynamic vitality 
that endlessly flows in-between humans, animals, spaces and energy-matter. As such, 
certain heterogenenic forms of autistic being surface as ‘a modality of becoming before it 
is any kind of individual pathologized state’, constituting an intensive thinking-feeling that 
charts lines of escape from the neurotypical’s representational universe, while opening up 
an alternative ‘ethic of the more than human’ that Manning argues is so urgently needed 
today (2013: 220). 
In his more recent monograph Universe of Things (2014), Shaviro makes comparable 
claims regarding what he calls an autistic form of ‘noncorrelationist thought’, which offers 
‘an alternative image of thought that is nonintentional, nonrelfexive, and most often 
nonconscious: a kind of ‘autistic’ thought that is not correlative to being but immanently 
intrinsic within it’ (Shaviro 2014: 12). Situating his Whiteheadean-inspired work in 
the wake of what we might call the speculative-realist turn (which includes a range of 
different speculative realisms such as ‘vital materialism’, ‘agential realism’, ‘object-oriented 
ontology’ and ‘alien phenomenology’), Shaviro argues that noncorrelationist autistic modes 
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of perceiving-thinking promise to help redress the legacy of (what Quentin Meillassoux 
calls) western philosophy’s ‘Kantian catastrophe’ (68), by pointing towards different ethico-
political potentials for perceiving, thinking and acting within the world (11). In short, 
such modes of thinking help ‘get at the strangeness of things’, while denouncing ‘Man’ as 
‘the measure of all things’: a philosophy Shaviro argues humanity needs more than ever in 
today’s (biospherical) climate (66).
Perhaps counter intuitively, then, from an autistic perspective, ‘normal’ senses and habitual 
perception are understood as favouring a perverted, distorted, inaccurate, incomplete or 
impoverished picture of ‘reality’ or what is ‘out there’. No doubt, neurologists, cognitivists, 
philosophers, psychologists, autistics, mystics and media scholars have been known to 
argue that ‘normal’ human perception is always-already mediated, negotiated, generalized 
and reductive. This is to say, from a cognitive top-down model of thought-perception, 
neurotypicals often only perceive what they mechanically expect to perceive. As a rule, when 
a neurotypical enters a new room, they pass through a door and perceive a table to sit at: 
rather than seeing that particular door, and that singular table, bedecked in all their matchless 
haecceitic refraction, hapticity and shadings. Bogdashina links this to both Henri Bergson 
and Aldous Huxley’s discussions of the ‘normal’ human brain’s eliminative filtering processes, 
which strain out excess perceptual information to protect perceivers from a paralysing 
sensory overload (or overwhelming encounter with the infinite, absolute or the Real). 
Writing before the pathological ‘event’ of autism, or the disorder being a clinically 
diagnosed concept, Bergson engaged with people with what he called ‘superabilities’ 
(arguably autistics avant la lettre), who displayed a lack, or different levels of, perceptive 
filtering in the brain (see Bogdashina 2010: 29; Bergson 1998, 1999). Influenced by Bergson, 
Deleuze describes ‘normal’ sensory-motor perception and affection in terms of being a 
‘subtractive’ affair, wherein neurotypicals only sense or perceive things partially, stripped 
bare of all that does not interest ‘us as a function of our needs’ (Deleuze 2005a: 66). We 
might playfully say here that neurotypical perception is more excessively censor-ry than 
excessively sensory. For Huxley, language plays a compounding role in creating a ‘restricted’ 
mind and worldview, with the enveloping form of conceptual intelligence we typically call 
‘normal’ in matter of fact being detrimentally constraining, particularly in comparison 
to the fluid intelligence of the unrestricted mind (2011). These notions find echoes in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the collective regimes of enunciation, which always pre-
exist subjects, and provide them with the linguistic tools and order words for living and 
working within and upon their milieu. This impersonal ‘fourth person’ aspect of language 
is ultimately linked to schizophrenia for Deleuze and Guattari, with individuals becoming 
situated within certain impersonal flows and murmuring fields of immanent language. The 
processes of assembling with these collective regimes essentially help reduce all perception 
to the quotidian and claustrophobic drudgery of the all too human universe of everyday 
experiences and implanted ‘molar’ desires. 
In sketching out the major differences between the autistic and neurotypical modes 
of thinking and perceiving as we understand it today, Manning argues that neurotypical 
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perception can be understood ‘to quickly parse objects from the field of resonance, whereas 
autistic perception tends to dwell in what is called a shaping’ (Manning 2013: 256). As 
such, neurotypical brains engage in a process that Anne Corwin describes as the conscious 
breaking up and sorting of the immediate environment into conceptual chunks: such as 
‘door’, ‘floor’, ‘table’ and so on (Manning 2013: 310). For autistics, neurotypicals are thought 
to ‘chunk too quickly’, though, as if the world somehow came pre-chunked. In articulation 
with dominant modes of perception-thought and action today, this might be thought of 
as a form of vertical or top-down capitalist perception, wherein chunking occurs as an 
egotistical process of determining the use-value of objects in the environment. As we will 
later discover, many autistics appear to retain access to that absolute relational field beneath 
or beyond this neurotypical or capitalist chunking, and can tune in to that pre-conscious, 
filtered out or backgrounded world of affective animism. That is, a world that Shaviro 
argues is alive with ‘panpsychic’ forces, and is best tapped into through a kind of autistic 
‘phenomenality without phenomenology, or a nonconceptual “what-is-it-likeness”’ (Shaviro 
2014: 132). In contradistinction to a neurotypical or ‘sapien intelligence’ then, Shaviro 
values these forms of ‘noncorrelational sentience’ because they are more precisely aligned 
with ‘what Whitehead calls “feelings” rather than articulated judgements of Hiedeggerian 
implicit preunderstandings’ (Shaviro 2014: 132).
Such a noncorrelational sentience would necessarily be aesthetic Shaviro points out, and 
consequently free of culturally imposed meanings (Shaviro 2014: 133). In his updating 
of Whitehead, Shaviro links these perceptive models with what François Laruelle calls 
‘irreflective thought’ or ‘blind thought’ (Shaviro 2014: 130), which in turn recalls Deleuze’s 
arguments that real thought ostensibly occurs at ‘a level below or before what he calls the 
“structure-Other”’, in that ‘primordial point at which “consciousness ceases to be a light cast 
upon objects in order to become a pure phosphorescence of things in themselves”’ (Shaviro 
2014: 131). A noncorrelationist understanding or artistic sentience of autistic forms of 
perception may help us to step outside the neurotypical ‘magic circle’, then, while granting 
us a valuable glimpse into another world free of imposed meanings, cliché and conceptual 
baggage: wherein things may appear as ‘complete, immediate, diffuse’ and as they are in 
themselves (Deleuze 2005a: 66). 
Consider then in this light that for many autistic people, concepts or enunciations like 
‘door’ have little connection to their multimodal experience of that particular door, and 
the vibrant (near animist) poetic language of phosphorescent things. Consequently, many 
autistics report a qualitatively different form of perception from neurotypicals, or outline 
encountering intense and dynamic bundles of stimuli and sensations, that reach out to meet 
them half-way. Or put otherwise, they encounter qualitatively vibrant matter, intensely 
material actants, which release intense in-forming vibrations that embrace the senses as they 
move in and experience the matter-space continuum. In her work on autisms Bogdashina 
relates this to a ‘literal perception’, or sensing things without any filtration, which results 
in a paradoxical Gestalt perception, wherein all sensory information ‘is received in infinite 
detail and holistically at the same time […] as a single entity with all the details perceived 
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(not processed!)’ (see Bogdashina 2003: 45–48; 2010: 61–62). Donna Williams defines 
her personal version of this as like having ‘a mind with no sieve’ (1999: 42), whilst Daniel 
Tammet describes his enfolded experiences in terms of embracing an infinity of detail, 
which always precede their objects (2009: 177). In the parlance of contemporary neurology, 
this phenomena is referred to as a ‘sensory gating deficit’, or else an ‘overperfoming’ brain 
(Bogdashina 2010: 29; Freedman et al. 1987), and is often classified as an affective illness 
that results in the intense perception of in-forming vital vibrations that materially embrace 
the sensorium and provoke shifting synesthetic patterns. Here, intense percepts and affects 
overpower, overwhelm or overrun concepts (or concept forming), so that an experience 
of that door would involve directly enduring intense and qualitatively unique sensations 
produced by the in-finite in-forming matter and qualities that the autistic inhabits space 
with, before any noun or notion of ‘doorness’ could parcel together or envelop this nebulous 
galaxy of affects and percepts. 
Echoing Williams, Tito Mukhopadhyaya indicates how unruly intensive elements, such 
as colour, saturation, light, texture, the grain of the wood become more immediate and 
significant than the conceptual place-holder neurotypicals use to parcel them all together. 
Accordingly, the sound that the door hinges make; the particular heft and density of the 
wood, and the noise it makes when tapped by a fingernail; the scraping sound of the door’s 
underside skimming over that particular carpet, all provide a far better way of ‘knowing’ the 
immanent and singular thing than the insufficient reductive noun ‘door’ (Bogdashina 2010: 
111). Williams accordingly outlines her autistic perception as ‘a kind of non-physical body-
mapping’ or an embodied experience that sidesteps interpretation through an unfiltered 
‘system of sensing’ or ‘tuning-in’ to the environment, which results in ‘a sort of “resonance” 
with matter’ (Williams 1998: 37). Here, we can locate echoes of Whitehead’s notion of the 
world signalling or communicating with the processual human body directly, which is 
always-already a part of, rather than apart from, the world (as medium). 
From these vantages, the encounter between subject and object becomes radically 
redrawn, with immanent affective datum, qua matter as vital energy, entering into 
experiential composition with the ‘subjective form’, resulting in the emergence of a subject-
superject (see Whitehead 1978: 52). Or perhaps more precisely in the case of autistisms, a 
form of perception that bypasses being ‘clothed’ in the usual ‘subjective forms’ (the Emperor’s 
clothes) and are better understood in terms of the worldings of a processual superject 
(Whitehead 1978: 52). This rich synesthetic mode of in-habiting reality helps highlight 
why a neurotypical perceptual experience is often referred to by neurologists as part of the 
‘Grand Illusion’ (Bogdashina 2010: 32). Or in Huxley’s terms, a pathetic and impoverished 
state of imbecility that we can contrast with the rich multisensory autistic ethic of relations, 
and which sheds valuable light upon the embodied and enworlded relationship between the 
human body, brain and inhuman material plane. 
Of interest to our discussions below, these modes of perceiving also appear to be promoted 
by specific artworks and digital technologies more generally, courtesy of the contrasting 
ways in which they invite attention and stimulate embodied action and affection. In New 
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Philosophy for New Media, for example, Mark B.N. Hansen exposes the extent to which 
‘post-cinematic’ or ‘post-medium’ digital technologies speak to the ‘framing function’ of 
the human body, rather than addressing themselves to the separating and distancing eye 
(2014: 10). Our interaction with digital images here increasingly promote ‘frameless’ modes 
of perceiving that Hansen describes in terms of an ‘absolute survey’, or as a form of ‘vision 
that grasps the entire visual field in a single instantaneous take’, rendering ‘a nongeometric, 
nondimensional space directly and immediately correlated with the surveying “I-unity”’ 
(Hansen 2014: 174). In such models the human body increasingly surfaces as a medium for 
processing and modifying informatics. For William Brown, the interaction or entanglement 
of the human body as a medium with digital technologies results in the emergence of a new 
concept of realism (and by extension reality). Important to our discussion below, certain 
of these serve to evoke a sense of being ‘enworlded’, a concept Brown fashions after Karen 
Barad’s notion of quantum ‘entanglement’, itself inspired by discoveries in modern physics 
(2015: 78). In the first place, Brown convincingly demonstrates how digital technology has 
in and of itself ultimately taken cinema ‘beyond’ itself (Brown 2015: 12). This ability of films 
to affectively bring about new thoughts is one of the greatest values of digital cinema, then, 
and helps us to grasp the ways in which the creation of new realisms can help us ‘to think’ 
differently (Brown 2015: 6). A thinking film such as Gaspar Noè’s Enter the Void (2009), to take 
an example we worked on together, employs an alternative form of digital realism to provoke 
viewers to perceive of ourselves as being radically enworlded rather than being solipsistic 
beings (Brown and Fleming 2015). In this example, the ‘assemblage’ of viewer and film ‘can/
does take the viewer beyond the human, and as such it is profoundly “philosophical”’ (Brown 
2015: 8). In such instances of digital film-thinking, as we become conscious with cinema, 
we come to recognize that we are ‘profoundly in, or with, the world’, and are as much the 
producers of perceptions as we are the passive receivers of them (Brown 2015: 3, 60). 
Digital imaging technologies here marshal perceptions and affections in a manner 
that helps expose how an immanent non-human force helps us as viewers to think and 
perceive differently. We might recall that for Deleuze, affects are always-already prior to our 
encounter and experience of them. Below I wish to move on to specifically interrogate how 
different forms of cinema are ethically employed and affectively deployed to help us think 
more ‘autistically’, and how the artistic techniques and digital technologies are variously 
used to help communicate what an alternative autistic relationship with the world might 
feel like.
Cinematic Autism
Generally speaking, mainstream films about autisms and autie-type people can be divided 
into two broad overlapping categories. One kind tends to focus on exceptional ‘high-
functioning’ savants or Asperger types with ‘superabilities’, and includes films such as Rain 
Man (Barry Levinson, 1988), Mozart and the Whale (Petter Naess, 2008) [both written by 
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Ronald Bass], the Temple Grandin biopic (Mick Jackson, 2010), and films such as Cube 
(Vincenso Natali, 1997), Pi (Darren Aronofsky, 1998), A Beautiful Mind (Ron Howard, 
2001) and more recently The Imitation Game (Morten Tyldum, 2015). These typically 
foreground the interactions between socialized neurotypicals and less socialized autistic-
savants-cum-schizophrenics with super and intuitive mathematical abilities (arranged on a 
continuum from idiot to genius), often driven to the brink of enlightenment or insanity by 
fleeting glimpses of an alternative or subsisting affective (panpsychic?) universe of emergent 
mathematical patterns. The other broad grouping focuses on the emotional and spiritual 
strains, tribulations, and rewards of living with ‘lower functioning’ autie-type people. Films 
such as What’s Eating Gilbert Grape? (Lasse Hallström, 1993), Breaking and Entering 
(Anthony Minghella, 2006), I am Sam (Jesse Nelson, 2001) and The Black Balloon (Elissa 
Down, 2008) would all belong to this category. 
Collectively, these mainstream films are useful for exposing how autistic people inhabit 
a qualitatively different (parallel) perceptual universe to neurotypicals, and offer tantalizing 
hints as to what this may be like. Temple Grandin’s opening sequence gestures towards this 
by depicting an enclosed cubic room-space that appears to recede into a ‘normal’ vanishing 
point from the camera’s fixed framing (with its inbuilt mastering perspective and receding 
renaissance perspective). Temple’s (Claire Danes) subsequent diagonal movement across 
this room from the back left corner to the front results in her body’s impossibly rapid 
growth, as if she suddenly expands in size and scale like a swelling Alice in Wonderland. 
This trick shot is later unfolded or revealed as the effect of an anamorphically skewed ‘Ames 
room’, the distorted form of which interacts with the camera’s in-built cycloptic apparatus 
to create a spatial illusion or perspectival special effect.3 The opening shot thus immediately 
embeds and enfolds two different ‘mathematical’ perspectives or spaces into the same 
aesthetic shot, ostensibly overlapping and collapsing together two coexisting shape-
worlds or planes – the normally perceived cubic room viewers apparently see beyond the 
cinematic fourth wall, and the actual trapezoidal world that the autistic experiences from 
within. In this case, it is the autistic person (with)in the room that has the privileged, 
correct or truer view of reality (as from an inside-out view of autism), whilst the film’s 
viewers are aligned with an impoverished or false neurotypical illusion (of reality). The 
expressive opening sequence thus appears to parcel many of the themes relevant to our 
understanding of autistic perception, and aesthetically reifies Bogdashina’s claims that 
although autistic people inhabit ‘the same physical world’ and deal with the same ‘raw 
material’, the perceptual universe they experience turns out to be strikingly different 
from that of non-autistic people (Bogdashina 2003: 44). Beyond aligning and enfolding 
mainstream cinema’s apparatus and normal gaze with neurotypical perception, we also 
begin to perceive an autistic prehension of a different shape and texture to reality, or of a 
co-present mathematical enworlding or shifting patterned architecture of angles, curves, 
gradients and rhythms that is significantly different to the everyday ones neurotypical 
people perceive. This cinematic realization chimes with the writing of autistic authors 
such as Dawn Prince-Hughes, who describes experiencing an intense ‘physical thrill’ when 
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sensing symmetry that seems to exceed and transcend a neurotypical’s perception of the 
same: ‘I love the lines and colour of tennis courts’ she says in a not too defamiliarizing 
manner, but then ‘I love driving through tunnels and being surrounded by their roundness’ 
(2005). The opening shot of Temple Grandin might here stand in as an apt synecdoche 
for not only the larger film of which it is a distilled expressive part, but also mainstream 
treatments of autism in cinema more generally, which make autie-type experiences 
intellectually perceptible rather than sensorially sentient to their viewers. 
To get a better sense of what such a universe may be like involves exploring different 
intensive and qualitative dimensions that dwell in a liminal border zone between the outside 
and the inside. To go to one extreme first, we might help achieve an inside-out view if we 
briefly turn to the writing of Daniel Tammet, wherein he recounts his personal experiences 
of reciting Pi to 22, 514 decimal places:
Although the digits of Pi are, mathematically speaking, strictly random, my internal 
representation of them was anything but – filled with rhythmic strokes and structures of 
light, colour and personality. From this random assembly of digits I was able to compose 
something like a visual song that meandered through every contour of my mind, through 
which I was able to hear the music of the numbers.
(2009: 58)
In both the novel and stage version of The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time 
(Mark Haddon 2003, adapted to stage by Simon Stephens 2013), the main character 
Christopher offers readers and viewers a chance to intercept his inside-out view of such an 
autistic world, which exposes a dynamically vital universe of shifting mathematical patterns 
and symmetry (using sophisticated 4D projections to realize this on stage). 
Films like Temple Grandin and Mozart and the Whale go some small way to representing 
or revealing the inner subjective experiences of these panpsychic mathematical worlds 
onscreen, employing special effects to overlay or mediate the cameras’ recorded images of 
reality. This aesthetically augmented animation again depicts moving mathematical symbols, 
angles and patterns not normally perceived by neurotypicals. These special effects often open 
up a liminal space (with)in or in-between the autistic brain and the rhythmical substratum 
of mathematical material-energy, without moving us out from mainstream cinema’s 
‘correlationist circle’. In Mozart and the Whale, for instance, viewers perceive Donald’s (Josh 
Hartnett) mind visualizing number games that are ignited by passing car registration plates. 
There, post-production special effects depict his brain rapidly and dynamically ‘solving’ 
their cubes and primes through vital animation. As viewers access the restless mathematical 
mindscape of the autistics, then, animation offers them a glimpse into the animist autistic 
world wherein – as Diana Krumins explains – everything suddenly becomes ‘somewhat 
alive’ (Krumins in Manning 2013: 150). And it is here, in recognizing this breath of life that 
insists within, beneath or beside our neurotypical universe we can begin to identify how the 
world of autistic perception unravels an alternative polyphonic universe of vital in-forming 
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affect and animist forces. Which is to say, the immanent realm that Shaviro describes in 
terms of being a panpsychic plane of reality, which we neurotypicals need to first embrace 
a kind of ‘stoned or crazy thinking’ in order to appreciate (Shaviro 2014: 86): and more 
of which in the following chapter. In the mainstream films, however, such images serve 
to reveal an overlapping collision of world and brain, information and processing, which 
although appears non-reflexive and non-conscious on behalf of the autistics – in that it is not 
consciously directed, as such – at best serves to disturb rather than destroy the ‘correlationist 
circle’: that which binds together the bifurcated notions of an objective ‘being-in-itself ’ and 
the subjective realm of human thought-perception (qua a human being-in-the-world) (see 
Shaviro 2014: 67). Thus, we might say that such autistic image forms describe and make 
tangible the parameters and perimeter of the correlationist circle, rather than truly stepping 
‘outside it’ (68).
These latter experiences are, in turn, also often related to an autistic sensory experience 
or phenomena called ‘echoemotica’, wherein the person sensing is often outlined 
experientially merging with sensory stimuli, as if somehow becoming ‘with’ objects, 
environments or in-forming forces. Here, Bergson’s notion of ‘intellectual sympathy’ 
considered alongside Gilbert Simondon’s conception of ‘internal resonance’ can help 
account for how certain autistics appear to feel an affinity with what it is they sense, and 
risk actually losing themselves within the stimuli, while experiencing a form of resonance 
or extreme becoming-with. Bergson writes that intellectual sympathy is a state wherein 
an individual is able to intuitively place oneself ‘within’ an object and coincide with it. To 
understand this, however, involves a shift in modes of perception from the intellectual, 
which only ever moves ‘around’ an object, towards an intuitive mode of perceiving that 
enters into what it perceives: the latter shifting from the relative and symbolic towards 
the (unrepresentable and inexpressible) actual and absolute. ‘Normal’ minds have to 
do themselves a violence in order to achieve this intuitive state, Bergson argues, but if 
successful, can result in a radical disordering and reordering of normal categories and 
concepts (1999: 51). Shaviro goes even further still, arguing that in order to achieve such 
intuition, thought must ‘commit suicide, as it were, in order to be resurrected in an entirely 
new and different form’ (Shaviro 2014: 113).
Simondon describes a comparable internal resonance that always-already connects 
human beings to an outside system of preindividual reality. There, human beings become 
both an agent and theatre of ‘ontogenetic’ individuation, simultaneously undergoing a 
primordial process of participation that brings the ‘individual-milieu dyad’ to light whilst 
exposing the ‘supersaturated system’ that constitutes being (1992: 301). From this vantage, 
‘beings’ no longer appear as stable bounded subjects with a unitary identity, but rather 
emerge in tandem with an entangled ecology of human and inhuman bodies, or through a 
dynamic ‘transductive unity’ that joins together form and matter. Thus, for understanding 
our true nature ‘[we] must begin with individuation, with the being grasped at its centre 
and in relation to its spatiality and its becoming, and not by a realized [substantialised] 
individual faced with a world that is external to it’ (Simondon 1992: 310). 
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Such radical ideas clearly chime with much autistic literature, and the writing of authors 
such as Donna Williams, who describes resonating ‘with the sensory nature of the object 
with such an absolute purity and loss of self ’ that it felt like ‘merging with God’ or becoming 
‘part of beauty itself ’ (1998: 15). Francesca Bierens similarly relates experiencing an autistic 
‘fluidity of boundary between the self and the outside physical world’ (2009: 208), which in 
turn recalls Manning’s autie-type descriptions of a ‘leaky sense of self ’ (2013), which spreads 
out to include the inhuman worlds of animals and objects. For Manning, recognition of these 
alternative modes of perceiving and sensing compels us to think an alternative ethical form 
of being with. Echoes here too of Roger Caillois’s famous work on insects and ‘psychasthenia’ 
(2003), where the troubling of the individual-milieu-continuum is even more radical still. 
For in the insect world, Caillois notes, the entanglement of body-brain and milieu is at its 
most profound, to the extent that it actually becomes a threat to insect existence. Indeed, 
any milieu becomes dangerously seductive and infectious for insects that inhabit it, to 
the extent that over extended durations of time, insect bodies-brains get dragged into a 
deterritorializing block of becoming with their environments. The result is unparalleled 
forms of mimicry at a level that goes far beyond utilitarian camouflage, and reveals extreme 
forms of ‘depersonalization through assimilation into space’ that surpasses survival tactics 
and expose the extent to which body and environment are radically entangled, or distributed 
across each other (Caillois 2003: 100). Arriving at these blurred borderlines, we can now 
turn to another associated notion of autistic being thought by mainstream cinema, which is 
related to animal thresholds and worlds. 
Animals and Alterity in Mainstream Cine-Autism
So far we have seen that mainstream narrative films focusing on autistic characters often 
explore or reveal supersaturated or sympathetic modes of being that gesture outside of the 
neurotypical or correlationist circle. But another overt manner through which they do this 
can be fruitfully investigated alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘becoming-animal’, 
which as Patricia Pisters (2003: 142–152) reminds us, is intimately linked to a heightening 
of the human senses (or super-senses). In putting to one side the pejorative associations that 
words such as ‘animal’ and ‘autism’ often gather or evoke in schoolyard parlance, we might 
first approach the extent to which various medical and scientific reports indicate that due to 
unique forms of neuronal micro-architecture, certain autistic brains can be understood as 
being tuned in to higher sensory-perceptive frequencies than most neurotypicals. These 
ideas are often accompanied by descriptions of autistic perception that are tellingly related 
to the paragon of animal perception. In their biographies, both Williams and Grandin 
discuss having intense experiences of audio ‘hypersensitivity’, or a superhuman ability to 
hear sounds more typically located in the animal-hearing range or spectrum. Bogdashina 
likewise makes known her anecdotal experiences of working with high-functioning autistic 
adults who were able to ‘smell like canines’, and of autistic children with ‘extra-acute sight’ 
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(or ‘hypervision’) who are able to see ‘like an eagle’ (Bogdashina 2003: 53–54). Ashwin et al. 
introduce the results of lab experiments wherein autistic participants appeared to exhibit a 
visual acuity so superior to that of a neurotypical test group that it ought to be mapped in a 
region typically reserved ‘for birds of prey’ (2009: 17). 
Autistic sensory-perception can here be outlined following along a line of becoming-
intense towards becoming-animal, which finds parallels in the work of novelists like Carlos 
Castaneda and Herman Melville (the latter, according to Julie Brown [2010], being another 
autistic artist before the fact), and the autie-type writing of Grandin and Prince-Hughes 
amongst many others. Prince-Hughes makes for an illuminating case in point here, as 
her writing outlines how she both instinctively and sympathetically comprehended the 
communication-patterns of the gorillas and bonobo apes she began to resonate with, and 
how she was able to feel an affinity with the animals that in turn became nothing less than 
a ‘mirror’ for her own soul (2005). On first encountering the apes, Prince-Hughes describes 
how she appeared to go ‘backward in time into the most primal and ancient part of myself. 
Back into the quiet recesses of my mind, where evolution has paused to breathe, bringing 
its people with it’ (2005). Comparable forms of animal affinity (as opposed to neurotypical 
‘empathy’) appear as a tropological feature scattered across many mainstream autism films. 
A staged ape performance by the autistic character in The Black Balloon arguably makes an 
oblique nod towards this, as does a scene in Mozart and the Whale that witnesses Isabelle 
(Radha Mitchell) moving and communicating with animalistic body gestures with a caged 
baboon at the zoo. 
Similar notions of becoming-animal that extend beyond apes are also introduced via 
Temple Grandin’s biographical writing and film. Grandin opines: ‘Animals and autistic 
humans don’t see their ideas of things; they see the actual things themselves’. In attempting to 
incorporate scientific discoveries to back up her claims, she forwards her belief that ‘[a]utistic 
people’s frontal lobes almost never work as well as normal people’s do, so our brain function 
ends up being somewhere in between human and animal. We use our animal brains more 
than normal people do, because we have to […] Autistic people are closer to animals than 
normal people are’ (Grandin and Johnson 2005: 57). The biopic movie visualizes Temple’s 
notion of becoming-animal in a variety of ways, but perhaps most overtly through a digital 
body-shifting morph that depicts Claire Danes transforming into a calf in an attempt to 
think-feel the animals’ affective perspective of a troublesome industrial cattle run.4 
In the film, Temple is also shown to affine with cows and horses in another augmented 
‘shaping’ sense, as is evidenced by multiple scenes framed from a God’s eye view of moving 
horses and cows that become overlaid with rhythmically animated images representing the 
angles and dimensions of their lines of sight and ‘flight zones’. Similar intuitive volumetric 
experiences highlight clear examples of what Manning terms autistic ‘shapings’, which she 
outlines in terms of hybrid speciations that are neither purely human, environmental or 
animal, but all three and more simultaneously. Linked to this, much of the existing autistic 
literature and the mainstream films unveil the existence of what some refer to as autistic 
‘mental maps’, or an alternative (hyper-dimensional) insisting reality or substratum that 
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exists beyond the animal and indeed beneath the material plane. That is to say, what Deleuze 
and Guattari term the abstract or geometric ‘Planomenon, or the Rhizosphere’, which as 
its dimensions increase towards n, ‘is called the Hypersphere, the Mechanosphere’, or the 
abstract cosmic machine that reveals the intersection of all planes (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b: 278).
In mainstream cinema, certain autistics appear to sense the co-existence of such 
abstract mathematical architecture. Rain Man offers us a famous example of one such 
autistic savant, who not only boasts incredible mathematical skills, but is also blessed with 
a brain capable of perceiving hidden patterns and probabilistic expressions (truths): being 
variously depicted ‘absorbing’ how many tooth picks have been spilled onto the floor from 
a fresh box (‘82, 82, 82’), calculating complex multi-decimal multiplications or fractions, 
and counting Vegas cards into multiple decks. Many other autistic film characters are 
similarly shown becoming obsessed with viewing and recreating geometric patterns or 
shapes that they encounter in architecture, wallpaper, carpets, tiled floors, etc. (or else 
are depicted drawing pictures, taking photographs or ‘correcting’ asymmetries with their 
movements of body and mind). Arguably the puzzle-maze horror film Cube makes this 
autistic ability to perceive hidden mathematical truths most overt, employing it as a plot 
device within a sci-fi setting. 
Indeed, the entire narrative of Cube (itself a mathematical function used to raise the 
number of dimensions) is set in a deadly moving four-dimensional labyrinth world, where 
understanding or even perceiving the hidden logic governing the ever-shifting maze of 
rooms means the difference between life and death: with different forms of booby-trap 
lurking within certain spaces and becoming activated at precise spatio-temporal locations. 
Burkard Polster and Marty Ross majestically unpack the complex mathematics behind the 
manifold maze design in Math Goes to the Movies (2012), which for reasons of space I must 
forego going into in any great detail about here. What is important to grasp on this outing, 
though, is that it becomes the autistic savant Kazan (Andrew Miller) – with his superability 
to ‘automatically’ and rapidly calculate and factor prime numbers – who becomes the only 
prisoner-participant able to solve each room’s unique three-number-triplet and unlock the 
deadly maze’s complex four-dimensional geometry. By ‘solving’ the primes, he effortlessly 
decodes the hidden mathematical rule defining the nature of the hidden room-within-the-
room. Kazan is thus able to perceive an overlapping or insisting mathematical architecture 
folded into Cube’s mobile maze in a manner that the neurotypicals cannot. Reflecting the 
opening shot of Temple Grandin somewhat, he is able to perceive an alternative reality 
folded into, or subsisting within, each of the cube rooms (or a different four-dimensional 
mathematical pattern embedded within the three-dimensional space). The reality he 
perceives is more ‘true’ than that of the neurotypicals’ on this outing, but unfortunately, his 
‘low-level’ social skills mean many of the other participants overlook his abilities, writing 
him off as an idiot. Although Kazan’s perceptual mathematical prowess is highlighted and 
celebrated, then, the film only offers viewers an outside-in view of his perceptions of this 
mathematical world. 
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The alternative reality autistics inhabit-experience or map-express with their bodies is 
also revealed across all the films throughout a series of affective-performative-movements 
and defamiliarizing speech performances. Here, various actors deliver comparable affective-
kinetic performances defined by psycho-somatic rocking and sporadic ‘neuro-stereotypy’. 
Typically manifest as intensive re-active movements that surface as affective expression 
events. A close-up of an anxious foot frantically tapping in Temple Grandin or Rain Man 
furnish examples of these, as do other involuntary body-tics captured and conveyed across 
many of the films, or the impulsive or compulsive cartwheels and acrobatic movements 
performed by the autistic child in Breaking and Entering, which signals her altered form of 
spatial awareness. As performative events, these create what Deleuze, after Alain Masson, 
calls a ‘degree zero’. That is, a loaded movement or hesitation, a discrepancy, a making visible 
or a sudden and dynamic birth of affective movement that generates a movement of world. 
Here, the non-normative sensory-motor movements expressively and qualitatively clash 
with habitual ways of perceiving-acting in or through space, and therefore rub up against 
the edges of a familiar or known world. Or put more plainly, they deposit and delimit the 
boundaries or borders of an alternative parallel autistic world that subsists or insists with-in 
our neurotypical reality. One that is not necessarily visible to, nor communicating with the 
closed sensory gates of the neurotypical. 
Taken together, these embodied performances work to unfold an alien form of 
perception-reaction, or different forms of ongoing ‘conversation’ that the autistics have 
with the tonal environments they inhabit. For these affective movements make palpable 
an intensive range of non-neurotypical interactions with the material environments and 
affective forces composing it, which in turn signal a radical parallelism between the autistic 
mind and body (and brain) in relation to the external world, which threatens to empty 
them out, or inside-out them. The autie-type performances further alter and defamiliarize 
typical speech functions, so that scripted dialogue and language is often made to stutter, 
stammer, stim, break down, break apart or deterritorialize into pure intensive rhythms and 
sounds – in a manner distantly reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s description of a minor 
literature (to which we will return in chapter four). Speech and voice are here deployed 
in an affective sensational manner, breaking language’s dominant use as a delivery system 
for content. Instead, voice surfaces as a range of intensive and vibrational sound-waves 
that push language and collective regimes of enunciation beyond their articulatory edge, 
and give life to a fluminous universe of nonsense, clicks, humming, stuttering, stimming, 
glossolalia, psycho-babble and intensive sonic expressions. 
These vocal performances also help topologically unfold sonic-territories, which the 
autistic characters often erect or enter into, creating tonal audio-spaces that display a 
different form of rhythmically patterned environmental quality, which at once expands and 
encases the autistic body, while creating a protective space in which the autistic seeks refuge. 
Deleuze and Guattari write about similar forms of sonic ‘territory’ in A Thousand Plateaus, 
wherein the child is described humming or singing to cocoon and comfort themselves in a 
familiar and protective sound-space. Therein, the ‘forces of chaos are kept outside as much 
07756_Ch02_61-96.indd   77 4/27/17   10:01 AM
Unbecoming Cinema
78
as possible, and the interior space protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfil or a deed to 
do’ (2004b: 343). 
Across many of the mainstream films the savants also tropologically get caught up repeating 
scenes and dialogue from movies they have encountered, which illuminates a dual retreat 
into a comforting memory of watching a film, and the rhythmical sonic landscape of the 
scene in question’s dialogue or speech. In Rain Man, Raymond (Dustin Hoffman) endlessly 
repeats Abbott and Costello’s ‘who’s on first’ sketch when pushed out of his comfort zone, 
while in Temple Grandin, Temple verbally loops a scene from a comedy in an attempt offset 
the overwhelming anxiety produced by her encounter with the unfamiliar and new. This 
sequence is actually replayed on screen amongst her verbal-loopings of it as if lifted directly 
from her own photographic brain-screen, which is shown functioning like a meta-cinematic 
apparatus capable of ‘thinking in pictures’, and governed by a modulating database-memory 
that can be accessed at break-neck speeds. In such moments, it appears as if the cinema and 
computers have formed an articulation with the autistic brain-world assemblage. Or again, 
in a manner that echoes Patricia Pisters’s work on the ‘psychopathological assemblages’ 
that exist between modern media machines and mental disorders (2013: 162) – or between 
media technologies, brain and world more generally (Pisters 2012) – the autistic brain 
is compared (in film and literature) to non-human technologies such as a photographic 
memory, a rapid Internet image search-engine or a complete video recall. Resonating with 
such ideas, Grandin compares her brain’s recollection abilities to accessing ‘a videotape 
in my mind’ (2006: 5), whilst Prince-Hughes describes her eidetic memory (which began 
recording all events in her life from her birth onwards) as a device that can be rewound 
and replayed as a sensually and sensorially complete ‘three-dimensional tape’ (2005) (like a 
futuristic ‘holodeck’ technology yet to be invented). 
If these brain machines share certain principles or erect vectors with actual contemporary 
film-making technologies, or even certain virtual technofantasies (see e.g. Ihde 2006), the 
mainstream cinema can only take us so far with regard to understanding the life of an 
autistic other from within. Below we must therefore move on to explore other forms of 
Art and art brut that forge articulations with autistic modes of thought, and which work 
to simultaneously ignite an unbecoming of the cinema as we know it from its mainstream 
manifestations, at the same time as it works to unsettle viewers’ expectations of what films 
actually do. 
Autism, Art Cinemas and the Unbecoming of Neurotypical Cinema
As these commercial films invariably address audiences as normopathic subject-consumers, 
and implicitly enfold a neurotypical ‘theory of mind’ regarding the viewer positions – via 
generic action-driven narrative forms and their associated expectations of verisimilitude 
and entertaining storytelling conventions5 – the representational mainstream products 
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ultimately fall short of sensationally conveying what autistic thought, perception and feeling 
are like. Arguably, a range of art cinema films take us one step closer to this. At least this is 
something the work of Nikolaj Lübecker suggests, particularly with regard to his explorations 
into narrative films that harness the critical and heuristic force of the anti-dialectical 
Dostoevskean idiot to critique the ‘representational logic that dominates in conventional 
film-making’, and to lay bare the everyday structures undergirding social and ethical life 
(Lübecker 2013: 14). Although not an exact equivalent to the autistic personae and modes 
of film-making explored below, as both an artistic vehicle and thematic trope, the simple-
minded ‘idiot’ does display some fruitful overlaps worth plumbing here. 
For Lübecker, films such as The Idiots (Lars von Trier, 1998), L’Humanité (Bruno Dumont, 
1999) and Elle est des nôtres (Siegrid Alnoy, 2003) can be understood employing the ‘idiot’ 
as a trope to literally render poetic forms of being-in-the-world ‘if not visible, then, at least, 
palpable’ to the viewers’ senses (2013: 15). In such films, Lübecker argues, film-makers 
embrace haptic aesthetics, a raft of technical devices and a ‘free-indirect’ style that helps 
reveal, or allow viewers to artistically participate in, what he terms a ‘phenomenology 
of the idiot’. Moving back through these key terms: the notion of a free-indirect style 
replicates Deleuze’s adaption of this literary term to account for a character and director 
(qua film-thinking) taking a step towards each other in a block of artistic becoming. 
Lübecker’s notion of haptic aesthetics, in turn, draws on Laura U. Marks’s Deleuzian work 
from The Skin of the Film (2000) and Touch (2002), wherein she describes haptic aesthetics 
disrupting dominant ethico-political viewing practices while helping film-makers to 
disturb or unsettle the prevailing sociotechnical language of cinema, which typically 
grants viewers a distancing mastery over objects and space (recalling the Hiedeggerian 
notion of ‘world as picture’). Against these trends Marks highlights the works of certain 
‘minor’ political film-makers who attempt instead to stimulate embodied sensations 
in their viewers courtesy of close-ups of textured or haptic surfaces, which directly 
stimulate feelings and sensations. By disorganizing and rejecting industrial standards 
and conventions, and deploying their affective aesthetics and violence of sensations in a 
comparable manner, the defamiliarizing idiot films trouble what it is viewers actually see 
and feel when watching. Furthermore, as experiential cinemas ‘of imbrication’, these idiot 
works artistically uproot and reorder ‘normal’ space-time relations, literally lifting viewers 
‘out of their everyday perceptions [to] reveal the invisible poetry fundamental to reality’ 
(Lübecker 2013: 9–12). 
In a similar exploration of the ‘etiological psychohistory’ of The Idiots, Trevor Ponech 
exposes how von Trier creatively puts film form and content into expressive relation, 
literally handicapping his film-making abilities with the strict Dogme 95 rules, and thereafter 
purposely ‘spassing’ the film-making process by embracing a non-polished guerrilla ‘idiot 
technique’, which amongst other things, exposes excessive behind-the-scenes ‘realities’ 
typically filtered out of normal cinema’s quotidian verisimilar illusions (2014: 165–166). 
And we can go with both Ponech and Lübecker up to a point here, for if mainstream cinema 
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did not go far enough in revealing the alternative perceptive worlds of the autistic, by 
bringing form and content into expressive relation, these shocking and thought-provoking 
art films of the idiot do take us one step closer. However, to my mind, because these films 
continue to rely upon action-driven narrative forms, they still ultimately fall short of the 
intensified disorder-ing impact we discover in the a-signifying and agential forms of autie-
type and animist productions such as In My Language, Le Moindre Geste and Assemblages: 
Félix Guattari and Machinic Animism. That is, in artworks and art brut films that terminally 
deflate ‘narrative’ conventions and explode the correlationist circle by unleashing unalloyed 
artistic forces and intensely raw inaesthetics (see Badiou 2005) which dramatically and 
affectively disorder viewers’ normopathic expectations of film.
 Here, we might recall that imposing ‘a narrative’ upon reality, qua overlaying zoe with 
bios, is in and of itself a particularly normopathic trait. Contra this, Blastland maintains that 
the ‘profoundly autistic mind does not possess any sense of narrative’ at all. Instead, life is 
basically ‘a series of ‘car crashes’ [and] random events that seemingly come from nowhere 
and cannot be predicted or understood (Blastland in Brown 2010: 22). Katherine P. Beals 
introduces an upsetting and unsettling side to this reality (at least from the narrative-
making neurotypical perspective) when she talks of her autistic son’s inability to understand 
her existence as a human being, or a social ‘other’. Which is, as a separate and complete 
person with their own mind, thoughts and feelings: ‘I’d tickle him, and he’d look at my 
hands; I’d chase him, and he’d watch my feet; I’d put a flashlight in my mouth, and he’d stare 
at the flashlight’ (Beals 2003: 36). Although many autistic children become incentivized 
to recognize other human beings, or learn to parcel together all the in-forming parts into 
a ‘singular’ territory or bounded biographical assemblage, Bernard Rimland upholds that 
many autistic persons naturally experience people and indeed life ‘as an incoherent series 
of unconnected events’. Thus, as Julie Brown describes it, even if all the details are there, 
‘the story isn’t. It’s as though the autistic individual is looking through a shoe box filled with 
random handfuls of pictures and cannot organize them into a photograph album that tells 
a story’ (Brown 2010: 21). In such descriptions we might also detect echoes of Deleuze’s 
description of the brain and its imagination, which are likewise an ‘assemblage of things’ in 
the most vague sense of the term like a ‘collection without an album, a play without a stage, 
a flux of perceptions’ (Deleuze 1993: 22–23). 
As indicated above, beyond declining narrativization, the autistic mind also appears 
to sidestep the entire world of symbolism and representation, perceiving ‘things’ in a 
profoundly different way. As the autistic person has little or no use for the ‘currency of 
symbolism’, Skott-Myhre and Taylor argue that their experience of reality is better 
understood in terms of a pre-linguistic ‘collision between bodies’ of heterogeneous forms, 
including organic and nonorganic material (Skott-Myhre and Taylor 2011: 46–47). Looking 
to religion and philosophy for cognitive paradigms to help explain this mode of being, they 
argue that the autistic universe can be understood resonating with Taoist, Buddhist and 
Hindu thought-models, and of particular interest to this and other chapters of this book, 
as revealing a distinctly Spinozian vector with regard to the Expressive and animist nature 
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of the universe (2011: 47). In a ‘flexible’ and ‘adaptive’ Guattarian metamodelling of similar 
philosophical positions, Mat Wal-Smith outlines an analogous autistic picture, albeit while 
describing a ‘simultaneously distributed and intensely embodied’ affiliation between mind 
and matter (2008: n.p.). If the ‘neurotypical’ retains an ‘agile (quasi)autonomy’ (Wal-Smith 
2008) within this continuity of movement and perceptive-sensation, by contrast, the autistic 
without the neurotypical sensory gating filters, or the protective barriers of the linguistic 
and the conceptual, experiences these random car crashes as violently in-forming spacings, 
which continually de-form and re-form, dis-order and re-order their ongoing experiences 
of being and becoming (in a modulating manner distantly reminiscent of Caillois radical 
insect psychasthenia). 
Such perceptual models also recall and intensify what Mark B.N. Hansen refers to as 
‘bodily self-intuitions’, wherein the world is experienced ‘as spacing’ (Hansen 2014: 190). 
At its most intense autistic extreme, however, stimuli (or in-formation) is felt rapidly 
rushing in via all the senses in a way that continually reshapes the autistic’s entangled 
experience of the environment-body-continuum, generating unique shape-worlds that 
vary depending on the particular assemblage of forces and factors at play. Expressionistic 
spacings, or shapings, constitute the in-formed sensory experiences of being that Hansen 
refers to as the ‘I-unity’ (2014: 174). That is, the ever-changing experiential folding 
together and infolding individuations of the perceiver and the supersaturated ecosystem 
of affective experience (their thinking-feeling of and with the environment). Or put 
more plainly, a sensual or sensory co-mingling with the affective space they in-habit, 
and an experience of becoming that leads outside the familiar world of the divided and 
separated self, or the separated I/eye that exhibits mastery over objects and space: and 
all its attendant social symbolic enunciations associated with acculturated or atomistic 
actors, egos and others. 
To exit this neurotypical magic circle we must now move backwards through the open 
sensory gates into a heteromorphic realm of speculative realism, of pre-individuated 
intensities, ever-shifting in-formational matter-energy, panpsychic patterns and expressions, 
and affective autistic poesies. Therein, subject-object divisions suddenly collapse and enfold, 
so that the world and the body appear ‘startlingly, painfully, exquisitely, processually one’ 
(Manning 2013: 222). In Parables for the Virtual (2002) Brian Massumi similarly foregrounds 
a comparable conflation or codetermination of perception and cognitivism that serves to 
radically erode any stable sense of boundaries between the inside and outside, the perceived 
and the thought, object and subject. Instead, the sensing subjective form and the dynamic 
sensations they experience are recast and unframed, forever meshing in an ongoing dance 
of individuation. 
It is a qualitatively distinct form of non-clichéd experimental film that best allows its 
viewers to prehend (grasp) what these overwhelming autistic experiences might be like. As 
must also be becoming clear by now, these harness agential or expressive bundles of affects 
and percepts (inaesthetics) that are designed to unsettle a viewer’s normal relationship with 
projected film images, and nudge their thoughts and feelings beyond established codes 
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and habitual practices. As such, a truly autie-type cinema would be partially defined by 
its attempts to allow viewers to encounter an ‘alien’ form of film-thinking, which ideally 
unsettles their habitual cognitive trends and disrupts or defamiliarizes the familiar 
viewer-image relationship, and by extension their understanding of the immanent body-
brain-world continuum. In this regard Viktor Shklovsky’s notion of ostranenie becomes 
an important conceptual touchstone, particularly as this relates to processes of cognitive 
‘defamiliarization’ or radical ‘deautonomization’ through the encounter with art and its 
expressive formal attributes. In a recent edited collection that revisits Shklovsky’s work, the 
notion of art ‘making strange’ is picked up by Laurent Jullier, who points to two problems 
that arise from a cognitive and evolutionary-cognitive perspective with regard to artistic-
deautonomization from a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ model of perception (from within the 
correlationist circle):
If ‘I can see only what I believe’ (a constructivist vision in which human beings tend to 
select in their environment what they already know they can find), no defamiliarization 
will be able to challenge my habitus as, literally, I will not perceive it. If ‘I believe only 
what I can see’ (an ecologist vision in which human beings tend to dictate the qualities of 
object in their environment by their senses), defamiliarization may challenge my habitus, 
but I will tend to attribute it to the mediation process between objects and myself. Yet 
these observations share a common point: in both cases, for defamiliarization to have a 
chance to operate, it will have to be repeated many times.
(Jullier 2010: 140)
The repetition process, or having repeated encounters with multiple works, speaks back to 
our discussion of the evental nature of multiple-singular artworks in the introduction. 
Indeed, it is only through multiple forms of autistic encounter experienced through film, 
art and our bodies that the evental transformative potentials of these ongoing works 
emerge. In the same collection of articles, Làzló Tarnay offers another route out of the 
correlationist circuit by layering Deleuze’s notion of deterritorialization to Shklovskian 
concepts of cognitive defamiliarization/deautonomization. Although at their core both 
concepts help foreground a process of ‘making strange’ the viewers’ extant relationship 
with art or reality, Deleuze’s models are more precisely configured around what the body 
senses: ‘Capitalising on Bergson’s reflection on creative evolution, Deleuze assigns the role 
of deterritorialising to the senses and the sensible. For [Deleuze] the radically new, a 
radically new experience, can only come through the senses and not through some 
rearrangement of the already known’ (Tarnay 2010: 155): which is to say, because the 
affective realms are pre-individual, that which is sensed as novelty is not cognitively 
recalled or remembered, but rather encountered, experienced and assimilated. Thus, 
‘deautomatizing perception is tantamount to constituting a challenge to the intellect 
which “normally” can only classify’ (Tarnay 2010: 147). It now only remains to turn our 
attention to three different forms of ethical autie-type cinema that work to ‘make strange’, 
07756_Ch02_61-96.indd   82 4/27/17   10:01 AM
Cinema and/as Autism
83
defamiliarize or deterritorialize viewer perceptions and thoughts, and collectively (as 
multiple-singular works) constitute part of a wider (neurodiversity and speculative realist) 
autistic event.
Affective Autie-Tpye Audio-Visual Art
In turning to autie-type artistic bodies we can begin by considering the earliest film Le 
Moindre Geste: an amateur avant-garde film that uses its form and content to provoke 
viewers into an artistic affinity with autistic modes of thinking and perceiving. With regard 
to the film’s title, it is worth parenthetically noting here that while teasing out parallels that 
emerge between Viktor Shklovsky and Leo Tolstoy’s thoughts on the political and ethical 
functions of revolutionary art, Yuri Tsivian observes that for the latter, ‘primal gestures’ are 
the starting point for all art: ‘The maker of art engaged in the creative process searches 
speculatively within himself for those primal gestures. They excite him, and they open the 
bone casket of the human skull to his eyes’ (Tolstoy in Tsivian 2010: 22). As an experimental 
art brut film, Le Moindre Geste more specifically attempts to open up the bone casket of the 
(already radically open) autistic skull to its creators’ (and viewers’) eyes and brains. The film 
was originally conceived as a therapeutic exercise, and was produced in and around a 
Cévennes psychiatric hospital as part of a cooperative process between Jean-Pierre Daniel, 
Josée Manenti and the psychiatrist Fernand Deligny as ‘a method of observation of a young 
autist’ named Yves Guignard (Champetier 2009). Recorded between 1962 and 1964 in 
16mm black-and-white film, the amateur exercise blurs documentary and fiction modalities 
as it traces the path of Yves and a young boy named Richard as they embark on an andante 
stroll, or line of flight, across the French landscape. 
The edited 1971 version of the film opens with a title sequence played over black frames. 
This is scored with the sounds of rushing river water. The first visual image thereafter 
depicts a rough child-like sketch of two human figures, one larger than the other, which 
Yves is in the process of drawing from the far side of a white silk-screen. Through the 
vaguely translucent whiteness of this screen-within-a-screen device, viewers can partially 
make out a silhouetted hand and arm as Yves scribbles wavy lines in-between the two 
basic figures, composed of circles and lines. Here, the camera takes up position in front of 
the silk-screen, creating the effect of the autistic artist’s sketches magically appearing, and 
then partially, or entirely disappearing courtesy of editing. All the while Yves can be heard 
howling and murmuring. The first edited cut delivers us to what appears to be an earlier 
iteration of the opening drawing, now containing only the larger human figure, as the 
smaller body appears bit by bit as it is drawn in. A third cut foregrounds completely blank 
frame, where a long solitary figure is inscribed down the centre of the screen: its narrow 
body stretching down to the bottom of the canvas. As the opening presents us with these 
artistic images of bodies in the ongoing process of being made and unmade, a disembodied 
male voice-over interjects: 
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Deligny speaking. This sort of man, it’s the hand of a 25 year old young fellow which 
traced it. ‘Mentally retarded’ say the experts. Such is he in Le Moindre Geste. Such he is 
in real life as we lived it for 10 plus years together. Such he is for us, never-ending cause 
of laughter, no matter what happens. And in this film like in daily life, I certify his voice 
is not mine. Could we say this voice is his? But why should a voice belong to someone? 
Even if someone voices it out. 
In this opening gesture, the strange film immediately unfolds an alien form of autistic 
thinking, wherein, as Shaviro outlines it, ‘everything exists on an equal footing’: ‘Form 
and ground, recto and verso, past and future, foreground and distance, foreground and 
horizon, etc. – all this now exists fully outside any ontological hierarchy’ (Shaviro 
2014: 132). Thereafter, the loosely structured ballade film follows Yves’s escapades with 
(and around) the smaller boy, Richard, as they trace a drifting path away from the asylum. 
On their already rootless journey, a series of unravelling lines of flight are unpredictably 
opened up by Yves’s various encounters with affective objects and disrupting materials 
within the landscape. Perhaps on account of the film-makers’ having had no professional 
experience of conventional (industrial) film-making, the experimental practices and 
emergent non-cinema techniques often serve to disorder norms regarding the 
conventional framings of bodies and space, and work to artistically defamiliarize 
the viewers’ relationship with the image and story. When the boys sit down, for example, 
the camera lingers on images of Yves’s feet, as he removes his shoes and stretches and fans 
his toes. In a review of the disordering film, renowned cinematographer Caroline 
Champetier describes the accumulative effects of these formal decisions, and how the 
proliferation of non-conventional framings gradually synthesize to unfurl an abnormal 
viewing encounter. In a distant echo of Pisters’s descriptions of certain ties between 
mediated modes of perceiving and mental illness, Champetier describes the film’s 
disordered style revealing something decidedly inhuman at the core of the cinematic 
medium, which exposes film as a deeply penetrating ‘scientific thinker’ (2009). 
Champetier’s description of the sections that introduce Yves and Richard not only help 
make this point clear, but also illuminate how the content of the images divulge a 
somewhat irregular and unsettling reality: 
[…] first image of Yves and Richard near the stream. Zoom on Yves’s back. Strange body. 
[…] Yves stops to drink water from the stream, using nature naturally. Water runs down, he 
drinks it. […] The body of Yves, the autist, the so-called ‘retarded’, walking this Cevennole 
nature, as if being part of it, without crossing it. Almost a moving tree. A rolling stone. A 
cat. A lizard pointing his face to the sun. All this contained in the image, dilated.
(Champetier 2009)
Beyond focusing upon Yves’s autistic movements, expressions, rhythms and gestures as he 
passes through different territories, the camera documents-inscribes his resonating, or 
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becoming and unbecoming with his environment: intercepting molecular thresholds of his 
becoming-animal, becoming-plant, becoming-elements. The camera operator also takes 
time to frame and foreground close-ups of various details that pierce or grab Yves attention: 
ants scurrying along a cable, the haptic texture of stones. The vagaries of these close-ups and 
the seemingly unmotivated attention to this excessive in-formation is shown to lead to 
reactive gestures and movements that in turn push the figures in a series of unpredictable 
directions: culminating in Richard becoming trapped in a pit. Demonstrating the film’s utter 
abandonment of normopathic cause and effect principles of narration, Yves ostensibly 
remains oblivious to the boy’s plight, and unaware of any need to help him. Being a non-
agent, or what Deleuze might refer to as a pure seer, or maybe more precisely a pure sensor, 
he simply drifts on. 
In this manner the form and content of the film, as well as its micro and macro 
architectonic structure, begins to express an alternative form of autistic abstract diagram, 
recalling those that Deligny devised in his broader work with autistic children, and 
which would in turn impact the thinking and writing of Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, 
in a passage (worth quoting at length) from A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari 
describe how:
Deligny transcribes the lines and paths of autistic children by means of maps: he carefully 
distinguishes ‘lines of drift’ and ‘customary lines’. This does not only apply to walking: 
he also makes maps of perceptions and maps of gestures (cooking or collecting wood) 
showing customary gestures and gestures of drift. The same goes for language, if it is 
present. Deligny opened his lines of writing to life lines. The lines are constantly crossing, 
intersecting for a moment, following one another. A line of drift intersects a customary 
line, and at that point the child does something not quite belonging to either one: he or 
she finds something he or she lost – what happened? – or jumps and claps his or her 
hands, a slight and rapid movement – and that gesture in turn emits several lines. In 
short, there is a line of flight, which is already complex since it has singularities: and there 
a customary or molar line with segments: and between the two (?), there is a molecular line 
with quanta that cause it to tip to one side or the other.
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 224, emphasis in original)
Throughout, not only does the visual image index Yves’s physical lines of drift, and inhumanly 
trace his corporeal gestures, and his becomings and unbecomings, but the film simultaneously 
enfolds and unfolds audio and ‘linguistic’ lines of drift and escape that intersect with these 
visual aspects of the film. The film’s recorded images are accordingly offset by Yves’s 
demented glossolalia voice-over, with his ‘infra-language’ (Tuttle 2006) intensively 
fluctuating between unhinged rage and half-formed memories/fantasies of prior 
mistreatments.6 These mad sound-images clearly open up alternative realities and recorded 
timelines that erect complex criss-crossing lines of flight. Formally speaking, the recorded 
sound track in and of itself actively scrambles and defamiliarizes viewers’ habitual relation 
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to (normally authoritative) voice-over conventions, and by so doing opens up further 
Delignyean lines of flight: 
As Deligny says, it should be borne in mind that these lines mean nothing. […] It is 
certain that they have nothing to do with language; it is, on the contrary, language that 
must follow them, it is writing that must take sustenance from them, between its own 
lines. […] The lines are inscribed upon a Body without Organs, upon which everything is 
drawn and flees, which is itself an abstract line with neither imaginary figures or symbolic 
functions […]’.
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 224, emphasis in original)
These audio-visual dimensions of the film led Champetier to champion Deligny’s 
unconventional non-narrative and non-representational use of the cinematic language, 
particularly lauding the manner in which his film divides sound and image in a way that 
forces us ‘to see and to listen’, whilst making palpable the ‘mysterious exchange’ forever 
taking place in-between the two (2009: n.p.). As such, the expressive film’s illogical yet ludic 
soundtrack serves to open up a disjunctive interstice in-between sound and image, at the 
same time as it enfolds competing informing ‘realities’ that force thought to flit around in-
between different timelines and mental territories (the reality of Yves being recorded for the 
soundtrack, and the half-formed memories the content of these rambling recordings give 
birth to). At other points these effects are stepped up as the film employs pure intensive 
expressions such as screams and yelps, or else introduces unmotivated sound effects – 
including the disjunctive noise of bagpipes and snare drums – which unleash affective sonic 
sensations indicative of schizophrenia, delirium or drift. 
In these various senses we can recognize how a disorganizing and disordering use of 
the film’s form converges and diverges with its recorded content (both audio and visual) 
to unearth an alternative type of thinking-feeling that dislodges or discloses an alternative 
relationship to the forms conventionally utilized in ‘normal’ neurotypical film-making. 
Thus, if von Trier could be understood handicapping and spassing the form and content 
of his art cinema, Deligny et al. more precisely embrace the productive potential of sensory 
‘disorders’ to unsettle and disorganize conventionalized film-making techniques: forcing 
the medium itself to take sustenance and flight from its articulation with autistic modes of 
thinking, feeling and inter-acting with the environment. Or stated differently, by forming 
an articulation with alternative autistic modes of thought, Le Moindre Geste ultimately 
ignites an unbecoming of cinema as we typically know it. The film accordingly emerges as 
a kind of ‘intercessor’, which as Ronald Bogue reminds us, introduces a form of ‘positive 
dissonance’, that is ‘made possible through an openness to interferences that disturb one’s 
regular harmonic vibrations’ (Bogue 2012: 14).
The next work to which we turn our attention, Lazzarato and Melitopoulous’s 
installation artwork Assemblages, appears to amplify the immanent and dialethical nature 
of contemporary screen art, especially through its attempts to provoke intense disordered 
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thoughts and feelings in its viewers’ brains and bodies during the artistic encounter. 
Certainly, theirs constitutes a radical art project that is both inspired by, and reflects 
upon, the work and ideas of Guattari and Deligny (amongst others), and employs both 
form and content to help unleash a deluge of competing image streams (with their own 
distinct form and content), which move into direct composition with viewers’ bodies and 
brains in a gallery space: as asymmetrical rhythmical flow of images, text and sounds are 
unleashed in a manner that makes viewers physically and mentally ‘do things’. Although 
the centrifugal artwork is usually in process when viewers enter the gallery space or move 
into composition with it, the key to understanding it arguably lies in what we might call 
the film’s ‘opening’ (even if it is looped), which is diegetically anchored to the space of 
La Borde: the alternative psychiatric hospital in France’s Loire Valley where Guattari 
practised along with Deligny and Jean Oury. Worth mentioning here is that in this 
revolutionary setting Guattari et al. embraced madness and creative artistic expression 
without fetishizing either, and felt free to experiment while engineering dynamic and 
ever-changing ‘group subjects’ in an effort to ‘seek out the creative element [in madness], 
to have the clinical observer be attentive to what we called the madman’s transcendental 
dimension’ (Dosse 2010: 47).
Burkhard Meltzer outlines how the Assemblages installation exploits and harnesses 
the La Borde institution and its radical art therapy practices as its ‘principal theatre’, 
combining images of performances and events (including images from Le Moindre Geste) 
alongside an interview that the artists recorded with Guattari shortly before his death in 
1992, and a multitude of reflections and reflexions voiced by his colleagues and friends 
regarding their alternative methods of institutional psychotherapy (Meltzer 2010). First 
and foremost, Assemblages appears to be a meta artistic project primarily concerned with 
inculcating difference, especially with regard to viewers’ thoughts and feelings about 
‘madness’, its relationship to artistic forms of expression and the treatment of both. At 
the same time, the form of the multi-stream installation also appears to artistically draw 
attention to, and actively modify the ‘normal’ relationships between screen(s), screening 
space (a different form of institution) and the viewers’ brain and body. Indeed, the decision 
to hang a confederation of multiple screens within a gallery space immanently attests 
to Assemblages having taken on what Alison Butler refers to as a ‘deictic turn’: a term 
used to describe modern ‘hybrid’ artworks that fundamentally dismantle or destabilize 
the familiar subject-object relationship between viewer and screen, while generating an 
alternative sense of presence (as opposed to cinematic absence) by promoting movement, 
participation and the acknowledgement of modulating or competing viewpoints (Butler 
2010: 306–323). The deictic refuses to hide or downplay the importance of the space in 
which the screen or screens hang, and thus guides attention outwards beyond the frame to 
endow the screening-event with a Benjaminian aura, and simultaneously inwards towards 
what is framed. 
In attempting to map out beyond the screen and trace how the encounter with such an 
unbecoming film might in turn ethically disorder the habitual modes of thought, we must 
07756_Ch02_61-96.indd   87 4/27/17   10:01 AM
Unbecoming Cinema
88
foreground the extent to which modern screens operate as entangled material aspects of 
our subjectivities, which directly impact how we think, feel and act. From such immanent 
perspectives, images are redrawn as active agents that perform in or operate upon lived 
reality itself, to the extent that the viewer and the viewed radically coexist and comingle. That 
is, we must pay heed to what the film-maker and philosopher Brown calls the immanent 
‘film-spectator-world-assemblage’ (2015: 123ff), and what Mullarkey describes as the active 
screen’s overlapping participation ‘in the Real’ (2012: 39). Or again, as Brown says: ‘If, for 
Deleuze, “the brain is the screen” (Deleuze 2000), and if, after Damasio and others, the brain 
and the mind are embodied, then the cinema screen is also a body that touches us. That is, 
we do not observe films in a detached manner, but instead we have a physical relationship 
with films’ (Brown 2015: 141). In a comparable Deleuzian-neurobiological manoeuvre 
that draws our attentions to the material articulations of brain and screen in our modern 
media-saturated environments, Pisters argues that we must increasingly recognize screens 
as dynamic ‘dialethical’ agents. Or again, as powerful forces that are neither purely external 
(objectively out there before us) or internal (as a subjective brain-image) (Pisters 2012: 38–
41, 88ff).
The confederation of screens and brain-screens that constitute Assemblages explicitly 
trade in transversals, lucidly and ludically employing/deploying form and content to 
unleash trans-subjective ecosystems of images, or overwhelming bundles of affects and 
percepts, that compete and congress into singularities. All bodies assembled within, and 
encountering Assemblages create or contribute their own ‘noise’, of course, which interfere 
and co-compose, creating new haecceitic arrangements, affections and synthesized 
confederate bodies. These, in turn, demand viewers distribute their bodies, attentions and 
movements, and pay consideration to the admixture arrangements of other relative actors, 
bodies and forces mobilised or at play with in and around the institutional space of the 
gallery. What is more, the dialethic and deictic aspects of the project become vertiginously 
compounded and confounded by the distributed performative-artworks-inside-the-
performative-artwork, the assemblages nestled within Assemblages, such as films-within-
the-film, or the institutional-spaces within whatever institutional-space the installation 
now screens in. 
One embedded documentary sequences and interview in particular brings viewers 
into a ‘meta’ clinical and critical discussion about the role and function of art itself. There, 
Guattari discusses his employment of radical art (works and practices) in an attempt to 
challenge the practices and assumption of Western Psychiatry (qua psychology), which he 
felt were wedded to an impoverished normopathic and neurotypical world view, and all 
too rational notions of structured subjective forms. Guattari’s beliefs and practices lead to 
other discussions and exegeses throughout the film, that forge concrete links between the 
productive powers of art and madness, while illuminating the potentials of art to help both 
the sane and the mad escape their mental prisons and think difference. In one interview 
with the artists transcribed elsewhere, Jean Claude Polack, another La Borde psychiatrist, 
explains how to this end Guattari felt that:
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There is a certain very particular ‘animist’ sensibility that one could call delirium. Of 
course, it is a delirium by our standard; it is something that cuts the psychotic off from the 
social reality that is completely dominated by language, social relations, thus effectively 
separating him from the world. But this brings him closer to the other world from which 
we are totally cut off. It is for this reason that Félix maintained this laudatory view of 
animism, a praise of animism.
(Polack in Melitopoulos and Lazzarato 2012: 242)
The notion of animism touched upon here, and expressed by the work itself in a multitude 
of different ways, can also be linked to the animist work of Bruno Latour (1996), Manuel De 
Landa (1997) and Jane Bennett (2010), whose notions of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and 
agential assemblages force us to pay heed to the vibrant and vital contributions of non-
human materials and forces upon how and what human beings think and do. For Bennett, 
the animist nature of vibrant matter itself force us to recognize that human beings are 
always-already part of larger networks of agential assemblages, which directly imprison or 
enable the forms of decisions, actions and thoughts they actually make. Assemblages are 
best understood as emergent wholes, then, and thought of in terms of dynamic living ‘ad 
hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of all sorts’ which human bodies, 
brains and societies move into composition with; to form larger ‘living, throbbing 
confederations’ wherein agency must be understood as being distributed (Bennett 2010: 
23–24). 
Assemblages reifies such models through its form and content, becoming an agential 
inhuman force in its own right that moves into composition with the viewer’s sensorium. As 
such, the inhuman artwork can be understood trading in a form of therapeutic Guattarian 
aesthetics that rises above the purely representational to become contagious, agential or 
viral in nature. For indeed, Guattari (and Deleuze) argued that affective art at its best, or 
most productive, must wield a performative ability to unsettle the subject/object dichotomy, 
whilst stimulating new ways of thinking and acting. As a provocative and deterritorializing 
artwork Assemblages does this by, amongst other things, attempting to overwhelm its viewers 
by forcing them to try and absorb multiple streams of in-formation all at once, rather than 
comfortably filtering and focusing upon one element or stream. This, in turn, reinstates 
the importance of the lived body and sensory motor system during the encounter with an 
agential artwork, as it is stimulated into different movements and disordering perception-
actions. 
It is in this sense that febrile links between art, autism and animism begin to raise their 
head within the installation, playing out upon different scalar levels in the actual gallery 
space and (with)in the on-screen images recording art therapy sessions within La Borde. 
As comparable affective art therapy performances take place across time, and in very 
different forms of institution, each unleash novel impressions, stimulating vectors and 
‘disarticulatory vibrations’ (Reynolds and Bryx 2012: 295) designed to release agitating 
and affective movements (of bodies and brains) in the viewers/patients so that familiar 
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subject-object relations come into crisis. Here, it is not exclusively the images projected onto/
into the screens that become important, then, for by deterritorializing traditional cinema’s 
‘fully institutional framework’, the installation itself demands that the viewer’s attention 
dialethically and deictically include the site of the screening, and the singular arrangement 
of other bodies moving around and through the institutional gallery space. In like manner, 
each visitor’s embodied encounter with the artwork helps ‘actualize meaning in relation to 
concrete spatio-temporal contexts shared with audiences’, in a way that mainstream and Art 
cinema often does not (Butler 2010: 310–311). 
In trying to tease out this complex interaction between form and content, screen and 
viewer, bodies and space, we can turn to one key scene from Assemblages where Deligny 
appears sitting outdoors brandishing one of his famous cartographic tracings or autistic 
maps. He here holds up a broad sheet that transcribes the movements, rhythms, lines of 
drift and flight that an autistic child undertook within the grounds and buildings of La 
Borde. As he describes his map-making, he gestures to one diagram that contains a series 
of repeating circular scribbles that trace their movements (these representing the places 
he or she stopped to spin or resonate). By gesturing to the space behind him where these 
spinnings occurred, Deligny and Assemblages conceptually enfold an autistic mapping 
into the territory he and we (as neurotypicals) see beyond (in a real landscape spatially 
mastered by the camera’s inbuilt Renaissance perspective). During any given screening 
event, Deligny’s drawings and discussions also move into rhizomatic composition with 
other images of autistic persons upon the installation’s other screens (or on the same screen 
at different temporal points). One particularly arresting and memorable image captures the 
‘animalistic’ movements of Yves perched on all fours staring down into a babbling stream: 
rocking and rolling his head and neck in stereotypic loops as he resonates with the qualia 
of the rushing water’s own movements, sounds and intensive momentum. In an act of 
artistic mise en abyme, perhaps, the artwork’s own form begins to mirror content and thus 
demands comparable movements from its viewers’ bodies. We might recognize that the 
three competing screens and streams (enveloped by a sound-territory and arrayed within 
a gallery space) toy with the viewer by pushing and pulling their attention in different 
directions, as sound and image drift in-between and across the screens in a manner that 
demands that they, like Yves, shift and adjust their body, head, neck, eyes, ears, feet and 
attention in affinity with the flowing screen-streams of in-formation. 
The overall effect gradually prompts viewers to unfocus their attentions, to allow their 
consideration to dilate and encompass all the different vectors, screens and sound streams, 
or else to zigzag and drift in-between different aspects of each, or maybe to momentarily 
circle around one or other in a manner that finds other affinities with Deligny’s tracings and 
maps. This abstract autistic diagram, which is shared by both Assemblages and Le Moindre 
Geste (on its own, or in its embedded machinic assemblage with the former) also serves 
to forge connections with the final film we will consider here, In My Language: the autie-
type art brut work of Amanda Baggs, that was recently discussed by Erin Manning (2013). 
This non-cinema work constitutes a paired down YouTube posting that actively challenges 
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viewers to move beyond everyday thoughts and feelings regarding Baggs’s so-called autistic 
‘disorder’. 
Baggs’s film formulates a short portmanteau piece that unfurls into two asymmetric parts, 
each designed to challenge viewers’ habitual modes of perception and thought regarding 
autism. The first half unfolds in what she calls her ‘native language’, while the second 
communicates with viewers via English enunciations, which are given voice by a synthetic 
computerized speech programme that mediates between Baggs and her online audiences. 
The first image of the posting introduces the film-maker poised before a window, framed 
from above as she restlessly rocks back and forth with her arms rhythmically flapping. The 
performative expression of her autistic stimming or stereotypy combines with the extradiegetic 
sounds of Baggs’s biological ‘vocal-chords’ making a modulating vowel sound: the topological 
wave form of which erects and expands what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a sonic territory. 
In this instance, a resonating and amplifying wave-form that envelopes her ‘dancing’ body 
and meshes with its own audio reverberations from the surrounding environment – as if 
actualizing a form of environmental sensing and resonant listening (reminiscent of how 
dolphins or bats employ echo-location to garner an auditory sense of space). 
Throughout the first half of Baggs’s film a modular audio architecture is thus erected 
that appears to have the effect of drawing a circle around Baggs, her environment (in a 
manner reminiscent of Deligny’s maps) and the viewer. Gradually, this sound territory 
expands to include additional ‘sonic bricks’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 434) or assembled 
elements fashioned courtesy of Baggs’s playful embodied interactions with material objects 
in her environment, which build into a bricolage cacophony of interactive sound-images. 
Accordingly, the enveloping humming-singing becomes back-grounded as a looping sonic 
montage is built into the film: the elements of which include the tympani sound of Baggs 
stroking a wooden door with a cane, the noise of her hand stroking a plastic computer 
keyboard, the clicking and jangling of a twisting metal chain, the xylophonic sounds of her 
fingernail scraping against a grill, and the flickering and fluttering clatter of paper being 
wafted around. Each individual sound element introduces their own unique audio textures 
and sonic ‘shape’ into the soundscape, but in combination create another audio form that 
is more than the sum of its parts, and in combination, point towards an alternative way of 
in-habiting and interacting with the immediate environment (offering examples of what 
Deleuze calls pure optical and sound situations divorced from narrative and action). 
If Baggs’s film unfurls an alternative form of felt sound that points to a territorial 
listening from within, this could also be recognized as an unfocused and receptive form 
of listening linked to a haptic orality. This autistic form of inter-active-listening finds its 
visual counterpoint in the alternative modes of looking likewise foregrounded by the video 
montage, which offer extreme and disorienting out of focus close-ups of the objects and 
materials responsible for generating these sounds. Although such images initially feed the 
viewers’ eyes with information, they also find parallels in the alternative haptic forms of 
visuality discussed above, which Baggs autodidactically creates, instilling sensual modes of 
looking that invoke a combination of ‘tactile, kinaesthetic, and proprioceptive functions’ 
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that mirror ‘the way we experience touch both on the surface of and inside our bodies’ 
(Marks 2000: 162). We can locate a choice example of these haptic forms of perception at 
the end of the first half of the film, in an image that records Baggs’s experience of exploring 
a book – traditionally a site of linguistic and narrative forms and representational 
symbolism for socialized neurotypicals. Baggs here frames herself in medium close-up 
pushing her head deep into the book, then rubbing the skin of her face sensuously over the 
smooth surface of its pages, whilst inhaling deeply and smelling its folds. Viewers then see 
her flicking through its pages in haptic close-up, making the pages bend and rifle through 
her fingertips as she plays them like a musical instrument. During these sequences the 
aroma, smoothness and rigid edginess of the material object is made tangible to the 
viewer’s senses, whilst its traditional representational and neurotypical use is – like the film 
language by extension – deterritorialized and defamiliarized in to a qualitative universe of 
pure sense data. 
Thereafter the first and second halves of the film are bridged by a blackened intertitle 
frame with ‘A Translation’ written upon it. Viewers are then presented with a close-up 
of Baggs’s hand playing with flowing water under a faucet. This sequence is scored by a 
computerized ‘female’ voice-over, which addresses viewers directly: 
The previous part of this video was in my native language. Many people have assumed 
that when I talk about this being my language that means that each part of the video must 
have a particular symbolic message within it designed for the human mind to interpret. 
But my language is not about designing words or even visual symbols for people to 
interpret. It is about being in a constant conversation with every aspect of my environment. 
Reacting physically to all parts of my surroundings. In this part of the video the water 
doesn’t symbolise anything. I am just interacting with the water as the water interacts 
with me. Far from being purposeless, the way that I move is an on-going response to what 
is around me. Ironically, the way that I move when responding to everything around me 
is described as ‘being in a world of my own.’
The film then cuts from a shot of Baggs’s fingers playing with the flowing water to a medium 
close-up of her rocking and waving her arms inside her front room. Behind her, a dog sits 
on the couch. The computerized voice-over continues: 
Whereas if I interact with a much more limited set of responses and only react to a 
much more limited part of my surroundings people claim that I am ‘opening up to true 
interaction with the world.’ They judge my existence, awareness, and personhood on 
which of [sic] a tiny and limited part of the world I appear to be reacting to. The way I 
naturally think and respond to things looks and feels so different from standard concepts 
or even visualisation that some people do not consider it thought at all, but it is a way of 
thinking in its own right. However the thinking of people like me is only taken seriously 
if we learn your language, no matter how we previously thought or interacted. 
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The film thereafter switches to an image of Baggs sitting before her computer typing, still 
over scored by the extra-diegetic voice-over: ‘As you heard, I can sing along with what is 
around me’. As Baggs finishes typing within the scene, the extra-diegetic electronic voice 
switches to become an embedded diegetic one, emanating from the computer she presently 
types upon within the documented room, suggesting it has switched its own spatio-temporal 
position (from the programme used in the editing of the film within the computer, to the 
electronic speaker recorded inside the filmed room itself), momentarily offering the scene 
and voice a different spatialized position or point of origin (as if switching from a mental to 
spoken voice). Diegetically, the voice software continues: ‘It is only when I type something 
in your language that you refer to me as having communication’. 
The following montage is thereafter explicated by the extra-diegetic machine voice: ‘I smell 
things’, accompanying an image of Baggs smelling her hand; ‘I listen to things’, accompanying 
an image of Baggs twirling an object by her ear; ‘I feel things’, accompanying an image of 
Baggs rubbing her face in a towel; ‘I taste things’, accompanying an image showing Baggs 
putting a marker pen in her mouth; ‘I look at things’, accompanying an image of Baggs eyes 
obliquely engaging the camera. Baggs’s autistic perception is here shown to be far from a 
withdrawal from the world, and rather a passionate polysensory embodied embrace of the 
environment and its various inter-active multi-sensory elements. Baggs elsewhere explains: 
‘conventional language only allows me [the] terms [of the neurotypical], so I have done my 
best to point out the enormous and beautiful world of experiences that lie between those 
words and beyond the limits of a language never equipped to describe them’ (see Manning 
2013: 256). If the message or content of Baggs’s art brut autie-type work concerns conveying 
and opening up an alternative form of aggregated or distributed perception, we should also 
take pause to consider how her chosen medium or form of unbecoming cinema – an online 
YouTube video – may also (contingently or accidently) contribute to another autistic affect. 
In The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains (2010) Nicholas Carr considers 
some of the ways in which the Internet, as a relatively new technology or sociotechnical 
practice, inculcates a form of ‘intellectual ethic’ by rewiring or re-routing the hyperplastic 
neural pathways of the human brains that move into regular composition with it 
(Carr 2010: 77). There, the Internet is understood as a communication technology that 
materially impacts and affects its human users, and displays a real ability to alter the brain’s 
hyperplastic mental architecture and modes of processing information. Although Carr does 
not explicitly link this to autism, some of his findings suggest that this could be a useful 
vector to consider. At a physical level, Carr highlights how our interactions with the web 
often result in a high repetition rate of the ‘same or similar actions’, usually in response to 
permutations of comparable external informational cues or stimuli. At a superficial level 
we might argue that these find subtle resonances with autistic forms of stereotypy, as with 
our repeated clicking and tapping of mouses and screens. Arguably further reflecting the 
autistic’s experience of reality, Carr incorporates Cory Doctorow’s ideas of plugging into the 
Internet as being akin to plugging into an endlessly distractive and distracting ‘ecosystem 
of interruption technologies’ (Doctorow in Carr 2010: 91). Accordingly, Carr suggests that 
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the web may in the end encourage its users ‘to borrow cognitive strengths from autism’ in 
order to help neurotypicals become ‘better infovores’ (Carr 2010: 222). Or stated otherwise, 
in forming articulations with web-based technologies, the human brain and computer 
technologies meet half-way in a block of becoming that transforms how ‘normal’ brains 
perceive and process information. 
It is interesting to recall here that in The Imitation Game, it is hinted that the father 
of the modern computer, Alan Turing (Benedict Cumberbatch), was himself located 
somewhere within the autistic constellation. If so, we might argue that today, the 
agential descendants of his inhuman computation machine have become responsible 
for hijacking and rewiring the brains of those who increasingly assemble with them, 
inculcating autie-type modes of interacting with their increasingly mediated information 
spaces. We can spare readers from a detailed argument regarding such issues here by 
pointing to Pisters’s work on similar themes in The Neuro-Image (2012) regarding our 
current era of ‘perception 2.0’, which emerges in tandem with our hyper-mediated digital 
culture, and to Mathew Fuller and Andrew Goffey’s work on contemporary ‘Evil Media’, 
which assembles with and impacts our minds, bodies, actions, work and socio-political 
organizations (2012). Bearing such perspectives in mind helps us to understand how the 
articulation of the autistic artist Baggs, her camera, computer, software programmes and 
online video sharing sites combine into a wider form of agential assemblage that allows 
viewers to join up and physically interact with, and become a networked part of, an ever-
expanding abstract autistic diagram. 
Drawing Conclusions 
All three autistic works considered above can be understood transducing normal modes 
of perception, with their affective aesthetics allowing neurotypical viewers to agentially 
sense another universe below and beyond their pre-chunked reality, wherein an alternative 
dialethical form of autistic ‘shaping’ emerges. Here, shapes are understood in terms of 
haecceitic singularities, or emergent ‘topological forms’ that are uniquely relational and 
always singular to the local qualities present in the environment and affective conditions 
of its formation (including site of projection) qua individuation. Baggs’s film, for example, 
clearly displays how autistics offset neurotypical chunking by tuning-in, singing or 
resonating with their environments, and indulging in a rich multi-sensational and multi-
modal body-mapping or shaping that takes place where concepts and language are ‘not-
yet’ (see Manning 2013). These alternative modes of being become communicated by all 
three artworks via bundles of affects and percepts that chime with what Francis Tustin 
similarly calls encounters with ‘autistic shapes’: which are ‘not the shapes of any particular 
object’, but just ‘a shape’ (Tustin in Manning 2013: 186). A shape here being a specific or 
haeccietic ecology of things, or a sensed affective conglomeration of swarming and 
intensive actants that collectively constitute the relational milieu of sensory experience. 
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As several images throughout all these autistic films make clear, these shapings or 
worldings emerge from being within what Tom Morton terms the ‘sensual ether’ (2011), 
or a pre-conscious culture of objects and materials (as energy) that collectively constitute 
an alternative relational milieu of experience, without for all that, ever being reduced 
to it. 
Autistic shapes must be understood as being as unique and singular as a snowflake 
or prime number, and as a sensual nexus of different in-forming patterns, intensities, 
qualities, gradients, rhythms and movements waiting to be actualized or created in an 
emergent encounter. Yves and Baggs in particular helped us understand how this can 
be comprehended as a resonating experience of dwelling in the conceptless flux where 
perceiver and perceived slip and slide into each other, and the human and inhuman overlap 
as they perform their ‘intricate dance’ (Bennett 2010: 32), entering into ongoing processes 
of becoming and unbecoming. In Assemblages the installation itself made this shaping 
palpable, by impacting and agitating the viewers’ body and senses with overwhelming 
streams of competing in-formation. Each film in its own way also forces us to recognize 
how immanent materializations actualize what Deleuze and Guattari call the body without 
organs (BwO) and unleash images of thought-without-image. At the end of Baggs’s film, 
the electronic voice intones in a language neurotypical English speakers can understand: 
‘I want you to know that this has not been intended as a voyeuristic freak show where you 
get to look at the bizarre workings of the autistic mind. It is meant as a strong statement on 
the existence and value of many different kinds of thinking’. We hope that these laudable 
sentiments can also be expanded to cover our larger enquiry into autistic modes of thinking, 
feeling and sensing here, and that in assemblage can help illuminate the ongoing value of 
unbecoming films and art that ethically reconnect us to the real, via the disordering means 
of affective autie-type art. 
Notes
 1 The use of the prefix ‘autie’ has arguably gained most popularity and traction through 
the writing of Donna Williams. In Autism an Inside-Out Approach (1996), for example, 
Williams introducers her readers to a unique type of ‘autie-speak’ (237). In her blog, 
Williams also regularly discusses interactions between her ‘non autie friends’ and other 
‘autie spectrum people’ (see http://www.donnawilliams.net/ntswhenaword.0.html). The 
notion of ‘autie-type’ art is one I borrow from existing scholarly and academic work, 
including articles and books by Ralph Savarese (2012), and Erin Manning. In Manning’s 
Deleuze-inspired monograph Always More Than One (2013), she draws on and expands 
Savarese’s earlier work on ‘autie-type’ writing (2012: 186). Following Savarese, Manning 
relates an ‘autie-type’ of artistic expression to a spontaneous poetic form of language and 
typing that constitutes a genre all of its own. She likewise expands this to her consideration of 
Amanda Baggs’s YouTube films, which we explore an example of here for its ‘autie-type’ film 
poesies. 
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 2 See for example ‘The autistic genocide clock’ http://wrongplanet.net/forums/viewtopic.
php?t=104387
 3 The New World Encyclopaedia describes an Ames Room as ‘a distorted room used to 
create an optical illusion of relative sizes’. The trick effect room was named after its creator, 
‘American ophthalmologist Adelbert Ames, Jr.’ and was likely ‘based on the late-nineteenth-
century concept of German scientist Hermann von Helmholtz’. 
 4 This werewolf-like transformation reflects a passage from Grandin’s diary where she talks 
of resonating with a cow about to go to slaughter: ‘When the animal remained completely 
calm I felt an overwhelming feeling of peacefulness, as if God had touched me […] As the 
life force left the animal, I had been completely overwhelmed with feelings I did not know I 
had’ (2006: 238).
 5 In a paper entitled ‘Cinemautism: Provisional and super knowledge in the (rooms and) 
social space of cinema’ film-maker and academic Steven Eastwood argues that the implicit 
principles governing the language of mainstream cinema can be pedagogically adapted 
to teach autistic people about the social rules and spatial conventions of neurotypicals’ 
social interaction, courtesy of the ‘subconscious’ visual rules regarding framings (figure-
field relations), body space (the two shot), emotional expressions (close-ups), the rules of 
conversation (shot-reverse-shot) and what it means to be an other.
 6 The notion of ‘infra-language’ is associated with the work of Bruno Latour and his Actor 
Network Theory (ANT). It can be understood as a reflexive practice used by the analyst 
to help them become more attentive or attuned to the complex inter-relations of different 
human and inhuman ‘actors’ and the role of their own metalanguage in what they are able 
to say about the network of relations under discussion. 
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Distorting and Perverting
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Chapter Three
Head Cinema as Body without Organs: On Jodorowsky’s Bitter Pill 
Films and Their Spinozian Parallels
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I am not the feeling. I am what is felt. The man who feels. Everything is so subjective. If 
someone [says] to me, I am mad, I say yes, I am absolutely mad like all the civilisation 
and like all the persons in this planet. I think all the humanity now is absolutely crazy 
and mad. 
(Jodorowsky 1971)
… the less human the world is, the more it is the artist’s duty to believe and produce belief 
in a relation between man and the world, because the world is made by men. 
(Deleuze 2005b: 165)
One of the only coherent philosophical positions is thus revolt. It is a constant 
confrontation between man and his own obscurity.
(Albert Camus 1955: 40)
In one of the mythological planet-dimensions sidestepped into during Alejandro Jodorowsky’s epic LSD-film The Holy Mountain (1973), viewers enter a bizarre art gallery owned by an industrialist named Klen (Burt Kleiner). As he strolls through his latest 
exhibition with his chauffeur and female lover in tow, the trio begin interacting with a series 
of sculptural objects that are part art-machine and part naked human body. The threesome 
here begin performing as interactive viewers, teasing, manipulating, groping or playing with 
the exposed flesh and protruding organs of the psychedelically painted art-human installations 
(subject-objects). Klen’s lover stokes an exposed penis with feathers while he is lowered 
beneath an exposed female bottom, whose anus he joyfully teases; first with gusts of air 
bellowed forth by his clapping hands, and latterly by groping the buttocks and ‘playfully’ 
inserting his finger (Cobb 2007: 147). The living sculptural-machines writhe and react to 
these interactive attentions. Tracing a reverse line, we also witness the active and participatory 
viewers becoming increasingly stimulated by their experiential encounters with these 
animated human-artwork hybrids.
Moving into an adjacent room, Klen then introduces the visitors and viewers to a strange 
rectangular box-machine. In voice-over he asserts: ‘We created a love machine. To make 
it live the spectator has to work with it, guide it, receive it, give himself in the act of love.’ 
The industrialist thereafter encourages his male chauffeur and female lover to take turns 
stimulating and agitating the machine with a large electronic pheremin-like phallus, which 
appears to disturb and pervert the invisible energy fields emanating from or embedding 
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the machine. Klen’s voice-over observes how ‘the skill of the spectator will determine the 
machine’s ability to reach climax’. After a few laboured movements with the phallus, the 
clenched chauffer fails to activate the machine and gives up. The female lover thereafter 
strips herself down to the waist, expertly wields the staff, and begins steering it around, 
coaxing and stimulating the enthused machine into an orgasmic climax. Her successful 
interaction results in the unfolding and dilation of the love machine, at which point she 
swiftly inserts the staff, which ejaculates viscous fluid everywhere. A cut thereafter reveals 
the birth of a smaller crying ‘desiring-machine’.
Such bizarre poetic scenes are not rare in Jodorowsky’s work, but here specifically reveal 
one of his many self-reflective musings upon an ideal participatory film-viewer relationship 
that is built into his unbecoming ‘head cinema’: a type of drug film targeted at US ‘head 
audiences’ (cult filmgoers with a preference for watching movies high on marijuana or 
drugs such as LSD) that were celebrated in their original context as alternative psychedelic 
underground cinemas fuelled by a vitriolic and nihilistic ‘will to be against’. Somewhat 
pretentiously, at the time, Jodorowsky also imagined his head films as material agents of 
spiritual change for his ‘western’ viewers – which is to say, as actual alchemical forces that 
could enlighten audiences during and after the event of screening. Certainly, the eccentric 
artist billed his drug films as mystical artworks that could help disorder and reorder his 
young viewers’ perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, and by so doing, increase their will to 
power. In one typical interview at the time, Jodorowsky famously proclaimed that in order 
to deal with enlightenment as a thematic concern, the ‘first thing a film must change are the 
actors who are in it; and then the audiences. If a young boy takes acid and experiences a 
change, the least a film can do is give him more than acid gives him; you must give him the 
pill’ (1971: 150). 
Throughout his oeuvre, film form and the performers’ bodies repeatedly surface as the 
most powerful and affective agents Jodorowsky wields for spiritually and metaphysically 
communicating with his viewer. As a director, he was well aware that these immanent artistic 
forces move into direct composition with the viewer’s body and brain during screening, 
contributing to the way in which they feel-think the filmic encounter. To a similar end, 
David Church observes that in a manner:
reminiscent of Artaud’s ideas about transforming the spectator, everyone making and 
viewing his films (himself especially) should be destroyed and reborn as new people. 
For this reason, he shoots his films in sequence from beginning to end, using the 
filmmaking process as a search for spiritual illumination, beginning with an initiation 
rite (i.e. violence, for he believes that art must be violent) and moving towards 
enlightenment.
(Church 2007)1
In this chapter we dive into Jodorowsky’s weird and unbecoming drug diptych El Topo 
(1970) and The Holy Mountain (1973), two ‘event films’ that attempt to engineer a 
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metaphysical encounter through the body and skin, by unleashing bundles of warped 
perceptions and raw corporeal affects that challenge viewers to see and think differently 
about the state of contemporary life. In giving themselves in the act of love, and individuating 
with his bad trip pill films, or intensive corporeal cinemas of cruelty, viewers are invited to 
encounter affects and sensations that render palpable the invisible forces that always-already 
pervert and distort life, and by so doing alchemically reawaken them, or give birth to a new 
world, or new ways of thinking-acting.
Accordingly, the midnight movies are explored as ‘event’ films in two very different, 
and yet inter-related ways. In the first instance, the febrile hallucinatory films are 
designed to agitate, shock, assault and prick complicit viewers during a contrived deictic 
and dialethic screening encounter, getting under their skin, agitating their nerves and 
provoking them to feel-think alterity during a screening event. As bad trip cinemas 
go, these deranged and hallucinatory Bataille-esque Artaudian encounters unbridle a 
raw violence of sensations, alongside a heady blend of physical and spiritual violence, 
rage, and abject despair. Of course, as Angelos Koutsourakis reminds us in his recent 
rethinking of Artaudian cinema, as is the case with the work of Bataille, ‘Artaud’s cinema 
of cruelty was inherently political, as much as it was sensual’ (Koutsourakis 2016: 67). 
In Jodorowsky’s films too, we can perceive how raw sensational violence is marshalled to 
help distort and pervert, in a ‘minoritarian’ political manoeuvre that allows the real to 
be seen and felt differently. It is in this sense too that Jodorowsky’s films begin to point 
towards two bifurcating poles of the event, and reveal an ethico-aesthetic affinity with 
the wider gaseous movements of – what we might call after Deleuze – a ‘pure event’. 
Or stated otherwise, Jodorowsky’s pill films distil the distributed affects and precepts 
that properly belong to a broader zeitgeist, or a wider spiritual movement of world, and 
narcotically deliver them to the embodied head-film viewer as ferocious (dis)affections 
and twisted perceptions. 
The ‘narratives’ we focus upon in this chapter unfold and drift along within surrealistic 
spaces of panpsychic autopoesis, wherein strange picaresque characters interact with 
a vital and dynamic animist plane of perverting forces, and interact with a range of 
defamiliarizing embodiments of sociopolitical and psychological insanity, domination 
and perversion. These forces, actors and actants are essentially entangled upon and 
within a supersaturated expressive substance that blurs the mental and material, physical 
and psychic, actual and virtual planes. Both within and beyond the screen, stable notions 
of fixed identity or (a concept of) ‘being’ are also replaced by fluid and oneiric images of 
shifting identity and swarming distributed mind-body becomings (see Fleming 2009). 
What is most interesting to this chapter, though, is how these delirious black humour 
exercises also appear to think a complete philosophical reversal, by focusing upon 
characters with ‘parallel’ mind-bodies that appear radically (immanently) ‘enworlded’, 
and thus act and desire upon and with-in a chaotic and shifting Expressionistic plane of 
vital images, matter, forces and energy. As such, within the films the meaty and fleshy 
body becomes a privileged site of spiritual revolt and empowerment, whose powers 
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become increased or decreased courtesy of the different spiritual or physical articulations, 
connections and compositions it moves into with other immanent bodies and forces.
To my mind, as a consequence of this, the ‘pill’ films clearly express the ethical condition 
of immanent existence, and explore what it is a body ‘can do’ under changing material and 
spiritual conditions. Jodorowsky’s drug films certainly appear to advocate experimental 
and artistic modes of living and being that involve deterritorializing sad passions, and 
actively distancing oneself from the negative desires of the state apparatus and its libidinal 
machines. On account of such, it remains strange to me that the philosopher Benedict 
Spinoza remains a figure so-far neglected from considerations of Jodorowsky’s head films, 
not least because these blazing cinematic diatribes against the distortion and domination 
of the human body and spirit have been compared to the concepts and works of almost 
every other philosopher and mystic around. To redress this somewhat, we set out here 
to explore how Jodorowsky’s ‘counterculture’ films not only politically and spiritually 
resonate with the evental spirit of the times, but eventually begin to operate as life-
affirming ethico-political agents or machines that invite viewers to reject ressentiment/
resentiment and bad conscience in order to reconnect human and world in an empowering 
Spinozist manner. 
If we stop short of saying Jodorowsky’s films do philosophy at this stage, we can begin 
to approach them as minor cinemas that invoke or provoke the thinking of certain 
philosophical concepts upon an adjacent artistic plane. Thus, in a manner comparable 
to the way in which Deleuze and Guattari extract an art ‘of Spinozism’ from the writing 
of Antonin Artaud, Herman Melville and Franz Kafka (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 67), 
so too can we set out in search for a Spinozian style of philosophical expressionism in 
Jodorowsky’s work. That is made palpable to the mind and senses courtesy of his raw 
and cruel Artaudian aesthetics. Saying this, we must concede that it is only the second 
of Jodorowsky’s pill films that is most accurately Spinozist, with the first being decidedly 
more Nietzschean in its intense embrace and expression of suffering and rage, as well 
as the eponymous protagonist’s (played by Jodorowsky) ongoing desire to flee the filthy 
and corrupt world of men. Ben Cobb certainly demonstrates that Jodorowsky borrowed 
heavily from Nietzsche’s novel Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883–1891) for El Topo, not 
least by evoking the central themes concerning the death of God, the Superman and 
the theory of Eternal Recurrence (Cobb 2007: 97). If Jodorowsky’s politico-aesthetic 
remains provocatively nihilistic or Nietzschean in this film, this ultimately appears to be 
a path (or process) that the artist and artworks reflexively pass through, before returning 
with a renewed spiritual and mystical conviction in his next pill film, which surfaces 
as the more positive and joyful of the drug diptych. Before getting to this, however, 
we must first take a moment to somewhat disentangle the different aspects of the term 
event we are deploying throughout this chapter, and sketch out the extent to which the 
subjective experiences catalysed by the warped film’s psychomechanics relate to the 
distributed affects and percepts associated with the ‘outside’ happenings or the site of 
the event.2 
07756_Ch03_97-134.indd   104 4/27/17   10:13 AM
Head Cinema as Body without Organs
105
Evental Happenings and Counterculture Movements
In France, Deleuze described May 1968 as a pure event. That is, an irruptive revolutionary 
becoming that ‘stripped bare all the power relations wherever they were operating’, and 
bore witness to the emergence of new problems and questions, ‘as if a society suddenly 
saw what was intolerable in it and also saw the possibility for something else’ (Deleuze 
2006c: 234). In his preface to Anti-Oedipus Foucault similarly highlights the contagious 
transformative power of these ‘five brief, impassioned, jubilant, enigmatic years’ which, 
amongst others things, led to the production of Deleuze and Guattari’s august book of 
ethics. 
At the gates of our world, there was Vietnam, of course, and the first major blow to the 
powers that be. But here, inside our walls, what exactly was taking place? An amalgam 
of revolutionary and antirepressive politics? A war fought on two fronts: against social 
exploitation and psychic repression? A surge of libido modulated by the class struggle? 
Perhaps. At any rate, it is this familiar, dualistic interpretation that has laid claim to the 
events of those years. The dream that cast its spell, between the First World War and 
fascism, over the dreamiest parts of Europe – the Germany of Wilhelm Reich, and the 
France of the surrealists – had returned and set fire to reality itself: Marx and Freud in the 
same incandescent light.
(Foucault 2004: xiii)
Foucault’s synthesizing of Reich’s philosophy and surrealist politics with regard to 
anarchic ethico-political happenings in 1968 reveals certain affinities if not vectors with 
Jodorowsky’s iconoclastic ethico-aesthetics. At the same time, however, this statement 
also helps us to begin drawing out an important and pragmatic distinction between two 
very different ways of thinking of ‘events’. The first pertains to the more common 
narrativization of past ‘historical events’, which results in a fixed and stable (hi)story. 
Against this extensive model, the alternative foregrounds the living and intensive 
throbbing energies of ‘pure events’, which, amongst other things, can witness the past 
return differently in the present. 
Tom Lundborg (2012) stresses that if we adopt the former form of modelling of ‘historical 
events’ we are forced to view history reductively, diminishing it to a recalcitrant succession 
of static and stable moments somewhat like the Deleuzian action-image. Adopting the other 
allows us to better recognize the power of pure events, which always remain unstable and 
intensive, and reveal fluid and dynamic modulating movements (more like a time-image) 
that are liberated of historicity. Consequentially, pure events always retain undetermined 
and untapped potentials, and appear gaseous in nature, like the unhistorical vapours within 
and between fixed historical moments. In the switch from moments to movements, the 
pure event always retains untimely potentials to suddenly erupt within and transform (our 
understanding and thinking of) both the past and the future, or to suddenly take on new 
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contingent meanings, existences and subjectivities (see e.g. Lundborg 2012: 99). Necessarily, 
any true change ignited by these forces is difficult to be pinned down, and always retains (real 
or potential) deforming-reforming abilities to transform how we, or the future, perceive or 
understand the event. 
In Badiou’s models, the event similarly flashes in and out of existence within the evental 
site, giving form to what was previously formless. The artwork here operates as an immanent 
site wherein the event can flash or pass into existence, and might ignite or nudge others, 
encouraging or interpolating them to become swept up in the larger evental movements. 
An event necessarily inhabits multiple sites therefore. As Badiou has it, because the event 
is constituted by a group of works, we must also think of the individual artwork as being a 
singular multiple, which individually and collectively serve to make actual the virtual or a 
new truth (see Badiou 2013: 66–91; 2005: 112). It is in this singular-plural manner that the 
‘Reichean’ and surrealistic features common to ‘Jodorowsky’s’ event work become relevant, 
and speak of his films belonging to a wider more distributed multiplicity of movements 
(including manifestoes, happenings, posters, protests, books, novels, and so on).
If pure events necessarily escape tenacious temporal historicity, so too do they move 
freely and dynamically across geographical territories. For like the movement of peoples 
and things, they cannot be easily pinned down within neatly bounded national borders. As 
a nomadic artist, Jodorowsky is a character whose life and work at once actualizes and forces 
us to recognize this fact, and demands we always indulge in an active exercise of – what 
Dina Iordanova refers to as – ‘watching across borders’ (2010: 51). With regard to the global 
events of 1968, for example, which we do not have space/time to go into in any great depth 
here, the reader might well grasp how a consideration of the art, archival footage, news, 
literature and cinema from many different nations during this era would expose a series of 
gaseous transnational inter-regional transmissions. Thus, events that may appear to be static 
historical moments within one particular nation’s respective grand narrative might from 
another perspective concomitantly appear to share in an affinity with the dynamic energies 
and intensities of a wider evental mo(ve)ment. Accordingly, we could argue that if 1968 
was the high water (or gas) mark of an event in France, these local movements were also 
interacting and resonating with a broader global expression that witnessed the ignition and 
eruption of other events within an expanded milieu that included sites distributed across the 
United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Mexico and the United States (to name but a few). 
Clearly, with its protests, rallies, happenings, concerts and capturing of San Francisco’s 
Haight-Ashbury in mid to late 1960s, the so-called ‘counterculture’ events in the United 
States offer an interesting parallels with the French events described by Foucault above. 
Coinciding with this wider event site in the United States in particular was the emergence of 
new pharmaceutical technologies and forces such as LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), which 
were enthusiastically embraced by the youth as another legitimate and liberating mode of 
social protest and spiritual revolt (see e.g. Lee 1994). Turning on, tuning in, and dropping 
out – to momentarily intercept Timothy Leary’s famous drug dictum – thus increasingly 
came to help define a new generation’s pharmacologically assisted flight from the stifling 
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libidinal economies and desires of the embedding conservative culture. So much so, in fact, 
that contemporaneous commentators such as Sheldon Renan linked LSD to the emergence 
of a new sociopolitical concept of ‘man’. In Deleuzian terms we might even say that this new 
form of man was ‘becoming-woman’: Not least because of LSD’s well-known interferences 
with ‘normal’ perceptual patterns, and the agential chemical’s intense disordering of habitual 
affective arrangements, which historically helped ignite freeform experiments with existing 
ways of living and creating (Renan 1967: 46). Highlighting the connections between the use 
of this drug and a wider evental happening, Renen notes how the LSD-taking ‘new man’ 
increasingly began to challenge dominant conventions, including cinematic ones: ‘Ideally, 
the new man sees more, feels more, is willing to experience more than the “conventional 
man.” He is the new species for a new age’ (Renan 1967: 46).3 
Although ostensibly a ‘minor’ or nomadic ‘third cinema’ produced outwith the United 
States, Jodorowsky’s psychedelic pill films clearly tapped into and resonated with the 
feelings and events historically impacting his US audiences. This of course works on a 
level above and beyond mere drug experimentation, for if the US counterculture had 
enthusiastically investigated new modes of thought, feeling, and action during the mid 
to late 1960s, things were destined to fundamentally alter due to several local reactionary 
events happening in 1968. The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in April dealt a 
heavy blow, for example, which recast the events of Malcolm X’s murder a few years 
earlier. Robert Kennedy’s assassination later that same year similarly sent another 
disruptive shockwave backwards and forwards in time, at once painfully recalling and 
re-framing that of his brother five years before, whilst surging forward to point to a 
new Nixon era. Closely linked to these tragedies (and the events in Paris at the same 
time) was the growing anti-Vietnam sentiment, marked by an ever-growing series of 
civil protests where university students up and down the nation began boycotting their 
classes. This movement gained in momentum until 1969, when around half a million 
anti-Vietnam protesters marched upon Washington, with returning veterans leading 
the march and being documented tossing their medals over the White House fence at 
the dirty and corrupt ideologies encrusted in its edifices. Although Nixon rode into The 
White House on an ‘end the war’ ticket in 1969, by 1970 American troops were still in 
Vietnam, and appeared to be pushing deeper into Cambodia. We might also recall that on 
the home front an anti-war demonstration at Kent State University was met with brutal 
state repression, with the Ohio National Guard opening fire on protesting students. On 
May fourth, four unarmed students were murdered and nine others seriously wounded 
by the military. The US authorities violently struck back, then, reasserting their exclusive 
rights to violence, power and control. As such, blood and tragedy marked the retreat of 
the defiant counterculture wave, and marked a new phase in the struggle to control or 
repress the powers of a threatening pure event. 
Of course, it would be too simplistic to say that the renewed hopes and ideals born 
with the 1960s ‘new man’ died at the close of the decade with him. But in the US context 
it wouldn’t be too far wrong either. Hunter S. Thompson arguably summarizes these 
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generational sentiments best in his dark and novel search for the fading American Dream 
in a new disillusioned era:
We are all wired into a survival trip now. No more of the speed that fuelled the 60’s. That 
was the fatal flaw in Tim Leary’s trip. He crashed around America selling ‘consciousness 
expansion’ without ever giving a thought to the grim meat-hook realities that were lying 
in wait for all the people who took him seriously […] All those pathetically eager acid 
freaks who thought they could buy Peace and Understanding for three bucks a hit. But 
their loss and failure is ours too. What Leary took down with him was the central illusion 
of a whole life-style that he helped create […] a generation of permanent cripples, failed 
seekers, who never understood the essential old-mystic fallacy of the Acid Culture: the 
desperate assumption that somebody […] or at least some force – is tending the light at 
the end of the tunnel.
(1996: 178–179)
Importantly, it is in this transformed sociopolitical crucible that Jodorowsky’s expressive 
bad-trip event fims emerge and are encountered by US audiences. His disturbing, horror-
oriented exploitation artworks materially embodying a poetic image of ‘freaks’ and ‘cripples’ 
encountering new grim meat hook realities. If in the US context the pill films opened up an 
emotional and spiritual space for catharsis and change, by concomitantly watching 
Jodorowsky’s films ‘across borders’, we can also begin to recognize how his work shares an 
affinity with the movements of a much wider spatially distributed event. To continue with 
this line of thought and argumentation, however, it now becomes important to back up 
slightly and introduce a brief consideration of Jodorowsky as a nomadic artistic and 
conceptual persona. 
Contingent Considerations
Defining Jodorowsky’s artistic style is notoriously tricky – in part due to the director’s unruly 
career and his knotting together of different artistic disciplines, modes of expression, and 
national traditions. However, in striving to build up a useful and relevant topography (or 
taxonomy) of influences and antecedents all the same, we can fruitfully intercept a well-
known line of argumentation offered by Jorge Luis Borges from his essay upon ‘Kafka and 
his precursors’ (2000). Borges there maintains that although Kafka’s work is as ‘singular as 
the phoenix’, it remains possible to recognize his practices within a diverse range of texts 
drawn from different literatures and periods (Borges 2000: 234). Borges teases out three 
main predecessors to Kafka’s style, which he discovers in Aristotle’s problem with movement 
in the Zeno paradox, the tone in Han Yu’s prose, and a spiritual affinity with the work of 
Søren Kierkegaard. What interests Borges the most, however, is that it is only after Kafka’s 
writing comes into existence that these similarities or affinities become discernible. Which 
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is to say, although the heterogeneous pieces Borges enumerates undoubtedly resemble 
Kafka’s work, it does not necessarily follow that they resembled each other. For even if in 
‘each of these texts we find Kafka’s idiosyncrasy to a greater or lesser degree, […] if Kafka 
had never written a line, we would not perceive this quality; in other words, it would not 
exist’ (Borges 2000: 236). In this sense, we might talk of a Kafka ‘event’ that can be understood 
actively transforming the past (and the future) in a contingent fashion, by revealing hitherto 
unforeseen elements in the work of other artists and philosophers that were not apparent 
before. 
Of relevance to Jodorowsky’s minor films, comparable untimely and evental insights 
can also be located in Umberto Eco’s (2008) exploration into what constitutes a truly ‘cult’ 
film. There, as with Kafka’s minor literature, Eco describes a cult classic such as Casablanca 
(Michael Curtiz, 1942) as a work that actively alters our perceptions of the past (and future), 
not least by evoking and invoking a heterogeneous range of antecedents that often share 
little in common with each other. Casablanca is thus described as a ‘plurifilmic’ film about 
films, which echoes and recalls many other movies while we watch it. Nowadays, a later film 
like Woody Allen’s Play it Again Sam (1972) demonstrates how the original-without-an-
original, in turn, impacts a range of films appearing afterwards in its wake, compounding 
and continuing its singular-plural status as an evental cult text. 
If Casablanca is plurifilmic, Jodorowsky’s work is more precisely pluriartistic. 
Consequentially, critics regularly have to resort to making schizoid comparisons that 
zigzag backwards and forwards in time and space. Rita González and Jesse Lerner, for 
example, argue that Jodorowsky’s films are best understood in the context of esoterica, pre-
Hispanic cultures, eastern philosophies, and new age fascinations that incorporate ‘stylistic 
elements of the baroque and Gothic – plus a dash of Pop and psychedelia’. They also draw 
connections to Kenneth Anger’s occult work, Maya Deren’s ‘enthnopoetics’, beat hysterics 
and ‘a myriad of other influences’ that include body performances and sculptural forms 
that were popular during the 1960s and 1970s (1998). As transregional and transmodern 
hybrids, the two pill films are in turn often hypertextually or paratextually linked to 
religious tomes, tarot, myth, fairy tale, folklore, psychology and philosophy, and have been 
described in terms of intertextual libraries referencing every book, play, artwork or film 
Jodorowsky ever encountered. Cobb, for instance, describes The Holy Mountain as a ‘very 
old gangster movie’ based on the ‘mystic and friar St John of the Cross’s (1542–1591) Ascent 
of Mount Carmel’ (2007: 119). 
Jodorowsky’s anarchic free-form experimentations also often results in a heady blend 
of different styles, genres and modes (ranging from the experimental theatre, avant-garde 
film-making, Surrealism, Expressionism, Biblical Epics, sci-fi, documentary, pornography, 
horror, thriller and silent cinema) that introduce conflicting rhythms and deliberately 
disjunctive experiences into the viewing encounter. Many critics and commentators 
(including Jodorowsky) also regularly link his films’ prominent utilization of ‘freaks’ and 
disabled bodies to the work of Tod Browning, or else draw connections to the films and 
ethico-aesthetics of Federico Fellini, Luis Buñuel, Ingmar Bergman, and the videos of 
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Marilyn Manson (who was famously inspired by Jodorowsky).4 Beyond these, we might 
also add that his characters’ movement through cinematic space reflects Joseph K’s in 
Orson Welles’ adaptation of Kafka’s The Trial (1962), while the spaces themselves invite 
comparisons with Jean Cocteau’s Orphée (1950) and Andrei Tarkovski’s Stalker (1979). A 
South American vector is also detectable, recalling and anticipating the work of directors 
such as José Mojica Marins, who likewise directs and stars as the egotistical ‘philosophical’ 
denizen of his own warped body-horror brain-fuck cinema.5 Jodorowsky’s satyricon 
style further reflects the oneiric-guided meditation of directors like David Lynch, albeit 
implementing a more fleshy and filthy dimension that in turn helps establish parallels 
with the abject body cinema of Dušan Makavejev and John Waters. One also thinks of 
David Cronenberg’s cerebral-corporeal oeuvre, which expresses a comparable Spinozist 
model of a mind and body parallelism.6 All this to say, if Borges uncovered three main 
tributaries for Kafka’s style, Jodorowsky for his part inherits these within a more scattered 
and heterogeneous galaxy drawn from a broader range of divergent practices, cultures, 
traditions and timelines. Seemingly aware of this, the director takes an old Spanish or 
Surrealist proverb as his motto: ‘In art, he who is no one’s child is a son of a bitch. And I say, 
that I’m everyone’s and everything’s child’ (Jodorowsky 1971: 132). 
Beyond forbearers and antecedents, though, a truly evental or minor artist must also 
be understood introducing something unique. Which amounts to saying, Jodorowsky’s 
own auteur identity and contingent contextual experiences must alchemically alter how 
we understand and think all these disparate forces and affects. And for this reason we 
should now turn our attention to the artist’s own life and circumstances, and explore 
how these impact and influence his film-thinking. 
However, before going there we must first concede that the value and politics of using 
auteur approaches have been fervently debated for over half a century now. And although 
for reasons of space we must refrain from dragging these debates back into the open here, 
due to this chapter (and the next) foregrounding the artistic persona behind very personal 
films, we might take pause to minimally justify adopting such methodological approaches. 
A good guide to such debates can be located within a lively monograph that explores the 
inimitable work of Fernando Arrabal – one of Jodorowsky’s peers and close theatrical 
collaborators (and to whose work and influence we will return to below) – wherein 
Peter L. Podol offers us a useful line of argumentation. For there, Podol highlights how 
knowledge of an artist’s experiences and life can significantly enrich our understanding 
and appreciation of their art, especially if the artist appears to be someone who is ‘entirely’ 
immersed in their work, and/or is a unique product of their time and place. That is, if an 
artist appears to be picking up on and resonating with the vibrations of wider happening. In 
such exceptional cases, Podol maintains, a biographical and contextual interface becomes 
at once necessary and enriching, for amongst other things, these help grant readers ‘a 
familiarity with the various forces that helped to shape [the artist’s] thought processes and 
produce his concept of art and aesthetics’ (Podol 1978: 15). Beyond their concepts of art 
and aesthetics, though, we can also add ‘philosophy’ here to Podol’s list, especially as we 
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set out to explore what Jodorowsky’s (singular) life can tell us about his pill films’ strange 
(plural-evental) thinking. 
Artaudian Auteur Machines
At the time when Jodorowsky was making his drug films, he was a self-proclaimed and self-
styled outsider and anarchist-artist. Beyond his own description of being an ‘atheist-mystic’ 
(Halter and Galinshy 2000), Jodorowsky made himself a restless and rootless character 
difficult to pin down or define in many traditional ways. For example, when asked about his 
background in one interview Jodorowsky characteristically reposts: ‘since the world is 
continually being created, why, in this universe, should I live the life of a being instead of one 
in the process of becoming’ (Jodorowsky 1971: 160, emphasis in original). Further 
highlighting his deterritorialized take upon normal identity categories, he answered Uri 
Hertz: ‘You must not have an age. You must not have a sex – interior, in your soul. No name. 
No nationality. No form. You are ego. Your are self […] in the myth’ (Hertz 1978). In yet 
another interview he simply declared: ‘As soon as I define myself, I am dead’ (Babcock 2000). 
Although his typically playful and evasive attitude to conventional interview questions may 
appear to work against establishing any easy biographical determinations, in matter of fact, 
these collectively serve to delimit a distinctly nomadic attitude and Nietzschean outlook 
that I elsewhere explore in relation to his restless and protean film characters who 
correspondingly display fluid and shifting identities (Fleming 2009).
If Jodorowsky’s most recent biographical film, La danza de la realidad/The Dance of 
Reality (2013) becomes a useful tutor text for understanding the early life of the director, we 
can pick up his life story from around the time The Dance of Reality’s narrative ends, and a 
teenage Jodorowsky was about to set off from his family’s adopted Chilean home (his father 
was an exiled Russian Jew and his mother an Argentinian) for Mexico, and then soon after 
to France (around 1953 at age 23), where he hoped to ‘revive Surrealism’. Indeed, in various 
interviews Jodorowsky outlines arriving in Paris and being appalled by the un-Surrealistic 
behaviour of André Breton (then nearly 60), who refused him a 3am audience on the night of 
his arrival. Disenfranchised, the young Turk thereafter set about devising a new movement 
that would become known as Producciones Pánicas (from Greek pan meaning everything or 
all), and eventually boasted members including Fernando Arrabal and Roland Topor. All felt 
that Panic art, in order to be productive, must be shocking and violent, and ideally deployed 
to shake viewers out of their habitual modes of perceiving and thinking (in a foreshadowing 
of 1960s psychedelic happenings). This was predominantly exercised through impromptu 
street theatre and gruesome and bloody performances, wherein animal sacrifice and nudity 
were not uncommon.7 
Panic also allowed Jodorowsky to branch out into cinema for the first time, but in 
comparison to the gruesome and irruptive artistic happenings, his first short film appears 
decidedly tame. This can partially be accounted for if we consider that around the same time, 
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Jodorowsky was concomitantly working with the mime artist Marcel Marceau, for whom he 
devised the famous Cage routine (Jodorowsky 1971: 136). His first film, La Cravate (1957), 
accordingly emerges as a cinematic ‘fable done in mime’, loosely based on Thomas Mann’s 
Severed Heads (Jodorowsky 1971: 138). The actor-director’s expressive utilization of mime 
(and silent-cinema modes) here marks the larval emergence of his auteurial ‘cinema of 
the body’ style, wherein pantomime movements, gesture and kinetic energy are privileged 
over dialogue and script for communicating and developing narrative and spiritual themes. 
‘The’ main protagonist of La Cravate (initially played by Jodorowsky) hopes to gain the 
affections of a female character, whose attentions he competes for with another butch male. 
In this strange universe the two suitors try to outdo each other by purchasing new heads (or 
identities, as these are played by different actors) which they hope will help them win her 
love. Both therefore go to a ‘head shop’ wherein camera framings and movements combine 
with editing to create the illusion of the two men unscrewing their heads and replacing them 
with newer models. This first Jodorowskian ‘head film’ (in an altered sense of the term) thus 
introduces proto-themes surrounding shifting notions of personal and embodied identity 
and performative affect, which simultaneously anticipate and talk back to (in an untimely 
manner) his later evental body of work.
Around this period Arrabal cemented himself as one of Jodorowsky’s closest friends 
and confidants. Podol reminds us that for Arrabal, the notion of Panic was based on 
the union of opposites, converting drama into ‘parties or ceremonies combining tragedy 
and guignol, poetry and vulgarity, comedy and melodrama, love and eroticism, the 
“happening” and mathematical set theory, bad taste and aesthetic refinement, sacrilege 
and the sacred, putting to death and the exaltation of life, the sordid and sublime’ (Podol 
1978: 59–60). Arrabal’s radical theatrical outlook and influence was also to leave an 
indelible imprint on Jodorowsky’s directorial personae, and which would emerge full 
blown in the form and content of his next film, which was a feature-length re-working of 
Arrabal’s play Fando y Lis (albeit from memory). However, in-between the completion of 
his first film and the production of Fando y Lis, Jodorowsky was to leave France to tour 
the world with Marceau. 
Circa 1966 the nomadic artist decided to drop out of Marceau’s world tour whilst in 
Mexico, with the express desire of actualizing an alchemical theatre that he hoped could 
change audiences directly. In an interview Jodorowsky describes how Antonin Artaud’s 
The Theatre and Its Double (1958) became his ‘bible’ during this episode, inspiring and 
empowering him to experiment with staging Nietzsche, Arrabal, and Beckett in the streets 
and theatres of Mexico (Hertz 1978). Artaud – who was touched with schizophrenia, and 
whose concept of the body without organs (BwO) was to become a major influence upon 
Deleuze and Guattari’s later work – railed against the Occidental theatre’s literary heritage, 
and its (then) preference for ‘realism’, which he felt offered very little to the art form. 
Artaud lamented that the western theatre had adopted monotonous calcinated conventions 
which had utterly divested it of all magic, allowing it to ossify into an inert and servile 
replica of quotidian everyday life. In its spiritually divested form, the western theatre had 
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thus ‘broken away from the spirit of profound anarchy which is at the route of all poetry’, 
and lost its originary function (Artaud 1958: 42). The popular theatre of Artaud’s day was 
therefore described as being dead, utterly rank, or reeking of ‘decadence and pus’ (42). As 
already indicated, Artaud was also a political writer, and so did not spare the sick forms 
of society that produced such symptomatic art forms, or their correspondingly shattered 
audiences, with their exhausted modern brains, and worn-out neurotic bodies. With regard 
to the latter, Artaud felt that the insipid contemporary theatre was simply ill equipped to 
stimulate or reinvigorate these ground down souls. Indeed, in his blazing manifesto the 
self-proclaimed mad man (in)famously railed that ‘our present social state is iniquitous and 
should be destroyed’, adding that if this is ‘a fact for the theatre to be preoccupied with, it is 
even more a matter for machine guns’ (Artaud 1958: 42). 
Following Artaud’s blazing lead, Jodorowsky strove to break down subject-object binaries 
by harnessing the plastic, physical, nonverbal and truly in-human powers of art and affective 
artifice to spiritually and physically reinvigorate and reawaken his audiences. This was 
ideally to be an immanent encounter ‘that wakes us up: nerves and heart’, and confronts 
the viewer as the equal of life, as opposed to some insipid replica or reflection upon the real 
(Artaud 1958: 84). Inspired, Jodorowsky began engineering intensely cruel forms of ethico-
political art that fundamentally rejected making their primary appeal to a detached and 
contemplative bourgeois spectator’s mind. Instead, these would directly assault the viewers’ 
senses and nerves with unstructured bundles of vibrational affect and violent perception 
images. It is in this sense that Jodorowsky’s theatre and film began striving to surpass 
ineffective representational modalities and rise to the sensational level of a BwO. On which 
point, Artaud famously wrote:
If music affects snakes, it is not on account of the spiritual notions it offers them, but 
because snakes are long and coil their length upon the earth, because their bodies touch the 
earth at almost every point; and because the musical vibrations which are communicated 
to the earth affect them like a very subtle, very long massage; and I propose to treat the 
spectators like the snake charmer’s subjects and conduct them by means of their organisms 
to an apprehension of the subtlest notions.
(Artaud 1958: 81)
While Artaud called for a new spellbinding theatre of delirium, madness, hallucination and 
fear – with an ability to communicate metaphysically with viewers through their bodies – 
Jodorowsky equally desired to create a new provocative theatre and cinema that would be 
the equal of modern life, and could intervene and reconcile viewers ‘philosophically with 
Becoming’: that is, an art that suggests ‘through all sorts of objective situations the furtive 
idea of the passage and transmutation of ideas into things, much more than the transformation 
and stumbling of feelings into words’ (Artaud 1958: 109). To draw some more parallels 
across time and space, we can discover affinities between Artaud’s disenchanted views of the 
modern theatre and film and Jodorowsky’s with the state of Mexican theatre and film after 
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he dropped out of Marceau’s world tour. Unquestionably, his stage and screen works 
produced around this time redoubled Artaud’s violent and passionate calls for raw and 
affective forces of light, staging, music, costume, sensual and stylized movements to be 
unbridled, in combination with a supersensual intellectual mise-en-scène that could break 
apart and unsettle the comfortable subject-object positions.
If Artaud saw the western theatre appealing only to bourgeois elites and the fluttering 
men in black suits who quarrelled over receipts ‘at the threshold of a white-hot box office’ 
(Artaud 1958: 45), Jodorowsky felt similarly about Mexican film during these ‘dark years’ 
for the National Cinema, which found audiences become accustomed to low-quality 
family melodramas, cheap genre pictures (churros), cabarellos, singing cowboy films and 
its Northern neighbour’s classical products. Historically speaking, from Jodorowsky’s 
perspective, these forms of cinema were trifling commercial works of distraction, which had 
lost all connection with older alchemical forms of dramatic language in space. The Mexican 
theatre and cinema thus had to be radically rethought, and brought back into contact with 
the cosmic and the universal (see Keesey 2003: 16). It was precisely around this time that 
Jodorowsky began making his first feature-length film, which he recorded over a series of 
weekends spanning a protracted two-year period.
The final cut of Fando y Lis (1968) unequivocally reveals the crystallization of Jodorowsky’s 
iconoclastic genre-blurring art, and became the first ethico-aesthetic film to reify his 
Nietzschean-Artaudian ethos. The black-and-white film, which entirely hijacks and detours 
Arrabal’s work, also displays interesting parallels with the autistic balade film Le Moindre 
Geste (1971) previously considered in chapter two, particularly by adopting a drifting 
episodic trajectory that is loosely connected to a line of flight made by two characters across 
a landscape, in this case towards the mythical city of Tar. Here, the loose cause-and-effect 
story follows and piles up a series of adventures and misadventures undergone by the adult-
children Fando (Sergio Kleiner) and his disabled partner Lis (Diana Mariscalto) as they 
drift across a dislocated apocalyptic landscape populated by a litany of grotesques. Although 
on first flush the film may appear to differ from La Cravate by granting its characters voices, 
Jodorowsky’s second film remains first and foremost a ‘cinema of the body’, with articulatory 
dialogue often becoming deterritorialized into glossolalia; or sounds that are employed to 
affectively express internal feelings, or relay the frenzied psychic states of the characters. 
Accordingly, speech no longer becomes a carrier for narrative content or serves to develop or 
advance character psychology. Instead verbal acts atrophy into spasmodic aural-tricks and 
fulminous psychobabble, which simply augment intensive bodily movements. Throughout, 
the disabled body of Lis is also laid horizontal on a cart and framed alongside a collection 
of human ‘monsters’ and ‘freaks’ that begin to unleash a transfigured or trans-figuring non-
normative notion of bodies and identities, at the same time as they uncomfortably expose 
the implicit normalizing function of traditional cinema’s body politics.
As a philosophical film-maker, Jodorowsky here emerges with an overt nihilistic disdain 
for any and all doctrinal modes of political, cultural and religious thought and/or action. 
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As a result, the ‘corrosive and corrupting’ film was destined to cause outrage during its 
1968 premiere at the Resena de Acapulco (Acapulco Film Festival) (see Siegel 1973: 20–29). 
By providing us with a cartographical overview of Mexican spectatorship habits and tastes 
during this period, the works of Carl J. Mora (1982), Charles Ramírez Berg (1992) and 
Andrea Noble (2005) help us to understand why. For one thing, they all demonstrate that 
other politically dissident films made by Cinema Nôvo directors were better received than 
Jodorowsky’s work at this time. This was no doubt because Jodorowsky opted to shed more 
familiar genre cloaks while making his sociopolitical critiques, and chose to wield the 
chainsaw rather than the scalpel for making his critical insertions. In one scene we find a 
bourgeois vampire helping himself to a syringe-full of Lis’s blood, for example, while another 
shows mindless zombie-like creatures egressing out of a muddy landscape. While such 
darkly poetic scenes mark the emergence of Jodorowsky’s infamous auteurial obsessions 
(with abjection, blurred somatic borderlines, the inter-relations and individuations that take 
place between inside and outside, self and other, body and space), they also betray his specific 
distrust and disgust with Mexico’s class system and its people’s sense of national identity. 
Indeed, throughout the film rubbled and wastes spaces are rendered homogenous. Different 
forms of acculturated behaviour and bodily technique are thus made to look ridiculous, or 
are rendered utterly insane after becoming deterritorialized from all ‘normalizing’ matrices. 
Consequently, his film was met with mixed feelings regarding the contemporary audiences’ 
own unsettled sense of national ‘identity’ (or their concept of Mexicanidad or Mexicanness). 
Recall here that in 1968 Mexico had not only overseen a successful Olympic preparation, 
but also a brutal student massacre in Tlatelolco (the aftermath of which Jodorowsky had 
witnessed first-hand) where up to three hundred lives were taken by army troops. This 
unease no doubt factored in to the unsettling reception of this foreigner’s shocking film. 
As did the director’s relentless and ostentatious pushing of every unsettling button at his 
disposal. Berg and Noble note that Mexican audiences were particularly protective of certain 
national stereotypes, such as the ‘long suffering mother’, who was implicitly woven into the 
idealized notion of a Mexican familial identity (Berg 1992: 24). For the relatively conservative 
audiences, such staples could be clung on to while other notions of Mexicanness ostensibly 
eroded or dissipated. Somewhat problematically, Fando y Lis contains scenes depicting 
silver-haired matriarchs gambling and sexually groping a younger sexualized male. In the 
film’s recorded DVD soundtrack Jodorowsky recalls these images upsetting the conservative 
Mexican audiences the most, even though they were in-mixed with shocking and graphic 
realizations of paedophilia, symbolic and simulated vaginal penetration, on-screen rape and 
vampirism (real blood-letting and drinking). Adding insult to injury, perhaps, Jodorowsky’s 
premiere booklet accompanying the film’s debut announced: ‘Every cinematic trick was 
avoided. The actors, enduring a veritable “Via Crucis”, were stripped naked, tortured, and 
beaten. Artificial blood was never used!’ (Jodorowsky 2003). By now, we can understand 
all of this as Jodorowsky attempt to add a touch of Artaudian ‘cruelty’ and raw theatrical 
affect into and around his screening event, but the perennial outsider ultimately misread 
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his Mexican audiences, who fled the cinema in their droves. After the screening Jodorowsky 
reports being greeted outside by a violent baying mob, and having to flee when it threatened 
to lynch him. The festival was subsequently closed down and the film banned in Mexico. 
Jodorowsky thereafter vowed never to screen to Mexican audiences again.
The director later fortuitously learned that young American audiences had taken kindlier 
to a print of his film, embracing it as an exotic head-film, optimally viewed when stoned or 
high. Believing Mexican audiences were simply not ready for him, Jodorowsky accordingly 
decided to aim his next film at this more liberal counterculture demographic. However, 
although he now coveted US audiences, he would remain a guerrilla Mexican film-maker 
at heart, opting to film what would later become El Topo on location in Mexico (where 
his money would go further) with a predominantly Mexican cast and crew. As always, the 
director found himself working outside any official system, and was opportunistically self-
funding and contingently fortuitous in finding benefactors. Jodorowsky thereafter wrote 
the script, produced the sets and costumes, performed in the main role (along with his son 
Brontis), directed (purportedly from within a deep trance), edited, post-dubbed, recorded 
and scored his film. As such, he actualizes a perfect picture of an artist who is both completely 
immersed in his work, and actively attuned with the wider events happening around him. 
He thus also provides a sound case through which to explore underground models of third 
or minor cinematic auteurship. 
El Topo
As a surrealistic spaghetti western, El Topo was to become a landmark US cult film that 
obliquely reflected the director’s feelings and views regarding, amongst other things, the 
Mexican student massacre and the wider global happenings of 1968. Certainly, the spaghetti 
western framework offered the cine literate director the ideal form to develop his peculiar 
form of philosophical expression: typically being a world cinema about the United States 
made outwith the national borders by outsiders. As such, it is already a ‘travel genre’ artwork 
that offers an unsettling plication of insider/outsider, national/transnational perspectives 
(see Eleftheriotis 2001: 126–127). We might recall that as a typically low-budget genre, the 
spaghetti western was more often than not defined by a series of ongoing adventures that 
would span several films, typically attached to a laconic drifting (anti-)hero who was 
inevitably framed within a violent and threatening world. Somewhat reflecting Jodorowsky’s 
own nomadic Nietzschean outlooks, Dimitris Eleftheriotis points to how spaghetti westerns 
were also fundamentally films ‘about men with no name, no place and no nation’ (2001: 
127), whose stories typically worked through a reimagining of identity that takes place 
‘beyond the boundaries of the nation’ (2001: 126–127). 
David Martin-Jones argues that the spaghetti western was also a genre that actively 
interfered with and countered the teleological myth of the classical Hollywood Western, 
not least by replacing the active hero with a reactive one, and foregrounding the plight 
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of subordinated and subaltern peoples, who were inevitably left suffering as a result of 
Expansive global capitalism. The very form of the spaghetti western therefore offers 
Jodorowsky’s philosophical work more than just an empty container for his subversive and 
iconoclastic ideas, and can be read as a deterritorializing force that actively unsettles and 
disorders the foundational national/political mythos of his new audience (by introducing 
an outsider alterity into it as if a foreign spirit possessed and detoured the familiar historical 
form). Characteristically, Jodorowsky’s content would further defamiliarize the spaghetti 
western form, not least by amplifying the genre’s questioning of the so-called civilizing 
nature of American expansionism, while collapsing the political binaries between wilderness 
and civilization, and inverting the ethical division of people into barbarian and civilized 
categories (Martin-Jones 2011: 55–57).
After completing El Topo – which maps the spaghetti western’s serialized form onto an 
episodic quest for enlightenment – Jodorowsky reportedly carried a print in its can across 
the northern border, making his way to New York City, where he initially managed to get 
the film screened in a gallery at the Museum of Modern Art. J Hoberman and Jonathan 
Rosenbaum note that after seeing it, the Elgin Theatre manager Ben Barenholtz immediately 
sensed the film ‘would attract hipsters, encourage a sense of personal discovery, and stimulate 
word of mouth’ (1983: 93). It did. At the Elgin, the film fortuitously encountered unique 
and fashionable modes of counterculture spectatorship that blended art cinema modes with 
liberal attitudes towards marijuana smoking and drug-taking.8 Accordingly, when asked 
in 1970 if he thought El Topo’s audiences would be on drugs when they watched his film, 
Jodorowsky tellingly replied: ‘Yes, yes, yes, yes. I’d demand them to be. To arrive stoned and 
to get high on the movie’ (Jodorowsky 1971: 136).9
El Topo’s episodic structure and surrealistic mise-en-scène undoubtedly appealed to 
the head-audience tastes for films that were ‘confusing but mentally stimulating’ (Peary 
1981), and no doubt contingently connected with counterculture audiences thanks to its 
exploration of non-western spiritual-paradigms that still offered valuable (counter)cultural 
capital. Jodorowsky makes such ideas overt when he aptly describes his film as a ‘Western 
that ends up as an Eastern’ (see Keesey 2003: 17). The film’s third-cinema aesthetics, erotic 
content, perverse sexual imagery and unconventional/exploitational focus upon ‘freak’ and 
‘monster’ bodies also helped generate a sense of taboo-transgression that appealed to non-
mainstream taste cultures, and also likely served to amplify the sensational film’s illicit and 
disturbing status. In combination, such features also helped differentiate the film’s form 
from other underground and art cinema products, as did the auratic choice of screening 
the film at midnight at the Elgin (finishing between two a.m. and three a.m. most nights) 
in a room laced with marijuana smoke and the electricity of an evental happening. All 
these features and factors alchemically synthesized to ensure that El Topo became the most 
popular US head-film event since 2001: A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, 1968). Indeed, 
sell-out crowds were recorded attending Elgin screenings seven nights a week from its 
initial screening in December 1970 through to the end of June 1971. Word of mouth further 
ensured that celebrities and counterculture personalities such as John Lennon flocked to 
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see the film. In combination, the novel film, unique environment, late night screening slots, 
head audiences and drug effects all contributed diegetic and extra-diegetic qualities to the 
film as machinic event or BwO. 
On-screen, Jodorowsky’s strange surrealistic (and Reichean) evental reimagining of 
Marxist revolutionary themes and Freudian symbolism began with the underground 
director announcing in voice-over that ‘[t]he mole (El topo) is an animal that digs tunnels 
underground searching for the Sun. Sometimes his journey leads him to the surface. When 
he looks at the Sun, he is blinded’.10 Jodorowsky seems to assert here that the mole, like 
the revolutionary spirit of an event, may pop up anywhere; and after undermining the 
overground topology, is ultimately destined to disappear back underground again, in order 
to regain its powers. Thereafter, a sclerotic western gunslinger dressed in all black spirals 
around a living-landscape that conspires to transform his identity and mode of acting. The 
strange bodies populating the plane always appear part of it, and cannot be easily extricated 
from the bizarre expressive world that El Topo constantly individuates with. Similar to the 
Byzantine plane Deleuze discusses in relation to the paintings of Francis Bacon, the cinematic 
spaces are here granted a degree of activity and agency that prevent viewers from knowing 
exactly where the space itself ends and the figures themselves begin (Deleuze 2005c: 88–89). 
Therein, characters are caught in a form of moving cinematic bas relief with their panpsychic 
surroundings, never fully detaching themselves from the engulfing landscape or immanent 
psychogeography that is endowed with its own active powers and desires. 
In the film’s first half, the characters most responsible for igniting El Topo’s becomings 
are the four Masters of the Revolver: each of which El Topo must defeat in a series of duels 
set upon the four corners of a rotating Jungian mandala world. The four masters constitute a 
blind seer, a geometric wizard, a Meso American pan being and an old ascetic hermit-cum-
mystic. These Kung Fu-like characters further serve to defamiliarize and unsettle the film’s 
(already estranged and surrealistic) spaghetti western framework, albeit whilst remaining 
in expressive harmony with the liminal desert space they inhabit. After murdering the final 
master, El Topo appears wrought with grief and guilt and attempts to commit suicide by 
jumping off of a bridge. The horizontally framed bridge functioning here as a metonymically 
load-bearing symbol that operates on a variety of different levels, and Jodorowsky discusses 
in terms of communicating Nietzschean undertones that (recalling and recasting our 
discussions in chapter one) invoke ‘the symbolism of the passage between man and that 
beyond him’ (1971: 132). Shortly thereafter the western hero dies and transmutates into an 
enlightened altruistic mystic, who individuates with a collective body of persecuted ‘freaks’11 
and ‘monsters’ that are found imprisoned within an adjacent mountain. Cobb reads this as 
El Topo being reborn as a Zarathustra-like being, dwelling in a cave and preaching ‘for man 
to master himself and harness his own power’ in order to become something else (Cobb 
2007: 97). 
When the unified freaks – played by disabled and deformed actors that at once 
poetically represent the self-proclaimed counterculture ‘freaks’ and the aforementioned 
Thompson-esque ‘permanent cripples’ – finally march forth into the world, they meet a 
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hostile archetypally western population that is not ready to accept their different modes 
of being. Instead, the perverted townsfolk mercilessly massacre the freaks as they advance 
towards them. Spiralling into a rage that allows for a superhuman vengeance, El Topo in 
turn guns down every last man, woman and child in the town. He then finally assumes 
a lotus position amongst all the massacred corpses and immolates himself in an act that 
Philip Strick convincingly argues recalls the Buddhist gesture of ‘shared guilt, protest, 
and despair’ (Strick 1973: 51). With life-affirming options being few and far between, 
the experiential film provides a visceral example of a bad trip cinema that cathartically 
faces up to the bleak spirit of its times, dragging the viewers’ thought and feelings across 
what Hoberman and Rosenbaum outline as the desolate spiritual wasteland of the US 
counterculture (1983). 
The only enlightenment El Topo finds is the (gr)immanent transubstantiation of the 
material body into fire and light. As such, El Topo can best be understood as a cruel and 
deflating event film that savagely critiques egotistical ‘western’ modes of thought and action 
in its first half, and then ineffective ‘eastern’ modes in its second, which appear useless in 
the face of violent repression. If these archetypal identity poles are ultimately found to be 
hopeless, what does remain liberating and full of latent potentials is the freedom to become 
in and of itself; or the ability to experimentally reimagine and reinvent one’s modes of 
thought and action. All things considered, then, El Topo’s philosophy infects viewers with 
distressing Nietzschean suffering, or perhaps we might argue from the untimely vantage of 
his future works, a Spinozism at its darkest and most grim. 
Thinking-Feeling with Spinoza and Jodorowsky: Atheist Anarchists, Mystical 
Materialists and Panpsychic Philosophers
Arguably united by their shared love of Artuad (and Spinoza), both Jodorowsky and Deleuze 
believed that films can be thought of as ‘spiritual automaton’ that have ‘thought as their 
higher purpose’, in that they immanently provide the biological brain with the material 
conditions for thinking (Deleuze 2005b: 151–163). As Daniel Frampton clarifies, there are 
always two distinct yet ‘overlapping areas to Deleuze’s thought-cinema’ model, wherein not 
only is the movement of film ‘a kind of thought itself ’, but the ‘imagistic thinking’ of cinema 
also appears capable of provoking the viewer into thought (2006: 166). In recapitulating 
Deleuze’s thought-cinema concepts, Frampton explains how (what he calls) ‘filmthinking’ is 
ultimately expressed by formal and aesthetic decisions – such as framing, editing, sound – 
which collectively comprise the film’s thinking and feeling of its subject matter (117ff). 
During the screening encounter, then, and in a manner that echoes and recalls our opening 
consideration of the spectator giving themselves in an act of love to Klen’s art-machine, as 
viewers immingle the screened film within their own thoughts, Frampton describes a 
‘unique mix’ of ‘filmgoer-thinking with the film-thinking’, wherein the ‘the filmgoer and 
film affect each other, are correlated with each other’ in a manner that results in the 
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surfacing of a ‘third-thought’, which is our own personal, yet distributed, thinking of the 
film (163). 
In somewhat foreshadowing Deleuze’s models of the ‘brain as screen’ (Deleuze and 
Narboni 2000), Jodorowsky (theatrically) announced in 1971 that he asked of cinema 
‘what most North Americans ask of psychedelic drugs. The difference being that when 
one creates a psychedelic film, he need not create a film that shows the vision of a person 
who has taken a pill; rather, he needs to manufacture the pill’ (Jodorowsky 1971: 97). 
Jodorowsky’s alchemical or pharmochemical view of film here also finds strong overlaps 
with Anna Powell and Patricia Pisters’s explorations into Altered States cinema and 
Guattarian ‘viral aesthetics’, wherein the perception-altering material force of film directly 
impacts and merges with the viewer during the screening encounter (Powell 2005, 
2007; Pisters 2003, 2012). Filmgoing and film thinking in such accounts again surface 
as an immanently experiential ‘event’, wherein inhuman aesthetic or inaesthetic forces 
intensively provoke and stimulate the viewers’ brains and bodies prior to any cerebral 
search for meaning. 
For Powell, in extreme cases of drug cinema such as The Trip (Roger Corman, 1967) 
and Easy Rider (Dennis Hopper, 1967), certain aesthetic modes of viewing illuminate 
cinema operating as a kind of perception altering ‘drug’, that allows viewers to attain a 
form of ‘contact high’ (in Deleuze and Guattari’s pharmacoanalytical sense of the term). 
By extension we can imagine how the pill films’ ‘narcotic properties’ offer viewers a chance 
to experience defamiliarizing new perspectives, which ideally provoke experiences of 
mental and physical alterity. Elsewhere, Pisters similarly turns to neuroscientific research 
to better understand the embodied and material aspects of the ‘brain as screen’, using the 
relatively recent discovery of the mirror-neuron to help destabilize the platitudinous 
distinctions typically erected between self and other, perceiver and perceived, inside and 
outside, brain/body and screen/environment (2003, 2006, 2012). Throughout, Pisters 
demonstrates how the perception of bodies moving and acting (whether in reality on 
reproduced on-screen) leads to the firing of corresponding neurons and mirror neurons 
within the observer’s embodied neural net (2006, 2012). Thus, during films screenings, 
at sub-microscopic levels, the visual (and auditory) perception of body movements 
external to the viewer is observed to trigger or catalyse corresponding or correlating 
movements of molecules inside the spectator body. It is in these ways, we maintain, that 
Jodorowsky’s febrile head films invite viewers to go on a witches ride, and feel-think in 
a Spinozist manner. 
No doubt, there are certain inductive comparisons a sophist could use to begin erecting 
parallels between Spinoza and Jodorowsky, and link the two thinkers together across gaping 
tracts of time and space. Both were lapsed Jews, for example, driven to live far from their 
parents’ original religious communities (in Portugal and Russia respectively). Both also 
worked intimately with lenses during their lives, and were each accused of being dangerous 
and immoral ‘atheist’ thinkers. Both were therefore also destined to inspire hatred and 
violent reactions in certain conservatives who found their work to be  perfidious or 
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threatening, offensive or intolerable. Hence, both also had to flee attacks upon their physical 
bodies. Each could also be discussed as quasi-alchemists, no doubt, for Spinoza studied how 
substances and poisons made enriching or decomposing assemblages with human bodies – 
empowering or disempowering their affective relations – while Jodorowsky explored how 
Artaudian artworks and drugs moved into composition with human bodies and minds, 
increasing their will to power. The work of both also became renown for simulating novel 
ways of seeing, thinking, and acting. 
Beyond these superficial similarities, there also remain certain philosophical parallels that 
we might also begin to tease out. As a starting point, we could note how in their respective 
works, Spinoza and Jodorowsky each outlay their own unique mystical-material model of 
‘Expressionism’, which in turn reveal certain overlapping ethical outlooks upon the nature 
of life, reality, spirituality and ‘God’. What is more, both likewise trouble the traditionally 
perceived divisions erected between spirit and matter. Recall that as a philosophical persona 
Spinoza is ‘neither materialistic nor spiritualist,’ for as A.N. White puts it, ‘he is both’ (White 
in Spinoza [1987] 2001 : LXV). Consider then in this light a letter that Jodorowsky writes 
to Ben Cobb, wherein he explains that the main concept underpinning all his creations can 
be understood in terms of ‘materializing spirit’ and ‘spiritualizing material’ (Jodorowsky in 
Cobb 2007: 125). Linked to this, the philosophies of Spinoza and Jodorowsky arguably find 
their most overt parallels in what we could refer to as their embodied ‘social’ outlooks, and 
by extension the ethical powers they believed were bound up in the immanent encounter 
with their works. In his own time and place Spinoza diagnosed the dominant ways of living 
and acting as constituting a betrayal of the universe and mankind (Spinoza [1987] 2001), to 
which his Ethics offered itself as an affective antidote: not least by delineating an alternative 
ethical way of living and acting. Thus, in a manner that recalls Jodorowsky’s discussion 
of his enlightening head cinema above, Deleuze describes how Spinoza primarily desired 
‘to inspire, to waken, to reveal’, by projecting a positive image of an affirmative life, which 
stood in defiance or opposition to the ‘semblances that men are content with’ (Deleuze 1988: 
14). In this sense, both Jodorowsky and Spinoza believed that their works held the affective 
and ethical potential to empower and enlighten those that they encountered or came into 
contact with. 
As Deleuze poetically renders it, what Spinoza found most contemptuous in his time 
was that not only were social actors usually content with their lot, but through their 
thoughts, feelings, actions and desires they somehow came to internalize a ‘hatred of life’, 
ultimately becoming ‘ashamed of it’, and content to suffer or reproduce these inadequate 
models of a
humanity bent on self destruction, multiplying the cults of death, bringing about the 
union of the tyrant and the slave, the priest, the judge, and the soldier, [who were] 
always busy running life into the ground, mutilating it, killing it outright or by degrees, 
overlaying it or suffocating it with laws, properties, duties, empires.
(Deleuze 1988: 12–13)
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Sadly, we encounter updated versions of these self-same life-betraying actors and desires 
within Jodorowsky’s pill films, whose city and town spaces bustle with (perverted and 
distorted) tyrants, priests, judges, soldiers, slaves, and villains who are all too happy to 
partake in the smothering, deforming, or outright destruction of life. As in Spinoza’s 
work, Jodorowsky’s oeuvre advocates shedding or casting off the sad passions that are 
divested by negative encounters with such bodies and forces, and to liberate action and 
thought from the invisible restraints that always-already territorialize, delimit, and 
disempower it. In both, thoughts can only become adequate, or even be achieved, through 
the liberation of the body. Indeed, in the Ethics ([1987] 2001), while Spinoza recognized 
that thought and extension were distinguishable, he maintained nonetheless that they 
were merely different attributes of the same substance. By putting thought and extension 
back into the same plane (of the real), Spinoza illustrated how the very idea constituting 
the human mind is little more than the corresponding extensive body. It thus follows that 
for Spinoza, ‘the more capable the body is of being affected in many ways, and affecting 
external bodies in many ways, the more capable of thinking is the mind’ (Spinoza [1987] 
2001: 222). 
If Spinoza’s philosophy here demonstrates that the mind’s ability for thought is directly 
correlated to the body’s capacity to (sense and) interact with its environment, Jodorowsky’s 
pill films emerge as practical inaesthetic expression of a comparable thought-model, that 
are themselves designed to immanently increase the viewer’s powers by stimulating their 
embodied brains, while provoking them to search for more adequate ideas. Appropriately, 
in both Jodorowsky and Spinoza’s work, then, an individual’s power to act and live, or their 
will to power, is directly related to the number of affections and affects their body becomes 
capable of. 
Elsewhere William Brown and I explore how recent scientific research conducted by 
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio (1994; 1999) and philosopher-linguists like 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) bear out these Spinozian (and Deleuzian) models 
of a mind-body parallelism (Brown and Fleming 2011, 2015). Damasio’s studies, for 
instance, first dissipate the concept of a ‘homunculus’ directing human thought and action, 
and demand instead we view the brain as a truly ‘embodied’ organ in the Spinozian sense. 
From such a vantage, ‘basic’ sub-cortal processes are shown to be essential to the formation 
of emotions and feelings, which in turn are influential of thought and higher levels of 
cognition (see Damasio 2004: 206). More recent contemporary research into what is called 
gustatory-thinking and skin-thinking likewise highlight the key role played by the gut and 
skin in higher-level emotional and cognitive processes. As we will specifically address in-
the-gut thinking in the next chapter, we might pick up the latter here as an illustrative case in 
point. Indeed, recent research into embodied ‘peripheral neural mechanisms’ located within 
and on the fingertips has demonstrated how the skin, the human body’s largest organ, 
literally becomes the site of complex geometric calculations while touching (see Pruszynski 
and Johansson 2014; Umeå 2014). In such findings the human mind no longer appears as 
an easily disentangled rational tool that can be divorced from ‘irrational’ phenomena like 
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touch, or even certain external stimuli. Instead, and in recalling the alternative and autistic 
forms of in-formational perception-thought explored in the previous chapter, we might 
here concede that it is what happens to the body, or what the body senses, or the very fact 
that we have bodies and sensible surfaces in the first place, that allows for thinking at all 
(rational or otherwise). Or, to render this in Damasio’s playful Spinozian terms: ‘The brain’s 
body-furnished, body-minded mind is a servant of the whole body’ (2004: 206).
These models of body-mind parallelism and distributed embodied thinking 
unquestionably gain artistic expression in the corporeal pill films we are exploring here. Not 
only by diegetically expressing these relationships between bodies, brain and material plane 
within the supersaturated and panpsychic fantasy spaces, but also through the Artaudian 
ways in which the actual pill films themselves communicate with the viewers’ embodied 
sensorium and trace circuits in their brain. Accordingly, as the heroes of the pill films 
struggle to free themselves from the disempowering sad passions and negative forces they 
inevitably encounter, the films themselves simultaneously get to work affecting the viewers’ 
bodies and brains. Deleuze describes similar potentials harboured by films within Cinema 
2 when he discusses the modern ‘cinema of the body’ through a parallel Spinozian lens. For 
there, Deleuze outlines how our ‘obstinate and stubborn’ viewing body ‘forces us to think, 
and forces us to think what is concelaed from thought, life’ (2005b: 182).12
If Jodorowsky’s pill films appear to proclaim ‘give me a body then’ in a Artaudian-
Spinozian manner, by so doing they simultaneously demonstrate how the body is ‘no 
longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself, that which it has to overcome to reach 
thinking’ but rather ‘that which it plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the 
unthought, that is life’ (Deleuze 2005b: 182). Concretizing such idea(l)s, we can recognize 
how The Holy Mountain is ostensibly a spiritual film that is almost entirely about bodies 
and flesh, and as we will soon discover, employs corporeal bodies, affective performance, 
intensive movements, dynamic rhythms and abject bodily forces to make felt what it is a body 
is capable of thinking and doing under ever-changing material conditions. This of course 
telescopes in two directions at once, with the diegetic bodies of the actors highlighting how 
the categories of life appear as the attitudes and postures of the body, while the imminent 
pill film structures its violence of sensations to influence the embodied viewer’s sensorium, 
and impact their attitudes and postures. In both encounters, we might say that to think 
is shown to be ‘to learn what a non-thinking body is capable of, its capacity, its postures. 
[For it] is through the body (and no longer through the intermediary of the body) that the 
cinema forms its alliance with the spirit, with thought’ (Deleuze 2005b: 182).
Scaling Up The Holy Mountain
Seeking to support Jodorowsky after becoming a fan of El Topo, John Lennon and Allen 
Klein (of Abkco Films) awarded the maverick director $750,000, his largest budget to date, 
to fund his next pill film, The Holy Mountain: ‘El Topo was normal’ said Jodorowsky ‘The 
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Holy Mountain was abnormal. My ambition was enormous. I wanted to make a picture like 
you would make a holy book, like the Bhagavad Gita or the Tao Te Ching. I went very far’ 
(Rose 2002: n.p.). Reflecting his grander scaled-up agendas, Jodorowsky opportunistically 
embraced ‘mainstream’ cinematic technologies, and in an attempt to push his affective art 
ever further, upgraded from his usual 16mm format to 35mm Techniscope instead. Forces 
of (counter-)acculturation or reterritorialization also witnessed Jodorowsky become 
another ‘turned-on’ artist, who began experimenting with LSD as a creative artistic 
technology (which apparently increased his artistic will to power at a time when the drug 
was increasingly becoming perceived as less fashionable and radical). We can accordingly 
understand Jodorowsky’s next film as a reworking and expansion of El Topo’s immanent-
spiritual themes upon new terrain, and as a piece of minor political cinema that takes its 
place in the tail end of the psychedelic comet that Harry Benshoff dubs the ‘LSD-film’ 
movement (2001: 29ff). 
Jodorowsky (arguably theatrically) discusses directing the entire film project from 
within a trance. Although such claims were not unusual for the director, he here talks of 
uniquely incorporating organic and pharmaceutical drugs into his production process in 
order to aid and abet the film-making process. By subsequently making a series of artistic 
decisions whilst taking and experimenting with psychedelics, Jodorowsky’s chemically 
altered thoughts and perceptions pervade the final thinking and feeling film assemblage. 
Reflecting these ideas, Jodorowsky has his main protagonist emerge onto a vastly expanded 
animist or panpsychic poly-plane which is this time also ‘expanded’ into a range of other 
parallel worlds or dimensions that each have their own style or aesthetic. In this way, 
an enlarged range of cognitive and perceptual experiences and effects common to LSD 
(and LSD-films) are rendered sensible, albeit remaining channelled through Jodorowsky’s 
unique freak-show horror style and his auteurial obsessions with the meaty biological body 
and its ‘spiritual’ modes of thinking and acting. Again reflecting the times, somewhat, the 
Alchemist (Jodorowsky) who opens and guides this cinematic ‘trip’ finds strong parallels 
with Carlos Castaneda’s Don Juan character (from another singular-plural artwork 
emblematic of the evental times), as he selects an apprentice, the thief (Horacio Salinas), 
and opens him up to an expanded pluriverse of disjunctive dimensions, and a wider 
confederation of forces and affects that the main characters must individuate with and/or 
deterritorialize from. 
The beginning of the story witnesses the thief being roused from an abject 
unconsciousness, then pissing himself from beneath a swarming blanket of flies. Within 
the following few minutes he is beaten, crucified, and harangued by a swirling crowd of 
naked children that hurl rocks at him. After sharing a marijuana joint with a man that 
has no arms or legs, and who hitches a ride on his back,13 both protagonists enter into an 
overwhelmingly bustling metropolis chocked full of melding timelines and heterogeneous 
cultures: a disorienting crowd of Romans, conquistadors, circus performers, cowardly 
bourgeoisie, US tourists, archetypal students and insect-like proto-fascists. We are here 
arguably situated inside a gaseous event time-space, wherein the past, present and future 
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co-mingle and coexist together. In a clear Spinozian manner, these help the head film think 
a world that ultimately betrays and mutilates life, and appears chock-a-block full of sad 
passions, negative encounters and inadequate thoughts. In this churning heterochronic 
chaos of poetic bodies, the thief and his companion appear little more than helpless seers, 
consigned to wander around and react to a series of overwhelming manipulative forces 
and encounters. In a distorted and perverted reflection of the brutal ‘meat hook realities’ 
of life in Mexico and United States circa 1968–69, viewers witness the ongoing massacre 
of students dressed in contemporary costume: who appear piled dead in the streets, or else 
stacked on army trucks being shipped away. Presently, the bodies of other student protesters 
are executed and opened up by the gas-mask wearing fascists, so that their gaping wounds 
poetically spill birds, fruit and strings of sausages and offal onto the streets. The now familiar 
Jodorowskian ‘freaks’ and ‘monsters’ also populate the large-screen, albeit framed amidst 
and alongside a bewildering array of living or dead animals, including a marching forest of 
crucified sinewy sheep carcases carried aloft by an army of army faceless fascists. 
The Alchemist ultimately rescues the thief from this chaotic world and sets him on a 
mythical quest towards the summit of a Holy Mountain, in order to usurp the immortals 
that reign there. During their first encounter within his tower (that appears to function 
as a metonymic stand-in for the cinema itself), the thief is rendered cataleptic after 
having his chakra-points stimulated by the numinous Kung Fu figure. There, during their 
theatrical dance-like fight routine, the Alchemist, tellingly played by Jodorowsky, is depicted 
stimulating key points on the thief ’s corporeal body in a way that impacts his brain directly, 
sending him into a sudden trance. Echoes here of Artaud’s assertion that great directors 
must know ‘in advance what points of the body to touch’ in order to throw ‘the spectator 
into magical trances’ (Artaud 1958: 140). Thereafter, both within and beyond the frame, 
Jodorowsky explores the corporeal body of the thief (and by extension the viewer) as a 
site of resistance, revolt, escape, and spiritual potentialities that must be reorganized and 
reinvigorated in a process of becoming (and unbecoming).
During his subsequent line of flight away from the sick and oppressive any-culture-
whatever, the voiceless thief ’s body is utilized on a variety of levels to communicate feelings 
and thoughts to the embodied viewer. In one notoriously dense scene full of multivalent 
layers of affect, meaning and poetic symbolism, all of these different aspects and facets 
of the body come together, and allow us to grasp (intellectually) how it is that this head 
film works as an intensive and affective Artaudian BwO. The sequence in question begins 
with three obese Pretorian guards tending to a stall that sells Christ icons and crucifixes. 
Jodorowsky’s camera here lingers upon the generous plump folds of their flesh as ‘a fair 
haired man dressed as a nun in the Virgin Mary’s blue-and-white robes, carves at a large cow 
in a visceral representation of Holy Communion’ (Cobb 2007: 133). In the ensuing mime 
sequence, the stall owners begin plying the thief with alcohol, before unceremoniously 
tossing his unconscious drunken body onto the floor of a warehouse. There, as the thief ’s 
sensory-motor-schema (and the film’s action-image drives) grinds to a veritable halt, viewers 
suddenly find the narrative anchored to a comatose un-perceiving non-agential body, which 
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is moved and manipulated by the desires and actions of others. The guards here use his lean 
and lifeless body to create an indexical cast for a life-sized Christ figure (itself a symbolic 
body through which one can pass to the spiritual).
Although the thief ’s unconscious naked body appears divorced of intellect, consciousness, 
desire or agency during these moments, Jodorowsky retains a motific fascination with 
embodied sensations, generating a litany of tactile and haptic close-ups that move outwards 
towards the spectator, rather than inwards towards the subjective form of the (non-
perceiving) thief. Or again, by having direct access to the image of the thief ’s body and flesh, 
viewers become more aware of its feelings and sensations than he does. Intrusive breathing 
tubes are thrust into his vulnerable nostrils in unsettling close-ups, for instance, in a manner 
that literally feels uncomfortable to watch. The camera thereafter foregrounds a viscous 
plaster gloop being sensually poured onto his skin and flesh via several ‘propriocentric’ 
close-ups (see Marks 2000: 162). The film also employs vibrating string instruments and 
a bass rumbling sound effect to score the experiential sequences, which help establish an 
aural meniscus or acoustomatic skin that affectively trembles and vibrates upon the viewers’ 
eardrums as the body’s surface is touched and stimulated on-screen. 
Thereafter, depicting the production of the hollow Christ bodies on-screen helps 
poetically signal the film’s awareness of viewers building themselves a sensational BwO 
around the protagonist’s sensory-motor body (which will organize the perceptions, feelings, 
movements and action throughout the movement-image narrative space and time), in 
a manner that again recalls the part human part art-installation machines we began our 
chapter with. On awakening from his drunken stupor the thief ’s face is momentarily held in 
a dislocated close-up beneath the feet of two body casts. His alarmed expression and tensing 
inner body movements affectively signal his being disturbed by something off-screen. In 
a manner reminiscent of the appearance of the monolith in Kubrick’s 2001, Jodorowsky 
opts to score the withheld reverse-shot or perception-image with the intensifying sounds 
of choral voices that are gradually rising in pitch and intensity. This layering in of spiritual 
voices immediately endows the ‘virtual’ or off-screen image (or what is being perceived by 
the thief) with a preponderant force or power. A loud and discomforting primal scream 
then suddenly erupts from the thief ’s diaphragm and guts, immediately causing the camera 
to track backwards; rapidly expanding the frame to reveal hundreds upon hundreds of 
thief-like Christ figures stacked and arranged in repeating Escher-like geometric patterns 
around the warehouse space. The importance of all these hollow bodies is then aesthetically 
underscored by a vortexing and vertiginous backtrack and concomitant pull of focus, 
making the dense clutter of limbs and torsos isomorphically bend in and around the frame. 
The distended moving image – designed to be projected onto a huge Techniscope format – 
thus works to momentarily dilate cinematic space and time by creating a warping torsion 
between the thief ’s body and the moving-plane of hollow simulacra around him. 
The sequence then suddenly morphs into a musically assisted dialectical montage, 
composed of a series of space-time blocks that isolate groupings and arrangements of the 
hollow bodies gathered together into various shapes and clustered patterns. The montage 
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editing here works to animate the different still figures in a way that recalls and intensifies 
the scenes of the dancing Christ statues in Kubrick’s earlier cult classic A Clockwork Orange 
(1971). As such, Jodorowsky’s intellectual ‘camera-consciousness’ expressively carves up 
the mise-en-scène into a series of false-movements, which must be recognized in terms 
of a dance of the symbolic spectator surrogates, for the material spectators (because this 
dance is not visible to any characters within the film and is an expression of the thinking 
film). 
As the thief wanders around, his mounting inner tension moves into composition with 
an extra-diegetic sound wave that rapidly builds in intensity and pitch – like a vibrating 
tuning fork. The affective sound and image here synthesize to impart an audio expectation 
or anticipation, as it intensifies towards an audible climax or peak. Intercepting this, the 
film immediately translates the mounting sound energy into a maniacal and frenzied 
visual explosion of kinetic movement and physical rage, simultaneously directed ‘inwards’ 
by the thief towards the hollow-bodies and ‘outwards’ towards the viewers’ embodied 
sensorium. That is, while the thief violently attacks these symbolic bodies on-screen, the 
film as immanent BwO similarly and simultaneously flexes its own raw inaesthetic muscles, 
by mounting an aggressive assault upon the viewers. The film here lays into the viewer 
symbolically and sensationally, via both form and content, in a parallel mind-body attack. 
At a level of firstness, loud and audibly intensive sounds exert a direct and painful impact 
upon the eardrums and nerves. Concomitantly the film’s editing rhythms synergistically 
intensify into a frenzied imagistic flickering of close-ups capturing fists, arms and legs 
lashing out while wildly punching, pulverising and kicking the hollow-bodies. Throughout 
the uncomfortable audio-visual assault, chaotic disharmonizing sounds of drums and 
percussion are also layered into the sequence so that the representational images of violent 
impacts become aligned with intensive drum beats and jangling tambourines, simulating 
and stimulating a physical blow and the subsequent dance upon the nerves. The chaotic 
and frenzied sequence full of raw sounds, fury and violence then comes to an abrupt end, 
casting viewers into a now jarring silence. In this dilated long take, the thief is framed 
utterly exhausted on the floor amidst the scattered debris, clutching onto the last hollow 
body. 
The narractive thereafter follows the thief outside the warehouse, transporting viewers to 
a quieter space where a swarm of prostitutes dressed in matching kit circle around a crowd 
of voyeurs (spectators). Jodorowsky here foregrounds and objectifies the bodies and flesh 
of the women, offering opulent Meyer-esque close-ups of their large breasts stretched into 
tactile fishnet fabrics. These images introduce another form of haptic and tactile quality into 
the image that recalls an illicit soft-porn mode. The sexual position of the female bodies and 
the association of the gaze with the male-perspective also introduces troubling gender and 
ethical issues that we unfortunately have no time or space to engage with here, other than 
to note that in amongst all these overtly sexualized bodies, somewhat unsettingly, the film 
singles out a prepubescent child in a matching whore uniform. Immediately viewers are 
uncomfortably aligned with a John’s POV as he makes a deal for/with this child. Hunching 
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down beside her, he then removes his left eye from its socket, before placing it in the palm 
of her small hand. After this weird transaction, he then begins erotically fondling and 
touching her little body. In this manner the on-screen spectator with the doubly embodied 
eyes (albeit aggregated across different bodies) has transformed from being an objective 
observer separated by distancing and objectifying gaze, to experiencing direct physical 
contact with the body of his perverted object of desire. Building on the previous section 
then, this sequence works to both physically and mentally unsettle and assault the viewer 
in the auditorium, while hijacking and perverting the erotic gaze, and making its otherwise 
invisible, violent, gendered modes of looking (objectively and tactilely) uncomfortably 
palpable. 
In these sequences we can locate yet more material expressions of Jodorowsky’s Artaudian 
cinema demonstrating its cruel ability to stimulate unsettling feelings, and provoke political 
movements of mind. Similar forces are thereafter bound onto the film’s drifting and 
discontinuous action-image structure, wherein enlightenment becomes associated first with 
a violent reclaiming of the body, then the active deterritorialization of sad passions and 
negative affects, followed by a creative reinvention of living and the concomitant opening up 
the parallel body-mind to other enriching bodies and forces (including animals, plants and 
chemical forces that gradually increase its powers and ability to act and become affected). 
Indeed, after being first placed in a trance by the Alchemist, the thief is re-animated in a 
Caligari-esque moment freed of his earlier rage and psychological-disorientation (much 
like the spectator in these calmer moments after the film’s mind-fuck opening). The thief ’s 
somnambulistic body is thereafter foregrounded and treated to a series of cleansing rituals. 
The closing of the prologue tellingly ends with a focus upon his anus, which directly 
faces the camera/audience as it is lathered and washed by the naked ‘Written Woman’ in 
a fountain temenos.14 The next cut takes us to another chamber where the thief is found 
defecating into a glass pot. The Alchemist here removes his stool and places it inside a still, 
while the thief ’s naked body is isolated inside a glass philosopher’s egg, wherein the blurred 
borderlines between inside and outside come under ever greater scrutiny as his body is 
heated above a furnace. The feeling of the pressurized environment (full of invisible forces) 
is communicated via a series of steaming claustrophobic close-ups and the intensive sounds 
of boiling and bubbling. In this sweltering crucible the thief ’s flesh and body are literally 
wrung-out of all their inner fluids and abject substances, with sweat, saliva, vomit, mucus 
and tears involuntarily ejaculating and spasming forth from his semi-permeable body-
plexus. Before being distilled by the Alchemist.
This relentless focus upon abject substances undoubtedly serves to introduce an 
uncomfortable zone of indiscernibility into the image, not only between good taste 
and bad taste, or the inside and outside of the body, but also between the character and 
spectator, who becomes affectively entangled in a shared sensational encounter of intense 
artistic discomfort and abjection.15 Within this sequence the base abject substances are 
transformed into gold, signalling the material and abject body itself as a form of philosopher’s 
stone. The journey towards this alchemical enlightenment thereafter emerges via a radical 
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breaking open of the body-mind onto an expanded plane of included disjunctions: which 
begin to reflect an axiomatic re-mapping of the body beyond the traditional biological 
boundaries. 
From Body to BwO 
After being released from the philosopher’s egg, the thief tellingly rejects his old concept 
of body by shattering a large looking glass that reflects his traditional body image. He 
then enters a crystalline mirror-chamber where his body becomes increasingly 
fragmented and distributed across a wider web of virtual duplicates. Moments later, these 
reflections are replaced by a series of effigies, hung within a spinning mandala-room. The 
Alchemist explains: ‘To accomplish the alchemical work you will have these companions. 
They are thieves like you but on another level.’ These so-called ‘industrialists’, who we 
might think of as the exploded machinic-components making up the thief ’s 
psychomechanical being (and blocking his becomings), live on a range of different 
‘planets’ that the film takes us into one-by-one. The archetypal characters populating 
these worlds appear to embody the pre-personal swarming affective forces that collectively 
help compose and constitute (or operate as conduits of desire) the modern human being. 
Recall here that for Deleuze and Guattari, individuals and groups are understood as 
being composed by different bundles of ‘lines, meridians, geodesics, tropics and zones’, 
which ‘vary in nature’ and march ‘to different beats’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 223). 
The quasi-agential bodies or personified forces within the parallel planet dimensions of 
The Holy Mountain become distilled representatives of similar ‘external’ territorializing 
forces of the implied assemblage, embodying some of the ‘little selves’ that Deleuze 
argues co-compose the ‘self ’: ‘We speak of our “self ” only in virtue of these thousands of 
little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says “me”’ 
(2004c: 96). 
The industrialists clearly embody these schizophrenic ‘little selves’ (or technologies of 
the self), which become organized around habit and repetition, being external powers 
that eventually become ‘folded’ in upon consciousness, and serve to organize and anchor 
identity (thought and action). Or as Deleuze elsewhere puts it: ‘Isn’t this the answer to the 
question “what are we?” We are habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying “I.” Perhaps, 
there is no more striking answer to the problem of the Self ’ (Deleuze 1993: x). Tellingly, 
within Jodorowsky’s film, these ‘thieves’ from a different level, who diminish the thief ’s ‘will 
to power’ become the personifications of hyper-masculine castrating despots, Oedipalized 
archetypes, capitalist war-mongers, weapons manufacturers, ideology manipulating state 
officials and perverted bourgeois cretins: all of which might be thought of as a distilled force 
associated with the vertical territorializing line of the assemblage, which form articulations 
with, and steal power from the protagonist’s own abilities to freely and creatively live, desire, 
think, act and become.
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A series of sequences then side step into the various surrealist and expressionistic 
worlds that embed these weird schizoid figures. By so doing, Jodorowsky serves to 
introduce complex LSD-film time-relations into the narrative that begin to destabilize and 
deterritorialize the loose action-image form linked to the thief ’s quest for immortality and 
enlightenment at the top of the Holy Mountain (arguably a McGuffin standing in for the 
care of the self). After eventually being introduced to all these poetic figures, the disparate 
bodies are finally gathered together in a mandala-shaped room within the rib-vault trunk of 
the Alchemist’s tower. There, in another symbolic cleansing ritual, the Alchemist commands 
all of the industrialists to place their effigies into an eye-shaped furnace, announcing that: 
‘We will destroy the self-image; unsteady, wavering, bewildered, full of desire, distracted, 
confused. When the self-concept thinks, this is I, and that is mine he binds himself and he 
forgets the great self.’ Shortly after, the narrative is again mapped onto a journey towards the 
moutain top. En route the film’s thinking of enlightenment increasingly becomes equated 
with the reinvention of living, as the collective bodies open themselves up to immanent 
agents of change and becoming: such as plants, prayer, meditation and drugs. However, 
demonstrating a change in the syntactic value and meaning of drugs within what we might 
call post-Leary acid cinema (and upon American screens more generally), the narrative 
takes time to highlight the spiritual limitations of LSD-like drugs with regard to spiritual 
enlightenment. Thus, in the Pantheon Bar at the foot of the mountain viewers discover 
a band of failed counterculture seekers who can venture no higher. These include drug 
apostles and a tripper that can manipulate and travel through space-time. He can teleport 
himself around, or travel anywhere he desires in a horizontal direction. He claims therefore 
to have ‘conquered’ the mountain by travelling ‘through’ it. The limitations of his ability are 
here highlighted by the Alchemist, who argues that one must conquer the summit to reach 
true enlightenment.
As the thief and his attendants attempt this, Jodorowsky’s self-reflexive cinematic 
moments reach their apogee. As the story moves closer to the mountain’s summit, the 
bodies of the seekers and spectators thus increasingly become exposed to invisible and 
inaesthetic pressures. What is more, in paralleling the characters, as the film approaches the 
narrative’s (temporal) pinnacle or summit, its own form and body begins to decompose and 
breakdown. This is achieved by a variety of aesthetical and formal means. In the first place, 
a gradual switch towards a documentary style travelogue takes over during the mountain 
climbing sections, which hints at the film taking a step closer to the ‘real’ or the ‘outside’ of 
the fictitious story. Counteracting this and demonstrating that Jodorowsky does not betray 
his Artaudian ideals, these documentary sequences are in turn in-mixed with paroxysmal 
Expressionistic hallucinations (associated with different apprentices as they mentally 
destratify) which invade the film from the inside, exploding forth like violent unstructured 
inaesthetics, which, in a different historical context, Tom Gunning referred to as a ‘cinema 
of attractions’ (Gunning 1986). 
After arriving at the mountaintop where the immortals dwell, the Alchemist approaches 
the thief and unties him with two peripheral characters (arguably a Jungian anima and ape 
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archetype that followed the seekers at a distance), and tells them to descend the mountain 
once more and change the world. Returning to the summit, the Alchemist then reveals 
that the immortals are dummies, yet more hollow bodies. He therefore pokes fun at the 
remaining seekers, while inviting them to sit around a table. Transforming his screen into 
a disjunctive temporal portal, the Alchemist (or Jodorowsky) then directly addresses the 
film audience through the now broken fourth-wall: 
I promised you the great secret and I will not disappoint you. This is the end of our 
adventure, nothing has an end, we came in search of the secret of immortality, to be 
like gods, and here we are, mortals. More human than ever. If we have not obtained 
immortality at least we have obtained reality. We began in a fairy-tale and we came to life, 
but is this life reality? No. It is a film. Zoom back camera […]. We are images, dreams, 
photographs, prisoners! We shall break the illusion. This is mana. Goodbye to the Holy 
Mountain, real life awaits us.
As his camera zooms backwards (in a trope that reflects the scene of the thief in the 
warehouse), the industrial bones of Jodorowsky’s film-making and production assemblage 
are finally exposed in an ‘excessive’ (see Sconce 1995) Fellini-esque gesture, wherein the 
film moves from the fictional story to a ‘real’ space full of sound-platforms, scaffolds, 
lights and behind-the-scenes crew members making the film. This deictic sequence 
erects a final bridge from the diegetic space back into the dialethical brain-screen space 
of the auditorium, where viewers are deposited in a state of bewilderment as the film 
credits roll. 
In an interview about his unusual ending, Jodorowsky reveals it ultimately shows that 
illumination in the Leary sense of the term does not exist. Instead, the film’s perplexing 
ending is used to challenge viewers to recognize their immanent nature, and see how, in 
a Spinozian sense, we are ‘illuminated; we just don’t realise it. The great mystery is to be 
alive, here and now. Nothing else is as important as that. It’s an incredible mystery. What 
more are we looking for?’ (Cobb 2007: 171). Or to say similar in Spinoza’s terms, we 
might state that enlightenment, or approaching the real via adequate ideas, is to shed our 
illusions and recognize that we are always-already one with God: ‘By reality and perfection 
I understand the same thing’ (Spinoza [1987] 2001: 46). Of course, the unorthodox ending 
is also utter nonsense, in the sense that Bogue menas when he says that ‘is not orthodox but 
paradoxical, and hence its sense seems nonsense, not good sense’ (Bogue 2004: 333). And 
here Jodorowsky can be understood engineering a final shock to thought, that demands 
active thinking, and sense-making. For while the Alchemist helps the film’s nameless and 
voiceless protagonist finally denounce the ‘phantoms of the negative’ and to stop fighting 
for his enslavement as if it were his freedom, he ultimately stops short of telling him how he 
should live. Similarly, the head film itself refrains from providing any utopian roadmaps for 
what audiences should now do or think. Instead, the pill film arguably forwards an ‘ethics 
of a faith’ that is capable of making ‘fools laugh’: which as Deleuze describes it, must not be 
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driven by ‘a need to believe in something else’, but rather ‘a need to believe in this world, of 
which fools are a part’ (Deleuze 2005b: 167). 
Notes
 1 Filming in sequence initially serves to inject a tangible before and after into each on-screen 
body, so that the actors function as physical conduits of time and change. During the 
production of The Holy Mountain, for instance, the performers and crew were subjected 
to sleep-deprivation, mystical rituals, and the administration of LSD and psychedelic 
mushrooms as part of their (the group subject), or the thinking film’s, quest for illumination. 
The effect on their corporeal bodies and performances becomes discernable on-screen, in a 
manner reminiscent of the hypnotized performances found in Werner Herzog’s crystalline 
Heart of Glass (1976), where performing ‘under the influence’ is similarly deployed to make 
palpable the physical properties of mind control, swayed perception, and the notions of 
enlightenment as becoming ‘more’ conscious. Beyond actors and characters, in Jodorowsky’s 
pill films, these heterogeneous forces also begin to materially affect the form and content of 
what we might call after Vivian Sobchack (2004) and Daniel Frampton (2006) ‘the film’s 
body’ and its embodied ‘filmmind’.
 2 The notion of the event having a site comes from Alain Badiou’s work. For Badiou, evental 
happenings flash in and out of existence within the event site, and can become manifest in 
multiple different forms and works (for a clear summary of how the event operates within a 
site for Badiou, see Ling 2011: 17–20).
 3 If we watch across borders, these local US movements and events can also be joined up to a 
far wider more dissolute movement, whose dynamism and gaseous spirit appears expressed 
similarly elsewhere. A consideration of Vera Chytilovà’s psychedelic film Sedmikrásky/
Daisies (1966), for example, which was produced in the LSD manufacturing hot spot in 
Czechoslovakia (see for example Lee 1994), demonstrates clear parallels and affinities with 
the US films Renan links to expressions of the US counterculture’s ‘new man’. 
 4 See, for example, Heffernan (2004: 225). 
 5 See, for example, O Ritual dos Sádicos/Awakening of the Beast (1970). The similarity between 
Marins and Jodorowsky’s work is highlighted by Christen, Lebbing and Weevers (1998).
 6 Steven Shaviro and Richard Porton pick up on these Spinozian features of Cronenberg’s 
films. See Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body (1993: 127–157), and Richard Porton’s ‘The film 
director as philosopher: An interview with David Cronenberg’. 
 7 In recent years a filmed recording of Roland Topor’s Melodrama Sacramentral (1965) has 
surfaced and can be viewed online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aM3RtHxOCKs. 
Jodorowsky appears and performs in this bloody and violent happening that serves to 
aesthetically foreshadow and anticipate his 1968 feature film Fando y Lis. 
 8 Vogue spectatorial practices can be extrapolated from reports from other New York venues 
at the time, which indicate disembodied art cinema models were being ‘expanded’ to cater 
to the sensational realms of bodily affect. For example, Jonas Mekas famously worked to 
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actualize an ideal spectatorial experience in the Anthology Film Archive’s Invisible Cinema 
that opened on Lafayette Street in 1970. Hoberman and Rosenbaum note how spectatorship 
had become particularly fetishistic, with Peter Kubelka designing an auditorium and 
chairs that emphasized a ritualistic aspect of viewing geared towards mobilizing a different 
response from that of film as entertainment. (Hoberman and Rosenbaum 1983).
 9 For a detailed discussion of audience demographics and spectatorship habits common to 
the Elgin Theatre during this period, see Davis (2000). 
10 For more on the figure of the mole in Shakespeare, Marx, Hegel et al see John Milfull (2005) 
‘Notes from underground: Of moles, metros and messiahs’ and John Cussan (2011) ‘Marx 
and the old mole: (or the drudging fiend)’. These remind us that Marx turns to the figure 
of the mole on several occasions, using it as an animalistic metaphor for the revolution. 
Marx engages Hegel’s reading of Hamlet in The Philosophy of History, for instance, where the 
Danish Prince addresses his father who speaks from beneath the soil/stage as ‘old mole’. ‘We 
recognize our old friend, our old mole, who knows so well how to work underground, suddenly 
to appear: the revolution.’ On another occasion in 1856, Marx refers to Shakespeare’s 
Robin Goodfellow: ‘the old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer – 
the Revolution’. Furthermore, in the seventh chapter of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte (1852), Marx writes:
   But the revolution is thoroughgoing. It is still traveling through purgatory. It does its work 
methodically. By December 2, 1851, it had completed half of its preparatory work; now it 
is completing the other half. It first completed the parliamentary power in order to be able 
to overthrow it. Now that it has achieved this, it completes the executive power, reduces 
it to its purest expression, isolates it, sets it up against itself as the sole target, in order 
to concentrate all its forces of destruction against it. And when it has accomplished this 
second half of its preliminary work, Europe will leap from its seat and exult: Well burrowed, 
old mole!
(Marx 1852)
11 In books such as The Skin of the Film (2000) and Touch (2002) Laura Marks foregrounds 
how certain minor cinemas harness alternative scopic regimes that seem to promote 
embodied and tactile modes of film viewing, and radically dissolve the distinctions between 
the subject and object, or the immanent ethico-aesthetics, the feeling body and the thinking 
brain (Marks 2000, 2002). 
12 This term at once finds parallels with the work of Tod Browning, but Hoberman and 
Rosenbaum also note how the term ‘freak’ had enjoyed universal currency as a self-
descriptive term for the counterculture since around 1967.
13 The character’s perpetual seated position, shuffling movements, smoking of weed and 
physical assemblage with the thief suggest that on a symbolic level, he also functions as an 
on-screen surrogate for the auditorium bound head-spectator, who is then taken along for a 
ride by this character.
14 This image tellingly anticipates and recalls the aforemntioned sequence of Klen in his 
gallery as he formulates an assemblage with an art-body-machines through its anus. Also 
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of interest here, Deleuze and Guattari inform us that the anus was the ‘first organ to suffer 
privatization’ under capitalism, and to be effectively removed from the social field (2004a: 
157). Tellingly it is this part of the body that Jodorowsky chooses to focus upon as the 
thief ’s body is reclaimed and freed from the surrounding territorializing plane. The anus 
is also explored as a symbol for the open and permeable body, while the notion of turning 
excrement to gold becomes another loaded metaphor for achieving enlightenment.
15 Deleuzian scholars such as Powell and Pisters show how the use of abject bodily substances 
such as blood, sweat, tears and vomit often invoke ‘the border between the inside and the 
outside of the body. The concept of the boundary, in all kinds of variations’ (Pisters 2003: 48, 
see also Powell 2005: 64–65).
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Chapter Four
That’s ‘Really’ Sick: Pervert Horror, Torture Porn(ology), Bad-Taste and 
Emetic Affect in Lucifer Valentine’s Unbecoming ‘Cinema of Repulsions’ 
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Vomit tempts; it solicits.
Eugenie Brinkema (2011: 52)
With society a circus of sensations, anything truly terrifying (by definition, truly 
surprising) is saliva for a jaded palate. 
Lawrence O’Toole (2008: 260)
The artist is not only the patient and doctor of civilisation, but is also its pervert.
Gilles Deleuze (2004a: 274)
Feelings of nausea, revulsion, revolt and disgust are increasingly understood to play an important role in higher level cognitive processes and moral psychology, and expose a complex enfolding of nature and culture, physiology and politics. For example, 
adopting a gene-culture co-evolutionary perspective allows Daniel Kelly to show that the 
body’s so-called disgust system works ‘in conjunction with a norm psychology that evolved 
to help coordinate social interactions’ (Kelly 2011: 6–8)1. It is precisely because disgust is so 
often thought a natural and spontaneous feeling, though, that we must remain hyper aware 
of the ways in which it can be channelled and mobilized ‘as an instrument of oppression 
and discrimination’ (Kelly 2011: 6–8).2 For indeed, reconsider in this light the political 
implications of Paul Rozin’s observation that: ‘To find something disgusting is to desire no 
commerce with it, it is beyond temptation. Disgust is a moral amplifier and an indication of 
moral feelings’ (Rozin 1999: 218). 
Bearing such notions in mind, we might retroactively identify how feelings of disgust have 
always-already been germane vectors undergirding and intersecting many of the chapters 
running throughout Unbecoming Cinema: the moral opprobrium felt by certain critics about 
Eric Steel’s ‘immoral’ decision to record and project actual suicide event-acts for instance, 
or the visceral feelings of spiritual revolt that were inculcated through an encounter with 
Jodorowsky’s twisted pill films. Linked to these ideas, a pertinent question that we must 
pose within this chapter relates to whether or not disgust can ever be mobilized for truly 
ethical ends? (see e.g. Kelly 2011: 138). In setting out to answer this, we necessarily close 
Unbecoming Cinema with a provocative chapter that critically and clinically engrosses itself 
in, and ruminates over, the odious outré work of an eccentric3 twilight economy showman: 
Lucifer Valentine, the (oc)cult inventor of the rank and distasteful ‘Vomit Gore genre’, a 
bilious horror evolution in the extreme torture-porn yoke that infects viewers’ viscera 
07756_Ch04_135-182.indd   137 4/27/17   10:25 AM
Unbecoming Cinema
138
and aggressively agitates their guts with viral bio-aesthetics (see Kennedy 2002: 28). As the 
anarchic inventor, director, writer, designer, camera operator, editor, scorer, and samizdat 
paroxysmal distributor of the debased gag-inducing ‘Vomit Gore Trilogy’ (Slaughtered Vomit 
Dolls 2006; ReGOREgitated Sacrifice 2008; Slow Torture Puke Chamber 2010), Valentine 
surfaces – like the cult interloper Alejandro Jodorowsky explored in chapter three – as an 
ostentatious auteur entirely immersed in his distorting lollapalooza work.4 What is more, his 
diabolical (from the Greek diabolein meaning ‘actively breaking up, dispersing’ (see Flusser 
2014: 58)) films invite us to explore a quite different form of unbecoming emetic cinema 
that, like the pill-films of the previous chapter, constitute ‘event cinemas’ in two diverging 
and yet overlapping senses of the term. That is, the Vomit gore films are simultaneously a 
visceral and embodied Artaudian cinema of cruelty that communicate directly with the 
viewers’ nerves and viscera (in an ethico-political manner), and an unbecoming cinema 
that flashes and resonates with the movements of a wider ‘pure event’. 
To understand this latter threshold, we can turn to a line of thought offered by Jacqui 
Miller’s in Film and Ethics (2013), where she notes that although most films can be 
understood reflecting their wider social context, a scarce few should be viewed as singular 
products ‘of a particular moment [that] could not have been made earlier, and probably 
not later’ (Miller 2013: 7). Valentine’s Vomit Gore films fall precisely into this category, we 
maintain, being unique symptomatic sociotechnical products of their time, as well as low-
brow, low-budget projects that pathogenically mobilize and deploy disgust in an interesting 
ethical and political way. 
The Vomit Gore trilogy explored here coagulates around three dissolute DVD 
packages, whose mashed-up main features kinetically mingle extreme and offensive 
representational images of horror, madness, cannibalism and gore, with a shocking and 
repulsive concoction of authentic abject images of violent gonzo fetish porn, bulimia, 
paraphilic vomiting and spew (qua principles of anti-consumption). On first gush, then, 
Valentine’s mawkishly symbolic and excessively stylistic participatory triptych may appear 
to reject mainstream tastes and sensibilities, not least by apparently refusing contemporary 
capitalism’s injunction to enjoy consumption, and affirm that you are what you eat. Contra 
such received views, however, and in drawing inspiration from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writing on ‘pervert’ artists such as the Marquis de Sade and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, 
we maintain that Valentine’s elevation of digestion and vomit to a noematic level (qua 
food for thought), in combination with his symptomatic embrace of torture, terror, niche 
paraphilic pornography and viewer/user interaction, expose the emergence of an ‘evental’ 
body of minor horror that politically distorts and perverts the libidinal economies and 
sociotechnical logic of their age. Or stated differently, Valentine’s unbecoming horror-porn 
can be thrown up as an ethically revolting and revolutionary emblem of our post 9/11 era 
of terror, torture and modulating digital control; and thus represents an intensification 
of, rather than exception to, a network of dispositif rules surrounding what has variously 
been called ‘Capitalist Realism’ (Fisher 2012), ‘Evil Media’ (Fuller and Goffey 2012) and 
‘perception 2.0’ (Pisters 2012, 2010). 
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It is worth recalling here that the word ‘revolution’ originally derives from the Latin 
revolver, which means ‘to turn’, while the term ‘revulsion’ relates to a notion of ‘shrinking away’ 
(see Tsivian 2010: 32). Nevertheless, in Valentine’s evental work, we necessarily encounter a 
revolting and revolutionary form of unbecoming cinema, which deploys ‘revulsion’ ‘to turn’ its 
viewers’ stomachs in an ethico-political way. To further explain why, we must variously explore 
how Valentine’s ill-egitimate ‘pornological’ work creatively melds a sick form of content, sick 
form of expression and sick format of expression that in combination serves to ignite an ‘event 
of thought’, that provokes a critical and clinical diagnosis of our sick times. What is more, this 
chapter argues that by employing his shocking art to render the invisible forces around us, if 
not visible, at least palpable (even if not palatable) to the tactile senses, the violent emetophile 
Satanist can be recognized as the pervert artist par excellence of our current civilization. 
Vomit Gore a GoGo
Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (2000) observed how the abstract logic of millennial 
capitalism – mutually entangled with and enabled by networked computer systems – 
fostered devious new ‘occult’ and ‘twilight’ economies.5 By such a token, Valentine’s work 
can be understood surfacing during the occult era that they christen the ‘second coming 
of capitalism’. Certainly, in common with the outlandish products of many other 
borderland economies they survey, Valentine’s ferocious work channels and expresses 
equivalent forms of monstrosity, energy and creativity’ (308–309). At the same time, his 
work also becomes recognizable as what William Brown refers to as a ‘barbarian’ non-
cinema, which emerges from the ‘periphery within’ the centre of the film-making world 
(2016: 109). Arguably expressing ‘the spectre, the distinctive spirit, of neoliberal 
capitalism in its triumphal hour’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 314), the inaugural 
Vomit Gore film first appeared in 2006, available for direct purchase from Valentine’s 
Kingdom of Hell webpage at a cost of $60. 
As a marginal low-budget extreme horror-porn film, which blurs amateur/professional 
categories, Slaughtered Vomit Dolls became the first esoteric instalment in a dissolute trilogy 
that serially focuses upon the descent into hell of Angela Aberdeen (Ameara LaVey, Hope 
Likens, et al); an individual, or rather dividual (the decomposed and deforming-reforming 
parameter-being that Deleuze discusses as a symptom of modern control societies [1997])6 
iterated and embodied by multiple different actors within and throughout the modulating 
series. Collectively, the hallucinatory barbarian films unfold a succession of episodic 
sequences that experientially depict the ongoing humiliation, torture, rape and ‘murder’ 
of Aberdeen’s destratifying ‘archetypal’ personalities, at the hands of various tormenting 
demons and sick torturers: invariably with a penchant for ‘erotic’ vomiting and vomit. The 
farrago films accordingly mingle hallucinatory expressionistic images of a schizoid mental 
breakdown with raw participatory inaesthetic images, deployed to populate the inside of the 
viewers’ body with violent peristaltic sensations and aggressive auto-affects, which induce 
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qualified feelings of revulsion, nausea and sickness. As such, Valentine’s Vomit Gore work 
operates at the very limits of communication, harnessing a shocking and perverted form of 
bio-aesthetic film-making, which, in a different historical context, Tom Gunning referred to 
as a ‘cinema of attractions’ (Gunning 1986). 
Indeed, if the cinema of attractions periodically and disruptively spurts forth from 
beneath cinema’s sedimentalized (narrative) conventions, as Gunning so convincingly 
argues, then we can recognize Valentine’s digital project(ile) as a particularly irruptive and 
grotesque ‘return’ of this affective artistic substratum. That is to say, what we might playfully 
call a cinema of repulsions. Valentine’s sick and sadistic director identity certainly recalls 
the theatrical showman persona bound up with the early cinema of attractions mode á la 
Gunning. This auteur structure also ensures that an Artaudian form of ‘corporeal experience’ 
(Murray 2014: 1) is sadistically personified as it is made manifest, with the Valentine director-
persona certifying that an asymmetric deluge of visceral vomit-themed kinky-kinetic 
energy will propel ‘outward’ from the frame towards the acknowledged viewer, as well as 
inward towards a character-based narrative situation. Valentine here harnesses and projects 
forth series after series of crude unstructured viral affects designed to infect, unsettle and 
assault viewers, making their bodies physically react with queasy touches and contorting 
spasms. Accordingly, viewing Valentine’s Vomit Gore films entails what Steve Jones refers to 
as the ‘fragmented surfing’ of episodic hard-core torture ‘events’, which eschew narrative to 
unleash ‘sensorially provocative’ moments of ‘visceral stimulation’ (Jones 2013: 177, 184). 
Related to this notion of invoking a form of sickness in the viewer is Valentine’s favourite 
form of viral bio-aesthetic affect: images of vomit and vomiting, which he deploys to get 
underneath the viewer’s skin, to agitate their nerves, and materially inter-mingle with their 
gut, where the pathogenic film images instil qualified feelings of nausea and disgust. Of 
course, it is not unusual for horror and gore films to become diegetically or extra-diegetically 
associated with nausea and disgust. Critics such as Mikita Brottman even suggest horror 
films harbour a tactical fascination with all things nauseating exactly because they desire 
to induce feelings of revulsion in their audiences (Brottman 2005: 3). Janet Staiger and 
Lawrence O’Toole furnish us with rich historical evidence of this when they discuss the 
original audiences of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (Tobe Hooper, 1974) and Alien (Ridley 
Scott, 1979) being so disgusted by what they saw that many viewers bolted to the bathrooms 
to throw up during the screening (Staiger 2008: 246; O’Toole 2008: 258).
On account of such visceral forces, O’Toole historically argued that horror must be 
recognized as the most subversive of all genres. From today’s vantage, one must concede that 
Internet pornography and terrorist snuff have edged in front of horror with their subversive 
capacity to overthrow scruples and catalyse moral panics. Interestingly, Valentine’s horror 
films can be subversively mapped alongside these particular ‘post-cinematic’ or ‘non-
cinematic’ vectors too; on the one hand molecularly indexing, or channelling, the fusion of 
terrorist ‘black magic’ and the ‘white light of the image’ alchemized in the post 9/11 crucible 
(Baudrillard 2002: 29–30), and on the other, vividly recalling shorter gape- and gag-inducing 
view-and-forward viral porn sensations such as 2 Girls 1 Cup (Marco Antônio Fiorito, 
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2007). The abject anti-abstract sequences of Aberdeen’s never-ending torture, humiliation, 
rape and ‘murder’ within modulating echo chambers make both these vectors clear. This 
is not to mention the millions of ‘disgust junkies’ who subscribe to YouTube channels 
streaming gross ‘cyst bursting’ and ‘boil squeezing’ videos (see e.g. Gallacher 2016), or 
reams of other ghastly online phenomenon and non-cinematic vectors that are peculiar to 
our times.
In difference to many of these other image economies, however, Valentine’s extreme and 
extremely disgusting violence of sensations can be understood endeavouring to solicit primal 
forms of bodily reaction that appear to provoke a subsequent ethical ‘event of thought’, by 
first getting inside the embodied viewer’s guts and exciting what is variously referred to as 
their ‘enteric nervous system’ (Hadhazy 2010) or ‘gustatory cortex’ (Kelly 2011: 142). That 
is, the complex neural network of over one hundred million nerve cells located within and 
across the human gut and digestive system (Greshorn 1999: viii; Hadhazy 2010; Enders 
2015: 131–134), that boasts more neurons and nerve cells than either ‘the spinal cord 
or the peripheral nervous system’ (Hadhazy 2010). On account of this, many scientist 
recognize the gut’s enteric system, in assemblage with its inhuman biome population, 
to be ‘another independent centre of integrative neural activity’ (Gershon in Hurley 
2011; see also Enders 2015: 131–134). Because this neural network is also understood 
to communicate bilaterally with the central nervous system via the gut-brain axis, and 
can ‘think’ and act independently of the brain, it is often provocatively referred to as 
the human body’s second brain. This second brain becomes the ‘neural seat of disgust 
[in] the insular cortex’, Kelly observes, and ‘has been linked to gastrointestinal functions’ 
(Kelly 2011: 142). 
For the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who adopts a Spinozian mind-body parallelism 
perspective, the human stomach and gut formulates an integral part of the body-minded 
thinking process already discussed in the previous chapter. The mind’s idea of hunger, for 
instance, is related to the brain receiving ‘basic’ or ‘sub-cortal’ signals from the stomach 
and gustatory cortex, and sensing changes in the blood’s composition as well as the body’s 
dwindling energy levels. These ‘lower level’ processes thus become essential in composing 
feelings and emotion, which in turn become influential on the mind’s functioning, cognition 
and decision making (see e.g. Damasio 2004: 206). In Gut: The Inside Story of Our Body’s Most 
Underrated Organ (2015) Giulia Enders’ research into the role of the human gut similarly 
leads her to promote a comparable Spinozian ‘philosophical reversal’ or recalibration of 
Descartes’ mind/body dualism ‘error’ (to channel the title of Damasio’s earlier 1994 work): 
‘It may be time to expand René Descartes’ proposition’ she explains, to say instead ‘I feel, 
then I think, therefore I am’ (Enders 2015: 141). 
Through his relentless unleashing of transductive emetic auto-affections upon the viewer’s 
sensorium, and specifically the second brain, during the screening encounter (which often 
induces gagging and retching), Valentine can be understood unbridling a range of viral 
bio-aesthetics designed to criss-cross the gut-brain axis in a manner that recalls the work 
of Antonin Artaud, another abject artist of ‘regurgitated formless matter’ who thought 
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and worked ‘through the digestive system’ (Murray 2014: 48). The Vomit Gore work in 
particular appears designed to agitate and execute the body’s automatic ‘disgust execution 
system’ (Kelly 2011: 116), while instilling a lingering unease in the pit of the infected 
viewer’s stomach, which thereafter agitates feeling-thoughts and instils qualified feelings 
and emotions at ‘higher’ levels of conscious processing, which in turn become responsible 
for soliciting or igniting a subsequent ‘event of thought’. The Vomit Gore films here emerge 
as powerful and affective artistic force fields, or what Artaud referred to as bodies without 
organs (BwO), designed to directly impact the viewers’ sensorium and nerves during the 
embodied screening encounter: to infect and contaminate, invade and transfigure, like an 
illness or plague. 
Like Jodorowsky’s work explored in the previous chapter, Valentine’s inimitable 
corporeal cinema never performs courtesy of a complete hypertrophy of symbolic or 
representational regimes, with ‘poetic’ meanings simultaneously becoming directed at the 
more distanced eye/I of the viewer as their sensorium is violently stormed. Here, Valentine’s 
raw inaesthetic or bio-aesthetic affects always-already converge with the films’ hallucinatory 
and febrile expressionistic style, which concomitantly assaults the eyes and ears. This is an 
asymmetrical and self-annihilating coupling though, with unstructured kinetic affects and 
representational meaning variously working for and against each other as disorganizing 
and re-organizing forces. 
We find the essence of this complex relationship diagrammatically expressed in the very 
first horror sequence in Slaughtered Vomit Dolls, which exposes the attraction-repulsion 
between Valentine’s use of raw bio-aesthetic affect and symbolic abstraction. The sequence 
in question features an early iteration of an Aberdeen archetype named ‘Pig’ (embodied here 
by a heavier set female actor listed as ‘Pig Lizzy’) whom viewers watch being tortured and 
murdered by Valentine’s satanic camera consciousness. There, the abominable articulation 
of gonzo-porn authenticity and sick symbolic-laden fantasy result in a dis-organ-izing and 
reorganizing of meanings and feelings, as Pig’s eyeballs are shown being brutally gorged out 
of their sockets by a long screwdriver, leaving the blinded naked victim to stumble around a 
generic hotel ‘non place’7 (which itself appears, like Aberdeen, in different iterations within 
and across all the DVD packages). Pig’s dismembered and disembodied eyes are thereafter 
laid upon a glass coffee table, framed from below by Valentine’s digital-camera, as the eyeless 
victim edges falteringly towards them. Presently, she begins thrusting her straightened 
fingers, then knuckles, and hand, deep into her mouth and throat cavity, causing her inner 
body to heave, spasm, convulse and finally projectile puke all over these disembodied 
eyeballs and the glass-top table.
Seeing Pig’s gag reflexes and kinetic deluge of vomit here often serves to activate the 
body’s disgust system’, setting into motion a sympathetic ‘gape face’, and then auto-affective 
heaving and gagging sensations. As such, the visceral image immediately touches us deep 
in the thinking-feeling guts, directly making our faces change shape and expression.8 
At the same time, the ‘metaphoric’ meanings derived from the horror-torture sequence 
confirm that, in a visually expressive Bataillean manoeuver that also recalls the slashed 
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eyeball marking the opening of Luis Buñuel’s Un Chien Andalou (1929), the Vomit Gore 
film announces an abject and poetic harnessing of powerful material forces that necessarily 
exceed seeing.9 
Through its mutually destructive articulation of material and metaphorical forces, then, 
the above sequence announces that there may be more to this new genre’s perverse and 
obsessive fascination with vomit and vomiting than first meets, or exceeds, the eye. This 
is to say, Valentine’s novel films appear to serve up vomit as actual food for thought, and 
dislodge, or force viewers to confront, a sickening ‘poetics’ of vomit. No doubt, if the act 
of vomiting can be linked to a corporeal regime of raw transductive bio-aesthetic forces, 
deployed to make the viewer’s body contort and spasm, the films’ coinciding preoccupation 
with the icky substance of vomit itself betrays a further obsession that provokes thought to 
confront the immanent materiality of vomit face-on. A brief mind experiment should help 
to make the implication of such obsessions clearer, especially if we momentarily contrast 
Valentine’s recurrent fascination with characters having to witness and consume their 
torturer’s vomit with other extreme and excessive cinematic moments where comparable 
victims are compelled to consume vile and abject bio-waste for the erotic enjoyment of 
others (both within or beyond the frame). 
To begin, we can here compare Valentine’s vomit-eating scenes with various shit-
eating sequences peppered throughout Sweet Movie (Dušan Makavejev, 1974), Salò (Pier 
Paolo Pasolini, 1975), The Cook The Thief His Wife and Her Lover (Peter Greenaway, 
1989), The Human Centipede trilogy (Tom Six, 2009, 2011, 2015) and the aforementioned 
post-cinematic viral ‘shock-video’ 2 Girls 1 Cup (2007). On arriving at these scatological 
considerations, we might concede that if at the level of bio-aesthetic affect these disgusting 
and shocking coprophagic sequences elicit comparable embodied auto-affective reactions 
as Valentine’s images of vomit chugging, my gut feeling remains that a clear schism opens 
up when we consider the divergent symbolic or representational meanings associated 
with the appearance and consumption of faeces and vomit. For one thing, shit literally 
and metaphorically represents the end of the human consumption-digestion or nutrition-
extraction process (and the fertile beginning for another inhuman cycle), while vomit more 
precisely represents the interception or interruption of this teleological digestive flow (by 
disease, bacteria, poison, emetics, bulimic intervention, etc.). The symbolism of vomit 
betrays a liminal status, then, being neither exactly food nor waste, but rather an arrested 
processual in-between substance. 
Accordingly, the act of vomiting is always-already a disruptive and untimely event that 
is associated with intersecting the teleological consumption-digestion-waste process. 
We might also recall here that for Deleuze and Guattari, the anorexic transforms their 
mouth into a perverse form of ‘anal machine’, supplanting its molar role as an ‘eating-
machine’ by reversing and re-directing the naturalized flows of consumption (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004a: 1). Brinkema similarly notes how ‘against the telos of proper 
digestion, ending in defecation and a voiding of material through the coursing hollow 
at the centre of the body’, vomiting witnesses the face return ‘as the site of entry and 
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exit’, so that the mouth become a schematic anus that serves to circle ‘back intake in a 
citational recall’ (2011: 55). Countless images of women purging over toilet bowls within 
Valentine’s films make this bulimic re-organ-ization of the mouth as anal-machine all 
too clear, and below, we investigate how this reorganized mouth-anus schematic can also 
be linked to strange processes of becoming-animal, or else index animal lines of flight 
opened up by Valentine’s decidedly inhuman art. Furthermore, images of vomit and 
abjection also often serve to invoke a radical blurring of boundaries between the inside 
and outside, self and other, in all forms of variations, and which stretch out to include 
the viewer and their embodied experience of the film (see Pisters 2003: 48; Powell 2005: 
64–65). At a higher level of register, and in a formal act of mise en abyme, the films’ 
own mashed-up postmodern citations of countless other horror films (such as Hannibal 
[Ridley Scott, 2001] and Poltergeist [Tobe Hooper, 1982]) similarly appear to reflect the 
same sick abstract diagram, as does the ongoing embedding of a 1980s home movie that 
diegetically and extra-diegetically announces the return of traumatic childhood events 
(the video being of Valentine’s own sister, we are told, but used in situ to represent the 
mediated memories of Aberdeen as a child).
In the following sections, we necessarily move on to explore how Valentine’s 
intensely disgusting auto-affective ‘viral’ images, flagrant transgression of sociopolitical 
taboos, mashed-up and broken apart non-narrative style, dissolute digital form(at) of 
expression and embrace of interactive prosumer technologies actualizes the complete 
transubstantiation, or unbecoming, of the traditional film object into an ‘informe’ 
nebulous objectile, which neatly reflects the Vomit Gore project’s thematic obsession 
with thinking through and with the digestive system. Of particular interest to this 
chapter, is how in combination the films’ wretched violence of sensations, twilight 
economy of disgust and interactive viewer/user dimensions collectively prompt thought 
to grope beyond the sick films in particular towards the in-forming sociotechnical and 
political background subsuming the entire oeuvre itself. Or put differently, Valentine’s 
‘symptomatic’ films provoke viewers’ thoughts and associations to zigzag from the 
particular to the general, and by so doing help unconceal and diagnose the form and 
function of the embedding culture’s abstract ‘desiring machines’. In attempting to map 
out these movements below, it becomes useful to begin by schizoanalytically detouring 
a long legacy of symptomatic horror film criticism that aims to expose how a distasteful 
and nightmarish genre might make certain cultural concerns and libidinal economies 
palpable to their viewers’ senses. 
Contextual and Contingent Meanings
In his landmark ‘psychological history’ of German horror cinema From Caligari to 
Hitler (1966), Siegfried Kracauer famously argued that a nation’s films offered attentive 
critics a direct and ‘royal road’ into the wider cultural unconscious. Kracauer there put 
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skewed silent-era horror movies such as Der Golem (Carl Boese and Paul Wegener, 
1915), Das Cabinet des Dr Caligari (Robert Wiene, 1920) and Metropolis (Fritz Lang 
1927) onto the proverbial (textual) analyst’s couch, in order to decode and decipher the 
symbolic meanings he saw undergirding their nightmarish dream-screens. Seeing their 
stylized form and mise-en-scène expressionistically reflecting their content, Kracauer 
maintained that the silent movement was best understood resonating with the German 
nation’s deep-seated anxieties: linked to the impending rise of dangerous ideologues, 
hypnotic proto-fascist cults of the idol and an inexorable manipulation of the distracted 
masses. Performing as both a cultural psychiatrist and critical clinician, Kracauer there 
interpreted the films’ penumbral semiotics betraying a neurotic entanglement with the 
unsettled historical context. Far from being inter-war historical curios, then, these 
Weimar horrors were more precisely perceived as zeitgeist texts that were clearly in-
formed by, and expressive of, wider sociopolitical apprehensions. 
Although not accepted by all, Kracauer’s far-reaching contextual and historical 
interpretation of horror unquestionably influenced subsequent waves of film critic, 
who increasingly read horror films as meaningful cultural products that expressed 
something essential about their particular spatio-temporal juncture. In his seminal 
‘Introduction to the American horror film’, for example, Robin Wood approaches 
US horror as a collective cultural nightmare that obsessively played out the dramatic 
‘struggle for recognition of all that [US] civilisation represses or oppresses’ (1984: 
171). Thus, while Kracauer saw a preoccupation with anti-Semitism and the rise of 
fascism as the nightmarish (sub)text underpinning pre-war German cinema, Wood felt 
American horror expressed quite different forms of trepidation and unease, which were 
allegorically linked to different repressed/oppressed ‘others’ and non-normative sexual 
identities (such as female sexuality, homosexuality and other marginalized or minor 
groups). If such approaches still remain of value and importance today, to the extent 
that it may even appear that ‘it has become routine to read horror as an allegorical 
response to political anxieties’ (Frost 2011: 16), we must concede that the Freudian-
Lacanian psychoanalytic approaches informing these particular interpretations have 
gradually dropped out of fashion. 
Amongst a multitude of other voices that highlight problems of comparing films to 
dreams, and cultural products to psychological phenomena, Deleuze and Guattari 
famously warned against approaching any artist or work (solely) through a psychoanalytic 
lens. For amongst other things, these models restricted critics to perceiving the author as a 
form of neurotic, who could do little more than mechanistically or pathologically produce 
neurotic artworks. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari fashioned an alternative clinical-critical 
approach to the study of perverting/pervert art, employing an expanded and immanent 
‘schizoanalytic’ or ‘rhizomatic’ method that appears better suited for exposing the 
complex arrangements of institutions, technologies, languages, forces and affects that are 
always-already in operation within a given cultural milieu or territory, and are relevant 
to our understanding of the minor or perverting artists’ works. Amongst other mad 
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and perverted artists, Deleuze and Guattari delve into the symptomatic corpuses of the 
Marquis de Sade, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch and Antonin Artaud, to better illuminate 
how their ‘perverted’ and/or ‘minor’ bodies of work help cast the libidinal economies 
and diagrammatic organizational logic of their particular cultures and civilizations (or 
desiring assemblages) into fresh light, by engineering an artistic encounter that allowed 
readers/viewers to sense or perceive the form and function of these abstract machines 
afresh. Thus, in his survey of literature in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze strives to contrast 
the neurotic artist and minor author, by arguing:
The neurotic can only actualize the terms and the story of his [sic] novel: the symptoms 
are this actualisation, and the novel has no other meaning. On the contrary, to extract the 
non-actualisable part of the pure event from symptoms (or, as Blanchot says, to raise the 
visible to the invisible), to raise everyday actions and passions (like eating, shitting, loving, 
speaking, or dying) to their noematic attribute and their corresponding pure Event, to go 
from the physical surface on which symptoms are played out and actualisations decided 
on the metaphysical surface on which the pure event stands and is played out, to go from 
the cause of the symptoms to the quasi-cause of the oeuvre – this is the object of the novel 
as a work of art, and what distinguishes it from the familial novel.
(Deleuze 2004a: 273) 
By provoking thought to move from the particular to the general, or towards the quasi-
causes of the oeuvre, the mad, perverted or minor artwork nurtures an encounter with the 
as yet unthought, or that which precedes thought, by nudging readers/viewers both towards 
prehending something that was previously invisible or hidden (the pure event) whilst 
making the visible emit the invisible (the virtual or abstract) that always-already informed 
our reception or mediation of it. 
Accordingly, although folk wisdom may maintain that artists like Sade or Masoch must be 
recognized as pathological perverts, Deleuze and Guattari show how critics do themselves 
a disservice by solely understanding their art as the product of neuroses. For by following 
their transgressive lines of flight as far as they could go, both Sade and Masoch used their 
novels to disarticulate and disassociate certain ‘syndromes previously grouped together’, 
and productively engineer new articulations that demanded fresh forms of thought and 
understanding. On this point Deleuze is clear, contending that there: 
is always a great deal of art involved in the groupings of symptoms, in the organisation 
of a table where a particular symptom is disassociated from another, juxtaposed to a 
third, and forms the figure of a disorder or illness. Clinicians who are able to renew a 
symptomatological table produce a work of art; conversely, artists are clinicians, not with 
respect to their own case, nor even with respect to a case in general; rather, they are 
clinicians of civilisation.
(Deleuze 2004a: 273, emphasis in original)
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Erika Gaudlitz illuminates how Deleuze’s understanding of Masoch’s work sees the erotic 
bodily techniques revealing ‘a blend of ethnographic and historical engagement’ that make 
the ‘schizoanalytic crossover of social and personal desire’ detectable for the reader (Gaudlitz 
2015: 8). To clarify upon this isomorphic and schizoanalytic inter-relationship between the 
perverted oeuvre and the civilization it emerges from – and in turn helps to clinically/
critically to diagnose – it becomes fruitful to turn briefly to Sade’s ‘anthropological’ corpus 
as a demonstrative case in point. 
We might remember here that for Bataille, Sade’s uniqueness lay in the way his stories 
affectively recombined sex and death, the ‘two primary taboos’ operating within his culture. 
By so doing, Sade ultimately forced his readers to perceive that ‘the urge towards love, 
pushed to its limit, is an urge towards death’ (Bataille 2001: 42). Bataille further felt that in 
Sade’s writing the intense peak experiences of sex and death each pointed towards a highly 
eroticized obliteration of the self, or towards a novel politico-religious co-mingling of 
subject and object. Not too dissimilarly, Giorgio Agamben earmarks Sade’s work as the ‘first 
and perhaps most radical biopolitical manifesto of modernity’, which erected a new erotic 
‘theatre of bare life’ that meticulously and unsparingly regulates and publicizes every aspect 
of physiological life, including sexual and digestive functions (Agamben 1995: 134–135). 
By stripping political life of bios and reducing it to pure zoe, Agamben also acknowledges 
a philosophical manoeuvre in Sade’s work that announced ‘the absolutely political (that 
is, “biopolitical”) meaning of sexuality and physiological life itself ’ (135). In both these 
readings we can detect a clear crossover between the private and the public, between the 
personal and the pathological or the biological and the political, which is made tangible to 
the reader so that they might sense or perceive a complex ethnographic entanglement at 
play throughout Sade’s stories.
The schizoanalytic dimensions of these become even clearer if we briefly work to 
triangulate Sade’s corpus with two other telling tutor passages, the first of which constitutes 
the remarkable opening of Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1991), wherein the 
philosophical historian depicts, in excruciating visceral detail, the profane public spectacle 
unfolding before the Church of Paris on the 2nd of March 1757. Foucault torturously 
confronts his readers with the litany of pains exacted upon the condemned body of Damiens 
the Regicide during his drawn-out corporeal ordeal with fire, hot pincers, molten lead, 
sulphur, horses and Parisian hecklers. A familiarity with this protracted passage, in turn, 
helps cast a second intersecting pedagogical entry from the memoirs of Giacomo Casanova 
into fresh light, where the carnal Venetian writes of accompanying certain aristocratic ladies 
to spectate Damiens’ amende honorable that day. Upon his arrival at the horrible spectacle, 
however, Casanova became alarmed at seeing his elegant French consociates leaning 
excitedly out of their carriage window and straining eagerly on their toes in order to secure 
themselves a better view of the gory horror show from their place amidst the crowd. What is 
perhaps most shocking by today’s standards, though, is that Casanova not only describes the 
ladies maintaining an unflinching gaze upon Damiens’ agonies, but also becoming sexually 
aroused (algolagnia) by the cruel Sovereign-era torture-porn spectacle, with one lady 
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ostensibly being vigorously and intimately stimulated beneath her rustling dress as the 
shocking events unfolded (see Casanova 2013: 397–398; Ellis 2012: n.p.). 
These tutor passages help expose why Sade’s erotic articulation of sex and death, bare 
life and politics were decidedly more symptomatic than neurotic, or operated upon an 
ethological and historical level rather than a purely pathological one. Which is to say, Sade’s 
art can be recognized distilling the essence of his historical moment into a novel form, whilst 
employing sensational ‘pornological’ (more on which below) affects and percepts to better 
reveal the perverse libidinal economies at work (desiring) everywhere around him: even if 
intensifying them and turning them on their head. 
From these critical and historical perspectives, it thus becomes clearer why Deleuze and 
others evade reducing Sade to a mere pathological pervert, or maintain that the brutal erotic-
affective fantasies and shocking institutional inversion of virtue and vice found within his 
art appear to be tactically deployed in order to encourage readers to prehend or perceive 
the general at work behind the particular. Like Bataille and Agamben then, Deleuze also 
sees Sade as a revolutionary artist, and fingers the pervert author as an original creative 
whose work exposes and intensifies the form and function of his particular civilization’s 
abstract social mechanisms. If in such cases the artwork and artist remain symptomatically 
in-formed by certain forces at play within their particular historical milieu, the artist is 
simultaneously lauded as a creative and ethnographic poet, responsible for generating 
unique forms of ‘fundamental encounter’ (see Deleuze 2004c: 176; O’Sullivan 2005: 1) that 
coax new forms of thought into being. 
For these reasons, and of relevance to this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari thus compel us – 
to momentarily purloin a line of thought from Guattari’s patient Jacques Besse – to seek out 
‘the poet, not the patient’, behind the mad and perverted artistic expression (see Dosse 2010: 
48), especially those which challenge their reader, listener or viewer to think with the pure 
event of the singular-plural artwork, or else experience themselves becoming swept up in 
wider evental happenings (along with the artist and artwork). The minor or pervert artist 
here emerges as both the ‘patient’ and ‘doctor’ of their particular civilization, then, but as 
with clinicians, as opposed to their patients, become more likely to lend their proper names 
to the ‘new constellations of symptoms and signs’ that their sensational and diagnostic art 
makes perceptible (hence sadism and masochism) (Deleuze 1991: 16). It is in this sense 
that we can follow Deleuze in recognizing Masoch and Sade’s oeuvres as a special type of 
ethnographic and anthropological territory, whereupon the clinical artist gathers together 
and re-arranges various signs and symptoms (and affects) in a sensual configuration, so as 
to make them detectible (even if not delectable) to a wider audience.
If the signs and symptoms featuring within Sade’s smarting corporeal works point beyond 
themselves to certain in-forming quasi-causes, can the same also be claimed of Valentine’s 
disgusting ‘perverted’ artworks here today? In venturing to answer this question, we might 
first concede that Valentine is not (yet) a ‘great artist’ in the traditional ‘aristocratic’ sense 
that Deleuze ascribes to Sade or Masoch. And we must also accept that Deleuze himself 
would not likely have valued or relished Valentine’s work. However, in taking inspiration 
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from Deleuze’s attempt to liberate Sade and Masoch’s corpus ‘from the stigma of perversion’ 
(Gaudlitz 2015: 6), whilst at the same time also liberating ourselves from the Master’s own 
aristocratic tastes, we can set out in search of the perverted poet behind Valentine’s Vomit 
Gore films. But as we depart from Sade and his Sovereign era, we must concede that the 
twenty-first century has itself increasingly become an era where (erotic) ‘public’ spectacles 
of torture and execution have returned and become somewhat commonplace, and that 
Valentine’s occult pornographic works also schizoanalytically resonate with the products 
and organizational logic of their own era, appearing rife with the affective economies of 
religious snuff, extremist torture porn and participatory slash and mash-up prosumer 
culture. 
Valentine as Pervert S/M Poet
As historically was the case with many readers of Sade and Masoch’s work, it often appears 
difficult for modern viewers and critics to move past heaving dismissive pathological pervert 
pejoratives upon Valentine’s seemingly neurotic artworks (see for example the online review 
by The JillKill, or the Facebook group ‘Lucifer Valentine Should be Raped With A Pole 
Wrapped In Barbed Wire’). Beyond the content of the film images themselves, there can be 
little doubt that such opinions are also invited by the director’s public(ized) persona – 
particularly when he plays up to his own transgressive psychosexual personality. In one of 
ReGOREgitated Sacrifice’s sundry DVD features, for instance, Valentine deploys intertitles 
and a deep digitally distorted satanic voice-over to introduce himself as the paraphilic 
creator and artist: 
The ‘vomit’ in Vomit Gore arises from my sexuality; I am an emetophile, meaning I am 
sexually attracted to vomit and vomiting, specifically, I am attracted to female human 
beings vomiting. The first time I ever saw females vomiting in a sexual content was in 
Max Hardcore porn movies, which triggered in me an innate and very strong fetish for 
emetophilia. I am also very attracted to extreme violence and Satanic themes, as I am 
a Satanist, so, stylistically and thematically, those elements have greatly influenced the 
Vomit Gore movies I have made. 
If Valentine can be understood toying with his outlandish showman-auteur persona here, 
the perverted artist personality becomes further amplified amidst a slew of semi-detached 
films and texts within and beyond ReGOREgitated Sacrifice’s DVD upchuck. In various 
shock-jock interviews, for instance, he describes having incestuous sexual relations with 
his younger (now dead) autistic sister (and muse), whose suicide by drowning he informs 
us is obsessively returned to, and symbolically re-presented throughout the triptych’s 
violent sexual torture and murder sequences. However, we might note here that beyond his 
own pathological distortions and traumatic (actual or virtual) childhood memories, the 
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erotically stylized and theatrical nature of the films’ torture sequences, with their unending 
elevation of banal bodily passions to unsettling objects of thought, gradually serve to occult 
a wider economy of ‘signs’ and ‘symptoms’ that are at play. And it is these features of the 
Vomit Gore films that ultimately begin to trouble any overly simplistic understanding of 
the perverted trilogy as a purely neurotic familial art, and expose a thoughtful elevation of 
the post-cinematic (Shaviro 2010) or non-cinematic (see Brown 2016) audio-visual artwork 
to a higher degree of expression. Indeed, through creating new symptomatic articulations, 
novel sociotechnical patterns, and defamiliarizing modes of sensation and ‘thought’, 
Valentine’s sick artworks increasingly prompt viewers to pay heed to new associations and 
connections. 
To best illuminate the extent to which external and essential forces must be taken into 
account, we can briefly return to one of the key critiques levelled at Kracauer’s earlier 
reading of the Weimar horror movies. The work of Thomas Elsaesser (2000, 2008) 
makes for an insightful case in point here, as it exposes how Kracauer’s psychoanalytic 
approaches constituted a wholly inadequate ‘historical imaginary’, which in its ‘splendid 
isolation’ failed to account for a wider complex web of international and domestic forces – 
including culture and leisure industry dynamisms and a whole host of other artistic, 
economic and technological dimensions – that dramatically impacted the form and 
content of the so-called Expressionist horror films (2000: 4, 11). This political manoeuvre 
also helps Elsaesser expose an expanded galaxy of forces that always-already border 
the cinema industry and exert disorganizing and reorganizing affects/effects upon its 
aesthetics and apparatuses.
Elsewhere Elsaesser embraces a media archaeology method reminiscent of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s schizoanalytic models to expose an alternative ‘perverted’ history of the cinema. 
This demands we treat film as a ‘philosophical perpetuum mobile’ (2008: 239), which must 
be endlessly rethought and reimagined as it becomes renewed, recomposed, resculpted 
and reshaped within a dynamic plane of ever-transforming forces: that ceaselessly and 
contingently inspire new forms and patterns of expression. Of applicability to our arguments 
here, Elsaesser aptly labels these distorting powers the ‘S/M’ forces.
These are, to list them briefly, the scientific and medical cinematic apparatus (on which 
there are some excellent books, noticeably by Lisa Cartwright (1995)); the surveillance 
and military apparatus (theorised, among others, by Paul Virillio (1989) and Friedrich 
Kittler (1999)); the sensory-motor-schema apparatus (of Gilles Deleuze’s (1986; 1989) 
philosophy); and the sensoring and monitoring apparatus (celebrated by Kevin Kelly 
(1999)), which speak of feedback loops, pull technologies, searchability and augmented 
reality.
(Elsaesser 2008: 232) 
Of particular relevance to our understanding of Valentine’s work is the imagistic 
perversions mobilized by the ‘digital rupture’, which, as Elsaesser observes, ignite a 
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movement from the perceptible towards the imperceptible, or from a world organized 
around ocular perception and conquest towards the invisible world of forces and fields 
(Elsaesser 2008: 239; see also Thomsen 2012). Such movements not only recall the opening 
torture sequence outlined above wherein Pig’s eyeballs are gorged out, but also recollect 
Deleuze’s notion of the modern cinema pitching its stake behind the eyes, in the brain. 
Patricia Pisters picks up on comparable movements in The Neuro-Image, especially in her 
discussions of a wider shift from a scopic or optical regime to new forms of digital imaging 
that increasingly operate directly on the brain and nerves. There, while striving to 
recalibrate Deleuze’s models to better approach our contemporary digital world, Pisters 
argues that vision, which is always-already an embodied mental operation, appears 
materially articulated to a plethora of extra-somatic digital-brain-screens, which literally 
perform as pre-personal transductive neural conduits, to which viewers/users connect and 
nerve. In our present era of ‘perception 2.0’, then, human subjectivity evermore inhabits a 
‘dialethic’ position (at once inside and outside) with regard to the interactive prosthetic 
brain-screens that everywhere surround us. 
When images and screens become material-aspects of subjectivity in this way, our 
understanding of the interactive relationship we have with media forces us to reconsider 
and redraw the old comfortable distinctions between subject and object, inside and 
outside, human and technology, perception-conception. With respect to this, Andrew 
Murphy notes that although the world has always been a medium á la Whitehead, it has 
‘only recently become a technology-imposed world as medium, something it was not 
before. The result is a “contaminated” world, over-run with media and communications, 
with media technologies, networks, techniques of spin and media cycles taking over 
politics, and so on’ (Murphy n.d.: 14). The Vomit Gore films again appear to pick up 
and make these ideas symptomatically palpable, particularly with regard to how they 
spread through networked systems. It therefore also becomes important to keep one 
eye on the surrounding assemblage of sociotechnical practices and economic, industrial 
and political machines that patently flow into and in-form the singular-plural works of 
this minor poetic artist. Below, I thus attempt to sketch out how modern Social Media 
becomes another particularly pertinent perverting ‘S/M’ force that factors into and 
pathogenically intensifies Valentine’s Vomit Gore project(ile). Before this, however, we 
must first turn to the decidedly less modern DVD form Valentine most often employs, 
and pay heed to how this format too plays into and resonates with his digestive abstract 
diagram. 
From the Digital Versatile Disc to the Digi-ested Vomit Disco
Valentine’s work unequivocally exudes a ‘splat pack’ horror DVD ethos (see Bernard 
2014), with each disk appearing chocked full of ‘intra-textual’ (Brown 2007) and ‘cinema 
of interactions’ (Grusin 2006: 71) features. We can recall here that the DVD – which the 
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director uses to enclose all three Vomit Gore packages – was, (media) archaeologically 
speaking, the digital technology that cradled and inculcated the most ‘fundamental change 
in the aesthetic status of the cinematic artefact’ (Grusin 2006: 76). Indeed, as expanded 
artistic environments, all three of Valentine’s mash-up vomit gore features arrive 
surrounded by a heteroclite slew of excessive expectorate ‘splatter-texts’; the multimodal 
intranet upchuck of bonus features and inter-active and (inter-reactive) adjunct sputum 
that always-already surround the Vomit Gore films. Slaughtered Vomit Dolls, for instance, 
constitutes a nebulous DVD package that, amongst other things, contains: original 
Valentine cover art, a making of documentary, bonus behind the scenes footage, scanned 
production notes, a picture gallery, actor biographies, a ‘history of vomit gore’ package, a 
short bonus feature called Self Inflicted, multiple actor interviews, and several modulating 
audio tracks including commentaries by Valentine and the actress Ameara LaVey, and his 
producer ‘No one body’. 
This format of expression at once reveals and revels in a Bataillean informe/
formlessness, which rather than being opposed or contrasted to form itself, undermines 
the very notion that art requires solid form (Bataille 1998: 25).10 Such dissolute collections 
also clearly celebrate an unbecoming of the classical film form, and as we will discover 
below, serve to solicit and spread ever more further flung and digitally disturbed Vomit 
Gore splatter-texts. By the standards of the times, of course, the DVD format already 
appears somewhat anachronistic. But there appears to be a message bound up in this 
outdated choice of medium too, which tellingly divulges a backwards and forwards 
looking impulse. That is, beyond commerce, Valentine’s peculiar preference for the 
increasingly obsolete DVD objects arguably reveal an expressive synthesis of form(at) 
and content, which reifies a liminal sense of technological in-betweeness, perfectly 
befitting the projects’ wider themes and diagrammatic obsessions. From one aspect, the 
digitally recorded DVD images appears quite distinct to the earlier iterations of 1980s 
VHS home video that appear catabolically and citationally embedded within all three 
Vomit Gore films. From the other perspective, we must recall how the DVD format 
historically inculcated interactive environmental formats that opened up ‘digital theme 
parks’ for their ‘users’ (as opposed to mere viewers), and which are now recognized as 
the technological precursors to (post-cinematic) Internet ecosystems (see Grusin 2006: 
76, 78, 90; Brown 2007: 170ff). 
Interestingly enough, the interactive distributed dimensions of Valentine’s DVD 
works likewise appear to serve one of two seemingly opposed, yet thematically and 
diagrammatically consistent, objectives: by either working to re-organize or re-
assemble the atrophied narrative constituents tenuously linked to the situational non-
narrative films,11 or else to dis-organize, dis-assemble or entirely deliquesce the Vomit 
Gore fantasies by exposing excessive dimensions of the real that insist behind or beyond 
the recorded diegetic scenes. Indeed, in order to make any intellectual sense of the 
participatory films beyond their suspended ongoing affective torture-porn situation, 
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viewers/users have to actively and inter-actively gather and re-assemble disjointed 
morsels of Aberdeen’s discombobulated biographical ‘narrative’ from fragments 
distributed across the heteroclite DVD packages, so that establishing how images and 
themes inter-relate with each other involves jumping around in-between the masticated 
films and adjunct splatter-texts, in an act that becomes comparable to trying to establish 
what someone ate and drank for dinner by forensically examining the contents of 
their sick. 
From flash-backs and glossolaliac dialogue caught within the films, for instance, 
viewers absorb that the ‘lost girl’ Aberdeen was sexually abused by her father as a 
child, that she ran away from home as a bulimic teenager, became a stripper, turned to 
prostitution, began using drugs and eventually committed suicide. Other free-floating 
biographical details are only partially dislodged or intimated, with their relevance to 
the story, or tone of the films, left deliberately obscured, partial or indistinct. Some of 
these only ever become fleshed out in the bonus features, or else via online interviews 
and fan videos. One important example, to which we will return to in more detail below, 
informs viewers/users that Aberdeen’s suicide occurred on the very same day as Kurt 
Cobain’s, which within the filmic universe results in the ‘quantum entanglement’ of their 
two tortured souls. 
Other self-annihilating ‘excessive’ adjunct features contained in the DVD packages 
appear to dissolve or break apart any sense of fictional verisimilitude, by introducing 
concomitant and competing planes of reality, such as the actors watching the films 
they performed in whilst inhabiting similar hotel room non-spaces. In such sequences 
although the actors appear out of character, they remain the recorded subject-objects 
of Valentine’s first-person digital camera, albeit this time answering questions about 
their memories and experiences of filming the docu-horror scenes rather than puking or 
being puked on. At a formal level, then, we can recognize how the wider dissolute DVD 
and interactive package is (de)composed of distributed expectorate bonus features and 
detached intramedia productions, which become attached, in turn, via viscous virtual 
strands to ever further flung online ‘splatter-texts’.
If these latter drives ultimately draw out attention to a deliberate S/M dig(i)estion of 
the cinematic product under Valentine’s direction, we must not forget that these artworks 
operate upon two distinct yet interleaving levels of unbecoming-ness simultaneously. 
Which is to say, while the form, format and distribution methods of Valentine’s diabolical 
films react to and reify cutting edge S/M forms, at the same time the content of the Vomit 
Gore films remains provocatively and politically ‘unbecoming’ in a more vernacular sense 
of the term, appearing unseemly, inappropriate, unflattering or unattractive to most 
viewing publics and taste cultures. To best grasp why the pervert poet might combine these 
two different forms of material and metaphorical unbecoming, we must now move on to 
consider how the offensive nature of these films themselves operate as agential forces that 
provoke viewers to see and think differently. 
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Unbecoming Cinema as a Transgressive and Offensive Event
Valentine’s Vomit Gore is indeed a contemporary art of the unbecoming – a disgusting 
cinema that triggers horrible embodied encounters, which, in turn, provoke an unbecoming 
(event) of thought. On account of this latter effect, the films arguably also become an 
ethical informe art worthy of our attention, not least by granting us the opportunity to test 
out Daniel Kelly’s notion of ‘the yuck factor’, which forces us to ask ‘whether or not being 
disgusted by something provides good reason to think it immoral or morally problematic’ 
(Kelly 2011: 7, 137). 
If, as Freud had it, beauty is intoxicating in its proximity to us, might we not in turn 
say that disgust is more precisely toxicating. Worth mentioning here is an insightful 
philosophical exploration into disgust by Eugenie Brinkema, wherein we are reminded 
that for Jacques Derrida, ‘the logocentric system can accommodate, consume, and 
represent everything except vomit, which, nevertheless, is not the negative of the system’ 
(Brinkema 2011: 59). Echoes here of our earlier consideration of Rozin’s work, wherein 
finding something like vomit to be disgusting ‘is to desire no commerce with it’, and 
to place it ‘beyond temptation’ (Rozin 1999: 218). Even if we know as per the chapter’s 
opening quotation that vomit blatantly does ‘temp’ and ‘solicit’ (see Brinkema 2011: 52). 
In this respect, while Kelly’s considerations of the role of disgust on moral judgments 
forces him to concede that ‘one group’s delicacy is another group’s revulsion’ (Kelly 2011: 
2), one instinctively feels with Valentine’s Vomit Gore fans that the opposite appears to 
be a more fitting appraisal, in that it becomes the majority of people’s revulsion that 
is detoured to become another group’s delicacy. Certainly, by making vomit(ing) the 
centripetal core of his artistic universe and occult economy, Valentine appears to push 
his viewers’ thought ethically towards the borderlands of the logocentric system. To 
account for comparable forms of disagreeableness in other films, Brinkema opts to 
introduce the notion of ‘Ekel’, which can refer to a ‘particular form of ugliness’ that 
marks the very limit and borderline ‘for the possibilities of the aesthetic’ (Brinkema 
2011: 57). 
Through producing monstrous amateur films that show, and demand viewers immerse 
themselves in horrendous images of vomit and vomiting, Valentine becomes a monstrator 
(shower) whose outrageous works ethico-politically embrace a bio-aesthetics of Ekel 
toxication, pushing sick images and raw unstructured affects into viewers faces and 
deep into their bodies, in a manner that forces vomit upwards from the enteric nervous 
system towards the brain: where it is served up with disgust as a noematic food for 
thought. In Deleuzo-Guattarian terms, we might here say that the at once symptomatic-
pathogenic Vomit Gore project(ile) appears to pervert, distort, but also diagnose the 
contemporary capitalist mega-machine: which is to say, the cultural assemblage it erects a 
deterritorializing line of flight away from. Deterritorialisation becomes an apt term here 
precisely because notions of being ‘outside’, ‘beyond’ or ‘against’ capitalism are highly 
problematic. For when inaesthetic and ethico-politics are aligned with occult economics, 
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the system has, as Deleuze and Guattari might say, already schizophrenically recorded its 
own anti-production, or reterritorialized its own deterritorializing flows. Thus, the naïve 
notion of being ‘outside’ or ‘against’ is immediately brought into crisis (see Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, 2004b). 
In Capitalist Realism, Mark Fisher (2009) similiarly observes that in today’s hyper-
consumable media ecologies, any notion of being outside or ‘alternative’ is rendered 
utterly banal; always-already dished up as eroded from within, and primarily consumable 
qua profitable. What is more, because the rapacious mainstream media endlessly 
re-packages, re-brands and re-circulates the trappings and suits of previous rebellious 
movements (such as rock, punk, rap), the notion of being ‘alternative’ increasingly 
performs as the dominant style (in a fascistic recoding and reterritorialization of 
micropolitical revolt and failed searches for alternatives). That is, as an atrophied 
symbolic form of ‘rebellion’ that is ultimately bought and worn as a ‘meaningless’ 
affective signifier. 
Valentine’s disgusting pervert art offers an interesting case study with which to test 
Fisher’s notion, especially as the form and content of his films appear to knowingly 
(read critically) reify an image of a civilization caught endlessly regurgitating and re-
consuming its own broken-down and degraded cultural forms. Fisher’s consideration of 
Kurt Cobain becomes particularly pertinent to this consideration of Valentine’s work, 
especially because the Grunge singer is identified as the cultural icon whose life and 
death marched in perfect lockstep with the wider cultural move towards ‘capitalist 
realism’ (2009): an insidious system under which there is no longer any real possibility 
of individuals positioning themselves outside or against the dominant ideology. There, 
Cobain’s objectless rage is rendered as a snare trap, wherein the more the singer seemingly 
rebelled and railed against the neoliberal system, the more popular his revolting image 
and videos became on MTV. In a reflection of Deleuze’s control society, Cobain ultimately 
came to recognize that every rebellious move or rejection he made was always-already 
anticipated in advance, becoming pre-formed into a marketable cliché: including his 
problems with drugs, depression and his eventual suicide (which all served to increase 
the Sony corporation’s profits). Cobain’s sad passions and self-murder thus help expose 
the vile logic of contemporary capitalism, wherein even success becomes failure, ‘since to 
succeed would only mean that you were the new meat on which the system could feed’ 
(Fisher 2009: 9).12 
As indicated, the Vomit Gore project(ile) reveals the spiritual entanglement of Cobain 
and Aberdeen (whose name is a homage to the singer’s home town), or at least, it does 
to those who poke around in Slaughtered Vomit Dolls’s expectorate splatter-texts, and 
interact with the adjunct bonus feature Kurt Cobain forever by Lucifer Valentine. This 
DVD feature characteristically opens with Valentine addressing his viewers via intertitle 
and his digitally distorted voice-over: ‘I wrote this to help answer questions about my 
movies in general and also shed some light on the theme of the death of Kurt Cobain 
in my first two movies’. Thereafter, a multitude of metabolized images and references 
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(hidden in plain sight) associated with Cobain’s suicide are shown to be in-mixed into 
the trilogy’s febrile narrative broth and mise-en-scène. As part of their niche-sickness, 
the Vomit Gore films expressively and knowingly channel the ‘spirit’ of Cobain into 
the narrative’s phantasmagoria, albeit catabolically breaking down and distributing his 
essence into the body of the oeuvre as a quasi-signaletic symptom, rather than simply 
re-cycling and trading in on his image as does the dominant system.13 In an online fan 
interview that reflects on Cobain’s role within his films, Valentine hints at these very 
notions:
I do feel that the commodification of his image was something that Cobain truly dreaded 
and did in part contribute to his demise. To me Kurt Cobain represents a beautifully 
talented and fragile genius who was unable to cope with an overwhelming inner conflict 
of wanting to create his art, but having a crippling inability to cope with the world’s 
consumption of that art and how that made him reflect upon himself and begin to 
question his own motivations for continuing to make his music. Cobain was one of the 
most recent rock n’ roll icons to die way before his time and his death leaves me with 
a sense of endless sadness, which influenced the character of Angela Aberdeen in my 
movies as I illustrated elements of Angela and Kurt’s quantum entanglement of their 
simultaneous suicides on April 5th 1994.
Valentine’s Ekel-economy of disgust appears to knowingly inhabit and dwell in the 
extreme liminal border zone of a consumable system, intensifying the Grunge impulse to 
a revolting nth dimension of almost unmarketable and un-consumable yuckyness. Thus, 
if Cobain’s pain came from becoming a commercial success, Valentine’s low-brow 
obsession with vomit, vomiting and unsettling horror-porn helps ensure that his works 
cannot suffer the same forms of undesired mainstream success (read failure). That said, 
being deliberately disgusting or offensive is not enough to shield art from the dangers of 
critical success. 
Indeed, amongst others William Brown, Mikita Brottman and Jeffrey Sconce all 
highlight a certain value in low-brow and disgusting films that are typically eschewed 
by ‘serious’ mainstream critics. And to some extent, all explore offensive marginal works 
that serve ‘as a kind of measuring rod to help us understand the nature of whatever is 
respected or revered’; while concomitantly exposing their historical borderings with 
other systems, including contingent moral taboos and transgressions (see Brottman 2005: 
2). Although Brottman’s book-length enquiry into the trash-strewn gutters of B-movie 
horror and offensive porn remains a convincing and edifying read, her attempt to rescue 
or recuperate the negative and anti-mainstream remains problematic if we bear Cobain’s 
unwilling exploitation in mind. For such civilizing approaches begin to run the risk of 
critically transforming what ostensibly appears designed as a negative and offensive 
encounter into something affirmative or positive; or of reterritorializing what is otherwise 
an intentionally deterritorializing drive and impulse (qua Grunge and Vomit Gore). 
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Thus – pace Herbert Marcuse’s notion of a ‘repressive tolerance’ – to remain ethical we 
must remain vigilant against positively reading or accepting that which is intended as 
offensive and negative. 
To reiterate, Valentine’s power as a sick scatological artist is intricately bound 
to the offensive and unrecoverable nature of his sensationally disgusting art. We 
must therefore block the flow of desire that demands we salvage the truly offensive 
dimensions of Valentine’s project, for fear of taming, or domesticating (qua castrating 
or Oedipalizing) that which should remain objectionable and disgusting. Sconce’s 
Bourdieuan exploration into bad ‘taste publics’ and Brown’s work into the disturbing 
non-cinema of Giuseppe Andrews can help us chart an alternative path around such 
pitfalls, by signposting alternative ethical forms of taste recalibration that might allow 
us to garner a negative ‘understanding’ or ‘appreciation’ of Valentine’s work. These 
necessarily demand we focus our attentions upon the ‘counter-aesthetic’ that crystallize 
around otherwise sacrilegiously indescribable ‘art brutarian’ works (Sconce 1995: 372). 
Looking at ‘paracinema’ films such as Plan 9 from Outer Space (Ed Wood Jr, 1959) 
that, like Valentine’s films, overtly trade in ‘excess’, Sconce shows how certain ‘bad’ 
films can entice or provoke viewers into alternative forms of spectatorial attitude and 
appreciation. Likewise, for Brown, certain forms of low-budget, low-brow non-cinema, 
such as Adams’s trailer park films starring drug addicts and non-professional actors, 
begin to demand a reorientation of viewer expectations and tastes, reminiscent of how 
earlier cult audiences developed their own detoured appreciations of film (see inter alia 
Sontag 2008; Bourdieu 2008; Jancovich 2008; Eco 2008; Brown 2016, forthcoming). In 
the encounter with such works, Sconce and Brown foreground how certain forms of 
‘excess’ (such as bad acting, poor props, disjunctive editing, ridiculous illogical stories) 
help erode any fictional verisimilitude, simultaneously dissolving ‘the boundaries 
of the diegesis into profilmic and extratextual realms’, while puncturing the ‘fourth 
wall’, so that ‘[t]he “surface” diegesis becomes precisely that, the thin and final veil 
that is the indexical mark of a more interesting drama, that of the film’s construction 
and sociohistorical context’ (Sconce 1995: 387, 391). In these sentiments we can also 
locate echoes of Deleuze and Guattari’s ethical notion of the evental artist activating 
strange and unfamiliar patterns via an encounter with their works, which trouble 
existing or habitual attitudes, and provoke thought and attention to shift from text to 
context. 
We might also here briefly re-consider another common criticism levelled at 
Valentine’s work, which argues that his repetition ad nauseam of images of pornographic 
vomiting and torture become truly boring (see for example the Jill Kill). Although we 
will later work to align affective feelings of boredom with a sense of pure masochistic 
waiting, we can take pause here to throw up another critical aspect to boredom that sees 
it revolt against predominating marketing and technocratic discourses. Indeed, in his 
essay ‘Boredom’, Kracauer argues that far from being something to be avoided, boredom 
should be something that we embrace, particularly as it is a state that harbours real 
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political potentials. In point of fact, for Kracauer, boredom is a necessary precondition 
for the birth of anything truly novel. For one thing, desiring to be constantly entertained 
or distracted betrays having already having succumbed to, or become territorialized by, 
the dominant system of consumption and spectacle. Recognition of this leads Kracauer 
to champion boredom, and to elevate the feeling to a positive and productive form of 
‘critical refusal’, or as a means of rejecting or diverting pleasure in order to awaken 
people ‘to a new life’ (2002: 301, 302). For Brown, similar forms of critical refusal can 
be linked to the notion of satis (of having had enough), which amongst other things, 
he sees surfacing in critical expressions of satire.14 For when a culture has had enough 
of something (satis), there is evidently an excess at play, which often leads to the 
satirical, scornful and derisive bringing forth of crappy images of puking, fucking and 
shitting. Valentine’s work here paradoxically becomes at once uncommon and kinetic, 
and yet static and boring.
Julian Hanich’s discussion of the integration of positive and negative affects within art 
offers us a useful touchstone here. Indeed, Hanich demonstrates how too much of a positive 
thing, over time, can in and of itself begin catalysing negative affects so that just like eating 
‘too much candy’, too much of the purely pleasant will inevitably ‘end in satiation and, if no 
change occurs, eventually turn into disgust’ (Hanich 2011: 30). Valentine’s vomit-themed 
torture certainly articulates disgust with boredom, in a doubly jointed rejection of what is 
typically perceived as marketable entertainment. At the same time, the form and content 
of the unbecoming project expresses and erotic and symptomalogical exhaustion with the 
tastes and practices of mainstream media consumption.
If so, Valentine harnesses disgust and boredom both as an artistic impetus and a 
subversive political mode of critique, which brings to the surface a deep micro-political 
dissatisfaction, and an express desire to transgressively evade or invert the dominant 
coding system. In making such claims, however, it becomes important to bear in mind 
how an immanent notion of transgression differs from transcendence, and should not 
be mistaken for a moving ‘beyond’ any fixed and stable moral limit or threshold. Rather, 
we must recognize a reciprocal and interleaving relationship between any taboo and its 
transgression, or the law and its necessary violation. In his reading of Bataille’s philosophy, 
for example, Foucault makes comparable claims, and warns us against adopting 
dyadic models that systematize taboo and transgression by erecting false relationals or 
binaries such as ‘black to white, the prohibited to the lawful, the outside to the inside, 
or the open area of a building to its enclosed spaces’ (Foucault 1977: 35). Contra these, 
Bataille and Foucault see transgression amounting to a spiralling movement comparable 
to a Nietzschean return, ‘which no simple infraction can exhaust’ (Foucault 1977: 35). 
Transgression and taboo here become codetermining concepts, so that instead of denying 
the taboo, the transgression ultimately realizes and completes it. Accordingly, the primary 
act of banning or forbidding serves primarily to beautify that which it denies access to, 
and ensures that satisfaction can only be realized in the act of transgressing or violating 
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the taboo (see Bataille 1998: 51–56). For adequately describing the evental nature of a 
transgressive act, Foucault accordingly adopts a useful horror metaphor that we can 
intercept here:
Perhaps it is like a flash of lightning in the night which, from the beginning of time, 
gives a dense and black intensity to the night it denies, which lights up the night 
from the inside, from top to bottom, and yet owes the dark the stark clarity of its 
manifestations, its harrowing and poised singularity; the flash loses itself in this space 
it marks with its sovereignty and becomes silent now that it has given a name to 
obscurity.
(Foucault 1977: 35)
Foucault thus asks, if lightning’s zigzagging path and line of flight allow us to perceive 
everything around it differently or afresh, is the same not also true of the evental artwork? 
From this immanent vantage, any transgressive act whatever, including making/viewing 
a deliberately disgusting film, like the flash of lightning, could be conceived as a fleeting-
flowing event, or a twisting becoming (or unbecoming) that reveals only ‘that narrow 
zone of a line where it displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, 
even its origin’ (Foucault 1977: 33–34). For both Bataille and Foucault alike then, it 
becomes ‘likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses’ (33).
In Valentine’s tarrying of pathogenic-symptom (vomit and vomiting) and critical-
diagnosis, we must recognize how his sick sequences do not so much cross some rigid 
prohibited line, but rather serve to heighten and re-articulate similarly grotesque 
symptoms and scenarios always-already present in the surrounding culture. No doubt, 
occasional acts of vomit consumption will be quite familiar to fans of Jackass (the television 
and film franchise, 2000–2014) or the Jim Rose Circus (1993–) for example. Valentine’s 
particular penchant for erotic emetophilic torture can also be understood as intensifying 
repulsive film sequences found in Audition (Ôdishon, Takashi Miike, 1999) and A Hole 
in My Heart (Ett hål I mitt hjärta, Lukas Moodysson, 2004). The extreme pornographic 
elements of eroticized torture and abject sexual humiliation can also be mapped 
alongside the ubiquitous reams of BDSM and gonzo fetish pornography increasingly 
found online, and which Valentine says helped shape or in-form his own paraphilic 
sexuality.
Such schizoanalytic considerations highlight how the Vomit Gore films do not so much 
trespass over any well-policed moral boundaries, but rather immanently recast extant taboo-
transgression axes and symptomatological vectors operating within the modern media 
culture. We might thus claim (á la  Foucault and Deleuze) that Valentine’s transgressive 
films simply light up and recast the dark cultural backcloth they criss-cross from within, at 
the same time as they poetically re-organize, re-arrange and re-articulate extant signs and 
symptoms in a new or novel fashion. Albeit while granting them new textures, shapes and 
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meanings within the confines of a marginal horror genre evolution that ignites febrile forms 
of metaphysical thinking.
Minor Horror: Experimental Evolution
For Deleuze, a minor artist is one that creates ‘new forms of expression, ways of thinking 
and feeling and an entirely original language’ whilst embracing and releasing ‘a whole 
conception of man, culture and nature’ (Deleuze 1991: 16). In arguing for Valentine’s 
credentials as a minor artist, we must account for the form and content of his creative work 
and visions. In the first instance, Valentine is certainly an artist that many, including himself, 
recognize as having created a new form of horror. When asked about his Vomit Gore work 
in an online interview, for example, the director tellingly states that:
Vomit Gore is the name of a sub-genre of extreme underground gore movies that I 
invented and the name of the style of the first three movies in this genre within what 
is known as the Vomit Gore Trilogy. However, the term ‘Vomit Gore’, to me, represents 
my ability as an artist to literally do anything I want, in any extreme form, with total 
irreverence for any norms, conventions or pre-conceived notions of the structures of the 
so-called ‘rules of filmmaking’, no matter how absurd, grotesque, over the top, ludicrous, 
twisted, dark, abstract, surreal, perverted, nonsensical, random and cinematically 
destructive and annihiliatory [sic] it may be, with absolutely no hesitation or self-doubt, 
in order to express an intrinsic child-like feeling of manic creative violence and personal 
darkness. (I rip through paper with crayons.)
(Valentine in Farmer 2014) 
Approaching the novel sub-genre as an excessively disjunctive and dis-organizing body of 
work allows us to recognize several moments within the films where Valentine forces 
different forms of visual ‘excess’ to counteract each other in a decisively acrid act of 
dissolvent-dialectics. Here, the engineered encounter between excessive stylistics on the one 
hand and excessively realist impulses on the other combines to catalyse dis-organizing and 
deterritorializing chain-reactions that are self-annihilating or mutually destructive in 
nature. By further combining, or articulating these apparently self-destructive modes, 
Valentine emerges as a diabolical experimenter of forms who all the same remains consistent 
to his sick and digestive abstract diagram. Steve Jones sees similar aspects at work within 
Valentine’s project(ile), recognizing form and content working in synthesis to communicate 
complex meaning and affect. Valentine’s amateur hand-held camera indexes an excess of 
profilmic non-actors (porn performers and semi-professionals) in non-spaces (such as hotel 
rooms, toilets and bedrooms) in a way that grants the film a distinct ‘realist’ quality, for 
example, yet at the same time the overall filmic ‘form is dominated by contrasting non-
realist modes’: 
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Blank white studio spaces are occasionally occupied. Unexpected imagery such as 
microscope-based sperm and ovum stock footage interrupts the action […]. Slow motion, 
distortion, and coloured filters are employed, as are radical shifts between natural light, 
torchlight, and stark over-lighting. The sound is frequently detached from the images, 
and includes children laughing, low demonic growls, pitch-shifted voices, and reverse 
singing. The editing is rapid, intercutting between these modes. The result is an audio-
visual onslaught.
(Jones 2013: 176–177)
The inventive digestive- or dissolvent-dialectical forms help expose the experimental 
expressions of an anti-mainstream minor artist, actively involved in perverting existing 
conventions and industry standards. Valentine’s choppy and abrasive editing technique also 
excessively intensifies and surpasses the rapid forms familiar to MTV and advertising 
conventions. So much so, in fact, that one begins to sense that the extreme masticated style 
is itself related to the project’s larger association with digestion. Germane to this, Brown 
recalls that the etymology of edit traces its roots back to the Latin for ‘he eats’,15 which, as the 
first step in the digestive process, appears fitting to Valentine’s masticated piecemeal editing 
style and his mash-up ethico-politics.
Taking a Deleuzian approach to Valentine’s films can also help explain how theses formal 
and styllistic experimentations help actively defamiliarize and reorganize genre conventions 
at a different scalar level. From such a vantage, Amy Herzog shows how genres themselves 
can be re-imagined as emergent and contingent assemblages, within which any given film 
might exhibit ‘productive functions’ capable of detouring or de-stabilizing the extant 
category, ostensibly serving to remake and unmake what came before. Novel or experimental 
genre films in particular become evental in nature, displaying an ability to launch new and 
unexpected patterns or forms which, if particularly world-shattering, popular or pleasing, will 
‘provide the foundation for counter rhythms and deviations’ (Herzog 2012: 140). Film here 
emerges as a type of desiring-machine, which, as Simon O’Sullivan argues, displays ‘a kind 
of schizophrenia’ that actively promotes ‘the scrambling of existing codes – or the setting up 
of autonomous codes that operate independently of any social coding’ (O’Sullivan 2005: 25). 
One of the ways in which Valentine’s anti-mainstream films modify, or pervert, existing 
horror patterns can be located in their unmaking and remaking of contemporaneous 
‘torture-porn’ themes and motifs. To explain how, though, we must now explicate, and 
complicate ‘everyday’ understandings of what both ‘porn’ and ‘torture’ mean within this 
postmodern portmanteau mode. 
Symptomatological Torture-Porn
To begin with the first part of the ‘torture-porn’ conceptual convergence first, we can 
commence by noting how in relation to other commonly listed contemporaneous 
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torture-porn titles – such as Saw (2004) or Hostel (2005) – Valentine’s works are actually 
pornographic, in that they capture and render graphically on-screen authentic acts of 
consensual sexual behaviour – including BDSM scenarios, images of vaginal 
penetration, lesbian sex, Roman showers, Golden showers, menophilia, spit swapping 
and bestiality.16 
With regard to pornographic modes, however, Jones observes that prior to the 
nineteenth century, pornography predominantly performed as a politically subversive 
and critical (art)form, or as a marginal mode of social critique that provided a rare 
space to work through ‘cultural anxieties over sexuality, gender, race, and class’ (Garlick 
in Jones 2013: 185). As we have already seen, Deleuze recognized Masoch and Sade as 
revolutionary ‘pornological’ writers, whose erotic novels sexualized history in order to 
‘literally and imaginatively […] turn the law upside down’ (Gaudlitz 2015: 15). If then, qua 
Kracauer and Wood (et al.), we can recognize horror being to the twentieth century what 
pornography was to the eighteenth and nineteenth, then we might argue that torture-
porn reveals a converging and spiralling return of both these critical modes in the twenty-
first century. Incontrovertibly, Valentine’s ‘taboo-flouting sex-violence combinations’ 
(Jones 2013: 185) make a distinctly masochistic form of pornographic viewing evident, 
which recalls and recasts Steven Shaviro’s notion of the participatory encounter with horror 
images: wherein it becomes clear that: ‘I do not have power over what I see, I do not even 
have, strictly speaking, the power to see; it is more that I am powerless not to see’ (Shaviro 
1993: 48). When discussing similar vectors of Valentine’s horror, and recalling Agamben’s 
biopolitical writing above, Jones notes how the ‘acts of urination, vomiting, and bleeding’ 
to which viewers are subjected are truly pornographic, ‘inasmuch as they render the body’s 
inner secrets visible’, at the same time as their ‘sex-violence convergences’ act to open up 
the human body in an ‘unlimited fashion’ for a decisive ‘pornographic gaze’ that grips 
audiences in a state of simultaneous fascination and repulsion – the subjective experience 
of which means that although ‘we cannot bear to look’, we somehow ‘cannot stop looking’ 
(Jones 2013: 184). 
By combining fetish pornography with extreme images of torture-horror in this way, 
Valentine’s films shock and affect viewers in unusual and unanticipated ways, creating 
unsettling sensual patterns and associations that solicit the body and brain to search for 
meaning, arguably located outside of the films and DVDs themselves. If the perverse 
and perverting powers of the pornographic are intensified or compounded in Valentine’s 
films in comparison to other mainstream torture-porn titles, what of their ‘thinking’ 
of torture? Paying attention to this theme again serves to reveal the sheer ubiquity of 
torture images appearing within and across different forms of contemporous media. 
As an inroad into these myriad discussions, we might pick up on the views of Slavoj 
Žižek regarding the now (in)famous leaked photos of American troops torturing and 
sexually humiliating Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib. By approaching these through his 
renowned (Lacanian) inverted-perspective, Žižek ultimately argues that, far from being 
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shocking revelations of something exceptional, hidden and forbidden, these images 
of torture more precisely reveal the real gears of contemporary American culture 
(145–149). That is to say, violence, hazing and ritualized humiliation are dished out as 
an ‘everyday’ right of passage in manifold US institutions.17 By intensifying the more 
symbolic or mundane shaming practices found in colleges, universities and military 
organizations, the Abu Ghraib pictures cast a distorted reflection of the wider cultural 
matrix. Taking a schizoanalytic approach to the same images, Patricia Pisters arrives 
at similar conclusions, albeit seeing the Abu Ghraib images as reflecting the culture’s 
bottom-up ‘collective’ unconscious: wherein the torture and humiliation of Iraqi 
prisoners emerges as an ‘antidote’ to the ‘humiliating images’ of the collapsing World 
Trade Centre (Pisters 2012: 295). 
Both these ideas find strong connections with Alfred W. McCoy’s comparative survey 
of torture images appearing in mainstream media before and after 9/11. In the first place, 
McCoy observes that real depictions and fictional representations of torture dramatically 
increased in the wake of the tragic Manhattan events. The abrupt upsurge in volume – from 
around 20 per annum in the pre 9/11 world to well over 150 in the decade after – helps pull 
into focus a disturbing interleaving of ‘state practice and public displays of torture’ upon 
American (and therefore global) screens (see McCoy 2012: 133). Alongside this striking 
increase in quantity, McCoy also observes a distressing transmutation in the qualitative 
nature and meanings of these images of torture. For increasingly, he argues, 
[t]hrough the invisible tendrils that tie media to the modern state, US television 
networks broadcast hundreds of hours of popular television dramas […] portraying 
torture as effective, even exciting, video games with elaborate torture scenarios 
proliferated, and major Hollywood films featured graphic torture scenes. Surveying 
the most popular of the displays indicates, moreover, that there was a progressive 
coarsening of representation, with ever more explicit violence paralleling the [Bush] 
administration’s increasingly overt embrace of torture. By the time Bush left office in late 
2008, screens large and small across America were saturated with torture simulations, 
conducting an ad hoc mass indoctrination of the public into a belief in the efficacy 
of torture – a sordid, even repulsive practice whose ugly reality was softened by its 
eroticised representation.
(McCoy 2012: 126) 
Recognizing this same titillating eroticization of torture led David Edlestein to coin the 
neologism ‘torture porn’ in the first place, a label which, as Aston and Walliss point out, 
although a ‘reductive term’, became a ‘useful synecdoche’ that critics and scholars 
‘predictably latched onto and exploited’ (Aston and Walliss 2013; see also Middleton 2010; 
Zimmer 2011). 
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If we bear in mind the historical role of both pornography and horror discussed above, 
we might take pause to reflect that an eroticization of torture is not necessarily a troubling 
or new phenomenon. What is more, we would also do well to distinguish between a 
sadistic and masochistic pole of the pornological eroticization and politicization of 
torture. To a similar end, Michael Flynn and Fabiola F. Salek expose how in a marked 
historical shift, the majority of post 9/11 media tended to employ narrative conventions 
to situate viewers evermore on the side of the torturer rather than the victim. As a result, 
unlike the majority of twentieth-century torture depictions where viewers were typically 
invited to identify with the victim, the majority of twenty-first-century representations 
abandoned a ‘fear of torture’ to instead drive home the ‘necessity’, and indeed ‘joy’, of 
these ‘illegal’ acts (Flynn and Salek 2012: 3). If audiences were increasingly becoming 
encouraged to politically, emotionally and ethically side with the ‘messianic’ torturer,18 
Flynn and Salek expressed fears that these images signalled ‘the gangrene of illegality’ 
setting in, and a poisoning of the entire cultural system (Flynn and Salek 2012: 10–12). 
Valentine’s sick pornological art certainly resonates with such an image, and can be 
imagined symptomatically spurting forth from a sick, poisoned and gangrenous body 
politic, being at once a symptom of the poisoning, and a pathogenic poisoner at the same 
time. In this way, at least, Valentine’s torture porn finds itself in accordance with other 
famous titles in the genre.19 
In both Torture Porn: Popular Horror after Saw (2013) and Selling the Splat Pack: 
The DVD Revolution and the DVD Horror Film (2015), Jones and Bernard respectively 
problematize the exclusively national reading of such arguments, by amongst other 
things, pointing to the trans-generic, transnational and international realities of many 
so-called torture-porn productions (which include titles drawn from pre-9/11 Japanese 
horror films, European art-house movies, DVD markets etc.). As indicated, Valentine’s 
films are included in Jones’s wider ‘torture-porn’ category (but not Bernard’s splat pack 
group), albeit as marginal and extreme low-brow trans-national (Canadian-American) 
cross-sector DVD productions, quite different from Saw and Hostel. And yet, quite unlike 
these high-budget commercial theatrical releases, Valentine’s amateur work appears 
decidedly less allegorical of their times, and are far better understood as resonating with 
and against their poisoned and sick cultural moment; or as being designed to infect 
or turn viewers’ stomachs in order to turn the sick extant libidinal economies on their 
head. This is to say, the sick and darkly satirical body of work appears to make a political 
statement, while proving that those who are poisoned can also perform as the ‘poisoners’, 
and can create sick agential artworks that can themselves ‘act as poisons and toxins’ 
within the larger cultural body (Deleuze 1988: 340). To better understand these unique 
dimensions of the Vomit Gore films, however, we must now turn to the inter-subjective 
(trans-kingdom) forms of ‘in the gut’ thinking they provoke in viewers, and consider 
how these raw affective forces help elevate vomit and digestion to an abject food for 
thought.
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Masochistic Bodies without Organs and Enteric Brain Screens 
Although Valentine is a self-confessed sadist, we must stop short of uncritically forcing a 
Sadistic label onto the Vomit Gore films, or indeed the erotic viewing positions or 
pornological outlooks they extend to their viewers. For one thing, against exclusive 
intellectual identification with the active sadistic monster (and their mastering gaze over a 
victim), we can detect a characteristic modular dissonance at play within Valentine’s work. 
This arrives courtesy of the viewer being allowed to ‘sympathetically’ inhabit both the 
torturer and victim positions during viewing. On first flush, the power and forcefulness of 
the film-maker and torturer on the one hand, and the compliance of the viewer and victim 
on the other highlight that this may be an asymmetrical power structure built into Valentine’s 
films. This even appears to become poetically actualized on-screen during Slaughtered Vomit 
Dolls’ most outlandish and protracted torture sequence, where we discover a (rare) male 
victim bound to a chair by his sadistic torturer (Hank Skinny). During this sick session, the 
cannibalistic tormentor saws his passive and immobile captive’s skull open, before dining 
out on his living victim’s brains. Somewhat predictably, Skinny thereafter begins inducing 
himself to vomit, throwing up the masticated semi-digested cerebral-meat back into his 
prey’s empty skull; and all over the camera’s lens for good measure. On a representational 
level, and in an act of artistic mise en abyme, the torturer might here be read as a surrogate 
for Valentine, and the seated captivated victim a more passive and subjugated spectator, who 
like the viewer beyond the screen has violence done to their brain and body. However, if 
such a reading might at first appear to align viewers with the victim, we might temper this 
uni-directional reading by noting how spectators also gag and convulse sympathetically with 
the spewing torturer as the theatrical post-mortem dismemberment continues. Recognition 
of this immediately contrasts the art of sadism, which demands the exclusive engagement 
with the victim position, and offers viewers (or readers) a limited or partial reflexive position 
upon torture and the torturer. Contra this, the Vomit Gore films reval a heteroglossic (alebit 
asymmetrical) nature, wherein molecular sadistic affects work in tandem to amplify the raw 
affective powers of, what are in essence, over-the-top spectacles of torture and humiliation. 
Here, it becomes clear that Valentine’s overtly exaggerated and intellectual mise-en-scène 
exposes a more masochistic ethico-aesthetic vector. For as Deleuze reminds us, although 
sadism and masochism remain united in their binding together of thanatos and eros, 
masochism alone displays the phantasmagorical theatrical quality: ‘for the art of masochism 
is the art of fantasy’ (Deleuze 1991: 55, 66). In such senses, Valentine’s Vomit Gore project(ile) 
clearly invites bi-lateral maso-sadistic forms of viewer participation and interaction, even 
if the sadistic auteur persona acts within the film as an amplifying molecular qualia and 
cruelly intensive force. 
Furthermore, and above all else, Deleuze maintains that the primary difference 
between sadism and masochism is bound up in feelings of suspense, delay and waiting. 
For the ultimate masochistic desire, he contends, is to experience ‘waiting in its pure form’ 
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(Deleuze 1991: 71). In Masoch’s literature, characters enter into a system of pure waiting 
by first signing a ‘contract of submission’ with their torturer, which ensures their future 
punishment. The nameless protagonist of Venus im Pelz/Venus in Furs (2000 [1870]) even 
enters into a doubly indentured form of ‘waiting’; at once signing a contract that ensures he 
wait for something physical, and also a literal serving contract, through which he must wait 
upon his mistress (as is indicated by the notion of being a waiter, a lady in waiting, or simply 
waiting on someone hand and foot). With regard to the former, the suffering guaranteed by 
this contract, although acute, is essentially a cruelty the masochist inflicts upon himself or 
herself. Again, as intimated, and in contradistinction to sadism, masochism allows for the 
schizoid engagement with ‘two rhetorical positions simultaneously: taking up, or pretending 
to take up, the position of victim and slipping into the position of torturer, however as the 
torturer of self ’ (Gaudlitz 2015: 10). 
This model of the torturer of the self certainly fits with the willing viewer of sensational 
horror DVDs. The notion of waiting is compounded in both Masoch and Valentine by 
delineating the masochist fantasy as a series of static tableaux. In Valentine’s work, this is 
echoed by Aberdeen’s afterlife position in a kind of modulating spiritual purgatory, wherein 
she repeatedly returns to the same primal fantasy scene of torture and puking. Consider 
in this light Ronald Bogue’s discussion of a masochistic art, wherein what we repeatedly 
encounter is ‘a scene of perpetual movement, but one that goes nowhere, a staging of a 
situation rather than an unfolding of actions that result from decisions, consequences, 
counteractions, external events, and so on’ (Bogue 2012: 110). Within and across all three of 
Valentine’s films, the stilled staged tableau of the emetophilic masochist fantasy is subjected 
to an on-going exercise in repetition with difference.
The signing of the contract again plays a key role in stilling and staging the fantasized 
future, at the same moment as it serves to evacuate or sensationally suture the ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ of an now inexorable futural event. Or stated differently, the generation of 
suspense marked by the masochistic contract becomes tied to what Patricia MacCormack 
specifically calls a temporalized desire ‘to be after’, whereby a powerful affect already begins 
to work upon the lived present from the untimely vantage of the future: ‘To be after, to 
seek something that comes after, after the wait, after the suspense, necessitates a temporal 
trajectory of a future imagined, and thus somewhat established in the present’ (MacCormack 
2008: 44). As Deleuze renders it, suspense is intensely experienced, elevated to physical and 
spiritual plenitude, in a subversive manner designed to interrupt the link between desire 
and pleasure, ‘so that the constitution of desire as a process must ward off pleasure, [and] 
repress it to infinity’ (Deleuze 1992: 53). Here, and as Gaudlitz points out, masochistic desire 
literally transforms the body ‘into a network of suspended nerves halted in the position of 
expectation, being neither alive nor dead, but rather a body without organs’ (Gaudlitz 2015: 
12). Far from being a perverted ‘syndrome of suffering’, then, masochism more pointedly 
becomes associated with sensational ‘bodily experimentation’ articulated to eroticism, 
mysticism, and becomings (Gaudlitz 2015: 7). 
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Of specific consequence to Valentine’s films, Brinkema outlines feelings of disgust 
operating in similar terms, with it too becoming a powerful sensation that is in and of 
itself ‘ever about-to-arrive’ (Brinkema 2011: 60, emphasis added). Hanich, in turn, offers us 
two different temporal experiences of being disgusted that help draw out yet more shared 
vectors with the masochist fantasy and desires. The first type of disgust response can be 
understood as a ‘sudden caesura’, which we find plenty of in the Vomit Gore films, as when 
we see Hank Skinny vomiting into his victim’s open mouth. Here, our hair-trigger disgust 
system is automatically activated. The other disgust response becomes ‘anticipatory’ in 
nature (Hanich 2011: 14), and parallels the feelings of masochistic suspension by serving 
to tinge ‘the pre-outcome phase’ (Hanich 2011: 14–16). That is, if we strongly anticipate 
being disgusted – as viewers of Vomit Gore must invariably do – ‘we are already disgusted 
to a certain degree’ (16). In such instances, and recalling the experiences of the indentured 
masochist, the foreknowledge of being disgusted by a Vomit Gore film catalyses ‘a backward 
effect upon the present’ (Hanich 2011: 16), leading viewers to feel a muted version of a 
futural qualified feeling or emotion. What becomes important to stress is that viewers of 
Vomit Gore, who anticipate with both of their brains (that is, the embodied brain-mind 
and the gustatory cortex) ‘don’t simply think about future possibilities’ but rather they 
also ‘feel future possibilities’ (Hurton in Hanich 2011: 16). The opening of Slow Torture 
Puke Chamber – whose title is itself indicative of waiting and suspense – makes these 
ideas palpable, and can help illuminate how Valentine’s viewers become indentured to the 
Vomit Gore images through disgust anticipation and a quasi-contractual arrangement with 
the film. 
The movie opens with a black frame, audibly scored with disturbing and distorted sound 
effects that assault the ears and nerves with discordance and loudness. Thereafter, text 
fades up under the heading: ‘DISCLAIMER from Hope Likens’. The words are thereafter 
read aloud by Likens, the amateur-star of the film, whose disembodied voice becomes 
layered over the futzed soundtrack of a home-movie, already familiar to viewers of earlier 
instalments of the trilogy:
Hello, this is Hope Likens speaking, today’s date is May 20th 2010. I am an actor and I play 
the lead role of Angela Aberdeen in the movie you are about to see. I would like to state 
that the following movie is a collaborative art project between myself and the director 
Lucifer Valentine that I willingly took part in for a period of two and a half years. During 
the production of this movie, I signed performer contracts at the beginning of each day of 
shooting, and was informed and agreed to the contents and subject matter of each shoot 
prior to filming […]. 
The subsequent screen contains more text, which is gradually offset by frictional sounds that 
overwhelm Likens’ voice. After several excruciating minutes of these uncomfortable sonic 
reverberations and legalistic ramblings, an unvoiced warning reads: 
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The following movie contains frequent graphic gory and violent scenes. Nudity and sexual 
themes. The material contained herein will definitely offend most viewers. Proceed at 
your own risk. Not suitable for anyone under the age of 18. All performers in the following 
movie are consenting adults and are 18 years of age or older. For more information please 
see the ‘making of ’ documentary as part of the extra features.
By indulging in this prolonged formal reading of a legalistic ‘document’ and disclaimer as a 
prelude to offensive libertine debauchery, this opening arguably establishes a Sadean trope. 
By the same token, the excruciating details (the date, the proper names, the duration, the 
places we can check) appear designed to prolong, delay and heighten the anticipatory 
anxiety regarding the ‘authentically’ disgusting images viewers are about to bear witness to 
(the film as a document of real sexual events). Likens’s reading of the contract also forces 
thought and associations to dart forward in a masochistic manner, to anxiously anticipate 
what is in store for both the actor and ourselves as participatory witnesses.20 Why does this 
film, unlike the other two, need a disclaimer? How offensive can these images be (in 
comparison to what we have already seen)? 
Beyond their obvious Faustian evocations of making a deal with the devil, the actress’s 
discussion of signing contracts with the Satanic director also disclose masochism’s exclusive 
semiotics of ‘imperatives, contracts, fetishism and language games’, which likewise ensure 
futural affections of (dark) ‘humour, gaming and the suffocating splendour of masochist 
scenarios’ (Gaudlitz 2015: 3). In contrast to Masoch’s excessive fantasies, though, which 
were effectively voided of realistic details so that the fiction could ‘erode’ reality from within 
(see Gaudlitz 2015: 9), Valentine appears to actualize a diametrically opposed trope with 
this opening: diabolically employing legalistic measures to foreground an excess of the 
documentary real that dissolves the theatrical and mythical masochistic fantasies from 
the inside. On one level, this corrosive and self-annihilating dialectical effect serves to 
immediately separate out Likens and Aberdeen, ‘before’ the film-fantasy even gets under 
way. Which is to say, the reading of the contract immediately works to unbutton the actor 
and character (who is herself split up and divided into different archetypes, and played by 
different actors within and between the films) so that each arrive on-screen already divided. 
Pace Friedrich W.J. von Schelling’s definition of the ‘uncanny’, this becomes specifically 
related to a bringing to light of that which ought to have remained hidden (see Brottman 
2005: 12); the repressed or typically hidden reality that subsists ‘beneath’ the thin veil of the 
horror-fantasy sequences (and needs to be disavowed to ‘enjoy’ the masochistic fantasy). 
Likens’s address to the viewer here destabilizes the potential for a successful masochistic 
fantasy (or theatricality), then, undermining the viewer’s ability to comfort themselves 
during particularly disturbing or disgusting sequences by reminding themselves that ‘it’s 
not real; it’s just pretend; or it’s just a film’.
Of course, this irruptive notion of a pornographic ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ is always-already 
tempered by a certain degree of cognitive dissonance. For the viewer is easily able to 
distinguish between different planes of ‘reality’ and ‘belief ’. The prosthetic baby carved out 
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of the womb and put into a blender is not ‘real’, we know, but at the same moment, the 
bloody and meaty baby gore-shake that is chugged by the torturer is (for we can see the 
human actor struggling to choke it down), as is the actor’s regurgitation of said meaty-
puke-shake into his fictional victim’s womb cavity, and then his actual co-star’s tasting 
mouth. On one level, the fantasy is a sick and violent one, but also simultaneously, authentic 
emetophilic pornography, which unleashes really sick images of actual puking and erotic 
torture. And this point is worth teasing out. For alongside the sensational gut-wrenching 
feelings of suspense, shock and horror, Valentine’s films also impress viewers with intimate 
erotic and sexual forms of corporeal experience. These forces, in particular, not only trouble 
existing sexual categories and identities at a representational level, but metacinematically 
point towards an unholy union of bios, zoe and technics. 
In attempting to understand the erotic-sensational masochistic forms of feeling-looking 
experienced by viewers of Valentine’s films, and the ethical forms of becoming-different 
they might trigger, it helps to briefly return to the Deleuze-inspired materialist work of 
Steven Shaviro, Anna Powell, Barbara M. Kennedy and Patricia MacCormack who, amongst 
others, help us to perceive the creative and affirmative aspects of such erotic encounters. In 
the first instance, viewing here becomes recognized as ‘mental encounter made through 
the viscera’, and a ‘sensorial and mental experience’ that is processed ‘corporeally as well 
as conceptually’ (Powell 2007: 4, 100). Such intimate, embodied and enfleshed models 
highlight the raw participatory ‘primacy of corporeal affect’ (Powell 2005: 2), and expose how 
inaesthetic or bio-aesthetic (Kennedy 2002: 28) forces impact the viewer’s body, making it 
feel and do things. For Shaviro, the ‘captivated’ horror viewer, in particular, provides us with 
the epitomic fan base that desires to come into contact with ‘masochistic, mimetic, tactile 
and corporeal’ imagistic forces (1993: 56). These modes of looking expose an ‘obsessive 
passivity’ and betray a desire for an ‘alien interest’ to force itself into and upon them (Shaviro 
1993: 50, 49). That is, through a kinetic and masochistic trans-kingdom tryst of human and 
technology (Shaviro 1993: 25, 49, 63). 
Here, the assemblage of body, brain and presubjective forces (light, colour, sound, editing) 
demonstrates an erotics that escapes ‘normal’ framings, not least because it is the affect of 
inhuman images that become erotically desired (rather than what they represent). It was for 
similar reasons that masochism was recognized as an art of ‘becoming-animal’ for Deleuze, 
and revealed an escape from the normal molar framings of thought, action and perception. 
And it is to these processes that we must now turn our attention. 
Valentine’s Becoming-Animal: Becoming-Vampyroteuthis?
Valentine’s work, although clearly indexing a maso-sadistic (viewer-film) tryst, more 
precisely helps expose the abominable union of sex and death. In particular, it is through the 
Vomit Gore project’s molecular affinities with animals, which feature heavily throughout the 
films, that this truth becomes most recognizable. We might recall here that for Spinoza, 
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because animals necessarily bring death to each other, they are useful for foregrounding the 
overtly external character of death. Or as Deleuze expounds it, unlike humans, animals do 
not carry death within, nor have they ‘invented that internal death, the universal 
sadomasochism of the tyrant slave’ (Deleuze 1988: 12). Prima facie, the most prominent 
beasts in Valentine’s work – insects, arachnids and molluscs (particularly cephalopods) – 
appear employed to amplify feelings of fear and disgust. The appearance of cephalopods in 
particular appear most germane to the wider corpus, though, appearing to operate as a 
totem animal for the project: becoming emblematic of the film’s violent inhuman politics 
and philosophy. ReGOREgitated Sacrifice makes this most overt, for beyond Valentine 
creating a crayon drawing of an amorphous octopus for the DVD cover art, the film’s most 
protracted and theatrical torture scene features an eight-limbed co-joined female twin-
creature, and a sick male torturer named Octopuke (Hank Skinny): who wears a dead 
octopus on his head as a grotesque judge’s wig. On one level, the slimy octopus is obviously 
employed as an affective force, which contributes its alien gelatinous form to the film’s wider 
Ekel-economy. Certainly, as Vilém Flusser argues, because octopi are animals that appear to 
inhabit a superficially polarized position within human beings’ imagined biological 
hierarchy (wherein skeletal creatures are normalized and thought to hold the upper ground), 
these slimy boneless creatures basically instil feelings of disgust in us (Flusser 2012: 11). 
However, Valentine’s fascination with the octopus appears to transcend merely deploying it 
as a ‘disgusting’ prop, as one of the film’s alternative commentary streams makes clear. There, 
the director discusses becoming fascinated by these sea creatures, which he calls aquatic 
‘chameleons’ or ‘changelings’, that fluidly change their shape, texture, colour and form at will. 
Demonstrating certain animalistic vectors connecting these creatures to the wider Vomit 
Gore project, Valentine here tellingly says to his producer (aptly named ‘No one body’) and 
viewers: ‘Our movies in general are like the octopus’. 
Octopi here emerge as the perfect metonymic creature for Valentine’s films. On the one 
hand (although arguably unknown to the director), the physiognomy of aquatic mollusc 
reveals clear poetic resonances with Valentine’s obsessive bulimic re-organ-ization of the 
human body within his films. Specifically with regard to the erotic/schematic mouth-
anus re-articulation discussed earlier. On the other hand, the creature’s inhuman modes 
of communication and transversal interaction also begin to reveal strange immanent 
resonances with the Vomit Gore project and its fans. However, in order to validate these 
outlandish claims somewhat, we can engineer a productive encounter between Valentine’s 
cruel Artaudian BwO, Deleuze and Guattari’s immanent models of becoming-animal, and 
the biophilosophical work of Flusser, the visionary technological philosopher. Together, this 
triangulation can help demonstrate how Valentine’s violent inhuman art makes palpable 
a shimmering molecular vibration passing across ‘the plane of consistency’, at once in-
between our present sociotechnical universe of digital brain-screens, and the dark deep-sea 
world of squid and octopi. 
First, recall that for Deleuze and Guattari, the human being is first and foremost 
understood in terms of an immanently embedded form of being, which they describe in 
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terms of shifting sedimentalized territories, or machinic assemblages, through which 
desire flows. Over time, the body and brain renew and reformulate themselves by making 
ongoing connections, articulations and disarticulations, with a surrouding rhizomatic web 
of surrounding forces, fields and flows of matter and energy. Replacing fixed notions of 
‘beings’ and ‘identity’ with flowing models of becomings (and unbecoming) thus demands 
we shift our attention away from that which is stable and familiar, and focus instead upon 
the contingent borderings embedding the human at any given moment: or towards the 
various fibres that historically cross-over these thresholds, establishing ‘lines of flight’ or 
escape. Deleuze and Guattari adumbrate a quasi-hierarchy, or cascading range of enmeshed 
and interleaving thresholds through which all human becomings necessarily pass. These 
are arranged upon a ‘plane of consistency’, and outlined in terms of becoming-woman (the 
initial departure point from the historical ‘man’ standard), becoming-animal, becoming-
molecular, becoming-particles, becoming-imperceptible. All these strata are ultimately 
entangled, however, and all becomings and unbecomings spiral through or zigzag across 
these various plateaus. As Cliff Stagoll clarifies, rather than pointing to notions of fixed or 
essential beings, final products, or even an interim stage, these processual models highlight 
‘the very dynamism of change, situated between heterogeneous terms and tending towards 
no particular goal or end-state’ (2010: 26).
In a provocative text that recalls these immanent models described by Deleuze and 
Guattari, Flusser works to expose certain animal practices that (re)surface within the 
modern mediated western habitus. In Vampyroteuthis Infernalis: A Treatise (2012), 
Flusser speculatively writes about the culture, aesthetics, philosophy and art of a unique 
and elusive cephalopod that dwells in the deepest darkest abysses of the Earth’s ocean, 
and which is more commonly known as the Vampire Squid from Hell. There, Flusser 
blends a Heideggerian notion of ‘being in the world’ with a Spinozian-esque model of a 
mind-body parallelism, to first show how our human mode of being sedimentalizes (and 
sentimentalizes) around our upright bipedal skeletal frame, its vertical bilateral symmetry 
(which forces us to lateralize our environment), the arrangement of our forward-facing 
stereoscopic eyes (that are pointed to an enlightened terrestrial horizon) and our possession 
of opposable thumbs. In assemblage, the configuration of these various parts and attributes 
results in certain forms of extended and embodied spatio-temporal perception and gestalt 
thought. Flusser thereafter attempts to escape these all too human ways of thinking by 
speculatively inhabiting an alternative squid-like mode of being – configured around a 
boneless gelatinous creature’s body-brain, which is defined by an aggregated nerve-net 
intelligence that organizes itself around a mollusc foot, which is also a ‘cerebralized’ mouth 
and anus (2012: 28–9). 
Throughout his biophilosophical treatise, Flusser imagines the divergent forms of ‘art’, 
politics and philosophy that would necessarily result from this inhuman mode of being, 
and creatively speculates upon the inter-subjective relations the creature would have 
with its mates, rivals, predators and prey. Intially, Flusser paints Vampyroteuthis as a 
kind of perverted inverse mirror of the contemporary human, albeit a valuable opposite 
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that helps us to better understand ourselves. The Vampire Squid is finally shown not to 
be our opposite at all though, but in fact a forgotten distant ancestor, who still lurks deep 
within the recesses of our hominid psyche. What is more, the squid’s immanent mode 
of being remains molecularly entangled with, and re-emerges from within our present 
mediated culture. Of primary importance here is Flusser’s understanding of the squid’s 
art of display and deception, which arrive courtesy of its various abilities to change its 
form, shape, texture and pattern at will, especially through secreting bioluminescent 
chromataphore pigments upon its body’s surface, so that it can inter-subjectively attract, 
affect, hypnotize, deceive, distract, shock, startle and confuse other marine animals in 
the pitch blackness. 
When originally writing in the 1980s, Flusser argued that video technologies and 
emerging digital imaging practices had begun to reveal a dark ‘return’ of the squid’s 
art and politics within advanced cultures. In somewhat anticipating Lev Manovich’s 
descriptions of the ontology of digital media (2001), Flusser describes the squid’s animated 
bioluminescent skin art as a form of painting in time, which the animal uses to inter-
subjectively communicate with others. In her updated parsing of Flusser’s arguments, 
N Katherine Hayles (2014) similarly becomes fascinated by the immanent parallels 
emerging between Vampyroteuthis’ transpiercing inter-subjective bio-aesthetics and 
our more modern sociotechnical use of digital imaging technologies and liquid crystal 
displays. 
Of particular interest to Valentine’s digital artworks, Flusser describes how the squid is 
constantly driven to create new artistic patterns and novel affects to help it inter-subjectively 
seduce mates, in a manner that distantly recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s picture of the minor 
artist. For reasons we do not have time to critique or engage with here, Flusser imagines 
the squid as being biologically male. While for some this might be problematic, it here 
fortuitously compliments our forging parallels with the forms of affect Valentine’s films reap 
upon his female fans, as we will discover in the following section. On this point, Flusser is 
worth quoting at length: 
The strategy of Vampyroteuthian art – his skin painting, for example – can be depicted 
in the following manner. He experiences something new and tries to store this new 
information in his memory, which means allocating a place for it among the information 
already stored there. He discovers that the new information cannot be integrated, that it 
doesn’t fit in. He must reorganize his memory to make place for it. His memory is jarred by 
the new information and he must process it (what we humans call ‘creative activity’). This 
creative jolt surges through his organism, seizes him, and the chromatophores on his skin 
surface contract and secrete pigment. At the same time, he experiences an artistic orgasm 
in which the colour ejaculation on his skin is enciphered into the Vampyroteuthian colour 
code. The sexual partner is stimulated and made conscious about the new information 
being expressed.
(Flusser 2009: 3)
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Vampyroteuthis’ erotic ‘art’ is here original, creative, bio-aesthetic, performative, affective 
and evental in nature. What is more, his creatively mesmerizing and modulating bio-
aesthetic performances are directly and affectively communicated into the body-brain of the 
other. If successful, after their sexual union (with his three penises), the hooded cephalopod 
may be killed and consumed by his mate, or else he may kill and consume her. Because the 
sexual politics of the squid exposes a dangerous world of violence and cannibalism, Flusser 
argues that the squid’s art ultimately becomes a ‘mode of rape and hatred – of deception, 
fiction, and lies; it is a delusive affectation, that is to say, it is “beauty”’ (Flusser 2012: 65). In 
relating these squid practices back to his own sociotechnical world, Flusser argued that 
humans appeared to evermore ‘create chromatophores (television, video, computer monitors 
transmitting synthetic images) with whose help the senders deceitfully seduce the receivers’, 
while propagating ever-new form of ‘media through which we rape human brains and force 
them to store immaterial information’ (Flusser 2009: 5).
If the squid’s violent bio-aesthetic art of beautiful hatred here distantly recalls Valentine’s 
inter-subjective sick and perverted torture-porn project,21 another of the aspects of the 
squid’s art that Flusser explores is the creature’s express ability to expel befuddling clouds 
of billowing bioluminescent ink into the surrounding waters to confuse, mask or stupefy. 
This informe art in particular, Flusser argues, draws into relief how alien and contrived 
a human geometry is, or acculturated notions of aesthetics and transcendent forms. 
While Flusser’s consideration of such informe liquid arts make what is normalized and 
accepted to us appear alien, we can likewise recognize Valentine’s informe bio-aesthetics 
pushing towards a similar end, diabolically defamiliarizing, disorganizing, disordering 
and deterritorializing the very forms and aesthetics that only contingently appear natural 
to us. 
Bearing this in mind, we might now return to the cruel theatrical torture-porn 
sequence from ReGOREgitated Sacrifice, wherein we can locate the zenith of Valentine’s 
dark Vampyroteuthian project. Therein, we find yet another embodiment of Aberdeen 
(whose shape-shifting nature likewise recalls the squid’s changeling practices) suffering yet 
more modulating acts of excessive rape and torture. Aberdeen is here bound to a chair by 
the aforementioned eight-limbed inhuman creature (composed of two demonic twins that 
are co-joined at the head) summoned from the dark depths of Hell. After violently separating 
themselves, the demons begin attaching chains and weights to the actress’s outer labia. As 
she endures this genital torture, Octopuke enters the fray, projectile vomiting colourful 
informe spew all over Aberdeen’s tied naked body. Presently, a tarantula is coaxed to crawl 
into her stretched open genitals, which the demonic twins then stitch closed behind it, so 
that the hairy creature is entombed and enfleshed inside the folds of her sewn-shut vagina. 
Thereafter Aberdeen’s eyes are gorged from her scull with a screwdriver (in a violent motif 
familiar to viewers of the other films), before her head is scalped and then decapitated. The 
twins then reappear clutching a large octopus, which they ritualistically stretch over her 
severed head in a grotesque coronation ceremony: in a manner that visually rhymes with 
her earlier enclosing of the tarantula within her vagina. Octopuke here proceeds to chew 
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upon one of the organism’s tentacles (or penises), which again causes him to throw up; this 
time all over Aberdeen’s severed head. 
If these sequences symbolically dislodge a Vampyroteuthian vector, we might recall 
how the participatory viewer also has their body and intimate senses populated with a 
litany of proprioceptive touches and impressions as they watch this scene, and that the 
raw and intense bio-aesthetic porn(ological) affects that transductively address themselves 
to their skin, viscera, guts and genitalia pass through the chromataphoric pigments of a 
Vampyroteuthian liquid crystal display screen. Accordingly, all around these rape sequences 
we can sense violent and erotic hypnotic practices of a Vampyroteuthian screen art. To 
furnish further evidence of this, we must now turn to real examples of Valentine’s fans that 
appear to have been deeply touched and unsettled by their immanent encounter with the 
Vomit Gore films, and help reveal some of the many ways in which the machinic films 
surface as a life-transforming creative force. 
Fucking Fans: Vampyroteuthian Violations and Conducer Contamination
In an online YouTube video review of the Vomit Gore project, horror fan JillKill discusses 
Valentine’s violent films as literally doing violence to her. A visual assualt that left her feeling 
physically violated. ‘I get sick just thinking about it’, she says, ‘I mean, I found the film vomit 
inducing’. After a fleeting hesitation she ponders: ‘Is that even an insult?’ 
A male fan’s video highlights how Valentine’s Vomit Gore films were corporeally 
transformative for him too, in that, by the last instalment of the trilogy, he had finally 
learned to override his body’s auto-affective gag reflex. We can discover other enfleshed 
and embodied examples of, or testaments to, the liberating and transformative masochistic 
and animalistic powers of Valentine’s Vomit Gore films in a range of other far-flung online 
S/M (social media) ‘splatter-texts’, which appear courtesy of Valentine’s prosumer, or more 
aptly in this context ‘conducer’, fans. More often than not, though, it becomes Valentine’s 
female fans – a group that one enthusiast playfully christens the ‘gore whores’ – that appear 
to be the most impacted or impressed, at times even possessed, by the encounter with his 
work.22 In these videos, a range of female Vomit Gore fans discuss, or reveal, having erotic 
and fetishistic relationships with Valentine (as star director construct) via his corporeal 
creations and artistic BwO. Which is to say they describe having intimate relationships with 
a parasocial stranger courtesy of his artistic creations. 
These intimate sexual assemblages arguably serve to queer, or disturb our everyday 
understandings of sexual identity, by exposing examples of fans having masochistic 
desires for, and intimate embodied relationships with, moving Vomit Gore images. 
Certainly, many of the ‘micro-celebrity’ video stars describe intimate acts of individuating 
with Valentine’s images, and speak of arousal and stimulation while watching his films, 
or else introduce the intense feelings of love and fascination they have for the director 
(construct). 
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Patricia MacCormack and Nick Davis’s writing on film erotics becomes useful here, 
particularly as both explore comparable queering potentials bound up with the viewing 
and reception of film, and the liberating trans-kingdom relations and sexualized flows of 
desire they erect between humans and inhuman kingdoms. To paraphrase MacCormack, 
if we were to ask ‘what is it you have sex with?’ the answer ‘male’ or ‘female’ is imagined 
as a stable enough term to explain our human sexuality. However, if we were to answer 
a ‘Vomit Gore film’, questions necessarily proliferate beyond, rather than refer back to, 
any pre-established system of libidinal desire (MacCormack 2008: 2). MacCormack’s 
cinesexual and cinemasochistic models anticipate and parallel Davis’ discussions of a 
‘desiring-image’, which similarly expose how pre-personal inhuman forces appear capable 
of modifying the bodies, subjectivities, identities and groups they move into composition 
with. What stimulates and moves viewers is often the more-than-human excesses offered 
by film as an intensive and signaletic body, and can include things like the intense colour 
of a shot, the vibrating kinetic energy of an edited sequence, the supersensual sounds 
and aesthetics, the distorting effect of a close-up. Which amounts to saying, the more 
than human affective aspects that cinema offers to our erotic enjoyment and experiences. 
Key here is recognizing that the entity with which viewers have an erotic and embodied 
relationship is primarily the film image itself, and not prima facie, that which it purports 
to represent (although this is of course one theatrical dimension of the overall masochistic 
and Vampyroteuthian encounter). MacCormack and Davis both also trace the extent to 
which having enfleshed and intimate relationships with inhuman images constitute novel 
forms of bodily experimentation, which in turn display potentials for igniting new forms 
of becoming. 
Valentine’s ‘gore whores’ arguably surface as an online cinesexual community that 
openly celebrates having inorganic libidinal relationships with excessive film stylistics 
and supersensual bio-aesthetics. Before getting to these, however, it is worth mentioning 
that these types of online video are somewhat anticipated or solicited by Valentine’s Vomit 
Gore project itself, and all seem to recall one of the bonus splatter-texts seeded within the 
Slow Torture Puke Chamber package. There, actor Hope Likens discusses her journey from 
fandom to ‘stardom’ (or from gore whore to gonzo porn performer). In brief, this involved 
soliciting Valentine online after having seen his films; becoming friends with the Satanist; 
informing the director of her desire to play Aberdeen alongside his ex-girlfriend (and star of 
the first two films) Ameara LaVey; and then agreeing to perform in the third instalment of 
the Vomit Gore Trilogy. One possible viral affect of Likens’s fan/star testimony is to catalyse 
the spread of comparable fangirl desires and films, which indeed appear to have contagiously 
spread and crystalised on streaming platforms such as YouTube. In this manner, like in 
Likens’s Vomit Gore splatter-text, a fantasy notion of Valentine’s fans becoming a real part of 
his amateur torture-porn art, and by extension his sexual project/desires, is folded into the 
wider project itself, suggesting another potential way in which the occult Vomit Gore films 
might magically dissolve the boundaries between inside and outside, viewer and screen, 
fantasy and reality, viewer and participant. 
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One can find numerous Valentine fangirl videos online today.23 These public videos 
more often than not contain frank discussions of the intense, erotic and transformative 
encounter these fans have with the participatory films (and their director construct by 
extension). One conducer who posts videos under a pseudonym, and claims to belong 
to a closet group known as ‘Lucifer Valentine’s Secret Friends Club’ can evidence this. 
She describes herself as a ‘hermit and a recluse’ who considers Valentine ‘a close friend, 
and someone I enjoy spending time with’. Wearing a satanic pentangle round her neck, 
and displaying what appear to be self-injury marks upon her arm, this fan frames herself 
kneeling upon her living room floor as she talks openly about having an ‘eating disorder’, 
of being an emetophile ‘but not bulimic’ and of her ongoing studies at mortuary school 
(where she reports studying to become an embalmer/funeral director). 
In another YouTube vlog entitled ‘How Lucifer Valentine changed my life’, a teenage 
fan opens with a series of intertitles that inform viewers ‘we all know I’m obsessed with 
The Vomit Gore Trilogy […].’, ‘but let’s see the effect they have on my life […]’. This 
conducer video contains another candid ‘to camera’ discussion of how Valentine (or 
the Vomit Gore films more precisely) transformed this fan’s sexuality (in a manner 
that recalls the director’s own discussion of discovering his own emetophilic desires 
after coming into contact with Max Hardcore porn films): confessing ‘Lucifer Valentine 
ruined my sex life’. 
Valentine’s films appear to have been so impactful or impressive that this fan informs 
her own channel viewers that she was inspired to change her name to ‘Cricket’, as a homage 
to Valentine’s original cover art from Slow Torture Puke Chamber (later videos such as ‘A 
day in the life of Cricket Valentine’ incorporate this new name, whilst more recent entries 
appear uploaded under a newer ‘Cricket Valentine’ account). Pastiching Valentine’s own 
unbecoming cinema of interactions style of communicating with his fans through his 
DVD splatter-texts, Cricket here adopts the use of intertitles and voice-over to (seemingly) 
communicate back with the director. One video informs viewers that after watching the 
films every day (for how long we do not know), Cricket now has ‘fantasies about having 
sex and murdering people with you’ (the director), whilst additional screens assert: ‘You 
moulded me into this’, ‘Thank you Lucifer Valentine’. In yet another vlog entry entitled 
‘Lucifer Valentine fan video’, Cricket shows off her bedroom and body to her followers (and 
presumably, she imagines, Valentine). She first shows us walls adorned in homemade Vomit 
Gore fan art. She then says: ‘Did I mention that your movies are on my body?’ Here, Cricket 
reveals two tattoos framing her midriff (on either side of her gustatory cortex or enteric 
system): on her left side the aforementioned cricket image, and on her right, Valentine’s 
crayoned octopus from ReGOREgitated Sacrifice.24 
Cricket’s video thus betrays a truly Vampyroteuthian nature to Valentine’s work, which we 
might now recognise as having transversally ignited becomings in and through her mind-
body via its powerfully transpiercing (chromatophoric) screen-signalling. Interestingly, in 
another echo of the project’s Vampyroteuthian nature, Cricket layers Nirvana’s ‘Rape me’ 
over a photomontage of her tattoos. With this conducer mash-up technique at once nodding 
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towards the trilogy’s own masticated entanglement with Cobain, whilst also allowing the 
song’s lyrics to hint at certain aggressive – yet consensual (the oxymoronic request to be 
‘raped’) – Vampyroteuthian vibrations shimmering across the plane of consistency. 
The extremely intimate connection the fangirls appear to share with the director and 
films arguably becomes most intensified and personal in the videos of ‘Fangirl Sarah’, who 
talks with Valentine via her mobile phone in several of her YouTube uploads. She displays 
a very real and embodied connection to the director. Indeed, she appears visibly blushing 
and gushing in response to his various comments during their recorded interviews. In one 
conversation she coyly voices her desire – like Likens before her – to star in Valentine’s next 
film, and speaks of her dream of having sex with his beautiful leading ladies. During this 
recorded conversation, viewers can hear Valentine on the other end of the phone saying 
‘You make my heart melt’. In another of her videos, which appears embedded within (what 
appears to be) the director’s own YouTube page, Fangirl Sarah films herself reviewing 
Valentine’s (then) latest film Black Metal Veins (2012) (which although featuring scenes 
of female vomiting, is not, strictly speaking, a Vomit Gore film). In accordance with the 
director’s demands, we are informed, she conducts this review sitting on her bed wearing a 
skimpy bathing suit (recalling again the settings and costumes featuring in the three Vomit 
Gore films). 
In other videos we find different forms of personal relationship between the director and 
his fans emerging. Indeed, in several videos featuring Valentine’s ‘fanboys’ we find the video 
hosts opening envelopes that contain original artworks (usually drawings in Valentine’s 
familiar violent child-like crayon style). These are often sent as a ‘thank you’ for positively 
reviewing his films online, and demonstrate another way in which the director ensures 
the creation of more far-flung vomit-themed splatter-texts. These YouTube videos reveal 
yet another tactic through which the larger Vomit Gore project becomes an unbecoming 
cinema, then, which increasingly appears molecularly broken down and virally spread 
around S/M systems. Recognizing the parallels between Valentine’s amateur project and the 
online splatter-texts they inspire suggest that, like vomit itself, the sick art project(ile) temps, 
solicits and spreads wherever they make intimate contact. Interestingly, the viral nature 
of the M/S project(ile) in these S/M realms also cycles back to recall and reflect the sick 
organic image of disease and digestion we have come to recognize as Valentine’s personal 
and perverse abstract diagram. The nature of the fangirl videos in particular make this 
tangible, especially as they allow us to perceive how, today, images and movies of all sorts 
are consumed, copied, slashed, edited, remixed, recomposed, re-projected, re-consumed, 
re-digested, re-mashed and re-projected in ongoing liquescent modulations and meme-
etic concatenations. Many of Valentine’s fans do this through creating their own trailers, 
fan art or online reviews, which mash-up and re-edit the already piecemeal Vomit Gore 
project (which are themselves always-already a cannibalized and regurgitated hyper-edited 
mash-up of other originals-without-originals) with others pulled from the ‘communal’ 
resource. Fittingly, the re-edited versions typically re-surface in decomposed, diminished 
and digitally degraded forms, before becoming further in-mixed with adverts, hyperlinks 
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and a masticated melange of other digital information, including the algorithmic splattering 
of similar suggestions on the YouTube applet bar. 
Convulsions
This chapter attempted to extend to Valentine’s zeitgeist works what Foucault, in his writing
upon transgression in Bataille, called a form of ‘nonpositive affirmation’ (Foucault 1977: 36). 
For as ethico-political creations, Valentine’s films are truly disgusting. And they are meant 
to be. Bodies that endure Valentine’s films inevitably feel sick, exhausted from heaving, and 
ill or toxicated for being plugged into too many masticated and endlessly modulating emetic 
flows of sick material. By design, bio-aesthetic affects from the screen turn the viewers’ 
stomach, trigger sensations in their gut, which linger and communicate with the brain, and 
thereafter force thinking to zigzag between text and context, inside and outside, symptom 
and cause. And rather than feeling purged or satis-fied by the encounter, we are afterwards 
left to grope around, like the eyeless Pig, for answers. What else then might we finally say 
about Valentine’s minor pervert art, and its clinical and critical diagnosis of our times? Well, 
if Foucault argued that the panoptic prison concretized the abstract diagram of nineteenth 
century’s disciplinary societies, and Deleuze thereafter saw the corporation offering the 
template for understanding the late twentieth century’s control societies, then the sick poet-
pervert Lucifer Valentine’s Vomit Gore project(ile) brings forth a new schematic image to help 
us conceptualize our era. And it is that of dig(i)egestion and vomit(ing), which together helps 
us to prehend the abstract logic and organizational principles substrating or era of Uber, 
Airbnb, zero hours contracts and their likes. That is, a world defined by ever more disintegrated, 
broken down and diabolical structure-less-structures. Where digital networked machines no 
longer appear so much like a ‘big brain’, as they are so often gnomically referred to, but rather 
more precisely a big gustatory cortex. A secondary brain or digestive system that intakes, 
stores, breaks down, redistributes and recirculates modulating material and information 
within the dark enclosed lumen of the digital flow spaces.
Notes
 1 From this perspective, as humans adapt to different environments, disgust becomes co-
opted into social structures and practice, which in turn drives gene cultural coevolution 
(see Kelly 2011: 6). 
 2 One thinks here of Nazi propaganda films that depicted Jews as less than human rat-like or 
insect-like beings. One might also think of more recent right-wing European media deploying 
terms like ‘swarms’ to describe the movement of large numbers of migrants and refugees. 
 3 Mikita Brottman points out that the notion of eccentricity ‘refers to the violation of the usual 
and the generally accepted’ (2005: 2). In this manner, Valentine and his films are truly eccentric. 
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 4 Valentine here appears somewhat like the cult director Alejandro Jodorowsky explored in 
chapter three. However, if Jodorowsky appeared as a transnational film-maker working 
across and between the southern US-Mexico border, Valentine appears as a transnational 
auteur whose works straddles the northern US-Canadian border. 
 5 Comaroff and Comaroff list fortune-tellers, casino capitalism pyramid schemes, superstitious 
stories of black magic services, organ harvesting and modern slavery as examples of ‘occult’ 
and ‘twilight’ economies. Therein, they argue because ‘the messianic’ regularly encounters 
‘the magical’, ‘the occult becomes an ever more appropriate, semantically saturated metaphor 
for our times’ (315, 317). Most occult economies display two distinct dimensions: ‘a material 
aspect founded on the effort to conjure wealth – or to account for its accumulation – by 
appeal to techniques that defy explanation in the conventional terms of practical reason; 
and an ethical aspect grounded in the moral discourses and (re)actions sparked by the (real 
or imagined) production of value through such “magical” means’ (2000: 310).
 6 In his short article entitled ‘Post-script to societies of control’ Deleuze argues that the earlier 
forms of disciplinary society that were explored by Foucault had produced individuals 
and subjectivities within and through various enclosed or carceral institutions (such 
as the school, barracks, factory and gaol). These institutions moulded individuals, who 
were subjected to a pressurized disciplinary gaze. In contrast to this, the contemporary 
technological assemblage defining the modern (neoliberal) world – with its proliferation 
of surveillance, pharmaceutical, economic, digital and computer technologies –contribute 
to a new logic of control. In the wake of the crisis of older disciplinary institutions (such 
as the family, school, university) the corporation emerged as the new model (replacing 
and improving on the older panoptic prisons and factories). One emergent property of 
the transformation from a disciplinary logic to that of control was in the production of 
‘dividuals’. That is, fractured and parametric subjects that appear divided against others 
and themselves, and who experience self and identity as an ongoing ‘modulation’. Under a 
system of control, dividuals are forced to endlessly change and adapt to ever-fluctuating and 
modifying rules and circumstances.
 7 In Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (1995) Marc Augé 
describes non-places as a familiar looking form of space emblematic of globalization and 
modernization. Examples include airports, highways, supermarkets and hotel rooms that 
could, in essence, be found almost anywhere in the (predominantly ‘developed’) world.
 8 Kelly describes the ‘gape face’ as ‘an expression and signal, derived from, and [involving] 
many of he muscle groups operative in, the act of retching and expelling substances from 
the mouth’ (2011: 142).
 9 In the original myth of St Valentine, the saint’s miracle was to return sight to a blind girl. 
10 If on one level these informe features contribute to Valentine’s symptomatic aesthetics of 
digestion and vomit, it becomes possible to detect these dispotif rules operating at a ‘lower’ 
ontological and material level of organization too. Here, we might recall that early digital 
critics such as Anne-Marie Willis described processes of scanning and digitization as 
a procedure that revealed horrific and disgusting parallels to processes of ‘cannibalizing 
and regurgitating’ (1900: 199). Valentine’s own scanning and dig(i)ested mash-ups of his 
home videos and 1980s visual culture more generally actualize these cannibalistic and 
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regurgitating procedures, as does their subsequent masticated and modulated exhibition 
online. Interestingly, the manner in which digital images are processed and ‘projected’ 
further reveal molecular associations with the wider abstract diagram of vomit. Indeed, 
Lev Manovich pointd out that unlike analogue cinema, the ontology of digital screening 
should be understood in terms of an algorithmic form of painting in time, wherein 
spatialized pixels modulate and transform during screening time. Accordingly, instead 
of being ontologically constituted by a series of static images that appear in motion due 
to the application of mechanical movement, digital images move due to liquescent bits 
of spatialized colour and information modulating in time upon the surface of the screen. 
Streaming glitches and scratched DVDs perhaps best reveal this new digi-ested ontology; 
as when a character’s moving body suddenly hurls itself across the frame in a disgorged and 
disorganizing smear of distended digitized pixel-pigment. Furthermore, Valentine’s DVDs 
are likely to be displayed on plasma televisions, desktop monitors and liquid crystal displays, 
which reveal yet more technological liquescent parallels with the abstract diagram of virtual 
vomit. Especially when we stick our fingers into them. 
11 At the time of writing, a teaser trailer posted on Valentine’s YouTube channel promotes 
the forthcoming release of Black Mass of the Nazi Sex Wizard (aka Vomit Gore 4), which is 
described as ‘the prequel to Lucifer Valentine’s vomit gore trilogy. In this demonic labyrinth 
we experience the satanic ritual which spawns endless incarnations of Angela Aberdeen, 
as she is doomed to live out her haunted existence of the eternal “lost girl”’, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=tSa3f2gsPn4 
12 Charlie Brooker’s Fifteen Million Merits (Black Mirror series 1 episode 2) satirizes how 
far today’s mainstream culture, with its endless palabum of singing and talent television 
shows epitomizes this logic, forcing contestants to exploit and literally whore themselves for 
corporate ratings and profit. If Brooker’s satirical work can be understood allegorically or 
intellectually diagnosing the present through the future tense offered by sci-fi and fantasy, 
Valentine’s ‘Vomit Gore Trilogy’ is more akin to a symptom-pathogen of its time, or an 
emergent minor expression that helps us diagnose the psychology of the era (through our 
guts).
13 Valentine originally eschews professional and corporate interference by serving as the 
financer, creator and distributor of his shoestring vomit gore films (which, as indicated, he 
originally sold directly to fans through his Kingdom of Hell webpage). 
14 Personal correspondence with author September 2015.
15 I thank William Brown for bringing up this point during a panel discussion at the 25th 
Annual Screen Studies conference at the University of Glasgow, Scotland June 2015 (see also 
Valpy 1828: 139).
16 It should be stated here that the films contain a melange of different fetishistic and 
psychosexual orientations and acts, which play out across different levels of fantasy 
and reality. Amongst images of sex and penetration with monsters, machines, animals and 
vomit, the torture-porn sequences contain real and simulated images of heterosexual and 
lesbian sex, as well as depictions of incest and child abuse. In interview when asked about 
his inspirations, it is interesting to note the amount of pornographic films Valentine offers. 
Consider for example this answer to a question about his influences:
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   I really liked the 70’s porn movies Taboo and Taboo 2, I love Max Hardcore porn because 
I like seeing those girls’ mascara run and the movie Man Behind the Sun; I also was quite 
influenced by lots of Brazilian scat movies, I don’t know the names of the directors of 
those scat movies but one of my favourites is called Shit Gang Monstrosity. I also really 
like watching bestiality movies like when women double penetrate themselves with live 
eels, you know, they put one into their pussy and one into their ass and it squirms around, 
people used to always send me those like from Denmark and elsewhere and I always 
liked them and sadly they often aren’t named or credit the directors but one was called 
Pig Barn Fuck Sunset and that was the first time I saw a pig’s cock darting in and out of its 
body trying to go into the women’s vagina; the woman had draped a potato sack over her 
back so the pigs hooves wouldn’t hurt her as it kinda grabbed her and fucked her from 
behind and I saw a close up of the pig’s cock and it was actually shaped like a pink, fleshy 
corkscrew.
(Valentine in Torres n.d)
17 In the wake of the real news reportage of the leaked Abu Ghraib images, the Pentagon held 
a closed-door slide show of the hundreds of photographs for members of Congress. McCoy 
notes how ‘Legislators emerged grim and shaken’, and ‘Senator Richard J. Durbin (Democrat, 
Illinois) said, “It felt like you were descending into one of the rings of hell, and sadly it was 
our creation”’ (McCoy 2012: 131). Here again, Valentine’s work appears symptomatological. 
18 Flynn and Salek note that in ‘the films made prior to 2001 the torturer was usually a fascist, 
a depraved outlaw, a rogue cop or serviceman, or a madman. Over the last decade the 
torturers have been counterterrorism agents, CIA or former CIA agents, and even Batman 
is one – when superheroes and agents sworn to uphold the Constitution are torturers, the 
ethical and professional rot is profound’ (2012: 12).
19 For Aston and Walliss, far from mindlessly reproducing the dominant logic, the form, 
content and iconographic detail of torture-porn films often subversively critique the society 
they emerge from. For them, in an era ‘dominated by war and terrorism, torture and religious 
fundamentalism and ever increasing powers and controls of governments over its people, 
the horror film in general, and the Saw films in particular, offer audiences opportunities 
to confront, understand and possibly work through the traumatic nature of a post-9/11 
America’ (2013).
20 This notion appears to be signalled by her name too, with ‘hope’ likewise being a future-
oriented feeling.
21 We might also note other co-incidental echoes emerging between the squid’s consumption 
practices: for modern research demonstrates that Vampyroteuthis’s primary diet is the 
masticated chum of other sea animals as it sinks to the ocean floor (Dickey 2012). 
22 The majority of Valentine’s ‘fangirls’ encountered online appear to be white women in their 
late teens and mid-twenties, who display a preference for a necrotic, Goth or Emo aesthetic. 
If ‘prosumer’ is understood as a neologistic portmanteau that folds together notions of 
digital era producer-consumers, the reversal or recalibration of the consumer-producer 
into a notion of a ‘conducer’ helps draw out pertinent notions of being led, but also of 
contributing in some way, and of adding to the project, and becoming a conduit of sorts. 
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23 Although Valentine boasts mixed gender fan groups, as we will discover, it is clear that a 
different form of relationship emerges between the director and his male and female fans. 
24 Incidentally, we might recall here that tattoos are essentially pigmented scars deposited 
inside the body, or embodied images that result from the penetration of ink below the 
epidermis into the fleshy tissue. This in turn perversely recalls and permanently reminds 
us of the cruel films’ mode of communicating through the skin and flesh. One might also 
sense here that the embodied pain associated with receiving a tattoo highlights a certain 
masochistic threshold bound up with this distributed trans-human erotic relationship with 
Valentine and the Vomit Gore project. Finally, we might also note that for Deleuze and 
Guattari, the use of tattoos in certain ‘primitive’ societies served to signal a re-organization 
of the body, or a hewing of the organs onto a collective socius or territorial BwO (2004a: 
158–159).
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A traveller, who has lost his way, should not ask, Where am I? What he really wants to 
know is, Where are the other places? 
A.N. Whitehead (1978: 170)
We initially set out to explore, survey, map and reconnoitre a diverse range of ethico-political audio-visual projects, drawn from different times and places, destined to screen in different milieus, upon diverse technologies, to unconnected audiences, 
about seemingly unrelated topics (mental illness and suicide, sensory-brain disorders and 
alternative modes of being and becoming, distorted drug films that promote metaphysical 
revolt and revolting pervert torture porn that turned our stomachs and world upside down). 
And yet in the end, with the gift of hindsight, we can now identify many common vectors and 
refrains working to link them together. Indeed, over four chapters this bricolage collection 
can now be seen as a dissolute range of projects that share in an ethico-political desire to 
do and think film differently, to help break life and thought free from where they were trapped, 
and bring something new to life. Or else make thought swerve, veer sideways, or go off course, 
and by so doing allow the modulating medium itself to become and unbecome.
For good or for bad, Unbecoming Cinema embraced highly personal, political and 
experimental works that appear to prehend wider evental happenings, and viscerally 
communicate these movements (of world) to their viewers, to unsettle them and make them 
think and feel differently. Looking back, our path across these four plateaus is best thought 
of as being like one of Deligny’s maps, for we not only traced out meandering lines of drift, 
but were also found repeatedly circling around similar issues, themes, affective forces and 
thoughts (albeit differently), that impulsively compelled us into repeating gestures and 
conceptual stereotypy. That is, if each chapter was topologically singular, we might now 
concede that we tropologically encountered consistent impulses and movements. Suicide 
and disgust, to take but two interleaving examples, appear prominently in chapters one, 
three and four. But they were also backgrounded (present but absent) issues within some 
of the narrative cinemas discussed en passant in chapter two. A far broader tangle of lines 
could also often be discovered zigzagging and criss-crossing boundaries as we moved. A 
swallowed or concealed theme intermingling disordered gastrointestinal ‘thinking’ and 
autisms, for example, subcortically and peristaltically surges beneath and between chapters 
two and four. In like manner, a range of other concepts, affects and percepts could be sensed 
silently assembling and intersecting here, bifurcating and growing undone again there, or 
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reappearing transformed in one space, only to disappear underground, and reappear again 
over yonder: like a proverbial rhizomatic taproot, a mole burrow, or the scribbled lines of 
a child-like drawing. Each restlessly communicating amongst themselves, while crossing 
boundaries, borders, lines, and threatening to run off elsewhere. Did Deligny not say that 
these lines ultimately ‘mean nothing’? That they are necessarily inscribed upon a body 
without organs (BwO), upon which everything is drawn and flees? Did El Topo not say the 
same about the revolutionary mole and his underground burrows? 
At this stage we must doubt there can be any satisfactory metaphor for us to fall back 
into for further drawing together the tangled web of evental movements and escape routes 
that we now recognize spreading out from each and every chapter, in so many directions, 
all at once. Instead, and in lieu of any shared meanings, we might instead try to make our 
spiralling return to what it is these machinic and ethical films were aiming to ‘do’. That is, 
the movements of world and sense of difference they imparted. For in the beginning we said 
that this book was inspired by moving encounters with ethical event films, which were not 
cinema as we typically knew it, and which worked to instil an ‘unsettling’ or ‘unbecoming’ 
in an attempt to call forth a new people and a new world. Over four chapters we certainly 
encountered disturbing political documentaries that thought differently about troubling 
social taboos, shocking artworks that got under our skin, agitated our nerves and made our 
bodies do things. We also put ourselves face to face with artworks that lit up the ‘normal’ 
from within, and allowed us to see it disrobed (of cliché or normalization) and cast afresh. 
After all is said and done, if these films were for us, and didn’t pass us by, they might just 
have helped us to think otherwise, or to understand ourselves and our locations better, or 
even just nudged us and modified our momentum. 
Beyond igniting events of thought (regarding viewers’ mind and body parallelism, their 
immanent enworldedness, the effect of sad passions and external actions upon their ability 
to live and act), the various films we have encountered throughout Unbecoming Cinema 
have undoubtedly helped us to perceive how human and art, art and world, can connect and 
conjugate us with the ethical movements of a wider evental assemblage. Hopefully, various 
chapters foregrounded how ethical film projects can be understood literally changing the 
minds, bodies and attitudes of those they encounter, whether by inspiring creativity and 
experimentation, forging the birth of new communities, sparking collective political actions, 
or instilling a desire to live differently or otherwise in those who become conscious with 
them. Which is to say, by allowing us to grasp adequate ideas that empower us to live and 
act, by increasing our knowledge of ourselves, our situation and of things. If so, we might 
also recognize the unsettling and unbecoming cinemas encountered here as event films, or 
immanent difference-engines that were the equal of life, and which helped make the everyday 
take flight. That is, ethical projects that should be understood doing cinema differently, in an 
attempt to leave us – and the world – slightly different in their wake. 
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UNSETTLING ENCOUNTERS WITH 
ETHICAL EVENT FILMS
UNBECOM
ING CINEM
A
Unbecoming Cinema explores the notion of cinema as a living, active agent, capable of 
unsettling and reconfiguring a person’s thoughts, senses and ethics. Film, according to 
David H. Fleming, is a dynamic force, arming audiences with the ability to see and make 
a difference in the world. Drawing heavily on Deleuze’s philosophical insights, as well as 
those of Guattari and Badiou, the book critically examines unsettling and taboo footage 
from suicide documentaries to art therapy films, from portrayals of mental health and autism 
to torture porn. In investigating the effect of film on the mind and body, Fleming’s shrewd 
analysis unites transgressive cinema with metaphysical concepts of the body and mind. 
David H. Fleming is assistant professor of film and media studies at the University of 
Nottingham, Ningbo, China.
Suicide. Autism. LSD. Vomit gore. You’d be forgiven for walking away from such a heady cocktail of potentially 
unbecoming topics, but you’d also be losing out. David H. Fleming may write – lucidly and intelligently – about films and 
film-makers whom many might find hard to stomach, but Unbecoming Cinema is nonetheless an essential enquiry into 
why such films get made, why some people do watch such films and – more importantly – what it is that such films do. 
For while many of the films that Fleming considers might be unbecoming of cinema in the eyes of various viewers, these 
films and film-makers are nonetheless pushing the boundaries of what it is that cinema can show and, by extension, 
what it is that cinema can make viewers think and feel – perhaps even changing how they think and feel. In this sense, 
unbecoming becomes a positive force, helping cinema to get over itself and become something exciting and new. 
At the forefront of film-philosophy and fizzing with ideas, Fleming guides us through this unbecoming cinema so that we 
might experience some (un)becomings of our own.
William Brown, University of Roehampton
In this exciting, intellectually intense and pleasantly mind-warping new book on cinematic ethics, David Fleming 
approaches films not as texts to be drily analysed, but as events to be encountered. What is at stake here is the 
shock which films are able to bring to our thought processes, their ability to shatter all that we may think we know is 
normal, so that we can look at the world afresh. This is an insightful work, philosophically informed but accessible and 
engaging, which rises up to meet key challenges of present times.
David Martin-Jones, University of Glasgow  
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